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SUMMARY 
 
The hypothesis of this work is that international human rights law and not 
international humanitarian law is the legal framework that applies to United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping operations in collapsed States where the peacekeepers do not 
become a party to an armed conflict. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis the work begins by examining what is meant by 
peacekeeping and charts the evolution of peacekeeping from its origins as a passive 
ad hoc activity to the modern highly complex operations capable of providing the 
foundations for the recreation of civil society. 
 
Chapter two of the work builds on the first chapter by analysing the UN’s theoretical 
approach to peacekeeping through its major reports. This chapter provides insight into 
the development of peacekeeping as a theoretical construct and then into a central tool 
in the UN’s attempt to implement the Charter.   
 
Chapters three and four analyse peacekeeping as practiced by the UN in operations 
conducted under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.  This analysis leads to the 
conclusion that as a matter of practice the UN and the State parties that have provided 
the troops to perform peacekeeping under UN control have acted in accordance with 
international human rights law and that as a result there is evidence of State practice 
to support an argument that as a matter of customary international law international 
human rights law applies as the framework for peacekeeping in collapsed States. 
 
With a clear grounding in the practice and theory of peacekeeping the work then 
examines the competing claims of international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law as the legal framework for peacekeeping operations.  Suggestions 
are made with regard to the triggers for international humanitarian law to apply and 
the conclusion is drawn that the vast majority of UN operations between 1949 and 
2003 were conducted beneath the threshold for the application of international 
humanitarian law. 
 
The final chapter of the work analyses the practical application of a human rights 
framework to peacekeeping and concludes that it provides a flexible and adaptive tool 
for the restoration of peace and the reconstruction of civil society.   
 
As a result of the analysis of UN peacekeeping theory, practice and the competing 
claims of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the work 
concludes that international human rights law provides the framework for UN 
peacekeeping in collapsed States and that international humanitarian law will only 
apply where peacekeepers cross the threshold into armed conflict. 
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MEMBER STATES OF THE UN 
 
Following is the list of the 191 Member States of the United Nations with dates on 
which they joined the Organization.1 
 
Member -- (Date of Admission) 
 
Afghanistan -- (19 Nov. 1946) 
Albania -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Algeria -- (8 Oct. 1962) 
Andorra -- (28 July 1993) 
Angola -- (1 Dec. 1976) 
Antigua and Barbuda -- (11 Nov. 1981) 
Argentina -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Armenia -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Australia -- (1 Nov. 1945) 
Austria-- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Azerbaijan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Bahamas -- (18 Sep. 1973) 
Bahrain -- (21 Sep. 1971) 
Bangladesh -- (17 Sep. 1974) 
Barbados -- (9 Dec. 1966) 
Belarus -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
On 19 September 1991, Byelorussia informed the 
United Nations that it had changed its name to 
Belarus.  
Belgium -- (27 Dec. 1945) 
Belize -- (25 Sep. 1981) 
Benin -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Bhutan -- (21 Sep. 1971) 
Bolivia -- (14 Nov. 1945) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -- (22 May 1992) 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an 
original Member of the United Nations, the Charter 
having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and 
ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission 
as new members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
                                                 
1 UN Press Release ORG/1360/Rev.1 (10 February 2004) 
Updated 24 February 2005 http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (6 Jun 2005). 
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admitted as a Member of the United Nations by 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 
May 1992.  
Botswana -- (17 Oct. 1966) 
Brazil -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Brunei Darussalam -- (21 Sep. 1984) 
Bulgaria -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Burkina Faso -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Burundi -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
Cambodia -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Cameroon -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Canada -- (9 Nov. 1945) 
Cape Verde -- (16 Sep. 1975) 
Central African Republic -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Chad -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Chile -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
China -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Colombia -- (5 Nov. 1945) 
Comoros -- (12 Nov. 1975) 
Congo (Republic of the) -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Costa Rica -- (2 Nov. 1945) 
Côte d'Ivoire -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Croatia -- (22 May 1992) 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an 
original Member of the United Nations, the Charter 
having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and 
ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission 
as new members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
The Republic of Croatia was admitted as a Member of 
the United Nations by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/46/238 of 22 May 1992.  
Cuba -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Cyprus -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Czech Republic -- (19 Jan. 1993) 
Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United 
Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 10 
December 1992, its Permanent Representative 
informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 
December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the 
  xiv
Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for 
membership in the United Nations. Following the 
receipt of its application, the Security Council, on 8 
January 1993, recommended to the General Assembly 
that the Czech Republic be admitted to United Nations 
membership. The Czech Republic was thus admitted 
on 19 January of that year as a Member State.  
Democratic People's Republic of Korea -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
Democratic Republic of the Congo -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Zaire joined the United Nations on 20 September 
1960. On 17 May 1997, its name was changed to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Denmark -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Djibouti -- (20 Sep. 1977) 
Dominica -- (18 Dec. 1978) 
Dominican Republic -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Ecuador -- (21 Dec. 1945) 
Egypt -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United 
Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a plebiscite 
on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was 
established by a union of Egypt and Syria and 
continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, 
Syria, having resumed its status as an independent 
State, resumed its separate membership in the United 
Nations.  On 2 September 1971, the United Arab 
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of 
Egypt. 
El Salvador -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Equatorial Guinea -- (12 Nov. 1968) 
Eritrea -- (28 May 1993) 
Estonia -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
Ethiopia -- (13 Nov. 1945) 
Fiji -- (13 Oct. 1970) 
Finland -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
France-- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Gabon -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Gambia -- (21 Sep. 1965) 
Georgia -- (31 July 1992) 
Germany -- (18 Sep. 1973) 
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic were admitted to membership in 
the United Nations on 18 September 1973.  Through 
the accession of the German Democratic Republic to 
  xv 
the Federal Republic of Germany, effective from 3 
October 1990, the two German States have united to 
form one sovereign State.  
Ghana -- (8 Mar. 1957) 
Greece -- (25 Oct. 1945) 
Grenada -- (17 Sep. 1974) 
Guatemala -- (21 Nov. 1945) 
Guinea -- (12 Dec. 1958) 
Guinea-Bissau -- (17 Sep. 1974) 
Guyana -- (20 Sep. 1966) 
Haiti -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Honduras -- (17 Dec. 1945) 
Hungary -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Iceland -- (19 Nov. 1946) 
India -- (30 Oct. 1945) 
Indonesia -- (28 Sep. 1950) 
By letter of 20 January 1965, Indonesia announced its 
decision to withdraw from the United Nations "at this 
stage and under the present circumstances". By 
telegram of 19 September 1966, it announced its 
decision "to resume full cooperation with the United 
Nations and to resume participation in its activities". 
On 28 September 1966, the General Assembly took 
note of this decision and the President invited 
representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the 
Assembly.  
Iran (Islamic Republic of) -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Iraq -- (21 Dec. 1945) 
Ireland -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Israel -- (11 May 1949) 
Italy -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Jamaica -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
Japan -- (18 Dec. 1956) 
Jordan -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Kazakhstan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Kenya -- (16 Dec. 1963) 
Kiribati -- (14 Sept. 1999) 
Kuwait -- (14 May 1963) 
Kyrgyzstan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Lao People's Democratic Republic -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Latvia -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
Lebanon -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Lesotho -- (17 Oct. 1966) 
Liberia -- (2 Nov. 1945) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Liechtenstein-- (18 Sep. 1990) 
Lithuania -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
  xvi
Luxembourg-- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Madagascar -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Malawi -- (1 Dec. 1964) 
Malaysia-- (17 Sep. 1957) 
The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations 
on 17 September 1957.  On 16 September 1963, its 
name was changed to Malaysia, following the 
admission to the new federation of Singapore, Sabah 
(North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became an 
independent State on 9 August 1965 and a Member of 
the United Nations on 21 September 1965.  
Maldives-- (21 Sep. 1965) 
Mali -- (28 Sep. 1960) 
Malta -- (1 Dec. 1964) 
Marshall Islands -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
Mauritania -- (27 Oct. 1961) 
Mauritius -- (24 Apr. 1968) 
Mexico -- (7 Nov. 1945) 
Micronesia (Federated States of) -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
Monaco -- (28 May 1993) 
Mongolia -- (27 Oct. 1961) 
Morocco -- (12 Nov. 1956) 
Mozambique -- (16 Sep. 1975) 
Myanmar -- (19 Apr. 1948) 
Namibia -- (23 Apr. 1990) 
Nauru -- (14 Sept. 1999) 
Nepal -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Netherlands -- (10 Dec. 1945) 
New Zealand -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Nicaragua -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Niger -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Nigeria -- (7 Oct. 1960) 
Norway -- (27 Nov. 1945) 
Oman -- (7 Oct. 1971) 
Pakistan -- (30 Sep. 1947) 
Palau -- (15 Dec. 1994) 
Panama -- (13 Nov. 1945) 
Papua New Guinea -- (10 Oct. 1975) 
Paraguay -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Peru -- (31 Oct. 1945) 
Philippines -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Poland -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Portugal -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Qatar -- (21 Sep. 1971) 
Republic of Korea -- (17 Sep. 1991) 
Republic of Moldova -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Romania -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Russian Federation -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
  xvii
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an 
original Member of the United Nations from 24 
October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, 
Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, 
informed the Secretary-General that the membership 
of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all 
other United Nations organs was being continued by 
the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 
member countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.  
Rwanda -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
Saint Kitts and Nevis -- (23 Sep. 1983) 
Saint Lucia -- (18 Sep. 1979) 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -- (16 Sep. 1980) 
Samoa -- (15 Dec. 1976) 
San Marino -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Sao Tome and Principe -- (16 Sep. 1975) 
Saudi Arabia -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Senegal -- (28 Sep. 1960) 
Serbia and Montenegro -- (1 Nov. 2000) 
On 4 February 2003, following the adoption and 
promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia 
and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and 
Montenegro.  
 
The Socialist “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an 
original Member of the United Nations, the Charter 
having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and 
ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission 
as new Members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia was admitted as a Member of the 
United Nations by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000. 
Seychelles -- (21 Sep. 1976) 
Sierra Leone -- (27 Sep. 1961) 
Singapore -- (21 Sep. 1965) 
Slovakia -- (19 Jan. 1993) 
Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United 
Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter dated 10 
December 1992, its Permanent Representative 
  xviii
informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 
December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for 
membership in the United Nations. Following the 
receipt of its application, the Security Council, on 8 
January 1993, recommended to the General Assembly 
that the Slovak Republic be admitted to United 
Nations membership. The Slovak Republic was thus 
admitted on 19 January of that year as a Member 
State. 
Slovenia -- (22 May 1992) 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an 
original Member of the United Nations, the Charter 
having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and 
ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission 
as new members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 
The Republic of Slovenia was admitted as a Member 
of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/46/236 of 22 May 1992.  
Solomon Islands -- (19 Sep. 1978) 
Somalia -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
South Africa -- (7 Nov. 1945) 
Spain -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Sri Lanka -- (14 Dec. 1955) 
Sudan -- (12 Nov. 1956) 
Suriname -- (4 Dec. 1975) 
Swaziland -- (24 Sep. 1968) 
Sweden -- (19 Nov. 1946) 
Switzerland -- (10 Sep. 2002) 
Syrian Arab Republic -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United 
Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a plebiscite 
on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was 
established by a union of Egypt and Syria and 
continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, 
Syria, having resumed its status as an independent 
State, resumed its separate membership in the United 
Nations.  
  xix
Tajikistan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Thailand -- (16 Dec. 1946) 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -- (8 Apr. 1993) 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an 
original Member of the United Nations, the Charter 
having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and 
ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission 
as new members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 
By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the 
General Assembly decided to admit as a Member of 
the United Nations the State being provisionally 
referred to for all purposes within the United Nations 
as "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" 
pending settlement of the difference that had arisen 
over its name.  
Timor-Leste -- (27 Sep. 2002) 
Togo -- (20 Sep. 1960) 
Tonga -- (14 Sep. 1999) 
Trinidad and Tobago -- (18 Sep. 1962) 
Tunisia -- (12 Nov. 1956) 
Turkey -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Turkmenistan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Tuvalu -- (5 Sept. 2000) 
Uganda -- (25 Oct. 1962) 
Ukraine-- (24 Oct. 1945) 
United Arab Emirates -- (9 Dec. 1971) 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-- (24 Oct. 1945) 
United Republic of Tanzania -- (14 Dec. 1961) 
Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 
14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a Member from 
16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 
April 1964 of Articles of Union between Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar continued as a single Member, changing its 
name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 
November 1964.  
United States of America -- (24 Oct. 1945) 
Uruguay -- (18 Dec. 1945) 
Uzbekistan -- (2 Mar. 1992) 
Vanuatu -- (15 Sep. 1981) 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -- (15 Nov. 1945)  
  xx 
Viet Nam -- (20 Sep. 1977) 
Yemen -- (30 Sep. 1947) 
Yemen was admitted to membership in the United 
Nations on 30 September 1947 and Democratic 
Yemen on 14 December 1967. On 22 May 1990, the 
two countries merged and have since been represented 
as one Member with the name "Yemen".  
Zambia -- (1 Dec. 1964) 
Zimbabwe -- (25 Aug. 1980)  
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
In 1994 the torture and death of a Somali youth by Canadian peacekeepers tarnished 
the reputation of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and resulted in the disbandment 
of a Canadian airborne unit.  The subsequent inquiry by the Canadian government1 
found that one of the causes of the incident was the frustration felt by the soldiers at 
having no means of dealing with criminal activity by the local population.  Although 
the Canadian example was by far the worst it was:  
 
“not an uncommon practice of administering some form of physical punishment to 
those caught stealing or breaching perimeters as a means of discouraging further 
attempts and seeing some ‘justice’ done.”2 
 
Michael Kelly was an Australian Army legal officer serving in Somalia with the 
Australian contingent that formed part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from 8 
January to 3 May 1993 and the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM) 
from 4 to 20 May 1993.  He realised that a legal framework must be clearly identified 
and understood by the peacekeepers on the ground so as to provide certainty to the 
peacekeeping force and avoid the perceived need to attack the local population; the 
very people the operation was design to protect and support.  Kelly found that 
although there was limited commentary on the point there was some support in the 
body of academic literature relating to peacekeeping and international humanitarian 
law for the law of occupation to be applied.3   Kelly therefore turned to international 
                                                 
1 Canadian Government.  Report of the Somali Commission of Inquiry. (2 July 1997) 
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm. (5 Oct 2005).  
2 Kelly M. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations. (1999) at 29. 
3 For example Roberts A. “What is Military Occupation” 55 British Yearbook of International Law 257 
(1984) who stated at 250 “One might hazard as a fair rule of thumb that every time the forces of a 
country are in control of foreign territory, and find themselves face to face with the inhabitants, some 
or all of the provisions on the law of occupation are applicable.”  This point was also taken by Eyal 
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humanitarian law and in particular the law of occupation to provide the legal 
framework.  When he returned from Somalia he augmented the literature by 
publishing Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations.4 
 
The basis of the application of humanitarian law as a legal framework in 
peacekeeping flows from common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions which inter 
alia provides for application of the Conventions in: 
 
 “cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” 
 
Kelly looked at the history of the law of occupation and its development over time 
and, in his view, embodiment into the Geneva Conventions in the form of common 
Article 2.  The result for Kelly of applying the law of occupation was that it brought 
in the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the powers and 
responsibilities set out therein for the treatment of civilians wherever a military force 
had de facto control over a population or territory.  This includes certain situations 
where the UN conducts peacekeeping operations.5 
 
While this approach no doubt assisted in the relative success of the Australian 
contribution to the operations in Somalia, it is the position of this work that as a 
matter of law, international humanitarian law and in particular, the law of occupation, 
does not apply in peacekeeping operations simply because the executive arm of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Benvenisti in his book The International Law of Occupation (2005) but Benvenisti appears to do this 
from the pragmatic rather than the legal point of view that only the law of occupation can provide the 
coverage. That assertion is disputed in this work. 
4 Above n 2. 
5 Id at 172-178. 
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host government has failed or the State has collapsed so that a UN force or 
administration is in de facto control.  This is not due to any inability of the UN to be a  
party to the Conventions as suggested by some commentators,6 indeed in this work it 
is argued that as a subject of international law the UN is subject to customary 
international law and that the Conventions form part of this body of law.  Rather it is 
the position of this work that international humanitarian law does not apply until and 
unless the threshold into armed conflict has been crossed and that this threshold is 
armed conflict or in the event of an occupation by a hostile force. 
 
This work is not intended as a comprehensive critical analysis of Michael Kelly’s 
work.  This work is aimed at establishing the de jure law in UN peacekeeping 
operations in collapsed States.   
 
In this work it is argued that the role and nature of the UN, when it engages in 
peacekeeping operations, is such as to clearly distinguish it from a force in occupation 
as intended by common Article 2.  Certainly, there is no dispute that in the event that 
a UN force, such as the Congo operation of 1960-3 or UN authorised force, such as 
the first Gulf War in 1991, engages in armed conflict, then international humanitarian 
law, including the law of occupation applies.  However, in the vast majority of UN led 
operations between 1949 and 2003 the UN peacekeeping force has not attracted the 
application of international humanitarian law because it has not been engaged in 
armed conflict or an occupation of the nature envisaged in common Article 2 of the 
Conventions.   Further, except for the Australians in Somalia, neither any State nor 
the UN has accepted that the law of occupation applies to UN peacekeeping. 
                                                 
6 Shraga D. Zacklin R. “The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-
Keeping Operations: Conceptual, Legal and Practical Issues.” In ICRC Symposium on Humanitarian 
Action and Peace-Keeping Operations Report. (1994) at 43. 
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The question may be posed: what if international humanitarian law does not apply?  
After all, as argued by Kelly, international humanitarian law is capable of providing a 
legal framework for peacekeepers to operate in and can provide a basic working 
structure until the UN force is removed.  In Somalia, relying on the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the Australian contingent re-established, at least on a temporary basis, 
the domestic court system that tried, convicted and executed a Somali warlord, 
Gutaale. 7   
 
There are a number of problems with this approach.  Firstly, in the view of the author, 
it is not sufficient to simply accept an approach that is expedient.  It is incumbent 
upon lawyers to determine what the law is, not what the most convenient law might 
be.  Secondly, from a practical perspective, the law of occupation fails to provide a 
lasting solution for peace. If the UN force was in occupation then once the 
peacekeeping force left and the occupation was at an end the provisions would cease 
to apply and the legal system would have to be rebuilt from scratch.  Thirdly, there are 
political realities surrounding the acceptance by the international community of a 
legal position whereby the UN is in occupation of sovereign territory.8  Finally, there 
are the very real risks to peacekeepers of international humanitarian law applying 
since, if the Fourth Geneva Convention applies then so do all the other conventions. 
Questions could well arise as to whether the peacekeepers were legitimate targets and 
combatants.  This would seriously undermine the peacekeeping force’s ability to 
achieve peaceful resolution.   
 
                                                 
7 Above n 2 at 54-61. 
8 Even Kelly concedes that this is a difficulty with his approach; above n 2 at 179-181. 
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The advantage the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention would have is that it 
gives the occupying authority the power to re-establish, at least to some extent, 
security, law and order and the judicial processes of the State.  It is axiomatic that 
these are essential ingredients for peace so that understanding which legal framework 
applies goes to the very heart of peacekeeping in situations where the domestic State 
is unable to carry out functions that are at the core of civil society.9  If Kelly is wrong, 
and that is the position of this work, then what legal framework does apply to UN 
peacekeeping in collapsed States?  The answer provided by this work is that 
international human rights law provides the framework.   
 
This branch of international law does not have the history associated with 
international humanitarian law.  International human rights law is a strand of 
international law developed in the twentieth century and in particular it has been 
developed significantly over the last 50 years by the international community.  Unlike 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law applies in times both 
of peace and armed conflict.10  During armed conflict international human rights law 
acts in mutual support of international humanitarian law, they are not mutually 
exclusive but act together to provide a holistic framework of protection.11  
 
This work argues for an international human rights law framework in collapsed State 
peacekeeping based on the following:  The mandate imposes certain obligations on 
the peacekeepers either expressly or by necessary implication.  One of these 
                                                 
9 On the rule of law being at the core of civil society see for example Navari K “Hobbes, the State of 
Nature and the Laws of Nature” and Williams H. Booth K. “Kant: Theorist beyond Limits” in Clark I. 
Neumann I.B. (eds) Classical Theories of International Relations. (1999) at 21 and 75-76. 
10 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinon of 8 July 1996 (Nuclear 
Weapons Case). ICJ Advisory Opinion at 25.   
11 Human Rights Committee. General Comment No.31 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. (26 May 2004). 
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obligations is to re-establish law and order and provide security for the operation to 
achieve its mission.  There are also international law obligations placed on the 
contributing States.  As there are no Article 43 agreements set up under the UN 
Charter the troops remain liable to discharge the obligations of the contributing State.  
International human rights law forms part of the obligation either as a result of treaty 
law or customary international law.   In this work particular emphasis is placed on the 
obligations imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights12 
(ICCPR).  It is the synthesis of the obligation under the mandate and obligations 
under international human rights law that provides the framework for collapsed State 
peacekeeping. This synthesis is a powerful tool to re-establish the rule of law.  
 
This proposition can be demonstrated using the example of a State that is a party to 
the ICCPR. The obligation and authority to re-establish law and order comes from the 
mandate.  The obligation to apply international human rights law and specifically the 
ICCPR comes from the Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) obligations under 
international law to apply the ICCPR where it has jurisdiction over territory;13 they 
will have such jurisdiction in a collapsed State over the sector allocated to them.  For 
States not a party to the covenant and the UN, those parts of the ICCPR and other 
international human rights covenants that form part of customary law must be applied.   
 
In order to fulfil their obligations under international human rights law the 
peacekeepers will need to pass ordinances or rely on the extant law of the domestic 
State.  The power to pass ordinances flows from the mandate as an implied power.14  
                                                 
12 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The doctrine of implied powers flows from the Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 149. 
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It is argued in this work that it may also flow as an implied power from the obligation 
to apply the human rights covenants such as the ICCPR.   The articles of the ICCPR 
provide the framework for the reconstruction of law and order and provide the basis 
for peace building and the recreation of the State.  Contained within the ICCPR are 
provisions that are capable of forming the foundations of laws dealing with arrest, 
detention and the treatment of detained persons.  The provisions put in place on the 
basis of the ICCPR can then be adopted or adapted as the State is reconstructed and 
can form the basis of constitutional government. 
 
The aim of this work is to set out the argument regarding which law applies to UN 
peacekeeping in collapsed States and to test the hypothesis that human rights law and 
not humanitarian law provides the legal framework.  The way in which this will be 
done is by looking at different aspects of peacekeeping and the applicable law in 
seven chapters. 
 
Chapter one of this work is the foundation chapter and looks generally at the practice 
of peacekeeping, its legal foundation and the terms used to define it. The chapter asks 
what is peacekeeping?  In answering this question the chapter uses as its start point 
the legal basis for peacekeeping found in the powers implied from Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter.  It outlines the growth of peacekeeping out of Chapter VI and the 
incremental development of peacekeeping.  Also examined in this chapter is the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly that aimed to fill any void 
created by the Cold War deadlock in the Security Council.  This important Resolution 
demonstrated the central role that peacekeeping had come to play in the activities of 
the UN. 
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Chapter one goes on to examine the legal basis of peacekeeping under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.  This Chapter of the Charter is more explicit in the ability of the 
Security Council to use military force and it is on the basis of Chapter VII that 
peacekeepers have found themselves in the position of a force authorised to use the 
force of arms to achieve its mission.   
 
Having outlined the legal basis of peacekeeping the chapter looks at the evolution of 
peacekeeping from small lightly armed observer missions to the forces capable of 
defending populations from attack and forming the basis of the administration of a 
State or territory.  Out of this logically flows an examination of the development of 
the terms used to describe peacekeeping activities and terms such as “traditional 
peacekeeping,” “peace making,” “peace enforcement,” wider peacekeeping and peace 
building are defined.  The chapter then looks briefly at peacekeeping in support of 
humanitarian missions and the interaction between Non Governmental Organisations 
and UN peacekeeping operations. 
 
The chapter concludes by noting the evolution of peacekeeping from a relatively 
simple, low key placement of a lightly armed force on the ground to observe a process 
or the relations between States across a border to a highly complex operation capable 
of supporting a State.  In performing these complex operations the UN needs to 
ensure that peacekeeping operations do not lose legitimacy by stepping outside the 
boundaries of the law.   The purpose of this work is to contribute to the legal 
legitimacy of UN peacekeeping by providing legal certainty to peacekeeping 
operations in collapsed States. 
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Chapter two focuses on what the UN sees as the theory of peacekeeping through its 
own reports and significant reports presented to it.  This is important as it leads to an 
insight into the UN’s understanding of what peacekeeping is about and how it fits 
within the Charter, from where peacekeeping mandates obtain their legal authority 
and legitimacy.  The start point for this is the first report of the UN in 1992 that 
directly addressed the issue of peacekeeping, An Agenda for Peace by Secretary-
General Boutros-Boutros Ghali.   
 
In An Agenda for Peace the Secretary-General laid out his vision for a robust and 
effective form of peacekeeping that was to be the panacea for many of the trouble 
spots around the globe.  At the time the Secretary-General had high hopes that the end 
of the Cold War would lead to greater agreement in the Security Council.  This 
proved not to be the case and many of the reforms proposed in An Agenda for Peace 
proved to be impossible in the political climate of the Security Council.   
 
The Australian response to An Agenda for Peace was set out in Cooperating for 
Peace.  It developed many of the concepts that were introduced in outline form by An 
Agenda for Peace and put forward a response to the introduction of many of the 
measures advocated. These are set out and analysed in chapter two of this work.  Its 
contribution to the debate helped to strengthen the vision set out by the Secretary-
General towards a well planned and legitimate form of robust peacekeeping, equipped 
with the mandate and arms to complete its mission. 
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In 1995 the Secretary-General issued another report on peacekeeping titled 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. This report was not as positive as the first report 
and highlighted the failures of the Security Council to implement the 
recommendations put forward in An Agenda for Peace.  The possibilities for 
peacekeeping are more limited in the Supplement and the express criticisms of the 
Security Council set out in the report may well have been a factor in the failure of the 
Security Council to re-elect Boutros Ghali to a second term of office.15 
 
By 2000 the UN realised that peacekeeping operations were not functioning as they 
should and commissioned a report from a panel of experts headed by Ambassador 
Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria, who gave his name to the report.  The panel made 60 
recommendations covering the field of peacekeeping operations.  Specific 
recommendations related to doctrine, strategy, planning, decision-making, 
headquarter organisation staffing levels, logistics, rapid deployment and public 
information. While the report made recommendations that were necessary to the 
efficient and effective running of UN peacekeeping operations many of the 
recommendations were ignored in practice due to the politics of international 
relations.16 
 
The failure to implement the practical requirements for peacekeeping articulated in An 
Agenda for Peace was highlighted by a UK report in 2002 An Agenda for Peace Ten 
Years On.  However the report was positive to the extent that while it acknowledged 
that peacekeeping had passed through some tough times it was hopeful that there 
                                                 
15 Shawcross, W. Deliver us From Evil ( 2000) at 204-206. 
16 Sir Jeremy Greenstock in International Peace Academy. Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional 
Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations. (Feb – Mar 2001) at  
http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublRepoReseBrahimi_body.htm. (5 Oct 
2005) 
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would be full implementation of the Brahimi recommendations and the emergence of 
genuine support for peacekeeping operations by the Security Council. 
 
The Responsibility to Protect was a report primarily aimed at the issue of 
humanitarian intervention that by necessity included robust peacekeeping operations.  
It was drafted in response to a question posed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan who 
asked: 
 
“…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” 
 
The international community was slow to react to the Secretary-General’s appeal so 
the Canadian government took the initiative.  The Responsibility to Protect report 
aimed to bring the debate to a level of agreement between the parties.17 
 
The Responsibility to Protect represented a shift in the thinking of the basis for 
international intervention.  Although it put the primary responsibility to protect those 
living under its sovereignty on the State concerned it also placed an obligation on the 
community of nations to act where the domestic State was unable or unwilling to do 
so.  This represented a major shift in the rationale that could underpin the deployment 
of a peacekeeping operation. 
 
                                                 
17 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The responsibility to Protect: 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. International 
Development Research Centre, Ottowa, Canada. (December 2001). 
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The final report discussed in this work is 2005 report by Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan In Larger Freedom.  In this report the Secretary-General aimed at 
recommending structural changes to the Security Council and refocusing on the 
priorities set out in the report.  As such it had broader application than just to 
peacekeeping.  With regard to peacekeeping the report did not advocate for 
implementation of Article 43, the UN standing force.  Instead it advocated the setting 
up of regional rapid reaction forces that could deal quickly and efficiently with 
situations that threatened international peace and security.  Of particular note for this 
work, In Larger Freedom recommended the setting up of a permanent office within 
the UN which would inter alia be responsible for making early efforts to establish the 
necessary institutions to rebuild the State, including the administration of justice.  
This work provides the legal basis upon which this aspect could be fulfilled. 
 
The reports of the UN set out in chapter two of this work provide the context in which 
peacekeeping operations were conducted and the vision that was behind their creation.  
In the next chapters the operations established by the UN under Chapters VI and VII 
of the UN Charter are examined to see what as a matter of practice the UN and 
contributing States have done in terms of legal framework in peacekeeping 
operations.  The chapters on Chapters VI and VII peacekeeping operations provide 
the basis for an argument concerning State practice with regard to the law applied in 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Chapter three of this work examines the Chapter VI operations and analyses the 
operations that have been conducted in terms of the legal framework applied by the 
peacekeepers in each case.  This analysis links in with the evolution of peacekeeping 
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set out in chapter one as over time the operations can be seen to become more 
complex in form while retaining essential characteristics required for Chapter VI 
operations.    From this analysis principles of Chapter VI peacekeeping are identified 
and set out as consent of the parties, impartiality as between the parties and the use of 
force strictly limited to self defence.   
 
Chapter three then looks at the “Trusteeship” model operations that have been 
conducted by the UN in West Irian, Namibia and Cambodia.  The legal Charter basis 
for these operations is analysed and the key deduction is made that in collapsed State 
peacekeeping under Chapter VI the opinio juris or State practice is for international 
human rights law to provide the legal framework and not the law of occupation. 
 
Chapter four examines Chapter VII peacekeeping operations.  It divides Chapter VII 
peacekeeping into three distinct types of operation.  The first type are those that 
closely resemble Chapter VI peacekeeping with the elements of consent of the parties, 
impartiality and the use of force only in self defence.  The second are those operations 
that run concurrently with an operation conducted by a Member State or regional 
organisation. The final type are those operations that could be termed more robust 
operations in that they are conducted without consent, impartiality or permit the use of 
force beyond self defence. 
 
As a result of its anomalous position in the peacekeeping continuum, chapter four 
analyses the UN operation in the Congo between 1960 and 1964.  This operation is set 
apart from all other UN peacekeeping as the UN became engaged as combatants with 
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rebel separatists and as a result applied the laws of armed conflict to at least part of 
the operation. 
 
Chapter four of this work then turns to the operation in Somalia that led Kelly to form 
his opinion that the law of occupation applies to peacekeeping in collapsed States.  In 
this section the operation in Somalia is set out in order to provide a factual basis upon 
which to directly challenge Kelly’s thesis in chapter six of the work. 
 
Chapter four then goes on to examine the peacekeeping operations and 
administrations in Kosovo and East Timor.  The legal basis for these operations is 
analysed with a finding that the authority for the operation was founded on the 
mandate with the legal framework being a blend of the domestic law of the State and 
international human rights law. 
 
As with chapter three of this work, the conclusion drawn with regard to the legal 
framework applied to Chapter VII operations in collapsed States is that as a matter of 
State practice as contingents of the UN force and pillars of the administration, the 
legal framework is international human rights law, not the law of occupation. 
 
As identified above, the competing views set out in this work are whether 
international humanitarian law or international human rights law provides the legal 
framework for UN peacekeeping in collapsed States.   In chapter five of the work 
international humanitarian law is examined in order to establish exactly what it is. The 
chapter examines the genesis and growth of international humanitarian law, 
highlighting the global nature of its development, in order to provide an 
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understanding of its purpose and limits.  The sources of international humanitarian 
law, the basic principles underpinning it and the specific conventions that form its 
substance are analysed for suitability in peacekeeping. 
 
This is achieved by examining the sources of international humanitarian law and 
discussing customary international law.  The applicability of these to peacekeeping is 
examined.  The chapter then goes on to look at the western and non western 
foundations of international humanitarian law and concludes that the wide acceptance 
of international humanitarian law flows from the common foundation of its principles 
across all major societies.    
 
The chapter then goes on to analyse the modern principles of international 
humanitarian law and the codification of those principles into the modern 
international humanitarian law conventions.  The chapter finishes with an 
examination of the enforcement of international humanitarian law. 
 
The conclusion drawn in chapter five is that international humanitarian law has 
developed over time on a global basis and has become a refined system of regulation 
of armed conflict.  It does not however regulate activities that fall outside the hostile 
or belligerent activities of combatants.  Peacekeeping that falls short of armed conflict 
does not lend itself to regulation by a highly developed system of law designed to 
regulate and protect in situations of armed conflict.  Even under the laws of armed 
conflict offences that are not related to the conflict have been dealt with under civil 
domestic legislation and not under legislation drafted to fulfil international 
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humanitarian law obligations or the international courts and tribunals set up to 
prosecute breaches of international humanitarian law. 
 
As a result of the conclusion drawn in chapter five that international humanitarian law 
does not apply outside armed conflict, chapter six seeks to determine where the limits 
of international humanitarian law lie.  The chapter examines the treatment of 
individual rights under international humanitarian law to demonstrate the importance 
of the accurate assessment of which law applies.   
 
Chapter six then moves to examine situations in which peacekeepers may find that 
they must apply international humanitarian law.  An analysis is made of the extant 
definitions of armed conflict and those suggested in the literature.  It is demonstrated 
in this section that there are occasions when the extant definitions of armed conflict 
are not helpful in accurately determining which law applies.  The next section of the 
chapter therefore attempts to set out more precise definitions of armed conflict, 
international and internal, so that peacekeepers can have more certainty in 
determining which law applies as the legal framework in an operation. 
 
The next section of the chapter sets out how the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law 18and the 
argument put forward by Michael Kelly have muddied the waters with regard to the 
accurate determination of which law to apply in collapsed State peacekeeping.  The 
section argues that the Bulletin was intended to act only as a guideline in situations of 
self defence by UN troops that fell short of actual armed conflict and not as an 
                                                 
18 ST/SGB/1999/13 (6 August 1999). 
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indication that international humanitarian law applied to situations where the UN 
troops were required to use force only in a policing role. 
 
The argument against Michael Kelly’s thesis that international humanitarian law 
applies to collapsed State peacekeeping is directly challenged and the flaws in this 
argument are explored in this section of the chapter.   
 
The conclusion reached in chapter six of this work is that the key to determination of 
which legal framework applies lies in determining when the threshold has been 
crossed into armed conflict.  If, the threshold has not been crossed international 
humanitarian law will not apply and to attempt to stretch it to cover collapsed State 
peacekeeping is not only misconceived, as a matter of law it is also dangerous for 
peacekeepers and unhelpful in providing a foundation for reconstruction and long 
term peace and security. 
 
The concluding chapter in this work is chapter seven.  Having established in chapter 
six that the argument that international humanitarian law provides the legal 
framework in collapsed State peacekeeping is flawed, this chapter sets out the 
argument for the application of international human rights law.  The chapter charts the 
development of international human rights from the UN Charter itself through the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the conventions, covenants and UN 
Resolutions flowing from it.  Chapter seven then examines customary international 
human rights law and establishes that there are fundamental human rights that 
peacekeepers are obliged to protect regardless of whether their sending State has 
become a party to specific international human rights treaties.  
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Chapter seven then explores the extent that implied powers are available to 
peacekeepers to assist in fulfilling the obligations created under international human 
rights law.  The issue of the enforcement of international human rights law is 
examined in this context.  Having established the obligation owed by peacekeepers to 
international human rights law the chapter then proposes a solution to the problem of 
enforcing international human rights law.  This is through the use of a military justice 
system.  The advantage of this system is that it can be placed on the ground 
immediately.  It can be used to train individuals who will form part of the domestic 
legal system where such systems have collapsed beyond repair.  The point is made in 
this part that only those military systems that comply with international human rights 
requirements can be deployed by the UN to fulfil these roles.  Although many States 
may offer their justice systems for deployment the UN will be required to ensure that 
only those systems that fully comply with human rights norms are deployed. If this is 
not done then the system will lose legitimacy and defeat the object of its deployment.   
 
The chapter concludes by distinguishing UN peacekeeping and its use of a 
Trusteeship model of administration, under which the UN provides the functions of 
the domestic State, from sovereignty.  Here the point is made that in cases of 
peacekeeping in a collapsed State situation the UN administers the State on behalf of 
the people of the State in whom sovereignty is vested. 
 
This work concludes by arguing that peacekeeping in collapsed States is as a matter of 
fact a very different situation from an occupation in violation of the sovereign State.  
Where the force is not involved in armed conflict international humanitarian law does 
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not apply.  State practice as well as a proper construction of international law supports 
this argument International human rights law has developed so as to negate the 
requirement to stretch international humanitarian law beyond its proper boundaries; 
by utilizing the military justice system a rapidly deployable justice system can ensure 
that Member States meet their international human rights obligations when deployed 
as part of a UN peacekeeping force in a collapsed State.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
What is Peacekeeping? 
 
Introduction 
 
“Our aims must be: 
 
- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could  
produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger  
before violence results; 
 
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues  
that have led to conflict; 
 
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where  
fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by  
the peacemakers; 
 
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts:  
rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and  
strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at  
war; 
 
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic  
despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an  
increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples,  
and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis  
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to the work of this Organisation.”1 
 
By the time Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wrote these words in his “Agenda for Peace” 
peacekeeping was an established part of the UN’s arsenal in attempting to realise the vision for 
world peace set out in the Charter. But what is peacekeeping and how did it come to hold such a 
prominent place in the activities of the UN? 
 
What is peacekeeping?  
 
In the past, truce monitoring has been the traditional function of UN peacekeeping operations.  But 
recently, with the changing nature of conflicts and the surge of intra-state confrontations, the 
functions of peacekeeping operations have become much more complex and comprehensive, 
encompassing conflict prevention, peacemaking, post conflict peace-building and assistance to the 
activities of international tribunals in bringing war criminals to justice.2 
 
“Peacekeeping” is a term that imparts virtually no information about what type of operation is 
taking place. Yet how many times would the reader of a national newspaper or television news 
viewer read or hear the word and believe instantly that he or she knew exactly what the article was 
about?  In common parlance the term implies that an operation short of armed conflict is taking 
place, although not necessarily that the operation excludes armed conflict, as many peacekeepers 
have discovered.  For most it probably conjures up the image of soldiers in their instantly 
recognisable blue helmets.  The blue helmet is an evocative symbol.  Many authors, and the UN 
itself, have relied upon it to set the scene for books and articles about UN peacekeeping activities.      
                                                 
1 Boutros Boutros_Ghali An Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. A/47/277 
S/2411 17 June 1992: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 June 1992. ( Agenda for Peace. (1992)) UN publications at paragraph 15. 
2 Han Seung-soo  ‘The Chronicle Interview: The Peaceful Resolution of Crises’ (June 2001) 38 UN Chronicle  at 0251-
7329. 
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In 1990 the UN defined peacekeeping; 
 
… as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the 
United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.  
These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation.  While they involve the 
use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them 
with the ‘enforcement action’ of the United Nations.3 
 
Despite what may have been an authoritative definition in its time, peacekeeping has come to 
encompass many types of activity, both military and civilian, including the use of military force to 
attain peace.  With each post Cold War operation the potential categories of peacekeeping seem to 
increase in diversity and complexity.  In his book Blue Helmets,4 John Hillen noted that UN 
military operations are generally referred to as “peacekeeping” regardless of which of the 
multiplicity of peace operation categories that have developed they fall into.  Hillen himself 
identifies three broad categories of operation: these being observer missions, traditional 
peacekeeping, or the later and more complex operations also referred to as second generation 
peacekeeping missions.5 All of these terms appear frequently in the literature with observer 
missions and traditional peacekeeping being particular favourites.  Regardless of the frequency of 
their use even these terms are not always used with the same meaning and so do not assist in 
reaching an understanding of peacekeeping or its purpose.   
 
                                                 
3 United Nations The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (2nd ed, 1990) at 4. 
4 Hillen, J. Blue Helmets. The Strategy of UN Military Operations. (1998). 
5Id at 79:  These are Hillen’s classifications, there are very many more nomenclatures for these operations.  
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A number of commentators6 attribute the rise of peacekeeping to the deadlock between the 
permanent members of the Security Council arising out of the Cold War, although, in a spirit of 
perversity the number and complexity of peacekeeping operations have increased exponentially 
since the end of the Cold War.   In the early days of peacekeeping military forces were sent in to a 
State as an act as much of display as any attempt to make an effective contribution to keeping the 
peace.  Over time however peacekeeping operations have benefited from the shift in the world 
political structure and have as a result become arguably both more complex and effective. 
 
Of increasing importance in peacekeeping is the issue of human suffering. The UN intervention in 
Somalia represented the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate option.7 In the 
Balkans enforcement measures were also implemented on the basis of averting human suffering. 
While justification for humanitarian intervention is not the focus of this work, it must be 
acknowledged as an increasingly common cause for the deployment of peacekeepers in the post 
Cold War era and as a result will be returned to later in this chapter.  Peacekeepers must respond to 
the requirement to integrate humanitarian assistance into the more traditional military issues facing 
peacekeeping operations.  The military is not expected to perform this humanitarian role alone.  
The increasing role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in peacekeeping makes it difficult 
to define any form of modern peacekeeping operation without acknowledging the inevitable 
presence of such organisations.   Many of these organisations see the military merely as security 
providers not as aid givers, with the NGO role as the real focus of the operation. 
 
                                                 
6 Eckert, A.E “United Nations Peacekeepers in Collapsed States”. Journal of International Law and Practice. (Summer 
1996)  at 275: Bialke, J.P. “United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of 
Armed Conflict”  Air Force Law Review 50.1 (1996) at 10. 
7 Kelly, M Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework” 
(1999) at 14: International Development Research Centre “The Responsibility to Protect Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (2001). 
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Through a combination of the rise in humanitarian focused operations and the resulting presence of 
NGO there are few military commanders who would contemplate a peacekeeping operation without 
dedicated civil affairs planning.8   The independence of NGOs can be a major obstacle in 
peacekeeping operations and if planning does not take into account the need to establish liaison and 
of the fact that NGOs will not always operate in accordance with military wishes, the operation is 
doomed to failure.  NGOs are often distrusting of military organisations, even those under the 
auspices of the UN.  There is also the potential for conflict between NGOs that have contradictory 
goals and objectives or that are competing for the same resources.9 
 
The UN has recognised the need to coordinate humanitarian activity.  In East Timor for example 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs established a civil-military cooperation 
component within the office to coordinate use of resources between the NGOs and to ensure 
military resources were used in direct support of humanitarian assistance operations.10  
 
Arguably the ability of peacekeeping to be so flexible and adaptable stems from its not being tied to 
a specific definition or intention articulated in the Charter. 
 
                                                 
8 Abigail, P. in Smith, H. (ed) The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander. (1994) at.87. 
9 Ross, J.N. “Civil-military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions: Opening Dialogue and Increasing NGO 
Influence Over Defence Policy.” Paper Presented at the Second Annual Graduate Student Seminar. Ottawa: Canadian 
Centre for Foreign Policy Development. (30 April – 5 May 2000). 
10 Elmquist, M. CIMIC in East Timor: An Account of Civil-Military Co-operation, Coordination and Collaboration in 
the Early Phases of the East Timor Relief Operation. Relief Web. http://www.relifweb.int 1999 (20 Mar 2005). 
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The legal basis for Peacekeeping 
 
“The technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United Nations.  The Charter does 
not mention it.  It was discovered, like penicillin.  We came across it, while looking for something 
else, during an investigation of the guerrilla fighting in northern Greece in 1947.”11 
 
Although peacekeeping is primarily an activity associated with the UN there is no direct reference 
to peacekeeping in the UN Charter. Indeed ‘the organisation’s founders never envisioned such 
activities’.12  Despite this alarming13 lack of express reference peacekeeping was scrutinised in the 
Certain Expenses Case,14 an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and was 
confirmed as a legitimate tool of the UN under the auspices of the UN Charter. In light of the rather 
unusual extra Charter position it is on the face of it surprising that such a significant activity as 
peacekeeping came into being and went on to be accepted as a legal and legitimate tool.  Given that 
the legitimacy of peacekeeping was confirmed over twenty years after the first operation it can be 
quite reasonably argued that the legal justification for peacekeeping has lagged behind reality, no 
very uncommon occurrence in the development of the law. 
 
In a tacit acknowledgment of this state of affairs the first UN peacekeeping force was described by 
the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold as a “Chapter Six and a Half” operation.  This term 
has stuck and the theme has even been developed by some commentators to describe more robust 
operations as Chapter Six and Three-Quarters.15  The reason that the Secretary-General adopted this 
description is that peacekeeping does not fit precisely into the provisions of either Chapter VI or 
Chapter VII.  They can also appear to have been set up within a Chapter VII framework but operate 
                                                 
11 Urquhart, B.  “The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping” in Henrikson, A.K. (ed) 
Negociating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy at 62. 
12 Turley, S. “Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?” 73 Texas Law Review 139 (2000) at 150. 
13 Alarming because of a lack of support for its legal legitimacy on the face of the Charter. 
14 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 149. 
15  Bialke above n 6 at 23. 
 26 
as if they were formed under Chapter VI.  In other words the legal underpinning of their 
establishment may have no effect on their operation.  Peacekeeping is a continuum and even within 
a single operation different places on the continuum can be reached at different times or in different 
places.  In some of its forms peacekeeping is conducted on the basis of a recommendation of the 
General Assembly and not by the Security Council.  Historically this has occurred because the 
Security Council has been unable for political reasons to agree to establish an operation.  When the 
General Assembly recommends a peacekeeping operation it only has the power to establish it under 
Chapter VI.  Most commonly since the end of the Cold War peacekeeping has been a tool of the 
Security Council.  
 
Peacekeeping has been argued to be an implied power of the UN deriving from Article 1, which 
states that the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security16.  The 
argument that legitimate powers can be implied from the Charter has been found to be good in law 
by the ICJ.  In the Reparations Case the ICJ stated that ‘the Organisation must be deemed to have 
those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to it in the course of its duties”.17  This is a critical point, 
which will be returned to in detail later in this work. 
 
Although the implied powers for the use of peacekeeping forces is derived from the primary 
purposes of the UN set out in Article 1 of the Charter, the purposes or grounds for which the 
implied powers may be used are found in Chapters VI and VII.  It is upon these two Chapters that 
all peacekeeping operations have been founded.  The Chapters set out a number of options 
available to Member States, the General Assembly and the Security Council. Not all of the options 
set out in the Chapters are relevant to peacekeeping.  On one side there are the options that have no 
                                                 
16 Id at 9. 
17 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] ICJ Rep 174 at 182. 
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scope for third party military intervention such as taking the dispute to the ICJ.  On the other hand 
there comes a point within Chapter VII where the more robust aspects of peacekeeping, usually 
referred to as enforcement, are replaced by armed conflict.  An attempt to identify where the divide 
between enforcement and armed conflict is to be found will be made in a later chapter of this work.   
 
Chapter VI 
 
While Article 1 of the Charter represents the general head of power on which legitimacy for 
peacekeeping can be founded there are elements in both Chapters VI and VII which are relied upon 
as the basis for different types of operations in the peacekeeping continuum.  Chapter VI operations 
are generally understood to be derived from Article 33 as a “peaceful means” of achieving a 
settlement of a dispute between the parties.18  Article 33 generally deals with the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes that may threaten international peace and security.  It sets out a 
form of means such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation and so on, by which parties should settle 
disputes peacefully rather than by resort to armed force.  Importantly, the article does not give the 
UN the power to impose peaceful solutions on the parties but clearly states that any solution listed 
in the article, or in the catch all of ‘other peaceful means’, is exclusively within the parties’ own 
choice.   
 
Chapter VI has a total of six articles dealing with international disputes.  The position of both the 
Security Council and the General Assembly throughout Chapter VI is that they may only make 
recommendations to parties.  Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council may impose a 
particular course of action on a party to a dispute being addressed under Chapter VI.  However, 
pursuant to Article 37(1) parties’ that cannot achieve a settlement through the pacific means 
                                                 
18 Above n 16 at 8. 
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indicated in the Chapter or by voluntarily bringing matters before the General Assembly or the 
Security Council,19 are obligated to refer the matter to the Security Council.  While being obliged to 
refer such matters to the Security Council and obtaining a recommendation there is no express 
obligation to comply with the recommendation, or authority for the Security Council to enforce 
such compliance.  The power to force compliance with a Chapter VI recommendation that a 
peacekeeping operation be launched must therefore come from a political source not a legal one. 
 
The legal result is that if a peacekeeping operation derives from a request from the parties under 
Article 33, or from any other provision of Chapter VI, for example from a recommendation under 
Article 36, consent of the parties to the peacekeeping operation is mandatory.  If consent is not 
present, regardless of the reason why consent has been withheld, regardless of the benign nature of 
the operation and regardless of the implied powers of the UN, without the acknowledgment that it 
is the parties own choice, a peacekeeping operation cannot be a Chapter VI operation.  Where the 
UN is dealing with a situation in which the government has collapsed without successor and there 
is therefore no means by which the State can give consent, or accede to a recommendation of the 
General Assembly or Security Council, then any peacekeeping operation, must be initiated under 
Chapter VII.  The requirement for a State to make a choice within Article 33 is in this sense active 
not passive.  
 
Under the Charter the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security but it is not only the Security Council that may make recommendations under 
Chapter VI.  The Certain Expenses Case20 went further than merely cementing the position of 
peacekeeping in the UN store of available actions, it also confirmed that the General Assembly has 
the potential to initiate peacekeeping operations, subject to there being consent to such a 
                                                 
19 and thereby undertaking to submit to its decisions. 
20 Above n 14. 
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deployment by the receiving State.  In other words, while peacekeeping operations under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter can only be authorised by the Security Council, Chapter VI operations may 
be initiated on the basis of a recommendation from the General Assembly.  The caveat to this being 
that the General Assembly cannot involve itself if the Security Council is simultaneously 
considering the matter.  The General Assembly’s power to recommend peacekeeping operations is 
useful where a member of the Security Council is using the veto to prevent a peacekeeping 
operation, as was the case with the United Nations Emergency Force operation in Egypt, the 
operation that precipitated the Certain Expenses Case.21  
 
While Chapter VI can provide the basis for peacekeeping it does not give any guidance on the 
detail.  The details are to be agreed between the UN and the States involved as suppliers or 
recipients of peacekeepers.  Although the Security Council does not ratify these agreements they 
are legally binding on the parties as treaties.22   
 
Uniting for Peace Resolution 1950 
 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution, the General Assembly’s most important contribution to 
strengthening the UN collective security system23 changed the role of the General Assembly under 
Chapter VI from that originally envisaged under the Charter.  With this Resolution the General 
Assembly clearly stated its intentions to take action in the case of a moribund Security Council.   
 
The General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a direct result of the events in 
the Security Council that occurred prior to the Korean War.  The USSR had decided to boycott the 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Higgins, R. United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary.(1970)  at 506.  
23 Goodrich, L.M. and Fox, W.T.R. (eds) Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions (1969) at 81. 
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Security Council at the time that the vote for action was taken.24  In its absence the deadlock 
previously encountered was temporarily removed and a decision made to commit a UN force to 
Korea.25  The USSR realised it had made a mistake in absenting itself and rushed back to the 
Security Council, arguing that its absence amounted to a veto.  This argument was rejected and the 
Korean War proceeded as planned.  The General Assembly realised that neither the USSR nor the 
other permanent members would make the same mistake again and that if action were not taken to 
avoid deadlock the Security Council would be unable to fulfil its responsibilities with regard to 
peace and security.26  Relying on the Uniting for Peace Resolution the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 498(V) of February 1, 195127 recommending the use of force by Member States against 
the Chinese forces in Korea.28 
 
In Uniting for Peace29 the General Assembly noted the responsibilities of the Security Council with 
regard to international peace and security.  It also noted in the event that the Security Council failed 
to discharge those responsibilities, the General Assembly maintained its rights and responsibilities 
with regard to international peace and security.  The General Assembly then resolved that, in the 
event of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression that it would consider the matter 
and make recommendations to Member States, including recommendations for the use of armed 
force.  
 
As well as amending its own procedures to enable the General Assembly to consider such matters, 
the General Assembly also established a commission to observe areas of international tension. 
                                                 
24 Above n 4 at 226. 
25 Goulding, M. Peacemonger  (2002) at 12. 
26 Ratner, M and Lobel, J. A UN  Alternative to War: Uniting for Peace. 
http://www.danirak.dk/english/ratner_final_op_ed_uniting.htm. (2 Feb 2003). 
27 Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea. Adopted at the 51st 
session 1 February 1951 
28 Above n 23 at 89-90. 
29 General Assembly 377 (V) Uniting for Peace. 302nd Plenary meeting 3 November 1950. 
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Further, a recommendation was made to all Members States to maintain forces to be made available 
for service with the UN at the recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly.  
The Secretary-General was requested to establish the panel of military experts to advise Member 
States on the requirements for the preparation of units for UN service.  Finally the General 
Assembly established a collective measures committee to look at assisting in the maintenance of 
international peace and security through collective self-defence measures. 
 
This resolution has to be viewed as a recommendation under Chapter VI and can only legally relate 
to Chapter VI operations despite the rhetoric used, as the General Assembly cannot make an Article 
39 finding or impose measures under Chapter VII.30  However, Uniting for Peace clearly 
foreshadows the General Assembly’s role in encouraging the practice of peacekeeping, which at 
that time was extremely new.  It also came some 12 years before the Certain Expenses Case31 
confirmed the power of the General Assembly to make recommendations for peacekeeping forces.  
The Uniting for Peace Resolution represents a corner stone of the legal and political development 
of the legitimacy of peacekeeping in terms of both traditional peacekeeping and enforcement 
action.  
 
Chapter VII 
 
It is trite law that peacekeeping operations initiated with the consent of the parties to a dispute can 
be initiated under Chapter VI.  In situations where the parties are unable to give consent or where 
there is no dispute but a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression by one or more 
State, then the Security Council may be required to act under Chapter VII.   Even with consent of 
the participating State or States the Security Council may determine that the matter should be dealt 
                                                 
30 See Castaneda, J. Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions. (1969) at 81 – 89. 
31 Above n 14. 
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with under Chapter VII.32  Proceeding under Chapter VII despite the fact that consent has been 
obtained can occur and could for example be caused by an assessment that the peacekeepers will be 
obliged to use force in excess of self-defence in order to achieve their mission.    
 
Chapter VII provisions are also extremely useful as reliance on the Chapter expressly overcomes 
the prohibition that otherwise exists in Article 2(7), which provides that except for the enforcement 
measures in Chapter VII the UN is not authorised to intervene ‘…in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State…’. There is considerable debate regarding where the 
line is to be drawn in terms of what is and what is not within domestic jurisdiction, particularly 
regarding human rights issues33.  The use of Chapter VII action avoids this debate and clears away 
what might otherwise prove a complex hurdle to resolving issues by intervention. 
 
The first article in Chapter VII is Article 39.  This article sets out the grounds upon which the 
Security Council may make recommendations34 or decide upon measures under Chapter VII.  
These grounds are; 
 
a. any threat to the peace, 
b. breach of the peace, or 
c. act of aggression. 
 
Only the Security Council is given the power to act under Chapter VII.  The General Assembly is 
limited to making recommendations under Chapter VI, although the General Assembly is able to 
recommend that the Security Council take action under Chapter VII.  If the Security Council 
                                                 
32 For example, UNSC Resolution 1264 authorising the deployment of INTERFET. 
33 Above n 25 at 23. 
34 Again these are only recommendations under Art 39 and as such not binding, contrast this with Art 40 resolutions 
that are binding. 
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decides to utilise the powers under Chapter VII it must first make a finding that one or more of the 
grounds set out in Article 39 exists.35  It has been argued that the Security Council must actively 
make the finding, it cannot simply be inferred; as without making such a finding it cannot lawfully 
use the Chapter VII powers.36  It has not always been expedient or possible for the Security Council 
to openly make a finding and in these circumstances it will have to rely upon Article 39 
recommendations.37  
 
Article 39 permits the Security Council to make recommendations as well as make findings and 
decide on measures.  The recommendations alone can be used very effectively when there is 
agreement within the Security Council.  The first instance of this was the Korean war where the 
recommendations of the Security Council under Article 39 were considered sufficient to permit 
individual member States led by the USA, to engage in armed conflict on the basis of an Article 39 
recommendation.38 
 
While recommendations of the Security Council have been used as the basis for peacekeeping 
operations, it is under Article 42 that the post Cold War robust Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations are now conducted.39   Where persuasive measures short of armed force have failed or 
are considered inadequate, then action by air, sea or land forces is permitted.  While the article 
specifically identifies demonstrations and blockades as examples of the type of action that may be 
taken under Article 42, it leaves all the military force options open to the Security Council.  Such 
                                                 
35 Sohn, L. (ed) Cases on United Nations Law.(2nd ed. 1967) at 303. 
36 Eckert above n 6 at 296. 
37 Although the action in the Congo had all the hall marks of an Article 42 operation the Security Council was at pains 
to point out that it was, while binding, not an Article 42 resolution [Goodrich, L.M, Hambro, E. and Simons, A.P. 
Charter of the UN Commentary and Documents. Third ed 1969, p.316]. It is difficult to see how this could be achieved 
other than by arguing that it was binding due to the agreement of all concerned to accede to the Security Council’s 
recommendations. 
38 The actions of the Security Council in this instance were based on expediency as the Article 43 agreements had not 
yet been signed.  There was also some debate over the legality of the resolutions recommending military action in 
support of South Korea given the absence of the USSR; Harris D.Cases and Materials in International Law (5th ed 
1998) at 954 – 955. 
39 See for example Somalia, above n 7 at 14.  Prior to the end of the Cold War Article 42 was noted more for its disuse. 
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actions are left to the words “any other operation by air, sea, or land forces of the Members of the 
United Nations”.  This action can be up to and including international armed conflict as occurred 
for example with the first Gulf War.  The Charter intends that States that have entered into an 
Article 43 agreement provide the forces for an operation conducted under Article 42.40  However, 
the absence of Article 43 agreements does not mean that military forces cannot be provided to the 
UN41 as it has always been possible for Member States to provide military forces on an ad hoc and 
voluntary basis.42  
 
When drafting a Chapter VII resolution it is the practice of the Security Council to avoid reference 
to the specific article under which the resolution is being drafted.    One of the main reasons for this 
ambiguity is that the US, for reasons related to its constitution, favours this form of drafting.  The 
basis of this concern is that a mandatory direction binding on the US may be given to apply armed 
force to a particular situation without the prior approval of Congress.43  If the resolution refers 
generally to Chapter VII then the details of whether the force is being approved as an Article 39 
measure, Article 42 means or as collective self defence under Article 51 is open to interpretation. 
 
Rostow put forward another reason for leaving ambiguity over the Article to be applied. He argues 
that Article 42 is not a reliable foundation and is open to challenge without support from the other 
articles in the Chapter and in particular Article 51.  Article 43 agreements for the provision of 
forces to the UN have not been entered into.  Rostow argued that as a result of the relationship 
between Articles 42 and 43, the military measures authorised by Article 42 can only be prosecuted 
                                                 
40 Harris, above n 38 at 950. 
41 Article 43 agreements were not entered into for action in the Gulf or Somalia; Palwanker, U. “Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces” International Review of the Red Cross No 
294 (30 June 1993) at 227. 
42 United Nations Institute for Training and Research. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace 
and Security. (1987) at 215. 
43 Glennon, M. “The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter” 85 American. Journal of  
International Law. 74 (1991) at 74-87. 
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by an Article 43 force.   He points in particular to the first Gulf War, which he argued was fought 
on the basis of collective self-defence with a Security Council Resolution acting simply as a focal 
point rather than as the legal authority for the military action.44    
 
The arguments against Article 42 make an interesting impact on peace enforcement operations.  As 
discussed above, the Article 39 findings that invariably precede a Chapter VII operation mean that 
the Security Council must make a recommendation or decide on measures set out in Articles 41 and 
42.  Therefore while States may opt to act under Article 51 with UN backing; a UN force could not.  
Even if a UN force appeared to be acting in collective self-defence it would legally be acting on an 
Article 39 ‘recommendation’ not under Article 51.45   
 
The recommendations in Article 39 differ from the use of force provisions in Article 42 because 
recommendations are just that while the Article 42 provisions require mandatory action by Member 
States.  As a matter of practice States are not keen to be dictated to over the use of their armed 
forces and as identified in the case of the US, it could cause constitutional difficulties.  A specific 
direction under Article 42 could well draw a veto from the US if prior consent had not been 
obtained under the US Constitution.  In any event, if Article 43 forces are required to implement 
the use of force provisions in Article 42, then action under Article 42 will be impossible until such 
agreements have been concluded. Therefore, Chapter VII peacekeeping can only be based on 
Article 39 recommendations.  Given the difficulties inherent in specifying which article is to be 
relied upon it is not surprising that the Security Council prefers to make a general reference to 
Chapter VII.  
 
                                                 
44 Rostow, E.V. Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law Continued: “Until What? 
Enforcement Action or Collective Self Defence” 85 American. Journal of  International Law. 74 (1991) at.452-473. 
45 The first Gulf War resolution was in effect making an Article 39 ‘recommendation’ for collective self-defence seems 
to be the basis of the argument put forward by Rostow, and that in effect the resolution was unnecessary for the action 
to be lawful as it drew legality from Article 51. 
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Regardless of which specific article authorises action, an examination of Chapter VII reveals that 
peacekeeping can be initiated under Chapter VII for four reasons.  Firstly because the operation 
cannot for some reason be initiated under Chapter VI, including, but by no means limited to a 
situation where there is an absence of consent or the ability to give consent.  Secondly, because the 
Security Council needs to make the action enforceable rather than merely a recommendation.  
Thirdly, because the Security Council wishes to use or authorise the level of force provided for by 
Article 42.  And finally, on the basis of Article 51 in a type of authorised self defence.  In UN 
resolutions it has become normal for the Security Council to issue a blanket Chapter VII mandate 
without detailing which article is specifically relied upon.  This situation provides flexibility and 
been the form favoured by the Permanent Members46.  
 
As a result, peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII can appear at any stage of the peacekeeping 
continuum. Simply because an operation has been commenced under Chapter VII does not 
automatically mean that it will have characteristics markedly different from a Chapter VI operation. 
The use of force (other than in self-defence) is not inevitable and consent of the parties may also be 
obtained. This has proven to be the case in East Timor.   
 
The evolution of peacekeeping 
 
As with every human endeavour peacekeeping did not emerge from the deliberations of the UN in a 
complete form. As noted above, peacekeeping was something of an accident rather than a planned 
child of the Charter.  Since its inception peacekeeping has been developing and commentators have 
charted the journey.   Segal,47 for example, has been able to identify five chronological phases of 
                                                 
46 See for example Security Council Resolutions  1244 (Kosovo) and 1264 and 1272 (East Timor). 
47 Segal (in Lee, R.) “The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures” Australian 
International Law Journal (2000) at 182.  
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peacekeeping in an evolutionary progression.48  The first of these phases, sometimes referred to as 
“first generation peacekeeping”,49 is represented by the operations conducted between 1946 and 
1955.  These operations are labelled by Segal ‘observer missions’.  They are characterised by the 
unarmed and impartial observer deploying in small numbers to supervise a truce or monitor an 
armistice.  The key ingredient in these missions is consent of the parties.  Violations of the truce or 
armistice would not be dealt with by the peacekeepers but were either dealt with by mediation 
between the parties or referred to the Security Council. In other words the active measures were to 
be taken not by the peacekeepers but at the political level.  The observer missions were a purely 
passive tool. 
 
Phase two operations ran from 1956 to 1965.  These operations saw a shift from small, unarmed 
groups to the deployment of armed forces.  Operations were still governed by the paramount 
principles of consent and impartiality but these two were joined by an express prohibition on the 
use of force except in self-defence.  One aberration in the phase two period was the Operation in 
the Congo (ONUC) in 1960.  In this operation the Security Council authorised an increase in the 
permissible use of force in order to remove foreign mercenaries and restore freedom of movement 
to the peacekeepers within the bounds of the Congo operation.   
 
Phase three, 1966 to 1985, saw very little in the way of peacekeeping missions due to a moribund 
Cold War Security Council and it is this lack of use of peacekeeping rather than the nature of the 
operations that cause them to be identified as a separate phase.  Consent remained the dominant 
principle and peacekeepers were not expected to use force.  The operations were in what had 
become the traditional mould of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supervising buffer zones 
                                                 
48 Id at 182 – 188. 
49 McCoubrey, H and White, N.D. The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulations of United Nations Military Operations. (1996) 
at 4. 
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and providing support to peace settlements.  Peacekeepers were still not considered to be an active 
measure but remained the passive tool of the Security Council. 
 
The fourth phase of peacekeeping from 1985 to 1990 still relied upon consent (of the parties and of 
the world powers) as the guiding principle for the insertion of peacekeepers.  However, the 
operations were now on a grander scale with elements of nation building being inserted as an 
integral part of the operation.  Peacekeepers were also being used to implement, as well as merely 
monitor, comprehensive settlements.  This phase represents the change in attitude towards 
peacekeeping from a solely passive tool to one that could also be utilised in a more active role. 
These operations are also referred to as “second generation”50 peacekeeping. 
 
The advent of “third generation” peacekeeping,51 (the fifth and final phase for Segal) was marked 
by the demise of consent as the guiding principle.  It also represents a period where from time to 
time there is also a loss of impartiality.  This loss of impartiality arises from the nature of the 
operation rather than by accident.  Increasingly peacekeepers are inserted into internal armed 
conflicts rather than as a buffer between hostile States.  Their missions are to disarm belligerents, 
rebuild infrastructure, physically as well as organisationally, in addition to providing security and 
basic administration for the State.  Segal does not go on to identify humanitarian intervention as a 
specific part of the fifth phase of the evolution of peacekeeping nor as the beginning of a fresh 
phase.  It is possible to argue both ways.  It is quintessential phase five in that it has been done 
without consent52 and from time to time with the loss of impartiality.53  However, the stated 
humanitarian purpose of the intervention does represent a significant shift, from the purposes of the 
other phases, which concerned themselves solely with the restoration or maintenance of peace.   
                                                 
50 Id at 6. 
51 Ibid. 
52 In Iraq to protect the Kurds, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and East Timor for example. 
53 The aerial bombing campaigns in the former Yugoslavia. 
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The argument concerning the legality of such intervention is another issue and not within the scope 
of this work. 
 
The evolution of peacekeeping has seen the emergence of a whole family of terms to describe the 
nature of a particular operation.  Although described above as an evolution, unlike the evolution of 
the human species the progenitors of Chapter VII enforcement have not perished along the way but 
survived to create an extant family of peacekeeping operations. Each genus in the family is 
described in terms of the task that is to be undertaken by the peacekeeper.  Operations can also be 
run within operations as with an observer mission running in tandem with an enforcement 
mission.54   As will be seen below, because it is human activity that is being described the terms are 
not always discrete.  Often one operation may have the characteristics of more than one label or an 
operation identifiable at its commencement may develop into something quite different before it 
concludes.  There are however a number of advantages in being able to identify or categorise 
operations. Using the different titles at least gives some doctrinal basis for commanders who are 
responsible for planning an operation.   It also provides some guidance as to the boundaries within 
which the operation is likely to be conducted and it is of course useful as a political tool in 
reassuring nervous States.  
 
Definitions of Peacekeeping 
 
As peacekeeping has evolved it has developed its own unique nomenclature.  However, these are 
not definite and fixed definitions under which operations can be labelled.  The terms themselves 
have meant different things at different times.  In 1970 Fabian defined peacekeeping very simply as 
“UN political-military control of local conflict by politically impartial, essentially noncoercive 
                                                 
54 See for example in East Timor where unarmed Observer groups operated in the same area as Chapter VII peace 
enforcers. 
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methods”.55 Thirty odd years later some forms of peacekeeping still have these characteristics but it 
is inconceivable that such a definition would be offered today as an attempt to cover the 
peacekeeping field.    
 
From a purely Australian perspective, in its 1994 report to the Parliament the Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade adopted a number of definitions relating to 
peacekeeping.56  By way of a general definition it accepted the much more complex proposition 
that peacekeeping; 
 
involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian, personnel to assist in the 
implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in 
conflict.  Peacekeeping presumes cooperation, and its methods are inherently peaceful; the use of 
military force, other than in self-defence, is incompatible with the concept.  Although neither 
described nor defined in the UN Charter itself, peacekeeping operations have been, both in the pre-
Cold War years and subsequently, the most numerous and visible manifestations of the UN’s 
cooperative security efforts.   ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping operations involve not much more than 
unarmed or lightly armed military contingents being engaged in monitoring, supervision and 
verification of ceasefire, withdrawal, buffer zone and related agreements.  ‘Expanded’ peacekeeping 
by comparison, involves the supplementation of traditional peacekeeping with activities such as 
election monitoring or organisation, human rights protection, and assisting or exercising civil 
administration functions during transition to independence or democracy.57    
 
This definition itself appears to subdivide peacekeeping into separate types of operation by 
function.  It identifies ‘traditional’ peacekeeping, ‘observer’ missions, humanitarian operations and 
                                                 
55 Fabian, L. Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping, (1970) at 16. 
56 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Australia’s Participation in Peacekeeping. 
(December 1994) at 150. 
57 Ibid. 
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nation building. It is clearly intended to be a broad based definition, even so it does not cover the 
field in terms of the wide variety of peacekeeping operations undertaken under the auspices of the 
UN. 
 
The other general definition of peacekeeping that was adopted by the committee was from the 
Department of Defence.  This definition was shorter and stated that peacekeeping; 
 
involves non-combat operations (exclusive of self defence), that are undertaken by outside forces 
with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation 
of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the 
dispute.58 
 
This second definition is more succinct and focuses on the key components of peacekeeping 
operations emphasising consent, third party peacekeepers facilitating essentially diplomatic action.  
But by the very act of emphasising consent and the absence of combat the definition fails 
adequately to define modern peacekeeping. 
 
Although more comprehensive definitions of peacekeeping could be adopted to cover the field in 
terms of the peacekeeping operations prosecuted around the world, it should be recognised that 
peacekeeping is as descriptively complex as operations are diplomatically sensitive.  Some of the 
distinctions are subtle; each nuance is vital to a commander tasked to carry out a mission.  Often it 
is better to recognise that peacekeeping is a general term that requires a second level of inquiry.  
The term ‘peacekeeping’ is rather like the term dog: before the purchase it is advisable to determine 
if you are going to get a Great Dane or a Toy Poodle.  
 
                                                 
58 Id at 151. 
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Traditional Peacekeeping 
 
Traditional peacekeeping is unfortunately something of a catch all term that takes historical fact as 
the point of reference to describe a particular method or structure of peacekeeping operation.  It is 
historical in the sense that it is a definition that describes what was originally the only way (save for 
the Congo operation) that peacekeeping was conducted immediately after World War Two.  Rather 
than even use the term “traditional” peacekeeping Sergio Vieira De Mello59 preferred to be more 
precise by describing such operations as ‘historical peacekeeping’ rather than traditional 
peacekeeping.  Traditional peacekeeping is conducted exclusively under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter. 
 
The original peacekeeping operations were conducted in order to maintain the status quo by 
containing a conflict with the aim of gaining time for diplomatic pressure to be brought to bear on 
the parties so that an enduring settlement could be reached.60  Given the limited means at their 
disposal the deployment of traditional peacekeepers was far more a political statement than a 
military intervention. 
 
The pattern of troop deployment through which this was achieved formed the basis of the category 
of peacekeeping that is still used to describe traditional peacekeeping operations. Traditional 
peacekeeping involves lightly armed troops forming a line or a buffer between former or potential 
combatants with authority to only use force in a passive manner.61 Critically, traditional 
peacekeepers are limited to the use of force only in self-defence.  Diehl62 emphasised the passive 
stance implicit in the initial development of traditional UN based peacekeeping by noting that non-
                                                 
59 De Mello, S. V. in Gordon D.S. and Toase F.H.(eds)  Aspects of Peacekeeping (2000) at 115. 
60 Above n 56 at 6. 
61Above n 4 at 79. 
62 Diehl P. F. “Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and 
Multinational Options.” Armed Forces and Socierty 19, no.2 (Winter 1993) at 5. 
 43 
coercion was the distinguishing feature of traditional peacekeeping.   In other words, traditional 
peacekeeping must be non-coercive or it is not traditional peacekeeping.  In the wider use of the 
term peacekeeping, and particularly in the most recent operations, it would be very difficult to put 
forward “non-coercion” as a distinguishing feature of the majority of modern peacekeeping 
operations either Blue Helmet or national contingents operating under the authority of a Security 
Council mandate.    
 
The pacific nature of traditional peacekeeping operations was cynically emphasised by Trevor 
Findlay when he wrote  “The term “peacekeeping” was a misnomer; there usually was no peace to 
be kept, only a sullen truce, and the “keeping” to be done was entirely dependant on the goodwill of 
the parties.”63  
 
Findlay’s amusing description of the realities of peacekeeping no doubt was felt to be an accurate 
description of the facts faced by peacekeepers on the ground.  Rather than being dependent on 
either non-coercion or goodwill traditional peacekeeping cannot begin or continue without consent. 
Consent consistently has the starring role in the evolution of peacekeeping.  Consent is the element 
identified universally in the literature and in military doctrine as the principal and essential element 
of traditional peacekeeping.  It remained for that matter the central theme of peacekeeping in the 
more general sense during the Cold War period.64   
 
Traditional peacekeeping is conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.  This is not surprising 
given that the guiding principle of traditional peacekeeping is consent of the parties.  With a 
mandate permitting only self-defence traditional peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and depend 
upon the legitimacy of their mission to maintain a position that could not be held by force. 
                                                 
63 Findlay, T. (in Horner, D. ed) The Army and the Future. Land Forces in Australia and South-East Asia. (1993) at 75. 
64 The references to consent in this context are legion. See for example above n 56 at 151; Bellamy, C. Knights in White 
Armour (1997) at 156. 
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Legitimacy, so crucial for the survival of the peacekeepers on the ground, is derived from the 
consent of the parties and is supported by the exercise of neutrality and impartiality on the part of 
the force.  Impartiality and neutrality in traditional peacekeeping is ensured by the multinational 
composition of the force as well as by its limited armament capability.65   The multinational make 
up of the contingents was especially important in the era immediately after the Second World War.  
Contingents of the time consisted exclusively of middle and small powers in order to allay the fears 
of the parties that they might be subject to take over by the great powers or become satellite States 
as a result of a foreign military presence.66  This model represents traditional peacekeeping as a 
delicate combination of factors that must be maintained by all the actors to achieve success. 
 
Although Featherston67 uses the term peacekeeping rather than traditional peacekeeping, the place 
of consent in her definition makes it expedient to deal with it as traditional, although more complex 
political dimensions are also described in her article.  Rather than use categories separated by the 
descriptions often found in military use Featherston defines peacekeeping by breaking it down into 
its core requirements.  For Featherston the key distinguishing factor between peacekeeping and any 
other type of political68 activity is that a third party must perform the peacekeeping role.  This third 
party must have certain essential characteristics. The third party is inserted on a voluntary and non 
coercive basis, it advocates for a particular outcome, process or both, it attempts a resolution of the 
dispute or issue, it is impartial, and the operation results in a change in the dynamics of a conflict 
situation.   This last requirement seems rather to imply that Featherston sees only successful 
operations as being genuine peacekeeping operations.   
 
                                                 
65 Above n 59 at 115. 
66 Smith, H. (ed) International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (1994) at 201-2; Above n 54 at 
5-6. 
67 Featherston A.B. Making United Nations Peacekeeping More Peaceful: Relating Concepts of ‘Success’ to Field 
Reality. Working Paper No.139. The Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies. (October 
1993) at 1-3. 
68 Political in the sense that every action on the world stage is by definition political.  
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The definition does not recognise a change over time in the principles of peacekeeping rather it 
asserts that the principles of peacekeeping were established and fixed in 1956.  These immutable 
principles are identified as:  
 
a. Consent to insertion of peacekeepers by the parties to the dispute, 
 
b. Impartiality, and 
 
c. Non use of force, except in self-defence.69 
 
The issue of consent has central significance in identifying the nature of a particular peacekeeping 
operation.  Success of peacekeeping operations and the reaction of actors to peacekeepers have 
been repeatedly dictated by the level of consent obtained for the mission at every level. While 
Featherston does not draw this from the analysis, consent is rightly shown as the first and 
cornerstone principle of traditional peacekeeping.  
 
With regard to the principle of impartiality Featherston adds the clarification that this means 
impartiality towards the parties involved in the dispute not impartiality towards achieving a 
particular goal or mission.  Peacekeepers are not inserted independently of a plan for a particular 
political outcome.70  
 
Featherston goes on to further define peacekeeping operations by reference to their complexity.  
Three categories are identified.  These are; “force-level, observer and multidimensional.”71 The 
force-level operations are primarily military missions with thousands of troops involved and a 
                                                 
69 Above n 67. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Id at 2. 
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small civilian contingent, usually UN Secretariat staff.  Observer missions on the other hand are 
relatively small contingents of tens to hundreds at most, of military personnel carrying out 
observation and verification.  Finally multidimensional missions are a species of force level 
mission with the explicit task of dealing with socio-political and / or humanitarian situations.  
Typically such operations will have a large civilian component as was the case with the United 
Nations Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET).72 
 
Both Featherston and Hillen in their definitions recognise the place of traditional peacekeeping in 
the international political arena.  The fact that military forces are only used as part of the political 
continuum is of course well understood, particularly by military forces imbued with a respect for 
the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.  Nevertheless, traditional peacekeeping is generally 
defined by the activities of the force on the ground rather than the political context from which its 
activities are inseparable.  The interactions between military and civilian segments of the operation 
are equally inseparable elements of traditional peacekeeping.  This is in contrast to the more robust 
operations where civilian elements are small or non-existent. 
 
One of the most important political aspects of peacekeeping is how consent of the parties is 
obtained and how strong and genuine that consent is.  Hillen73 quotes from a number of sources that 
emphasise the requirement for strong political support and pressure from major powers combined 
with the willingness of the parties in order to make any headway in traditional peacekeeping 
operations.  It would be naïve to suppose that anything less than this kind of support is required in 
any form of international diplomacy let alone when even the lightly armed forces of a foreign State 
are to be deployed onto another State’s sovereign territory. 
 
                                                 
72 Although UNTAET was not a ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operation. 
73 Above n 67 at 84-5. 
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Observer Missions 
 
The observer mission is generally considered to sit within the traditional peacekeeping umbrella.  
Indeed observer missions are arguably the quintessential form of traditional peacekeeping.   
Returning to Hillen’s definitions,74 he describes observer missions as the most militarily pacific 
type of peacekeeping operation.  In observer operations UN forces stand as impartial 
representatives of the UN watching an area and doing no more than reporting on the activities that 
they witness.  They may or may not be armed and if they are armed they will only be able to use 
those arms in self-defence.  These operations are also characterised by being almost solely military, 
a fact that is on the face of it at odds with the highly pacific nature of these operations.   
 
The vital ingredients of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence are 
central and unambiguous. In these operations it is hard not to question whether the military is being 
used merely as a man power resource in an environment where presumably use of civilian 
resources would be cheaper and as such a more attractive alternative.  Why then should there be 
such a preponderance of military in observer missions?75 
 
The answer to this is both historical and practical.  Military staff have been used on observer 
missions since 1948 and the duties performed are of a technical nature requiring technical expertise 
and the professional standing of the personnel deployed.76  This level of technical expertise is 
uncommon among civilian employees, although with the civilisation of military functions by many 
western States this situation may change in the future.  There are also the significant advantages to 
                                                 
74 Above n 4 at 79. 
75 While military may be a cost effective tool for the UN, for nations supplying forces, especially Western Nations, 
civilians are a cheaper option.  In particular contracted civilians are highly cost effective as the wages, benefits and 
allowances are less that those paid to a military equivalent.  This factor has been the driving force in much of the 
Australian move to contract out and civilianise Defence functions.  
76 Above n 4 at 33-4. 
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be gained from having a disciplined force that can be deployed at short notice and trained quickly 
to perform the necessary duties.   
 
Hillen notes that the success of observer missions in their ability to be cheap and politically 
acceptable, in part due to the absence of force also means that they are effectively failures.  This 
assertion is based on examples such as observer missions in the Middle East and India/Pakistan 
running without closure from 1948 and 1949 respectively.  Although there has not been a major 
invasion by either State77 this is most likely due to other international political factors and not the 
observer mission.78  The aim of most peacekeeping missions is to reach an end point and withdraw.  
As neither these missions nor the observer mission in Cyprus is yet concluded and with no 
conclusion in prospect after more than fifty years, it is probably fair comment to accuse them of 
being failed missions.  Indeed, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has threatened Cyprus with 
withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation unless a settlement was reached.79  
 
Wider Peacekeeping 
 
For a short period the British Army used a doctrine known as Wider Peacekeeping.80  It was 
defined as “the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the 
belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.”81 
 
The doctrine, although brief in tenure, is important as it represents something of a bridge between 
traditional peacekeeping and the modern post Cold War doctrines.  Although transitory, failing due 
                                                 
77 At the time of writing this work the relationship between these two nations has reached a point where armed conflict 
over the region of Kashmir is being openly predicted in the media. See for example SBS World News 1830h 29 May 
2002. 
78 Above n 4. 
79 www.un.org/news/ossg/sg/. (11 March 2003). 
80 Gordon, D.S and Toase, F.H. (eds). Aspects Of Peacekeeping The Sandhurst Conference Series. (2001) at xxv. 
81 Bellamy above n 64 at 151. 
 49 
to its hasty construction in response to rapidly changing international circumstances, it did 
represent a transition mechanism from cold war era tactical peacekeeping thinking to the modern 
expectation of complex civil and political situations.82  For example, Wider Peacekeeping doctrine 
tackled the thorny issue of peace enforcement operations defining them as “an operation carried out 
to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may by 
engaged in combat.”83 Note the key place of consent in this definition.   
 
The British Wider Peacekeeping doctrine allowed for movement between peacekeeping and 
enforcement actions with the line of consent being the point at which the transformation from one 
to the other occurred.  The doctrine was flexible in that it was not intended that an isolated incident 
on the ground caused a shift in the total operation.  Tactical elements could be involved in a 
firefight because a domestic authority with control over a specific area had removed consent for a 
patrol to move through that area.  Only the troops involved in that firefight would have crossed the 
consent line and when the situation had been resolved and local consent re-established then the 
tactical element involved would have crossed back again to the safety of peacekeeping.84 
 
At this point it is interesting to note that the US was also using consent as a crossing point between 
peacekeeping and enforcement.  The notable difference in the US doctrine was that once the 
consent line had been passed there was no return; effectively the peacekeeping mission was in a 
state of collapse.  It has been argued that this approach arose from the US experience in Somalia in 
crossing the ‘Mogadishu line’. 85  Experience in Bosnia seemed to support the British doctrine as 
tactical elements did cross and recross local consent lines without plunging the whole operation 
into enforcement.  
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 MoD. Wider Peacekeeping (1994) at 1.2. 
84 Above n 82 
85 Id at 152-3. 
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Although it was not to last, with the definition of Wider Peacekeeping British doctrine recognised 
and marked the passing of the traditional requirement that any peacekeeping operation required 
consent, however grudging, from the parties or potential parties to the conflict as a mandatory 
prerequisite for the insertion of an international peacekeeping force.   While Wider Peacekeeping 
indicated the crossing of the consent Rubicon it did not mean the end of traditional peacekeeping, 
or of peacekeeping as a general term.  Traditional peacekeeping remains as a legitimate description 
of a particular genus of peacekeeping operation but from this point it was doctrinally recognised 
that it was no longer alone.    
 
Peace Support Operations 
 
The successor definition to Wider Peacekeeping is the far wider concept of ‘Peace Support 
Operation’.  The term describes the; 
 
complex, multinational, military operation in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve the settlement 
of armed hostilities, including the use of force in restricted circumstances.86    
 
The term Wider Peacekeeping was not one used in Australian doctrine. Instead the term ‘Peace 
Support Operations’ appeared in the early 1990s as a response to the dramatic changes in the use 
and type of peacekeeping operation that occurred at the end of the Cold War.   The doctrinal term 
Peace Support Operation was designed to cover the entire peacekeeping continuum as the term 
peacekeeping was felt to be inappropriate in light of the burgeoning activities in which forces were 
obliged to take part.  Indeed the doctrine identified nine separate categories of operation in the 
                                                 
86 Gow, J. and Dandeker, C. “The Legitimation of Strategic Peacekeeping: Military Culture, the Defining Moment”. In 
Gordon and Toase (eds) Aspects of Peacekeeping (2001) at 181.  
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peacekeeping continuum stretching from traditional observer mission activities through to 
enforcement action.87   Wilkinson88 sees the term inextricably linked with the post Cold War 
emergence of increasingly complex emergencies.  The peacekeeping response is not simply the 
provision of force but “a wide range of political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and other 
considerations…”89 Wilkinson argues that peace support operations are based on three key 
principles: consent of the recipient State, impartiality and the use of minimum force.90 Although on 
this basis peace support operations are distinguishable from peace enforement, the reliance by 
Wilkinson on consent makes them Chapter VI operations.  This situation is at odds with his model, 
set out below.91  
 
                                                 
87 Waddell, J.G. Legal Aspects of UN Peacekeeping, Smith (ed) The Force of Law International Law and the Land 
Commander (1994) at 48. 
88 Wilkinson, P. “Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: Peace Support Operations and Complex Emergencies” in 
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89 Id at 66. 
90 Id at 77. 
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 52 
PK PE WAR
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS GULF WAR
KOREAN WAR
CONSENT
COERCION
CHAPTER VI CHAPTER VII
Consent
Use of force
in self defence
only
Consent
promoting techniques
Uncertain or
no consent
Prepared for
combat
Combination
of enforcement
 and consent
 promoting
 techniques
Combat
Designated
Enemy
War
fightingtech iques
Wilkinson’s Conceptual Model.
 
 
 
It can been seen immediately that Wilkinson contradicts his own definition of peace support 
operations by including Chapter VII operations.  It has already been established in this work that 
Chapter VII operations are characterised by the option to proceed without consent.  
 
Adopting Wilkinson’s model rather than his definition, it is argued that the term ‘Peace Support 
Operation’ is something of a catch all for any modern peacekeeping operation. Even when used by 
respected authors there seems to be confusion as to the precise nature of the operation 
contemplated.  As a result of this umbrella intent it is no more helpful as a descriptive term than 
peacekeeping itself.   The definition is so broad it may well be regarded as just another alternative 
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word to peacekeeping.  What the development of the term and its associated doctrine does represent 
however, is an acknowledgment that peacekeeping is complex, and regardless of the category of 
operation the focus is always on peace as the operational End State.  The term peacekeeping on the 
other hand seems to be a more simplistic term, descriptive of a point in time rather than an on going 
process.  The issue of peacekeeping as part of the peace process will be addressed in a later chapter 
of this work when examining the contribution made to the debate by UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali. 
 
Peace making 
 
In 1994 the Joint Standing Committee stated that peace making was; 
 
best understood as a close relative of preventive diplomacy, involving the same range of methods 
described in Article 33 of the UN Charter – ie ‘negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means’ – but applied after a 
dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict.  As with preventative diplomacy, ‘peace 
making’ has at least two distinct chronological dimensions.  Initial (or ‘Stage I’) peace making 
efforts will usually be aimed at the immediate goals of cessation of hostilities, and stabilisation of 
the situation on the ground; subsequent (or Stage II’) efforts – which might continue in parallel with 
the deployment of peace keeping mission – might be aimed rather at securing a durable political 
settlement. 92 
 
As well as presenting its own definition the Committee also adopted the Department of Defence 
definition of peace making, which; 
 
                                                 
92 Above n 56 at 150. 
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involves the process of arranging an end of disputes, and resolving issues that lead to further 
conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or from other forms of peaceful 
settlement.93 
 
In both of these definitions the diplomatic process is paramount, although in the Department of 
Defence definition it is exclusively the domain of the diplomat and politician while in the 
Committee’s adoption of the Department of Defence’s submitted definition, peace making appears 
as an amalgam of military and diplomatic action.  Waddell94 notes that there is some confusion 
over the definition of peace making and that it is often confused with peace enforcement but that in 
his view peace making is properly a purely political activity.  The preponderance of the literature 
agrees with this point. 
 
Featherston for example, describes peacemaking as a predominantly diplomatic activity aimed at 
achieving a peaceful settlement to a dispute.  It is conducted at the State or macro level. The means 
by which the UN deals with peacemaking in the Featherston definition is primarily through the 
means made available to it in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.95  Featherston therefore clearly 
separates the military peacekeeping operation from the form of political activity that does not use 
the military as part of the tools of diplomacy.  
 
Peace enforcement  
 
Enforcement operations may be simply defined by contrast.  “Peacekeeping is consensual whereas 
enforcement is non-consensual.”96  Peace enforcement is generally conducted under Chapter VII of 
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the UN Charter because as the name implies, the operations are designed to be capable of going 
beyond pacific settlement should the need arise.  As frequently observed in this work and 
elsewhere, the willingness of the UN to use the Chapter VII powers in peacekeeping operations has 
increased significantly since the end of the Cold War.  Between the inception of the UN and 1990 
there had been only two occasions on which the UN had authorised peace enforcement these being 
in North Korea and the Congo.  On neither occasion was Article 42 cited as the basis upon which 
the operation was conducted.  Since 1990 the UN has relied upon Chapter VII military enforcement 
action against Iraq, in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and East Timor.   
 
Waddell has suggested that there are three triggers to which the UN may respond by initiating 
enforcement action.  The first of these is in response to aggressive, large-scale armed incursion 
across State borders.  Both the Korean and Gulf wars were responses to this type of activity 
although whether UN sanctioned armed conflict can genuinely be included in the category of 
peacekeeping is questionable.  This type of enforcement of peace is probably better considered in a 
category of its own.  The second is enforcement of a ceasefire or to re-establish a buffer zone as 
seen in the former Yugoslavia.  The third and final occasion is in response to significant 
humanitarian need which was the basis for intervention in Somalia and East Timor.97 
 
Featherston’s approach to defining this category is essentially a practical one.  She declines to refer 
to this final category as ‘peace enforcement’ on the basis that there is little peaceful about it.  
Preferring to refer to it simply as ‘enforcement’ this category represents the use of coercive 
measures and mechanisms under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Featherston is perhaps focusing a 
little too heavily on the military involvement in such operations, as even under Chapter VII non-
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military means are equally available. Indeed armed military enforcement is not expressly referred 
to within the Charter of the UN, being coyly described in Article 42 as; 
 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of Members of the United Nations.98   
 
A better use of the word ‘peace’ in ‘peace enforcement’ has been made by Rich who uses the 
expression to distinguish the middle ground between what he calls genuine peacekeeping and 
actions such as the Gulf War, which he describes as ‘enforcement’.99 
 
However, Featherston’s point is well made in terms of the realities of peace enforcement operations 
as part of the peacekeeping continuum.  The Australian Joint Standing Committee certainly adopted 
a military definition of peace enforcement accepting the Department of Defence’s submission that: 
 
Peace enforcement operations are a form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed 
intervention, that is pursuant to international licence authorising the coercive use of military power 
to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions – the primary purpose of which is 
the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international 
community.100 
 
Under British doctrine the concept of peacekeeping separates traditional peacekeeping from other 
forms of operation performed by military forces.  As noted above, British doctrine sees 
peacekeeping operations as being expandable to a point where the host State or the fighting factions 
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within the State no longer consent to the presence of peacekeepers.  At this point whether armed 
force is to be involved or not the operation changes its nature to become peace enforcement.  
Enforcement is then defined as a;  
 
coercive operation carried out to restore peace in a situation of chaos or between belligerent parties 
who may not all consent to intervention. 101   
 
In British doctrine enforcement action is defined by reference to boundaries.  Between 
peacekeeping and enforcement is the boundary of consent, the key principle of the traditional 
peacekeeping operation.  Between enforcement and international armed conflict is another equally 
important boundary, that of impartiality.  This boundary is absolutely crucial in this work because it 
is submitted that it is this boundary that also marks the legal boundary between humanitarian law 
and human rights law as the de jure law applicable in peacekeeping and enforcement actions that do 
not cross the threshold into armed conflict.  The difference between enforcement as seen in Timor 
and armed conflict as seen in the first Gulf War is that in the former there is no identification or 
targeting of an ‘enemy’.  To use the language of humanitarian law, in enforcement operations there 
are no legitimate combatants as between the UN and other forces on the ground, while in armed 
conflict there are combatants who may be lawfully killed.   
 
While British doctrine introduced flexibility of terms crossing and recrossing boundaries the US 
military did not view peacekeeping and peace enforcement as representative of a continuum 
divided only by consent.  Although heavily influenced by British doctrine102 US Army doctrine in 
referring to the transition between peacekeeping and enforcement stated that enforcement 
operations; 
                                                 
101 Bellamy, above n 64 at 252. 
102 Id at 152. 
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are not part of a continuum allowing a unit to move freely from one to the other.  A broad 
demarcation separates these operations.103   
 
Despite eschewing enforcement as part of the peacekeeping continuum the US definition is not 
immediately clear on what would constitute the broad demarcation.  The obtaining of consent or 
otherwise at the strategic State level rather than the more capricious vacillations faced by the troops 
at the tactical level on the ground would seem the intent of the demarcation, but this is by no means 
clear.  
 
As can be seen from this brief outline of some elements of British and American doctrine, even 
within such a significant regional alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) there 
is no standardised model for military peacekeeping.104   However, a consensus does emerge on the 
issue of consent as the key demarcation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.  Without 
consent there can only be peace enforcement or in the extreme an armed conflict such as was the 
case in the Gulf War.  Even if the UN plans for a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, in 
circumstances where the conflicting parties withdraw their consent to its presence the troops on the 
ground will almost inevitably be forced into peace enforcement once consent is withdrawn, 
regardless of the doctrinal demarcation.  If the UN has not planned for this the troops will be left 
exposed until the Security Council has passed resolutions recommending or authorising the use of 
force under Article 39 or 42. 
 
The area of enforcement is arguably the most difficult category to deal with at its extremes.  In 
particular it seems false to call operations such as the Gulf War peace enforcement operations 
                                                 
103 Department of the Army. FM 100-23: Peace Operations ( 1994) at 12: Bellamy, above n 62 at 153. 
104 Topan, A. Braun, G. “UN Deployments in the Crossfire” International Peacekeeping. (July – October 1999) at 128. 
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rather than moving to a further category or relying on the distinction between peace enforcement 
and enforcement.  The reason that this extreme of the peacekeeping continuum is particularly 
troublesome is that it straddles the divide between human rights and humanitarian law.  It is also 
the point at which the UN ceases to be an impartial third party and becomes an active participant.  
For these reasons it is suggested that the time is ripe for the recognition of a new category in the 
continuum, the trigger for which is the identification of an enemy in the humanitarian law sense 
and the concomitant adoption of combatant status by the UN forces.   Rather than adopt the subtle 
distinction between peace enforcement and enforcement it is suggested that such operations are 
more properly described as UN-sanctioned military operations. 
 
Peace enforcement operations alone will not bring peace to violent situations.  Somalia and the 
former Yugoslavia have been instrumental in demonstrating a way of transitioning from peace 
enforcement to the more progressive phase of ‘peace building’ operations.  The peace building 
operations sit between peacekeeping and collective military action.105  It is arguably in East Timor 
that this transition has been the most effective to date. 
 
Peace building 
 
Featherston argues that peace building is the term used to describe the operation that takes place 
post-conflict and concerns the reconstruction of one or all of a number of key infrastructures such 
as the economy, society or political functions.  Peace building is planned and implemented with the 
aim of ensuring that conflict does not break out again.  The peace building activity is planned at the 
macro-level either within the UN system or international Non governmental organisations (NGO) 
                                                 
105 Lee, R.J. “The United Nations Peacekeeping Success but Peace Enforcement Failures”  Australian International 
Law Journal. (2000) at 182.   
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but it is conducted at the local community, or micro-level.106  Unlike peace making, peace building 
is an amalgamation of military and civilian activity. 
 
Past Secretary –General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace building as an; 
 
action to identify and support structures designed to strengthen and consolidate peace … often 
[started] prior to the end of a conflict, to hasten the establishment of peace on firm foundations. 107 
 
In the definitions presented to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, the Department of Defence submitted that peace building  
 
involves post conflict diplomatic and military actions that seek to rebuild the institutions and 
infrastructure of a nation that is torn by civil war; or build mutually beneficial bonds amongst 
nations formally at war in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.108 
 
From this selection of definitions it would appear that peace building is a combination of traditional 
peacekeeping, perhaps an observer mission, or the provision of border security with a concerted 
diplomatic effort.  The emphasis in these operations should be on the diplomatic and civilian 
exercise of restoring a civil infrastructure.  East Timor has recently been the focus of UN efforts in 
peace building with UNTAET facilitating the reconstruction of the judicial, policing, military and 
political infrastructure.  Peace building operations are inevitably the desired End State of any 
peacekeeping operation as the balance shifts from the military to unquestioned civil primacy of the 
operation.  The transition between INTERFET and UNTAET and the shift within UNTAET itself 
to Timorese self-government is arguably the model example of a successful movement from 
                                                 
106 Above n 67 at 3. 
107 Boutros-Ghali in Ocran, T.  “The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping” Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol 25:1] (2002) at 2. 
108 Above n 56 at 152. 
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enforcement to peace building.   As noted by Strohmeyer ‘You can force your way in but you have 
to build your way out.’109 
 
Kosovo provides another excellent demonstration of the requirement for building out of an 
operation. In Kosovo, as in East Timor, the UN invested significant efforts in building civil 
administrations from scratch.  One of the earliest institution-building activities in Kosovo was the 
establishment of an emergency judicial system, when on 30 June 1999 the District Court was 
opened in Pristina.110   Another more mundane requirement for early attention in any peacekeeping 
mission required to move towards peace building is the establishment and enforcement of road 
traffic rules.  Such simple steps are easy to overlook but the seeds of progress toward the 
withdrawal of the UN force are to be found in such mundane activities. 
 
Peacekeeping in support of humanitarian missions 
 
In the introduction to this chapter humanitarian crisis was identified as an increasingly significant 
catalyst for the insertion of peacekeeping forces with the concomitant role of support to 
humanitarian aid agencies or NGO.  Given the importance of this catalyst for peacekeeping it is 
deserving of at least brief attention at this point by highlighting an interesting perspective on the 
legal basis on which NGO and military peacekeepers cooperate, put forward by Ted A. Van 
Baarda.111   
 
                                                 
109 Stohmeyer, H. “Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems 
in Kosovo and East Timor” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer 2001) at 108. 
110 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo S/1999/987 16 
(September 1999) at 38.  
111 Van Baarda, T.A. “A Legal Perspective of Cooperation Between Military and Humanitarian Organisations in Peace 
Support Operations”.  International Peacekeeping, Vol 8, No.1, (Spring 2001) at 99-116. 
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Van Baarda begins by pointing out that there is a treaty or convention basis upon which NGO and 
military may cooperate within extant international law.  The roots of the relationship he identifies 
in the Convention of 1864 on the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.112  
Although acknowledging that the references to medical services, which receive special protection 
under the Convention, are intended to be military, the work performed is humanitarian and a level 
of civilian cooperation is found in the arrangements made for placing and supplying the medical 
establishments. 
 
The next step on Van Baarda’s path is found in the 1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.113  In this Convention there is recognition for civilian 
medical services set up by ‘Voluntary Aid Societies’, which Van Baarda sees as the natural 
progenitors of the NGO.114  The concept of international organisations of this character is 
contemplated within the Convention, as demonstrated by express reference to such organisations in 
Article 11.  However, this article only permits international aid societies from neutral countries to 
offer aid, provided they have obtained the consent of their own State and authorisation from the 
belligerent State.  Van Baarda sees this as implying that the aid organisation would be required to 
operate in accordance with the instructions of the belligerent, not a situation likely to be tolerated 
by any modern NGO.   This state of affairs is effectively the modern position in international 
humanitarian law as far as care for sick and wounded is concerned, indeed Article 27 of the First 
Geneva Convention115 expressly states in addition to the requirements referred to above; 
 
[t]hat personnel and those units shall be placed under the control of that Party to the conflict   
                                                 
112 (ser. 1) 607, 129 Consol. T.S. 361, entered into force June 22, 1865. Geneva, 22 August 1864 
113 11 L.N.T.S. 440, entered into force August 9, 1907 
114 Certainly organisations such as Medecins sans Frontieres would fulfil precisely the roles envisaged in the 1929 and 
1949 Conventions. 
115 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 
(August 12, 1949). 
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NGOs keen to assert that humanitarian law is the applicable law in the more robust peacekeeping 
operations may perhaps want to be careful what they wish for! 
 
Perhaps fortunately, humanitarian aid practice is considered to have moved beyond that covered by 
the Conventions with discussion being directed rather towards the practical operational 
considerations verses the NGOs independence dilemma that are often at the heart of tension 
between NGOs and the military.116   In the process Van Baarda notes that the NGOs often have 
been the ones effectively directing the way in which humanitarian aid is provided.  The specific 
example given is that of UNPROFOR which gave support to UNHCR under an enlarged mandate.  
UNHCR in turn coordinated requests from the NGO so that UNPROFOR could provide protection 
as required through liaison with UNHCR.  This solution to the cooperation and coordination 
problem was both innovative and outside anything provided for under the Conventions, which at 
this point in time provide the only legal basis for military and NGOs cooperation. 
 
Returning to a more incremental legal development, Van Baarda seems to be arguing for a 
development of humanitarian law into peacekeeping by the extension of the:  
 
Draft agreement relating to hospital zones and localities’ as annexed to the First Geneva and the 
Fourth Geneva Conventions.  The form of the extension would be to include refugee camps and 
presumably other humanitarian aid posts where the term ‘hospital zone’ appears.  Also advocated is 
the inclusion of cooperation in the field of heavy logistics. 117   
 
Van Baarda’s suggestion may certainly be an acceptable method of alleviating the tensions between 
NGOs and military but there are a number of difficulties in adopting this course of action.  The 
                                                 
116 Above n 111 at 102. 
117 Id at 114. 
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establishment of a new convention is a politically complex and time-consuming operation at the 
best of times.  In this case there is the potential for significant division between those nations 
traditionally supplying international humanitarian aid and those receiving it, as well as between 
traditional suppliers of the organisations and military forces.  The US for example, is particularly 
sensitive toward its military being dictated to by agencies outside the control of the US 
government.118  Another major difficulty with this approach is that it leaves less room for 
flexibility.  By mandating a role in the facilitation of cooperation for, for example, the UNHCR, the 
Security Council could provide a legal basis for military and NGOs cooperation that is both flexible 
and has the advantages born of legitimacy.   
 
Certainly the current ad hoc arrangements on an operation by operation basis do not appear to suit 
any one but it seems unlikely for the reasons outlined above that Van Baarda’s suggestions will be 
taken up for the foreseeable future.     
 
Internal Stages 
 
It has been identified in this work that peacekeeping has moved through a number of historical 
phases of development to reach the modern complex form.  Commentators have also recognised 
that peacekeeping operations themselves also move through phases in their individual development.  
Each stage in this development is linked with a particular peacekeeping strategy.  Ryan119 identifies 
these stages noting that although different commentators use different terminology to describe each 
stage and that some operations may stagnate in a stage for very long periods, there is broad 
agreement that there is common ground as to the process.  Ryan sets the stages out as follows: 
 
                                                 
118 See for example the US attitude towards the International Criminal Court. 
119 Ryan, S “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles?” in Woodhouse, T and Ramsbottom, O. 
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. (2000) at 34. 
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Stage    Strategy 
 
1. Pre-violence  Conflict prevention 
2. Escalation  Crisis / humanitarian intervention 
3. Endurance  Peacemaking and relief work 
4. De-escalation Peacemaking and ‘traditional’ peacekeeping 
5. Post-violence  Peace building / transformation.120 
 
The importance of the internal stages in the peacekeeping process is that one of the tasks of the 
peacekeeping operation will be to shape the environment to achieve the conditions conducive to the 
next stage in the process.  Where peacekeepers themselves are unable to achieve this then the 
responsible international actors will be responsible for attending to this task.  Planners responsible 
for the peacekeeping operation should be identifying the markers for the process and planning the 
elements of the operation in such a way as to make shaping the environment an achievable task. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from this brief overview, peacekeeping is an increasingly complex phenomenon.  It 
is both military and civilian; it is used to keep international peace, to build nations and to relieve 
the suffering of peoples.  It has arguably become the keystone in the Security Council’s fortress 
against the destabilisation of nations and the spread of the ‘scourge that is war.’121  The legal basis 
for peacekeeping does not appear in the UN Charter but the ICJ has confirmed its legitimacy as a 
tool.  The UN needs to ensure that peacekeeping operations do not lose legitimacy by stepping 
outside the boundaries of the law.   This work is aimed at contributing to that process by identifying 
the legal framework to be applied in peacekeeping in collapsed States. 
                                                 
120 Id at 34. 
121 Preamble to the UN Charter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Theory of Peacekeeping from a UN Perspective 
Introduction 
 
In chapter one of this work the question was asked what is peacekeeping?  A review 
of the literature demonstrated that peacekeeping has its legal basis in the implied 
powers of the UN Charter and that it has developed through a continuum of change 
from a traditional, lightly armed group of observers to a highly complex and 
sophisticated organisation capable of providing the basic infrastructure upon which a 
State can be pacified or even recreated. 
 
While chapter one identified what is meant by the term peacekeeping this chapter 
focuses on the development of the UN’s approach to the role of peacekeeping in 
achieving the aims of the Charter. 
 
This chapter will use UN reports and responses from State or State based actors to 
identify the UN’s vision for peacekeeping from the Secretary-General’s report on the 
future of peacekeeping in 1992 to the report of the Secretary-General Kofi Anan in 
2005.   
 
The reports 
 
The UN has grown in size and complexity since its inception.  The organisational 
requirements for peacekeeping operations have also grown and become more complex 
as the polarisation created by the Cold War fragmented.  As discussed in chapter one 
of this work, the end of the Cold War heralded an increase in the use of peacekeeping 
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operations as an option available to the Security Council.  Although the UN Charter 
and the implied powers drawn from it provided the legitimacy for peacekeeping, it 
became clear to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that a vision and policy were 
required to direct its use.   
 
In January 1992 the Security Council held its first ever meeting at the Heads of State 
level and asked the newly elected Secretary-General, 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to 
prepare a report mapping the future of peacekeeping operations.  This report was to 
see the commencement of a dialogue regarding peacekeeping within the UN as well 
as from critics, academics and interested parties.   
 
The key reports that concern the development of a vision and plan for peacekeeping 
and are therefore the subject of this chapter are:  
 
1. An Agenda for Peace, prepared by the Secretary-General in 1992,  
 
2. Cooperating for Peace, which was the Australian response to An Agenda for 
Peace submitted to the UN in September 1993,  
 
3. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, prepared by the Secretary-General in 
1997 after it became clear that the end of the Cold War was not the panacea that had 
been hoped for,  
 
                                                          
1 Goulding, M. Peacemonger  (2002) at 14. 
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4. The Brahimi Report, prepared at the direction of the Secretary-General to get 
peacekeeping operations back on track after perceived failures in peacekeeping 
operations in 2000,  
 
5. An Agenda for Peace Ten Years On, A UK commentary on the progress made 
ten years after publication of the original report in February 2002,  
 
6. Responsibility to Protect, the report prepared by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty in response to a request from the UN issued 
December 2001, and  
 
7. In Larger Freedom, prepared by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to encourage a 
return to the principles of the United Nations following the invasion of Iraq by the 
Coalition of the Willing issued in 2005. 
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An Agenda for Peace 
 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented “An Agenda for Peace, 
Preventative Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping” to the UN Security 
Council which adopted it on 31 January 1992. In An Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali 
reminded the Security Council that the fundamental requirement for any action by the 
UN is founded on the Security Council’s ability to reach agreement.  It was hoped that 
the end of the Cold War had ushered in a new era of cooperation within the Security 
Council, which would result in the practical implementation of the Charter ideals, 
specifically including the securing of human rights.2 
 
By the time Boutros Boutros-Ghali became Secretary-General peacekeeping was 
already a central part of the UN strategy for the preservation of international peace 
and security.  But in An Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali presented: 
 
“a coherent conceptual framework for the UN’s efforts to help maintain peace and 
security in the post-Cold War era and to define some of the techniques that would be 
needed.”3    
 
Peacekeeping was only one of the techniques for achieving peace developed in An 
Agenda for Peace but the report made a significant contribution to the practice of 
peacekeeping by articulating the underlying concepts, legitimising its operation and 
outlining future possibilities.  The report defined peacekeeping as: 
                                                          
2 Boutros-Ghali, B. An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277 – s/24111. (17 June 1992) at para 1. 
3 Above n 1 at 20. 
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“the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent 
of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police 
personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands 
the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”4 
 
As well as peacekeeping the report addressed the related concepts of preventative 
diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace building.  These concepts were 
presented as tools to be used individually or in combination by the UN to respond 
proactively to a situation that threatens peace and security.     It is this proactive vision 
for the role of the UN that is at the core of An Agenda for Peace. 
 
Collective Human Security 
 
In An Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali sets out his view that each element of the UN, 
including each Member, has an indispensable role to play in the maintenance of 
human security.5  This has led commentators to argue that Boutros-Ghali was 
identifying a new basis for intervention by the UN.  Peou for example, argues that An 
Agenda for Peace gave rise to a new concept of “collective human security.”6  For 
Peou this concept is a considerable step from the way peacekeeping had evolved up to 
that point.  He argues that although An Agenda for Peace emphasised the importance 
of sovereignty in the UN process it also noted that absolute and exclusive sovereignty 
was no longer, if it ever had been, a viable concept.7    
                                                          
4 Above n 2 at 20. 
5 Above n 2 at 16 
6 Peou, S. “The UN, Peacekeeping and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to the 
Brahimi Report” International Peacekeeping Vol 9 No2 Summer (2002) at 51-68. 
7 Above n 2 at.6. 
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Peou suggests that Boutros-Ghali put forward an alternative approach to the sovereign 
State as the key to international action on the basis of a system of collective human 
security.  This sees the individual, not the State as the point of reference.  The concept 
challenges the basic premise that intervention by the international community is for 
the purpose of preserving the State and instead puts forward collective intervention 
action as a means of achieving human security.8  It also challenges arguments that the 
State is the only entity responsible for providing security to the people.  The adoption 
of the concept of collective human security effectively eliminates arguments over the 
ability to intervene in circumstances where human security is endangered.  As a result 
intervention on this basis must override State sovereignty. 
 
The concept of collective human security has the potential to provide a justification 
for humanitarian intervention, not only in the absence of a State with the ability to 
provide consent, but potentially also against the express wishes of the State.  The 
Security Council can be seen to have adopted the concept through Security Council 
Resolution 1296 (2000).  In this Resolution the Security Council stated that: 
 
the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to 
civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to 
international peace and security.  
 
Such a finding in a specific circumstance would amount to an Article 39 finding 
enabling the Security Council to adopt the measures available under Chapter VII, 
including the use of force.  One option available to the Security Council in such a 
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situation would be to intervene in the conflict with a military force to protect the 
civilian population.  Effectively a new argument has been introduced into the debate 
regarding humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention may now be based 
upon the concept of collective human security, which gives authority to the UN, or a 
regional Chapter VIII peacekeeping force, to intervene regardless of the wishes of the 
sovereign State, despite Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the UN from 
intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.   
 
Although Peou’s argument is persuasive it overlooks the clearly articulated intention 
of An Agenda for Peace not to undermine State sovereignty or to go as far with the 
concept of human security as Peou suggests.  Boutros-Ghali makes numerous 
references to the importance of the sovereign State.9  In An Agenda for Peace 
Boutros-Ghali sees the State as the primary means of achieving the ideals set out in 
the Charter.  He also reiterates the General Assembly Resolution 46/18210 that inter 
alia stressed the importance of the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of a State as well as requiring the consent of the State where humanitarian aid is to be 
provided.11  The term collective human security is not even used in the report, 
although as noted above, there is reference to the responsibility of all elements of the 
UN including its individual Members, to maintain human security.  Indeed, it is clear 
that protection of fundamental human rights was recognised well before the report as 
a matter that did not contravene the prohibition in Article 2(7).12   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 Above n 6 at 51. 
9 See for example at paras.3,5,6,7. 
10 19 December 1991. 
11 Above n 2 at 12. 
12 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania Case ICJ Rep (1950) at 65; 
Schmidt Case (1984) ILR, 75 at 1. 
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A better view of the report’s reference to human security is that it is a restatement of 
the underpinning Charter commitment to human rights.  Rather than forming a basis 
for intervention by the UN, human security is used in the report to remind each 
Member that it contributes to the maintenance of peace as part of the UN.  If 
understood in this sense then the reference to human security is reinforcing the human 
rights basis of the Charter rather than foreshadowing humanitarian intervention to the 
extent suggested by Peou and evident in later reports, particularly the Responsibility 
to Protect.   It may be that the concept of collective human security found its 
inspiration in the report’s reference to human security but it was not the intended 
effect of An Agenda for Peace to provide a basis for humanitarian intervention 
beyond that which had already been recognised.   
 
Preventative Deployment 
 
An Agenda for Peace noted that the UN has been reactive to situations of conflict and 
called for action in future to precede and prevent conflict.  Boutros-Ghali suggests 
that preventative deployments should be on the basis of consent from a State fearing 
invasion from another.  Consent of the State should be obtained to place a 
peacekeeping force on that State’s side of the border to act as a preventative or 
deterrent to invasion.13  Preventative deployment may be further expanded into a 
demilitarised zone where there is consent from both parties to the dispute.  Again the 
emphasis is placed on consent of the State.  Although difficulties with preventative 
deployments exist, not the least of which is determining the amount of weaponry that 
is required to create a deterrent, there have been situations in which the interposition 
                                                          
13 Above n 2 at 13. 
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of such a force could have averted a humanitarian disaster.  Bellamy14 argues that 
disaster could have been averted in Rwanda and Bosnia by the insertion of a 
preventative deployment.  Had this aspect of An Agenda for Peace been implemented 
many lives may have been saved. 
 
The report emphasises the requirement for consent of the host State where 
deployments are to be made.  From the express reference to Chapter VI of the Charter 
as well as the requirements of neutrality and impartiality it seems that the report was 
developing along the lines of the traditional form of peacekeeping operations for 
preventative deployments. 
 
With regard to peace making the emphasis in An Agenda for Peace is on the 
interaction between the States.  The provision of such humanitarian assistance as may 
facilitate the peace making process is seen as working through the State mechanisms 
not through the independent imposition of aid.15  This is also the position where 
sanctions form part of the peace making strategy.  The alleviation of suffering caused 
as a result of the imposition of sanctions is seen as a responsibility of the State and not 
as a situation requiring provision of aid directly to the people. 
 
UN Standing Force 
 
An Agenda for Peace calls upon the Member States to provide forces to the UN on a 
permanent basis for enforcement action under Chapter VII.  Article 43 of the Charter 
provides for the provision of military personnel and equipment by Member States in 
                                                          
14 Bellamy, C. Knights in White Armour (1997) at 162-163.  
15 Above n 2 at 16. 
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the form of a standing force for use where required for the purposes of Chapter VII.  
Member States had effectively rendered Article 43 useless by failing to detach troops 
to form the UN force.  An Agenda for Peace saw the post Cold War climate as finally 
providing the environment for this concept to be put in action.  It was acknowledged 
that the size of such a force may be difficult to accurately assess but that such a force 
would be useful in meeting a threat from States, other than those equipped with 
sophisticated weapons.16   
 
An Agenda for Peace gives very little guidance on the size or makeup of the force. 
What it does provide is a mission for the force, “to respond to outright aggression, 
imminent or actual.”17  However, this mission is too broad and is effectively 
meaningless; it is in effect a vision rather than a practical mission for a force. Forces 
are put together in the mix of combat forces, logistic and service support arms to 
achieve a specific mission.  Such a general mission does not provide any assistance in 
determining the type of force to be set up. Nor does it assist in determining the 
combination of naval, land and air components required.  Some attempt to define the 
operations to be undertaken by an interim force was identified; these were to be in the 
form of ceasefire enforcement units.  These units were envisaged as being deployed to 
support existing units where a firmer hand was required to bolster an operation.  The 
troops would be volunteers; more heavily armed than peacekeepers and having 
undergone extensive peacekeeping training within national forces.  Although it is not 
articulated in An Agenda for Peace, it seems that the Secretary-General envisaged that 
these units would form the nucleus of the future Article 43 force. 
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From a practical perspective there were always going to be difficulties with Article 
43.  Firstly and most significantly are the political difficulties in providing such a 
force to the UN, issues of command, control, conditions of service and funding to 
name but a few.18  The military specific challenges do not end at the size and 
composition of a force.  Some of the questions that would have to be addressed are:  
 
1. Which State would be responsible for the through life support19 of the 
equipment?  
 
2. Would the UN force be based on the equipment used by one Member State or 
generate new equipment to achieve inter-operability within the force?   
 
3. What authority would be responsible for determining current capability 
against major capital equipment procurement?  
 
4. What level of operational security would be required?  
 
5. How would cryptographic material be generated and handled?   
 
6. How could States be prevented from accessing operational information 
relating to the force through their national contingents?  Such access might 
compromise the mission. 
 
                                                          
18 These will be discussed further below in an analysis of Cooperating for Peace. 
19 “Through life support” is the term used to describe the process of maintenance and repair of 
equipment from its introduction into service until it becomes redundant or is replaced. 
 77
7. Members of the force would be required to use a standard operating 
environment so as to effectively administer the force and operate.  This would require 
the generation of standing and operational orders, presumably in multiple languages.  
Modern Defence Forces develop orders over decades while this force would be 
required to have them in an instant.  Is it feasible to create and maintain such a force 
or is it even achievable?   
 
8. Would members of the force be trained simultaneously in their own and UN 
procedures and processes or would training be left until attachment to the UN force 
and then how would the training be done and by whom?   
 
9. What would be the position of a force member where breaches of national or 
international obligations were alleged?   
 
10. Would different standards apply to members whose parent State were or were 
not signatories to conventions that may be violated by the force?   
 
11. If the Security Council became responsible for making the decisions normally 
made by the State with regard to its defence forces, would the Security Council have 
become a super State rather than merely a forum for States to discuss and determine 
international activities? 
 
These problems are not new; many of them are encountered in every UN operation.  
In such operations however, the forces remain in their national units with only the 
major headquarters being fully integrated.  National units are controlled operationally 
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by the UN headquarters but remain under command of their national command 
elements.  From a practical perspective the UN simply does not have the capacity to 
set up its own force, and there can be no doubt that this and nothing less would be 
required to fulfil the requirements of Article 43.    
 
Improving Peacekeeping 
 
An Agenda for Peace notes the changing nature of peacekeeping.  Boutros-Ghali sets 
out the requirements for a successful operation as:  
 
“a clear and practicable mandate. the cooperation of the parties in implementing that 
mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member 
States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, 
required; effective UN command at headquarters and in the field; and adequate 
financial and logistic support.”20   
 
These requirements are not contentious and remain the key basis for a successful 
operation.  In particular the provision of a mandate that is robust enough to permit the 
deployed force to effectively contribute to the restoration of peace and civilian 
government is a recurrent theme.  What is noteworthy in An Agenda for Peace is the 
clear articulation of the requirements and the acknowledgment that peacekeeping has 
moved beyond a purely military response option to become a complex, integrated 
military and civilian response.   This articulation of the increasing complexity of 
peacekeeping opened the way for the future operations that were capable of 
                                                          
20 Above n 2 at .20. 
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replicating many of the functions of government bureaucracy in places such as 
Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and East Timor.  
 
Peace Building 
 
Although peace building is primarily a diplomatic and civilian led part of the 
peacekeeping process, An Agenda for Peace acknowledges the military role in 
providing the infrastructure for peace building.   Provision of logistic support as well 
as specialist skills, such as de-mining, are specifically identified as key areas in which 
the military may be involved.21  Many of the structures of State that have collapsed 
and require rebuilding post conflict to avoid the danger of relapse into conflict can be 
provided in the first instance by the military.  
 
Protection of UN Personnel 
 
An Agenda for Peace raises the issue of protection for the UN personnel performing 
the roles within the peacekeeping operations and notes that efforts need to be made 
for their protection at an international level.  In An Agenda for Peace the Security 
Council is urged to take action against elements that attack the peacekeepers and UN 
workers or to withdraw from operations as a result of such attacks.   
 
The Security Council has condemned assaults upon peacekeepers and in Somalia 
withdrew the operation altogether, although the withdrawal was as a result of the 
                                                          
21 Above n 2 at 24. 
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domestic US response to US losses rather than owing anything to An Agenda for 
Peace.   
 
There was however the development of an international covenant to protect those 
working for the UN, including peacekeepers.  The Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel22 owed in large part its existence to the advocacy 
of Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace. 
 
Conclusions on an Agenda 
 
An Agenda for Peace was intended to set the tenor for the brave new world that faced 
the international community at the end of the Cold War.  The Secretary-General 
wanted it to act as a catalyst for refocusing the world community on the original 
purposes of the UN.  Peacekeeping was a central theme of An Agenda for Peace 
because it had developed into an increasingly useful tool for the UN despite its 
absence in express terms from the Charter.   A number of the issues advocated by 
Boutros-Ghali came to fruition such as the Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel.  The report provided the basis for development of 
ideas in subsequent reports and some of the measures advocated were not to be 
followed.  In some part this was due to the visionary rather than real politik approach 
of the report.23    
 
Perhaps the best example of this idealistic approach is the recommendations regarding 
raising the UN standing force set out in Article 43.  Article 43 was not designed in the 
                                                          
22 UN Doc A/RES/49/59 (1994), (entered into force 15 January 1999) 
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Charter to provide a peacekeeping force, its purpose was to provide the UN with the 
military means to conduct the enforcement measures made available by Article 42.   
In An Agenda for Peace this role is specifically preserved and it is expressly stated 
that the standing force was not intended to be used for peacekeeping or even peace 
enforcement, for which separate units were to be made available.24  It is very clear 
that in An Agenda for Peace the Secretary-General saw a distinction between peace 
enforcement and the larger scale operations for which an Article 43 force would be 
deployed.  Article 43 forces would only be deployed “to respond to outright 
aggression, imminent or actual.”25  It seems then that the Secretary-General was 
making a distinction between peace enforcement and a situation where an armed 
conflict was imminent or actual.  Regrettably peace enforcement is not defined in An 
Agenda for Peace so that it is difficult to assess whether the Secretary-General was 
intentionally drawing a distinction between peace enforcement and armed conflict in 
which the UN would intentionally engage.  
 
Implementation of Article 43 simply could not withstand the realities of what the 
international community was practically able to do.  The planning and logistic 
requirements for a standing UN force would have been considerable and the cost of 
such an undertaking would have put a significant drain on the resources of a UN 
organisation that consistently suffers from funding constraints.26      
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
23 See for example Rostow, E. “Should UN Charter Article 43 Be Raised from the Dead” Global 
Affairs (Winter 1993) at 109-124. 
24 Above n 2 at 43-44.  
25 An Agenda for Peace paragraph 42. 
26 Even areas as central to the Charter provisions as the work of the High Commission for Human 
Rights cannot adequately perform their mission as a result of funding shortfalls; Arbour, L. 
“Commissioner Laments UN Funding Shortfall” 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200505/s1379157.htm (16 Jun 2005). 
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Despite the practical problems with the Article 43 force a number of States including 
the US took an active interest.  President Clinton commissioned a report into the 
viability of the proposal, expanding it to include peace enforcement operations.27  
 
However, the US experience in Somalia in 1993, graphically depicted in the popular 
movie “Black Hawk Down,” put an end to the US interest in expanding the Article 43 
role and indeed for some time the US lost interest in UN peacekeeping altogether.28  
With the loss of US support the interest in raising an Article 43 force disintegrated.  
 
Peou’s argument that An Agenda for Peace raised the concept of collective human 
security, particularly as a basis for humanitarian intervention, is interesting but it does 
not seem to have been developed in the report to the extent argued for by Peou.  
Boutros-Ghali certainly highlighted the increasing amount of room created for 
intervention by the development of peacekeeping, but he still maintained that the 
State must be preserved as the main conduit through which the benefits of united 
international action must function.   The issue of peacekeeping by consent is raised on 
a number of occasions and although the proliferation of Chapter VII intervention is 
foreshadowed, there is a clear preference that at least one State party involved should 
be consenting. 
 
Perhaps the greatest significance as far as peacekeeping is concerned in An Agenda 
for Peace is that it did for the first time clearly articulate the central place of 
peacekeeping in the UN planned response to threats to international peace and 
security.   It provided; 
                                                          
27 Snyder, J.W. “Command versus Operational Control: A Critical Review of PDD-25” 
http://www.ibiblio.org/jwsnyder/wisdom/pdd25.html (16 Jun 2005). 
 83
 
“a coherent conceptual framework for the UN’s efforts to help maintain peace and 
security in the post Cold War era and to define some of the techniques that would be 
needed.”29  
 
An Agenda for Peace also introduced the concept of peace enforcement units that 
would perform a more robust, interventionist form of peacekeeping that would hold a 
place between the traditional consensual operations and all out armed conflict as used 
in Korea.30  By necessity such operations would fall under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The concept of peace enforcement supporting a more interventionist role for UN 
peacekeeping would be one of the key themes further developed by the reports 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter.  As it turned out Chapter VII operations 
would form the basis of the majority of peacekeeping operations post An Agenda for 
Peace. 
 
Cooperating for Peace 
 
On 27 September 1993 Gareth Evans, the then Australian Foreign Minister, presented 
Cooperating for Peace31 to the UN as an Australian contribution to the debate 
initiated by An Agenda for Peace.  It developed many of the concepts that were 
introduced in outline form by An Agenda for Peace and put forward a response to the 
introduction of many of the measures advocated.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Ibid. 
29 Above n 1 at 14. 
30 Rich, P. B. “Warlordism, Complex Emergencies and the Search for a Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention” in Gordon, D.S. and Toase, F. H.(eds) Aspects of Peacekeeping” (2001) at 267.  
31 Evans, G. Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. (1993). 
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Cooperative Security 
 
A concept introduced for the first time by Cooperating for Peace was the concept of 
“cooperative security”.  Cooperative security is closely aligned to “comprehensive 
security” and “collective security”.  Comprehensive security is defined as a: 
 
“notion that security is multi-dimensional in character, demanding attention not only 
to the political and diplomatic disputes that have so often produced conflict in the 
past, but to such factors as economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, unregulated 
population flows, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism and human 
rights abuse.”32   
 
Collective security is a term that has a mainly military response focus.  Cooperative 
security embraces both collective security and comprehensive security and develops 
and integrates them.  Cooperative security is: 
 
a broad approach to security which is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in 
temperament; emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than 
exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favours multilateralism over bilateralism; 
does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that States are 
principal actors in security systems, but accepts that non-State actors may have an 
important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, 
but does not reject them either; and which above all, stresses the value of ‘habits of 
dialogue’ on a multilateral basis.33 
 
                                                          
32 Id at 16. 
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In practical terms the scope of cooperative security was to be very wide-ranging and 
inclusive.  The aim of introducing the new definition was to move away from 
terminology that already implied certain well used measures and find a new 
description that would include all the options available to the international community 
without giving bias to any particular option.  This approach was to encourage 
selection and integration of means and methods appropriate to the particular situation.  
Peacekeeping, as it is defined for the purposes of this work, forms a small part of this 
integrated response system.  Peacekeeping within the cooperative security framework 
was to have increased flexibility and responsiveness. 
 
Preventative Deployment 
 
Military intervention in the form of preventative deployment is introduced in An 
Agenda for Peace and followed up in Cooperating for Peace.  This strategic response 
is based on the positioning of military forces or observers in such a way as to deter the 
escalation of a particular situation into armed conflict.34   The difficulty for insertion 
is to select a situation in which the insertion of force acts as a deterrent and not a 
trigger to escalation.  Cooperating for Peace points out that such a deployment must 
by its nature be conducted under Chapter VI of the Charter.  The report saw 
difficulties with this approach as Chapter VI imposes the necessary restrictions on 
force to self-defence and the need for consent of the parties; from the report’s 
perspective this may mean that the insertion of the force was pointless.  It saw the 
self-defence requirements as meaning that the force is without teeth, while it 
expressed concern that the receipt of consent would mean the deployment was 
                                                                                                                                                                      
33 Ibid. 
34 Id at 81. 
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without purpose given that if States are prepared to consent to the insertion of such a 
force, prevention of the dispute can probably be achieved without the need for it.35   
 
This reaction tends to overlook the realities of international politics where consent is 
not necessarily given freely but as a result of pressure from other international actors.  
In East Timor, for example there is some suggestion that US diplomatic pressure was 
applied to Jakarta to ensure that armed conflict between the Australian led contingents 
and the Indonesian armed forces did not break out.  The fact that a US Marine 
Expeditionary Unit was placed just over the horizon may also have been a settling 
factor. 36 
 
Cooperating for Peace argues that any intervention on the basis of preventative 
deployment needs to be either backed by the will to transition to a Chapter VII 
operation, or the ability to withdraw from the operation entirely.37  The process must 
also be characterised by a sophisticated level of integration into the diplomatic and 
political effort.  There is a tendency in UN operations of the type envisaged by 
Cooperating for Peace as being amenable to preventative deployments, to be reactive 
to crises rather than to be well planned responses to foreseen events.  The UN has had 
difficulty in developing the concept beyond a theoretical weapon in the UN’s arsenal 
of responses.  To make it work, planning time frames must be shortened by decisive 
political decision making.  The issue of proactive response is a repeated theme in the 
UN reports and responses and an issue that the UN appears to be constantly grappling 
with.   
                                                          
35 Id at 84. 
36 Cobb, A. “East Timor and Australia's Security Role: Issues and Scenarios” Current Issues Brief 3 
1999-2000. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib03.htm#5. (11 Jul 2005).  
37 Above n 31 at 84-85. 
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Even in the former Yugoslavia where preventative deployment was utilised it became 
necessary to turn to NATO under a Chapter VII mandate to provide the teeth required 
for any form of successful outcome.  However, despite its limitations and the fact that 
use of preventive deployment may be impractical in many cases, it is possible to 
envisage situations where it may be an effective option.  General Sir Roderick Cordy-
Simpson when providing answers to the UK Defence Select Committee in 1999 was 
of the view that a preventative intervention in Kosovo would have been the right 
solution subject to timing.38  The issue comes down once more to creating the 
environment in the Security Council where decisive action can be taken and responses 
to situations planned instead of hastily cobbled together solutions provided at the last 
moment.  
 
Peace Making 
 
It has been noted in this work that confusion often exists in the literature between 
peace making and peace enforcement.  Cooperating for Peace does not fall into this 
error but clearly separates the essentially diplomatic activity of peace making and the 
military responses of peace enforcement and peacekeeping.  Peace making in 
Cooperating for Peace is based on the peaceful diplomatic means of dispute 
resolution found in Article 33 of the UN Charter, but implemented after a dispute has 
spilled over into armed conflict.39  The process is broken down into two stages with 
Stage I being containment of the dispute and the implementation of measures such as 
                                                          
38 Cordy-Simpson, R. (1999). United Kingdom Parliament. http://www.parliament.the-stationary-
office.co.uk/pa/cm/199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39. Q.200. (15 Nov 2003) 
39 Above n 31 at 89. 
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a ceasefire, while Stage II is the production of a lasting condition of peace between all 
concerned.40  
 
Peacekeeping may be used in the peace making process to assist with the supervision 
of Stage I agreements, such as through the deployment of peace monitors, observers 
or election monitors. These operations are inserted in order to create the conditions for 
Stage II peace making but are not essential or required within the peace making 
process, which may well occur without the insertion of a peacekeeping operation.41  
The crucial requirement and the rock upon which many operations have floundered, is 
to maintain the aim of achieving Stage II and not to permit the operation to stagnate 
into a comfortable status quo; arguably the fate of the operation in Cyprus.  
 
Peacekeeping 
 
With regard to peacekeeping, Cooperating for Peace notes that it is performed either 
by the police or the military, usually supported to a greater or lesser extent by 
civilians.  There is also a distinction between peacekeeping and the preventative 
deployments, as well as between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.  Peacekeeping 
is viewed as an activity performed primarily after armed conflict. It is about ensuring 
that the agreements reached in Stage I of the peace making process are fulfilled. The 
methods used in peacekeeping are inherently peaceful.  Peace enforcement is carried 
out in the face of resistance by one or more of the parties and as a result the methods 
are perforce not peaceful.42  
 
                                                          
40 Above n 31 at 90. 
41 Above n 31 at.90-91. 
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One of the disadvantages noted for peacekeeping in Cooperating for Peace is the risk 
that parties to a dispute will prefer to keep the status quo created by the introduction 
of peacekeepers and never move into Stage II.  Specific examples of this are 
identified as the operations in Cyprus and Kashmir.  The increasing complexity of 
peacekeeping operations is also noted.  In hindsight the rush towards complexity had 
hardly begun when Cooperating for Peace was written but the trend was already 
evident though not fully anticipated in the report. 
 
Traditional Peacekeeping. A number of categories and descriptions of Chapter VI 
peacekeeping have already been set out in chapter one of this work.  In Cooperating 
for Peace only two categories are advanced.  The first is traditional peacekeeping with 
the identified requirements of consent from all parties, use of force only in self-
defence and impartiality.  Other requirements in traditional peacekeeping set out in 
the report are: a requirement for the united backing of the international community, 
command and control by the UN and a multinational composition of the deployed 
force43.  These expansions of the basic requirements for a traditional peacekeeping 
operation seem rather descriptive of many of the operations rather than an appropriate 
definition of what is required.  It is suggested that a traditional peacekeeping 
operation would still be defined as such even if a permanent member of the Security 
Council abstained from the resolution establishing the operation.  There are also 
examples of classic traditional peacekeeping operations that do not fall under UN 
command and control.  For example, the Multinational Force Observers (MFO), in the 
Middle East to which Australia currently contributes members of the ADF fall into 
this category.  Finally, the requirement for a peacekeeping force to be multinational is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
42 Above n 31 at 99. 
43 Above n 31 at 104. 
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again descriptive of the majority of operations rather than a requirement.  Provided 
that the rules of impartiality, force only in self defence and consent of the parties are 
met there seems no reason to exclude a single nation operation from the category of 
traditional peacekeeping operations. 
 
Expanded Peacekeeping. The other form of peacekeeping set out in Cooperating for 
Peace is titled ‘expanded peace keeping’.   This form of peacekeeping is seen in the 
report as a form that goes beyond Stage I and becomes an integral part of the Stage II 
process.  Additional complexity is added from the traditional ‘interposition’ type 
operations as many of the expanded operations involve the settlement of disputes 
between non State groupings, not all of whom may have control over the tactical 
elements of their organisation.44  A variety of actors, military, police and civilians 
perform a variety of functions but the share of responsibility and the functions 
performed by these actors varies considerably from operation to operation.  Expanded 
operations may even require the establishment of a temporary UN administration, a 
formula that has worked well in West Irian, Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo; or 
may be limited to the provision of humanitarian assistance, such as provision of food 
and water or the clearance of mines.  More often the operations involve complex 
amalgamations of tasks and responsibilities requiring a formidable bureaucratic 
framework to be constructed within the operation. 
 
Rules for Effective Peacekeeping.  Mindful of the increasing complexity of 
peacekeeping operations, Cooperating for Peace cautions the automatic use of 
peacekeeping as a panacea to every dispute.  It urges the Security Council to make a 
                                                          
44 Above n 31 at 104-106. 
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realistic assessment of the likely success of any form of operation rather than inserting 
a peacekeeping force so as to be seen to be doing something about a difficult 
situation.  Without attempting to limit the use of peacekeeping as a response, 
Cooperating for Peace suggests that an operation should only be mounted if certain 
identified criteria are met.  These are:  
 
clear and achievable goals; adequate resources; close coordination of peacekeeping 
with peace making; impartiality; local support; external support; and a signposted 
exit.45 
 
In addition to the detailed preconditions for the deployment of peacekeepers 
Cooperating for Peace also marks out the requirement for detailed planning.   
 
Peace Enforcement 
 
Having emphasised the integration of peace making with peacekeeping in the 
traditional and expanded forms, Cooperating for Peace highlights the need for a 
cautious approach to the military options in the application of the Chapter VII 
methods with the use of force as the very last resort.46  At the time of the publication 
of Cooperating for Peace, Chapter VII enforcement deployments were ‘extremely 
rare.’47  This situation has changed considerably.    Despite the preference for the 
resolution of problems through peaceful means there are times when there has to be a 
resort to force.   
 
                                                          
45 Above n 31 at 109. 
46 Above n 31 at 133. 
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In Cooperating for Peace an assumption is made that in enforcement actions the 
Geneva Conventions will apply.48  It is suggested that this is based on the historical 
use of Chapter VII in armed conflict situations, such as the Congo and Korea.  The 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian law generally in 
peacekeeping are discussed at length in chapters six and seven of this work as 
determining their application is a central element in understanding which legal 
framework must be applied in collapsed State peacekeeping.  It is suggested that the 
enforcement actions envisaged in Cooperating for Peace are those that amount to 
armed conflict rather than any operation that is authorised under Chapter VII.  The 
understanding of peace enforcement found in Cooperating for Peace represents a 
different approach from An Agenda for Peace where, as discussed above, peace 
enforcement was set out as a response that was more forceful than peacekeeping but 
appeared to fall short of armed conflict. 
 
Cooperating for Peace identifies three situations in which peace enforcement 
operations are warranted.   These are: cross-border aggression, support of 
peacekeeping operations, and support of humanitarian objectives.49   
 
Cross Border Aggression is perhaps the most straightforward and least controversial 
of the bases for enforcement action.  The function of the UN is essentially to protect 
and uphold the integrity of the Nation-State.  If a State is invaded then the UN has a 
fundamental obligation to protect it.  Cooperating for Peace emphasises the 
importance of the UN in this role and identifies enforcement action in response to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
47 Above n 31 at 143. 
48 Above n 31 at 145. 
49 Above n 31 at 146-158. 
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such an act as being at the core of the UN’s obligations.50  Cooperating for Peace 
rejects the Orwellian argument that some States may be more equal than others, 
particularly oil producers, when it comes to a UN reaction to invasion.  As stated in 
the report: 
 
“It would be deeply unfortunate if any such impression were to become conventional 
wisdom. There are few bottom lines in international affairs, but this is one of them. If 
there is ever another case of naked aggression as clear-cut as Iraq’s against Kuwait, 
the Security Council must act totally consistently with its authorisation of peace 
enforcement in that case, and the international community must act just as swiftly, 
decisively and effectively.”51   
 
Once an enforcement operation has begun then control over it must be manifest.  
Cooperating for Peace urges the continued use of mandated reporting by States to 
demonstrate this control,52 especially given that the most usual form of enforcement is 
a contracted out operation. That is an operation performed by the Member States 
under a Security Council, or on rare occasions a General Assembly, Resolution.   In 
such circumstances command and control is vested in the States concerned and the 
distinctive Blue Helmets are not worn. 
 
Support to Peace Operations. The use of force in support of peacekeeping operations 
was raised in An Agenda for Peace. Cooperating for Peace noted that enforcement 
action in this role had only been used once, that being in the former Yugoslavia.  The 
use of enforcement is divided into two areas: Firstly to protect the peacekeepers and 
                                                          
50 Above n 31 at 146. 
51 Above n 31 at 147. 
52 Above n 31 at 149. 
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secondly to force compliance with a mandate that is being frustrated.53   Cooperating 
for Peace noted some concern with regard to the first proposition on the basis that it is 
very difficult for the Security Council to transform quickly enough into a secondary 
Chapter VII option where that became necessary at short notice.  It was also noted 
that there were concerns among some States as to the appropriateness of such an 
action.  The report recommended that rather than moving from one operation to 
another the Chapter VI operation should be recalled and the new Chapter VII 
operation should be inserted.  Where Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations were to 
be inserted simultaneously then it was recommended that they be kept separate with 
distinct mandates.54 
 
Support of Humanitarian Objectives. The issue of humanitarian aid and 
peacekeeping has been raised in chapter one of this work.  At the time that 
Cooperating for Peace was written the issue was very topical with the Somali 
operation, the first purely humanitarian Chapter VII operation, having been raised and 
deployed in the year Cooperating for Peace was published.55 
 
Cooperating for Peace identifies that there are major practical difficulties in 
determining which humanitarian disasters will and will not be the object of 
peacekeeping efforts.  However, this point is not dwelt upon.  Instead a series of 
conditions are suggested that should be met before the UN undertakes any 
humanitarian enforcement operation.  These conditions are: a consensus from the 
international community, including non State actors regarding the threat to life; 
                                                          
53 Above n 31 at 151. 
54 Above n 31 at 152. 
55 Above n 31 at 155. 
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necessity of intervention; that there is a capacity in practical terms to achieve the ends 
sought.56   
 
While Cooperating for Peace highlighted the need for consensus and planning it did 
not discuss the legality of humanitarian intervention.  A strong inference can be drawn 
from the detailed consideration of the factors that should be addressed in making the 
decision to intervene that it is considered a legitimate and lawful activity under the 
UN Charter.  Humanitarian interventions have been seen subsequently in Rwanda, 
Kurdistan, Haiti and Bosnia.57  Despite these practical applications of the principle 
there is still a strong debate surrounding the legality of humanitarian intervention, 
which arguably has not made much headway since Cooperating for Peace was 
published.   What is certain is that the ingredients for successful intervention set out in 
Cooperating for Peace have not been followed, to the detriment of the operations.58 
 
UN as Trustee 
 
Another issue subject to examination in this work and that is raised in Cooperating for 
Peace is the role of the UN as a Trustee.  In Cooperating for Peace the issue is 
addressed with disappointing brevity.59  The point is made that while Article 73 of the 
UN Charter cannot be used because of the restriction on application to non UN 
members, the machinery behind the Article is still available.   Regrettably this point is 
                                                          
56 Above n 31 at 156-157. 
57 Wray, R.J. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/DecFeb99/Johnson.htm (20 Nov 2003). 
58 Arguably action could have been taken to prevent the massacre at Kigali had the conditions and 
preparation advocated in Cooperating for Peace been followed: For debate regrading humanitarian 
intervention see for example, Abiew, F. K. The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
Humanitarian Intervention, (1998):  Meron, T.  "The Humanization of Humanitarian Law," American 
Journal of International Law, 94 ( 2000) at 239-278. 
59 The issue is limited to less than a page at 158. 
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not developed and a weak argument relating to the cost of establishing an 
administration is used to terminate further consideration of the issues.  In later 
chapters it will be demonstrated that the UN has effectively used the mechanisms 
without articulating the source.  At this stage it is sufficient to note that Cooperating 
for Peace could have made a valuable contribution to preparing the ground work for 
the subsequent operations in Kosovo and East Timor but did not have the foresight to 
predict the rise of this aspect of UN activities. 
 
The remaining attention to peace enforcement in Cooperating for Peace is directed 
primarily at the administration of operations.  One strand that is picked up from An 
Agenda for Peace is the call for the allocation of a standing force for peacekeeping as 
envisaged by Article 43 of the UN Charter.  This is at odds with An Agenda for Peace 
which expressly excluded peacekeeping from the role of the Article 43 force.   
 
While the benefits of a standing force are acknowledged in Cooperating for Peace the 
point is made that practically such a force will never be raised, even from volunteers 
recruited specifically to the UN.  The reasons for this are simple.  Firstly, it would be 
too costly to maintain the size of a standing force required and secondly, even if a 
standing force could be maintained, it would be impossible to accurately assess the 
number of troops and skill sets required to respond to every conceivable peacekeeping 
operation.    Cooperating for Peace concludes that the current ad hoc arrangement is 
the only practical solution but that this solution needs better management and 
organisation.60  
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Concluding Cooperating for Peace 
 
In concluding Cooperating for Peace a number of recommendations for reform of the 
UN are set out.   Some of these recommendations are structural, such as restructuring 
the Secretariat and regenerating the Security Council.  Many of the recommendations 
urge a rethink of the approach to peace operations, particularly with regard to the 
management, coordination and resourcing of the diverse areas and approaches.  
Finally, Cooperating for Peace poses questions that relate to planning.61  In this work, 
informed planning is seen as the most basic and fundamental requirement for the 
successful implementation of any form of peace or peacekeeping operation.  This is a 
theme that also runs through Cooperating for Peace and underpins An Agenda for 
Peace.  Despite the clarion call from these key works for more detailed planning prior 
to deployment of peacekeeping operations the absence of detailed planning persisted 
and constituted the major weakness of peacekeeping operations.   
 
Cooperating for Peace provided a sound planning tool for UN peacekeeping 
activities.  Some of the recommendations set out in the report would not be followed.  
This was due to the inherent and inescapable political nature of the UN and the 
realities of operations on the world stage.  The setting up of an Article 43 force, for 
example, advocated in both An Agenda for Peace and Cooperating for Peace was 
arguably never a viable option for the UN.   
 
Overall Cooperating for Peace made a valuable contribution to the debate regarding 
peacekeeping in the UN.  It built and expanded on the themes raised in An Agenda for 
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Peace and assisted in maintaining the momentum towards more robust, better 
structured and planned operations.  
 
Supplement to An Agenda for Peace 
 
In January 1995 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali presented a report for the 50th 
anniversary of the UN entitled “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.”62  This paper 
was more cautious in its approach in comparison with the almost euphoric tone of An 
Agenda for Peace.  The purpose of the paper was: 
 
“to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen 
difficulties have arisen and where there is a need for the Member States to take the 
“hard decisions” I referred to two and a half years ago.”63 
 
Major Changes 
 
Supplement noted the change in the nature of conflict in that during the Cold War 
conflict was seen as an issue between States while post Cold War conflict was more 
likely to be intra State.  The incidence of peacekeeping and the complexity of the 
operations had increased concomitantly.  The incidence of operations within collapsed 
States had also increased substantially.   The result of this change in the predominant 
form of peacekeeping operation had led to the overburdening of the UN peacekeeping 
headquarters.64   
 
                                                          
62 Boutros-Ghali, B. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995). 
63 Id at para.6. 
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The increase in humanitarian operations was also highlighted as a major area of 
change in the peacekeeping field.  Supplement observed that the change in operational 
character had led to the emergence of a new type of peacekeeping operation under a 
Chapter VII mandate but with the force attempting to maintain impartiality between 
factions.65 
 
As well as the extended types of operation that peacekeepers were engaged in 
Supplement drew attention to the increased integration of military and civilian 
elements within an operation to respond to the increasingly complex operational 
requirements.  Specifically, the rebuilding of the civilian infrastructure had led to the 
integration of specialist administrators to achieve reconstruction and reform of the 
remnants of the existing system of government.66 
 
Finally peacekeeping operations were no longer to be viewed as amenable to rapid 
insertion and withdrawal.  The UN had accepted that a peacekeeping operation was 
unlikely to succeed unless a long-term commitment could be given to sustain the 
operation until reliable institutions could be built up to replace the UN.67  
 
Peace and Security 
 
Supplement noted that the UN does not have a monopoly on many of the 
peacekeeping response options and that regional organisations had been increasingly 
involved in collective security operations due to a perceived short fall by the UN.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
64 Id paras 8-17. 
65 Id paras 18-19. 
66 Id at paras 20-21. 
67 Id at para 22. 
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Supplement urges the UN to find ways of improving its response to these situations as 
the UN is better equipped to bring about a long term and long lasting resolution.68 
 
Supplement identified the reforms effected in the UN organisation to improve 
information flow and situational awareness, an area thought to have contributed to the 
poor performance of the UN.  The effectiveness of these changes demonstrated that 
the major point of failure was not information and bureaucracy but the reluctance of 
States to accept UN assistance.69  This situation created tension with Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter as without consent the Security Council would be required to make an 
Article 39 finding that a threat exists to peace and security and establish an operation 
under Chapter VII. 
 
Peacekeeping 
 
Although peacekeeping was acknowledged to have proved highly adaptable the three 
basic principles of traditional peacekeeping were underlined: consent of the parties, 
impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence.  Supplement asserted that the 
maintenance of these principles was often the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful operations.70   
 
Where the principles have been compromised it has been in the areas of impartiality 
and the use of force.  The specific circumstances highlighted by the report were the 
protection of civilians in safe areas, protecting humanitarian operations and pressing 
parties to achieve reconciliation at a faster pace than they were prepared to accept.  
                                                          
68 Id at paras 23-25. 
69 Id at para 27. 
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Supplement reserved particular criticism for operations where mandates permitting 
operations without the consent of the parties and increased use of force were overlaid 
on extant operations without providing the military force to support such a mandate.  
These operations were seen as doomed to failure as mixing enforcement with 
peacekeeping creates an insurmountable tension between coercion and the diplomatic 
process peacekeeping is designed to facilitate.71   
 
Supplement is highly critical of the impatience displayed by the international 
community.  Settlement of complex situations required time; processes were complex 
and setbacks frequent.  Supplement urged that the temptation to use military force be 
resisted.  The use of force in peacekeeping must be kept separate and cannot be used 
as an interchangeable alternative.72  
 
Another problem in peacekeeping highlighted by the Supplement was the command 
and control arrangements.  Three levels of command and control were identified: 
Overall political direction vested in the Security Council; executive direction and 
command vested in the Secretary-General;73 Command in the field vested in the 
special representative or military commander.74  Supplement criticised the failure to 
observe these distinctions in levels of authority and particularly the tendency towards 
micro-management from above.  Emphasis was placed on the need for information to 
flow through the established channels to avoid confusion in the field.  Linked to this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
70 Id at para 33. 
71 Id at paras 34-35. 
72 Id at paras 36-37. 
73 Generally recognised by military forces as “control” as the S-G has no legal authority to “command” 
under national laws. 
74 Command over Australian troops can only be exercised by an Australian military officer, even the 
Minister for Defence does not “command” Australian military members (see ss8 and 9 Defence Act).  
Therefore a UN Force commander has control but not command.  Command of an Australian 
contingent is vested in the National Contingent Commander.  The US, NZ and UK take the same view. 
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condemnation of interference was the need identified in Supplement for unity of 
command and the equal treatment of all contingents to avoid the implication that 
some States were receiving special treatment.  Supplement did however recognise the 
need for national contingents to consult their own channel provided this did not 
interfere with the needs of the operation.75 
 
Supplement reserved the most urgent call for assistance to the availability of troops 
and equipment.  A decline in the willingness of Member States to supply troops and 
equipment was noted.  The conclusion was drawn that the UN needed to consider the 
creation of a rapid reaction force.  This is a significantly more detailed proposal than 
the impractical suggestion put forward in An Agenda for Peace for an Article 43 
force.  The size was not articulated other than as an unspecified number of battalion 
units: 
 
“These units would be trained to the same standards, use the same operating 
procedures, be equipped with integrated communications equipment76 and take part 
in joint exercises at regular intervals.  They would be stationed in their own countries 
but maintained at a high state of readiness.”77    
 
This proposition was a significant improvement on the proposed Article 43 force 
although there are problems with its practical implementation.  Before troops can be 
allocated to a task the problem must be defined.  This is the basis of all strategic 
planning.  In Supplement the problem is not articulated; rather there is a leap straight 
to the solution. There is also no specific discussion of the role envisaged for the force.  
                                                          
75 Above n 62 at paras 38-42. 
76 A feat not yet achieved within the Australian Defence Force. 
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The temptation to move on to the practical issues such as training regimes and 
interoperability has obscured the real failing in the plan.  It is impossible for a force to 
be trained and equipped for every contingency, particularly when national tax payers 
are expecting their armed forces to be prepared for defence of the State.     
 
Finally in regard to peacekeeping, Supplement advocates the use of radio as a medium 
to disseminate information to the local population.78  Care must be taken with this 
approach. Information Operations, regardless of how well intentioned, are likely to be 
criticised and labelled propaganda, particularly by the NGO community, which can 
lead to unwanted complications in the operation.  However, the UN learned in 
Cambodia the value of providing clear and accurate advice to the ordinary people, 
free from the biased information being put out by the parties to a conflict or dispute.79 
 
Peace Building 
 
Supplement was positive with regard to the progress made in the field of peace 
building but warned that care was still required.  Two kinds of peace building 
situations were examined.  The first form was where a comprehensive peace 
agreement had been reached and a ‘multifunctional’ peacekeeping operation would be 
engaged to oversee the process.  The second was where peace building was taking 
place before or after conflict but without the support of a peacekeeping operation.80   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
77 Above n 62 at para 44. 
78 Above n 62 at para 46. 
79 Boutros-Ghali had not always been a fan of the use of Radio in this way but had been persuaded to 
use it in Cambodia to good effect, ensuring that the civilian population had access to information from 
the UN perspective rather than solely from groups opposed to or critical of the UN intervention: 
Shawcross, W. Deliver us From Evil ( 2000) at 42. 
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In Supplement the Secretary-General was more explicit about the abilities, and even 
the requirement in appropriate cases, for the peacekeeping operation to provide the 
structures of administration than he was in An Agenda for Peace.81   This was an 
important acknowledgment, particularly in the context of the justice system in 
collapsed State peacekeeping operations.   
 
Without reference to sovereignty, it is envisaged in Supplement that the special 
representative would run the activities of government in a collapsed State or 
territory.82  This is exactly what happened in East Timor and parts of the former 
Yugoslavia.  
 
Peace enforcement 
 
The Supplement discussed the issue of peace enforcement.  Unlike An Agenda for 
Peace the Secretary-General did not call for the formation of Article 43 agreements, 
perhaps tacitly acknowledging the impracticality of such agreements in the prevailing 
political environment.  In a continuation of the less optimistic tone adopted by 
Supplement, concern was raised with regard to the proliferation of contracted out 
enforcement operations to Member States.  This concern was based on the lack of 
control that the UN had over these operations and a fear that actions may go further 
than envisaged by the Security Council.  Supplement also questioned whether the use 
of force other than in self-defence was ever appropriate in a peacekeeping operation.  
Despite these concerns and warnings the Supplement was in general positive towards 
                                                                                                                                                                      
80 Above n 62 at paras 48-49. 
81 Above n 62 at para 53. 
82 Above n 62 at para 53. 
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the use of peace enforcement operations as they were seen as more desirable than 
unilateral action.83   
 
Marks84 sees the position in Supplement as going further than acknowledging a case 
by case role for Member States in enforcement operations.  He argues that in 
Supplement the Secretary-General was making a clear distinction between Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII operations with the latter being run directly by the Security Council 
under contracted out arrangements, while the Secretary-General is restricted to 
running the Chapter VI operations.85  Whether Supplement goes as far as separating 
the responsibility for operations to this degree is not as clear as Marks suggests but it 
is certainly the case that UN doctrine set out in Supplement was that: 
 
“[C]oercion cannot be combined with consent-based peacekeeping; they are 
alternatives and a choice has to be made between them.” 86   
 
This doctrine did not last long with the emerging demands of complex, 
multifunctional operations such as Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone forcing the 
Secretariat to adopt a new approach to mixed peacekeeping and enforcement 
operations.87 
 
Coordination 
 
                                                          
83 Above n 62 at paras 77-80. 
84 Marks, E. Peace Operations Involving Regional Organisations National Defense University, 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum25.html (23 Nov 2003). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Above n 2 at 17. 
87 Above n 2 at 74. 
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Supplement acknowledged the inability of the UN to deal with every problem in the 
world.  Cooperation and integration with Members States, individually and as Chapter 
VIII peacekeepers as well as regional organisations, NGO and a variety of 
combinations of actors was noted as essential to achieve human security, the concept 
developed in An Agenda for Peace.  This cooperation was identified as having many 
purposes, including consultation, diplomatic support, operational support and co-
deployment.88 
 
While Chapter VIII peacekeeping was seen in Supplement to have considerable 
potential it was emphasised that even where the resources were available to run the 
operation independently the UN should be involved.   Some basic principles that 
should be applied were identified;  
 
a. mechanisms for consultation with the UN,  
 
b. acknowledgment of the Charter primacy of the UN,  
 
c. clear identification of the division of labour between the UN and the 
relevant organisation, and  
 
d. common standards and policy approaches to problems common to the 
UN and the organisation such as standards for peacekeeping 
operations.89 
                                                          
88 Above n 62 at paras 82-86. 
89 Above n 62 at paras 87-89. 
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As well as cooperation and coordination outside the UN, Supplement also addressed 
the issue of interdepartmental cooperation within the UN.  A number of different 
departments had become involved in peacekeeping, peace building and provision of 
humanitarian aid.  The need for coordination up and down as well as between 
departments was identified as in need of attention.  In Supplement a move was 
signalled toward an improvement in the functional relationships and processes both 
internally and external to the UN warranting the formation of a committee and the 
personal attention of the Secretary-General.90 
 
Financial resources 
 
The financial difficulties commented on in An Agenda for Peace were dealt with in 
Supplement with feeling.  The Secretary-General pointed out that the funding situation 
had become a crisis and that the UN ability to establish peacekeeping operations was 
threatened as a result. In particular the Security Council was criticised for failing to 
ensure the resources were available before establishing operations in Bosnia and 
Rwanda.91  
  
Conclusion 
 
Supplement is concluded by stating that it was: 
 
                                                          
90 Above n 62 at paras 90-96. 
91 Above n 62 at paras 97-101. 
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“[I]ntended to serve as a contribution to the continuing campaign to strengthen a 
common capacity to deal with threats to peace and security.”92  
 
Supplement called on the UN to make the hard decisions, warning that a failure to do 
so would spell trouble for the future.93   
 
The tone of Supplement is in contrast to that of An Agenda for Peace where all kinds 
of possibilities for peacekeeping and the future of UN cooperation were laid out.  
Supplement seems more to outline the failings of the UN and warn of the dangers 
inherent in inaction.  An Agenda for Peace was a child born in the euphoria of the end 
of the Cold War.  Supplement was a morose adolescent, warning that the cause of 
peace could be lost in the negligence and self-interest of the Security Council and 
General Assembly. 
 
Until the Boutros-Ghali Secretary-Generalship the Security Council had not been so 
roundly criticised since Dag Hammarskjold had fought with the Members over the 
Congo peacekeeping operation.  Supplement was the Secretary-General calling in the 
strongest terms for action on the part of the Security Council and the UN in general.  
The approach was not a diplomatic one and it has been suggested that the approach 
adopted by Boutros-Ghali led to his being the first Secretary-General not to be elected 
for a second term.94  
 
 
 
                                                          
92 Above n 62 at para 102. 
93 Above n 62 at paras 103-105. 
 109
Brahimi Report 
 
On 7 March 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan selected a panel of ten experts in 
the area of UN peacekeeping operations to prepare a report that would make frank, 
specific and realistic recommendations for the future of peacekeeping operations.  
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria, who was to give his name to the panel’s 
report, was appointed as the panel leader.   The findings of the panel were released on 
23 August 2000.  The panel made 60 recommendations covering the field of 
peacekeeping operations.  Specific recommendations related to doctrine, strategy, 
planning, decision-making, headquarter organisation staffing levels, logistics, rapid 
deployment and public information. Initially at least, the Brahimi Report was received 
with the approval of key States.  In particular the US claimed that the Report 
highlighted areas in which it had held concerns and urged the Secretary-General, 
Security Council and General Membership to give the Brahimi Report ‘serious and 
expeditious consideration’.95  
 
As a precursor to its recommendations the Brahimi Report noted the fundamental 
importance of the ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping in 
particular, is to succeed.  It also noted that force alone was not sufficient.  Force was 
seen as the means used to create a space within which peace building can occur.  The 
Brahimi Report made it clear that none of its recommendations would have an impact 
on effectiveness unless the Member States were prepared to support operations 
politically, financially and operationally.96  The call for genuine support for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
94 Above n 79 at 204-206. 
95 Boucher, R. The Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping. http://www.us-
mission.ch/press2000/084boucher.htm (21 Nov 2003). 
96 Brahimi, L. The Brahimi Report. http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations (16 Jun 2005)  
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peacekeeping operations rather than empty rhetoric in favour of commencing them 
was a theme repeated from An Agenda for Peace through the Supplement. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The Brahimi Report made it clear that the tendencies of the past to deploy to 
situations of military stalemate and where at least one party to the conflict was not 
committed to the intervention, was not sustainable without a commitment to achieve 
specified outcomes.  Peacekeepers were seen as the means to create the space and 
security for peace builders to achieve self-sustainment of the peace process. The 
report emphasised the partnership between peacekeepers and peace builders, which 
must be seen as an inseparable one.  For future success the role of peace builders in 
complex operations must be acknowledged as a key role.  A number of the 
recommendations of the Brahimi Report were focused on the development and 
improvement of the integrated peacekeeping – peace building process.  In particular, 
with regard to the integration of peace building, the Brahimi Report recommended: 
 
“A doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in 
peace operations that emphasises a team approach to upholding the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve 
national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration programs into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their 
first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund “quick 
impact projects” that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; 
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and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of 
governance institutions.”97 
 
Robust doctrine and the use of force 
 
The Brahimi Report supported the previous core principles of impartiality, consent of 
the parties and the use of force only in self- defence. However, referring to the 
purposes set out in the UN Charter, the Report also identified the need, and in some 
cases the requirement, to preserve the distinction between the victim and aggressor.   
The report identified as a fundamental premise the ability of the UN to respond 
effectively to violations or the Charter.  As a result the UN must be prepared to pass 
more robust mandates including specific authority to use force.  As a consequence 
deployed forces would need to be larger, better equipped and possessed of rules of 
engagement that permitted them to use force, not merely to defend themselves but to 
deny the initiative to their attackers and attacks on the subject of the operation. 
 
The effect of this requirement would be that better planning processes would be 
required in the Secretariat, complex operations would need to be allocated field 
intelligence and enhanced capabilities in order to defend the operation.  The Report 
identified the requirement that UN peacekeepers, both troops as well as civilian 
police, who witnessed violence against civilians must be presumed to be authorised to 
stop it.98  Acceptance of this principle gives weight to the argument that the passing of 
Ordinances such as those passed under INTERFET for the arrest and detention of 
persons committing criminal acts was an inherent right under the mandate. 
                                                          
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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Fearson and Latin99 are critical of what they view as the implied requirement for UN 
forces equipped with robust rules of engagement to be involved in what they argue are 
effectively counterinsurgency actions.  They put forward the argument that such 
operations involve a level of information protection that cannot be achieved in a 
multinational command.  Also, such operations impeach the impartiality of UN 
forces.  They recommend that counterinsurgency should be left to national or regional 
forces.  Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti are pointed to as examples of this approach being 
taken in practice.   
 
Fearson and Latin argue that where a UN force must be involved in any form of 
combat that instead of automatic support for the authority in control, that is the extant 
government, the UN should choose which side to support.  The basis of support 
should be which side is better suited for the governance and peace of the State.  The 
examples given to back this view are the African National Congress in South Africa 
and the insurgency led by Museveni in Uganda.100 
 
This view seems somewhat misconceived as it is at odds with the UN Charter.  The 
UN is effectively obliged to recognise the sovereignty of the State as it finds it.  What 
the UN can do is choose not to intervene or withhold authorisation for a Member 
State to take action.  The point that can be more appropriately made regarding the 
robust forms of peacekeeping is that which was made by White.  He observed that the 
UN peacekeeping operations envisaged by the Brahimi Report are a muscular form of 
peacekeeping that does not cross the line into enforcement actions, the enforcement 
                                                          
99 Fearson, J.D and Latin, D.D. International Institutions and Civil War. (June 2001) 
www.duke.edu/web/licep/4/laitin/fearonlaitin.pdf (16 Jun 2005) at 1-30. 
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role being better suited to Member States. However, White questions the accuracy of 
the assumption that seems to pervade the Brahimi Report that the line into 
enforcement had not been crossed in situations of more robust prosecution of the 
mandate. 101 
 
Fearson and Latin were not the only commentators to raise concerns over the issue of 
impartiality.  The International Peace Academy (IPA) published the results of its 
regional meetings of February to March 2001 at which the Brahimi Report was 
discussed.102  It was noted that while impartiality should remain one of the key 
principles of peacekeeping it should mean a fair application of the mandate and “not 
as an excuse for moral equivocation”.103   States participating in the meetings seemed 
to remain suspicious of peacekeeping and concerned that a peacekeeping operation 
was an excuse for the interference in internal affairs, particularly where the basis of 
the operation was humanitarian intervention.104 
 
Another area that received criticism from the Brahimi Report related to the 
contribution of troops by Member States.  To improve this aspect of operations the 
Report recommended that the Secretariat must be empowered to be fully honest with 
the Security Council regarding the needs of an operation. Troop contributing nations 
should be involved throughout the planning process. Advice from contributing States 
was identified as necessary during the planning and implementation phases and it was 
                                                                                                                                                                      
100 Above n 99 at 22-23. 
101 White, N.D. Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi 
Report).  Journal of Conflict and Security Law. (2001), Vol.6 No.1, at.130. 
102 International Peace Academy. Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi 
Report on UN Peace Operations. 
http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublRepoReseBrahimi_bod.Regional 
Meetings February – March 2001. .(16 Jun 2005). 
103 Above n 102 at 4. 
104 Ibid. 
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suggested that a subsidiary organ of the Council should be created under Article 29 of 
the Charter for this purpose. It was considered to be beneficial for Member States 
contributing troops to an operation to attend Security Council briefings where the 
safety of their troops was affected or where there was to be a change to the mandate 
regarding the use of force.105  These initiatives were aimed at integrating the State and 
UN interests and reducing the risk of failure due to the isolation of contributing 
States.  What was not as clear from the Report was how the Secretariat was to 
exercise control and enforce uniformity on convergent State interests which would 
undoubtedly have impacted on the planning process. 
 
Information management and strategic analysis 
 
The Report made a number of recommendations in the area of information 
management and strategic analysis.  It recommended that a new information gathering 
and analysis entity should be created to support the Secretary-General and members 
of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS).  It was proposed that an 
ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would be created.  
EISAS would maintain an integrated database on peace and security issues, distribute 
knowledge within the UN system, be responsible for policy analysis, formulate long-
term strategies and bring incipient crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership.   It 
was also proposed that the EISAS would consolidate the existing Situation Centre of 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with the addition of all small 
scattered policy planning offices and military analysts, experts in international 
                                                          
105 Above n 96 at 4. 
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criminal networks and information systems specialists. EISAS would then serve the 
needs of all members of the ECPS.106   
 
The focus of analysis of the Brahimi Report has tended not to be in the area of 
intelligence and information management.  The IPA meetings only reported on this 
aspect with regard to the London meeting.  The London meeting called for a more 
detailed analysis of the issue and a greater clarity in the allocation of responsibility for 
information analysis and dissemination.  It was noted that when tackling organised 
crime the State should be given the support required to deal with the situation as the 
local authorities would have the only true understanding of the problem.  For other 
operations it was recommended that an intelligence function should be raised to 
coordinate and guide information.  This function should be kept separate from the 
dissemination of information to the public, which in turn should be separate from 
“military propaganda”.107   The London meeting called also for greater journalistic 
skill and the more effective use of print and electronic media.  This approach to the 
use of media is an expansion of the theme introduced by Broutros-Ghali following the 
success of radio in Cambodia where the UN was able to use this medium to present 
information on its activities directly to the people. 
 
The issue of intelligence gathering on UN operations is fraught with difficulties at the 
practical level.  Many States are deeply concerned about the protection of national 
information.108  The UN is reluctant to approve rules of engagement that permit the 
clandestine acquisition of information.  Even with nationals working within the UN 
there have been occasions of conflicting State and UN interests in the preservation of 
                                                          
106 Ibid. 
107 Above n 102 at 20-21. 
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information and open allegations of espionage.  As early as 1948 for example Jim 
Hill, working in the UN department of the Australian government, was accused of 
espionage for being the source of information that had been passed to Soviet UN 
delegates.109   If Martin Van Creveld is right about the future of conflict and its 
asymmetrical nature110 then the UN will need to invest far more time and effort into 
this area of its operations and overcome the natural reluctance of States to engage in 
information sharing.   
 
Improved leadership and rapid deployment 
 
In order to overcome the difficulties created by delays in the deployment of UN forces 
the Brahimi Report proposed the identification of potential operation leaders and key 
appointments as well as the development of a stand-by force consisting of 
approximately 1500 troops for rapid deployment.  Deployability of the force was to be 
enhanced by a streamlined logistic support system including the development of 
stockpiles of resources to be used on operations.  Pools of civilian personnel were also 
recommended as well as enhancement of the recruitment system.  The identification 
of individuals vital to the rule of law function was also recommended, emphasising 
the central role of the return of law and order to the peace building process. 
 
These enhancements to the process would undoubtedly improve the ability of the UN 
to deploy a force at short notice on a robust mandate.  The recommendations received 
broad support from the IPA meetings and the process of building a military 
                                                                                                                                                                      
108 See for example above n 102 at 13.  
109 McKnight, D. Australia’s Spies and Their Secrets. (1994) at 15-16. 
110 Van Creveld, M. On Future War. (1991). 
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component on the lines proposed in the Brahimi Report commenced with the 
formation of the European Rapid Reaction Force.111    
 
Integrated Mission Task Force 
 
The Brahimi Report proposed the establishment of an Integrated Mission Task Force 
(IMTF) to plan operations and support field headquarters.  The staffing for the IMTF 
was to be drawn from across the UN staff to improve the efficiency of operational 
planning.  This proposal received support at the IPA meetings although it did not 
appear to stimulate significant debate.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Many of the issues addressed in the Brahimi Report built on issues raised in An 
Agenda for Peace and the Supplement. The Brahimi Report was required because 
little action had been taken to implement the recommendations of those previous 
reports.   One issue omitted in the Brahimi Report is implementation of the Article 43 
agreements.  It would seem that the concept of using Article 43 had been abandoned 
as impractical.   The need for rapid response in force still remained and the solution 
put forward in the Brahimi Report seems to have been followed by the European 
Community in the form of the Rapid Response Force.   
 
                                                          
111 Above n 102 at 20.  The European Rapid Reaction Force deployed to the former Yugoslavia in 2003 
despite scientism regarding its capacity to conduct anything other than very limited operations. See for 
example Reyment, S. “No EU Rapid Reaction Force for a Decade” Telegraph Newspaper UK . 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml (11 Jul 2005).  
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The European lead seemed to have been followed by other States in the form of 
commitment to the stand-by agreement system that was set out in the Brahimi Report.  
The proposals have been realised in the form of the United Nations Stand-by 
Agreement System (UNSAS).  States have agreed to provide certain components on 
specified periods of notice in order to rapidly deploy to new peacekeeping operations 
or reinforce existing ones.  Stand-by resources may only be used for peacekeeping 
operations mandated by the Security Council.112  On 19 February 2003 there were 77 
States that had signed up to at least the initial stages of the Stand-by process. 39 of 
these, including the majority of European Union States, had signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to provide resources and two, Jordan and Uruguay, had reached full 
deployment level.113    Although on paper the UNSAS appeared functional by 2003, it 
is difficult to assess whether it could ever be operationally functional.  
 
As eloquently acknowledged by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK permanent representative 
to the UN, the main stumbling blocks to the full implementation of the Brahimi 
Report are the politics of conflict management and the politics of international 
interaction rather than the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposals.114   
 
Agenda for Peace Ten Years On 
 
In 2002, ten years after the publication of An Agenda for Peace, the United Kingdom 
United Nations Association (UNA-UK) published an assessment of the progress made 
in the UN’s peace activities resulting from An Agenda for Peace and subsequent 
initiatives, particularly the Brahimi Report. UNA-UK noted the optimistic outlook of 
                                                          
112 (16 Jun 2005). 
113 Ibid: A model MOU for the provision of Stand-by resources can be found at this site. 
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the original report subsequently tempered by the world realities evident in Supplement 
and the lack of progress towards some of the key recommendations in both papers as 
noted in the Brahimi Report.115 The UNA-UK was of the view that many of the 
recommendations put forward by Boutros-Ghali, while received enthusiastically, were 
not supported. Had they been supported they were of the view that peacekeeping 
disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda may have been avoided.116   
 
Specific issues identified as major contributors to these failures were: the lack of 
sufficient resources to implement peacekeeping mandates, vital aspects of post 
conflict peace building not being funded or integrated into peacekeeping operations 
and reluctance by UN staff to put the true costs of operation support before the 
Security Council.  After Brahimi, the UNA-UK assessment was that the situation 
appeared to have improved to some extent.  The UK led operation in Sierra Leone 
was pointed to as evidence that Member States had finally attempted to address issues 
outlined in the Brahimi report, particularly the need for robust mandates and a 
credible size of force capable for implementing them.117 
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The UNA-UK assessment is a positive one.  While it acknowledged that 
peacekeeping had passed through some tough times it was hopeful that there would be 
full implementation of the Brahimi recommendations and the emergence of genuine 
support for peacekeeping operations by the Security Council. 
 
 
Responsibility to Protect 
 
The Responsibility to Protect was a report prepared by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) examining the dilemma of 
‘humanitarian intervention’.  And specifically it questions: 
 
“When, if ever, is it appropriate for states, individually or collectively, to take 
coercive action, and in particular military action, against another state, for the purpose 
of protecting people at risk within a state?”118   
 
The Responsibility to Protect report was produced by a commission established by the 
Canadian government, which was responding to calls from Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan to reach international consensus on the issue of humanitarian intervention.  
Opposing views had developed within the international community regarding 
intervention, with international actors divided between intervention on humanitarian 
or human rights grounds and the supremacy of State sovereignty.  Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan asked: 
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“…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to Rwanda, to a Serbrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” 
 
The international community was slow to react to the Secretary-General’s appeal so 
the Canadian government took the initiative.  The Responsibility to Protect report 
aimed to bring the debate to a level of agreement between the parties.119  
 
The report is divided into eight chapters dealing with; The policy challenge; New 
approach; The responsibility to prevent; The responsibility to react; The responsibility 
to rebuild; The question of authority; The operational dimension and; The 
responsibility to protect and The way forward.120   
 
Core principles 
 
Underpinning the Responsibility to Protect four core principles and eleven sub-
principles for intervention were developed.  These were: 
 
(1) Basic Principles 
 
a. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for 
the protection of its people lies with the State itself. 
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b. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of international war, 
insurgency, repression or State failure, and the State in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect. 
 
(2) Foundations 
 
The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the 
international community of States, lie in: 
 
a. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; 
 
b. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN 
Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security;  
  
 
c. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection 
declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law 
and national law; 
 
d. the developing practice of States, regional organisations and the 
Security Council itself; 
 
(3) Elements 
 
The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: 
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a. The responsibility to prevent: to address the root causes and the 
direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting 
populations at risk. 
 
b. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling 
human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive 
measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme 
cases military intervention. 
 
c. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a 
military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction 
and reconciliation, addressing the causes of harm the intervention 
was designed to halt or avert. 
 
(4) Priorities 
 
a. Prevention is the single most important dimension of the 
responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be 
exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment 
and resources must be devoted to it. 
 
b. The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should 
always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered 
before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.121 
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The Responsibility to Protect core principles are in many respects a synthesis of the 
reports and commentaries that had preceded it.   In general terms the Responsibility to 
Protect developed the concepts of human security and peace building while basing the 
primary responsibility for these functions not on the international community but on 
the individual State.  The Charter position of the State as the primary functionary in 
international relations is unambiguous, as is the ultimate responsibility of the Security 
Council to ensure international peace and security. 
 
The policy challenge 
 
The first chapter of the report is dedicated to identifying the policy challenges facing 
the international community, specifically with regard to the issue of humanitarian 
intervention.  The report identified the changing international environment, especially 
the new security challenges and implications for State sovereignty with the shifting of 
international power and conditions of sovereignty since 1945.  Of particular note was 
the emergence of the concept of human security and the impact it would have on 
concepts of sovereignty.  Having identified the changing world and additional 
responsibilities of States in it, the report was supportive of strong State identity and 
the role of the sovereign State in international affairs.  The sovereign State in the 
modern context was not viewed as having unlimited power within its borders but as 
having a dual responsibility: to respect the sovereignty of other States and to respect 
the dignity and basic rights of all people within the State.122  
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While upholding the key role of State sovereignty the report raised the issue of 
intervention and related it to the performance of the obligations and responsibilities of 
States.123  
 
Responsibility to protect 
 
The approach of the report to the responsibilities of States in the context of modern 
sovereignty is that a State must protect, prevent, react and rebuild.  As identified 
above, these form the basic elements of the responsibility to protect.  The 
responsibility to protect is about practical protection for people at risk of death 
because their sovereign State is unwilling or unable to protect them.  The report 
identified the four basic objectives that must be met before any intervention could be 
contemplated.  These four objectives were identified as: 
 
To establish clear rules, procedures and criteria for determining whether, when and 
how to intervene; 
 
To establish the legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and after all other 
approaches have failed; 
 
To ensure that military intervention, when it occurs, is carried out only for the 
purposes proposed, is effective, and is undertaken with proper concern to minimise 
the human costs and institutional damage that will result; and 
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To help eliminate, where possible, the causes of conflict while enhancing the 
prospects for durable and sustainable peace.124 
 
The report was concerned to point out that military intervention was not the only 
intervention referred to and acknowledged that many States viewed any international 
involvement, even the provision of aid, as a form of intervention. 
 
The report was concerned to reinforce the commitment of the international 
community to the concept of the nation State and to uphold the definitions and 
protection of sovereignty in the UN Charter.  What the report aimed to do was to shift 
the defensive posture of some States toward a debate regarding the ‘right to intervene’ 
by changing the focus of the debate to the responsibility of the State to act for the 
benefit of those people who needed support from the State.125  This changing of the 
emphasis to the responsibility of the State demonstrated the commitment and 
intellectual rigour applied to the report and the genuine commitment to improve the 
lot of those in need rather than advance the standing of particular international actors.  
 
Responsibility to prevent 
 
While there is a clear responsibility on a State to take action to prevent conflict and 
other man made disasters, the report also identified a responsibility on the part of the 
international community to act in response to the failure of protection.  That is not a 
response to the conflict but to the failure of the State to maintain peace.  The report 
made an important distinction by this approach, one supportive of the concept of 
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sovereignty.  The report traced the UN’s role in fostering support for States to assist, 
both directly and through encouragement of regional organisations.   In order for 
regional and UN organisations to be effective however, the report identified the 
importance of providing early warning and analysis of potential crisis situations.  The 
sharing of intelligence, though difficult with regard to protection of State interests, 
was seen as of significant importance in assisting in early identification of crisis 
situations.126 
 
The report emphasised the role of the Security Council in attempting to tackle the root 
causes of conflict, which were identified as: political, diplomatic, economic, legal and 
military.  The ‘toolbox’ for direct preventative efforts were to consist of components 
designed to tackle these root causes.  The report set out suggested approaches using 
the toolbox and concludes by identifying the need to change from a culture of reaction 
to a culture of prevention within the international community, a change that should be 
led by the Security Council.127 
 
Responsibility to react 
 
The report identified a responsibility for the international community ‘to react to 
situations of compelling need for human protection.’128  Again the toolbox approach 
to intervention was advocated with military intervention representing the last resort.  
The basis for military intervention in the Responsibility to Protect was essentially, 
though not expressed as such, the principle of human security.  The trigger for 
intervention was expressed as ‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human 
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beings’ with such harm identified as ‘large scale loss of life’ such as through actual or 
apprehended genocide or large scale ethnic cleansing.  Once the threshold for 
intervention is met the intervention must be conducted with the intent of averting 
human suffering, as a last resort using proportional means and with reasonable 
prospects of achieving the aim.  The only source of authorisation for intervention was 
seen as the Security Council.  The Security Council should be supported and upheld 
to allow it to function as it was intended in the Charter.  Security Council 
authorisation should precede intervention and the Security Council must respond 
promptly to requests for intervention, subject to confirmation of allegations of large-
scale loss of human life.  There was a warning akin to presentiment however, that if 
the Security Council refuses or is unable to act States may take matters into their own 
hands.  This approach was not supported by the report but it was identified as a 
practical result of Security Council inaction 129 
 
The issue of intervention on the basis of a just cause was raised and the bases that are 
set out reflect the original Just War principles found in the work of St Augustine and 
Grotius.130   The criteria for a just war are that it is declared by a legitimate authority, 
the cause must be just, the intention must be just, not just expedient, force can only be 
used after all other reasonable means have failed, there must be a reasonable hope of 
achieving an outcome, the amount of force must be proportional to the threat faced 
and the outcome should bare a close relationship to the cost. 
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Responsibility to rebuild 
 
The report was concerned that any international intervention on the grounds of 
prevention or reaction should be followed by the obligation to rebuild.  This was seen 
as the only way to effect a durable peace. Post intervention strategy must be planned 
as part of the intervention process.  Some of the key elements of post intervention 
strategy were identified as: security, justice and reconciliation, and economic 
development.131   
 
Of significance to this work, the report identifies Chapter XII of the UN Charter as 
providing a framework to adapt to a UN authority in a collapsed State.132  While the 
basic provisions provide a helpful model, Chapter XII itself prohibits its revival now 
that all the trustee nations have achieved full sovereignty.  It would seem a dangerous 
process to attempt to invoke Chapter XII rather than rely on a Security Council 
mandate that has the authority to implement a tailor made solution to a specific 
situation.  Nevertheless the Trusteeship model is a useful model and has a distinct 
human rights basis thereby supporting the argument that a human rights framework 
should be used in collapsed State peacekeeping. 
 
Question of authority 
 
Chapter six133 of the report examined the source of authority to intervene in the affairs 
of a sovereign State where the criteria for intervention had been met.    The report 
identified the non intervention principles set out in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the 
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Charter and the provisions in Chapter VII which permit the Security Council to 
intervene, if necessary with force, in the event of a threat to peace and security.  
Although noting the Article 51 provisions for the use of force in self-defence, the 
report dismisses these provisions as irrelevant to the purposes of the responsibility to 
protect.  Chapter VIII provisions for regional action are also noted but identified as 
subordinate to the Security Council, the authorisation of which is required, albeit after 
the event in certain situations.134 
 
By examining the legal capacity and responsibilities of the Security Council to uphold 
international peace and security the report concluded that where domestic authorities, 
either alone or in conjunction with external agencies, had failed in their responsibility 
to act then that responsibility fell to the Security Council.   Where the Security 
Council fails to take action the General Assembly may be called upon to fill the void 
and in the last resort regional organisations under Chapter VIII must step in, if 
necessary with ex post facto approval from the Security Council.  However, if the 
Security Council fails to act, particularly in ‘conscience-shocking’ situations then the 
report warned that other agencies may act with the risk that the activities are not 
conducted for the right reasons or commitment to precautionary principles.  Secondly, 
and perhaps most portentously, the report warned that if the Security Council failed to 
act and successful military action was taken by others, observing the criteria for 
intervention set out in the report, then there might be enduring serious consequences 
for the credibility and position of the UN itself.135  While outside the scope of this 
work, it is difficult not to wonder if this is not the situation faced as a result of the 
second Gulf War. 
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Operational dimension 
 
The report distinguished military intervention for human protection purposes from 
armed conflict and traditional peacekeeping on the basis that there were different 
objectives to such interventions.  Armed conflict is aimed at destruction or defeat.  
Traditional peacekeeping had consisted of monitoring, supervision and verification of 
ceasefires and peace agreements, with consent, neutrality and the use of force only in 
self defence as the core operating principles.  Enforcement action had consistently 
been performed by coalitions of willing States rather than the UN directly. The report 
saw human protection as requiring a new approach.136 
 
The report identified the need for preventative deployments where robust use of force 
options were made available.  Deployments must be planned in detail and integrated 
into the broader political effort, including detailed post intervention strategies.    The 
report emphasised the importance of coalition building between the intervening 
States, common objectives based on the responsibility to protect principles, a clear 
and unambiguous mandate and the commitment of resources for the full term of the 
operation, including the rebuilding phase.137   
 
Conditions for the successful conduct of interventions were identified in the report.  A 
clear and strong command structure free from political micro management was the 
first requirement.  The development of good quality civil-military relations was 
identified as imperative to the effective provision of support to the people.  Rules of 
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engagement tailored to the operational environment and drafted so as to reduce the 
requirement for individual States to add national clarifications. The principle of 
proportionality was given particular emphasis so as to restrain excess but also to 
provide for sufficient force to avoid paralysis of a force trapped on the ground by 
superior firepower or an inability to seize the initiative.  Control of troops was 
emphasised and the report called for the development of national codes of conduct to 
avoid discredit being brought on the operation through the unchecked misconduct of 
the troops. Finally, the report addressed the importance of limiting casualties and 
development of good media relations, again emphasising the constant requirement for 
planning.138 
 
Following military intervention the report identified the need for the rapid transition 
to civil administration and expression of the principle of self-determination in the 
form of free and fair elections.  Notably, the report identified the role of the military 
as the ‘only viable instrument’ in the re-establishment of the national law 
enforcement.139 
 
Five protection tasks were identified after enforcement.  These were: protection of 
minorities; security sector reform, including the rebuilding of police and judicial 
functions; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; protection tasks such as 
mine clearance; finally, pursuit of war criminals. 
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In concluding the chapter, the Secretary-General was urged to take steps to initiate a 
doctrine for intervention on the basis of human protection based on the principles set 
out in the report.140 
 
The way forward 
 
The report concluded by identifying that the concept of the responsibility to protect 
resolves the past conflict between intervention and State sovereignty. A consensus 
was identified that the responsibility of a State to protects its people from killing and 
other grave harm underpinned the very concept of sovereignty, and where that 
obligation could not be fulfilled then intervention by the community of States may be 
warranted.   The key issues for intervention were the mobilisation of domestic and 
international political will to take action.  For the future, the report recommended the 
acceptance by the General Assembly of the concept of the responsibility to protect as 
a sovereign responsibility of States.  This responsibility was based on: sovereign 
responsibility; responsibility of the community of States to prevent, react and rebuild; 
definition of a threshold justifying military intervention; and the precautionary 
principles that must be met to justify military intervention.  It recommended that the 
Security Council embrace and adopt the guidelines for military action and that the 
permanent members abstain from use of the veto in maters of intervention for human 
protection purposes.  Finally the report recommended that the Secretary-General work 
towards the adoption and implementation of the report and its recommendations.141 
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Although the report put the primary responsibility to protect those living under its 
sovereignty on the State concerned it also placed an obligation on the community of 
nations to act where the domestic State was unable or unwilling to do so.  This 
represented a major shift in the rationale that could underpin the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation. 
 
 
In Larger Freedom 
 
Although this work looks primarily at peacekeeping from 1949 to 2003 it would be 
remiss to omit the 2005 In Larger Freedom142 report.  The report was primarily aimed 
at recommending structural changes to the Security Council and refocusing on the 
priorities set out in the report.  There was also a proposal to abolish the “enemy 
clauses,” the Trusteeship Council, and the Military Staff Committee from the Charter, 
the latter proposal representing a tacit acceptance that the Article 43 agreements will 
never be implemented.   
 
As requested in the Responsibility to Protect there was a call for acceptance and 
adoption of the Responsibility to Protect recommendations and a commitment to 
collective security. In relation to a commitment to the collective security regime of the 
Charter, the Secretary-General appealed to the Security Council to specifically 
examine the issue of the use of force and clearly articulate the basis for its use. 
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In Larger Freedom makes proposals for the UN to combat the causes of threats to 
international peace and security.  In particular it proposes action be taken to reduce 
poverty, criminal activity and for the Members to work together to eliminate terrorism 
by denying terrorists access to resources and support.    
 
Of particular significance to this work, the report specifically identified human rights 
as the foundation and framework of Charter and therefore UN activities.  The 
Secretary-General made it clear that it is under this framework that the conditions can 
be created to establish and maintain justice and the rule of law.143  It could be argued 
that as human rights is the framework for the Charter then international human rights 
law must be the legal framework for activities conducted under it such as 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  
 
As the report covers a number of issues that are concerned with the far reaching 
challenges to world peace, it is intended to examine here only those parts of the report 
that are directly relevant to peacekeeping. 
 
Peacekeeping 
 
The report did not call for the revitalisation of Article 43 as the first report, An 
Agenda for Peace had done.  Instead there is a recommendation that Member States 
form strategic reserves that can be called upon to deploy rapidly for peacekeeping 
operations.  The report noted the increasing success of regional peacekeeping 
operations and recommended that a mechanism be set up so that regional groups such 
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as the European Union and African Union could work together with UN 
peacekeepers.144  In effect this recommendation amounted to the identification of a 
requirement for interoperability between the UN and the regional peacekeeping 
organisation.  From a Charter perspective this approach would lead to a seamless 
continuum between Chapter VI or VII operations and Chapter VIII operations. This 
approach also appears to be a shift away from the Boutros-Ghali reports that 
envisaged a clear separation between regional and UN peacekeeping. 
 
In Larger Freedom drew attention to the importance in peacekeeping of the rule of 
law and the UN commitment to the implementation of human rights and international 
law as well as basic standards of due process.  The Secretary-General made a 
commitment to deal with individual members of contingents behaving improperly and 
called on Member States to do the same within the contingents.145   The report does 
not develop the theme of the implementation of law by peacekeepers but the 
conclusion could be drawn that the report intended that where necessary peacekeepers 
would be involved directly in setting up and administering a justice system.  If this 
were not the case then it would not have been necessary for the report to expressly 
direct peacekeepers to adhere to “the basics standards of due process”.   This part of 
the report may support the assertion made in later chapters of this work that 
peacekeepers have a duty to administer justice where the domestic system has failed 
and is also consistent with the Responsibility to Protect. 
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Peacebuilding 
 
The report noted that there is a gap in the machinery of the UN with regard to the 
process of Peacebuilding.146  While the UN is able to negotiate peace agreements and 
deploy peacekeepers there is no mechanism to continue the process through to 
completion.  The report therefore recommended the establishment of a Peacebuilding 
Support Office to undertake this role.  One of the many functions of this office (which 
included the coordination of troop contributions) would be to make “early efforts to 
establish the necessary institutions.”147  This would include the institutions for the 
administrations of justice and indeed the report made specific reference to the role of 
the Office in strengthening rule-of-law institutions.  Such institutions would have to 
be sustainable through to stable domestic State administration.  The report clearly 
intended that if necessary Member States could request support before conflict 
erupted and the State collapsed.  
 
Use of Force 
 
The report did not deal specifically with the use of force in peace enforcement;148 it 
referred to the use of force generally, from Member States under Article 51 through to 
the UN mandated Chapter VII operations.   The report picked up on a theme from 
Responsibility to Protect in recommending that the Security Council determines a 
method for establishing the principles to be applied in determining the level of 
response required to a threat. The aim was for the Security Council to be more 
transparent in its determination of a situation requiring the use of force.   
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Conclusion to In Larger Freedom 
 
The In Larger Freedom Report builds on its predecessors in the area of peacekeeping 
while recognising the realities of the extant world situation.  Unlike the Boutros-Ghali 
reports, there is no implied hierarchy of deployments as between regional Chapter 
VIII operations and UN operations.  In Larger Freedom prefers an approach in which 
regional and UN operations can operate together to achieve the desired result. 
 
The recommendation for the abolition of the Military Staff Committee is a tacit 
acknowledgement that the Article 43 provisions would never be set in place.  In the 
event that the report’s call for strategic national forces was implemented, this would 
effectively replace the Article 43 force.  In this way the report can be seen to support 
the original concept of the Charter and achieve the intent by other means.    
 
The recommendation for a Peacebuilding Office is of considerable significance to the 
development of a coherent process to bring collapsed States back to functionality.  It 
would be the element in the Peacebuilding process that would determine which legal 
framework would be used to rebuild on and then coordinate the process through to 
hand back to the reconstructed domestic State.  If the Peacebuilding Office could be 
implemented it would be invaluable to States concerned over the lack of a coherent 
exit strategy that often plagues UN peacekeeping operations.149 
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The process set out in the report would require the Peacebuilding Office to consider 
which legal framework to apply in reconstructing a State.  Given the emphasis in the 
report on human rights and compliance with the rule of law it is wholly consistent 
with the approach of the report that international human rights law would be the legal 
framework to be applied. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Articulation by the UN of the place that peacekeeping should hold as a response 
mechanism to threats to international peace and security began with the vision of 
Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace.  The vision for peacekeeping in this report 
was based essentially on the notions of traditional peacekeeping with the consent of 
the parties as a vital ingredient for success.  As times changed and the world became a 
less stable place the concept of peacekeeping became more complex and the 
operations were no longer restricted to single functions.  Multidimensional operations 
mingling civilian and military branches, traditional observer elements integrated with 
robustly mandated sizeable forces capable of enforcing the mandate became common.   
 
The consent of the parties was seen by Boutros-Ghali as almost indispensable for 
peacekeeping operations.  Through the reports it can be seen that this approach has 
changed over time and that there has been a shift towards the position that it is the 
responsibility of the State, and if the State fails then of the international community to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Security Council on "Exit Strategies" in Peacekeeping Operations 15 November 2000. 
http://www.un.int/usa/00_173.htm (20 Jun 2005).  
 140
protect, prevent, react and rebuild.  Where necessary the international community, 
through the Security Council, will act without the consent of the State. 
 
The position of sovereignty has seen a change in fortunes over the period of 
peacekeeping development.  Boutros-Ghali saw sovereignty as receding under the tide 
of Security Council initiated intervention, despite his emphasis on the need for 
consent in peacekeeping operations.  The Responsibility to Protect had a less passive 
notion of sovereignty, with an emphasis on the independence of States and an 
obligation to maintain the protections encompassed by the concept of human security.  
Rather than have the State competing with the Security Council for the right to deal 
with State citizens, The Responsibility to Protect preserved respect for the State and 
only sought intervention where specific State obligations were breached.  This theme 
is again reinforced by In Larger Freedom where State responsibilities were 
emphasised in the context of working within the collective security model set out in 
the Charter. 
 
The Brahimi Report was less concerned with the theoretical position of peacekeeping 
and was concerned primarily with the practical conduct of peacekeeping operations.  
Although the Rapid Reaction Force was declared operational150 it is yet to be 
genuinely tested.  It also runs the risk of competing for military resources with the 
European Union and NATO.151  Progress in other areas stimulated by the report has 
slowed; for example, no further progress has been made with regard to the Stand-by 
Arrangements.152  Many of the practical arrangements for peacekeeping have also 
been slow to materialise, in particular the UN mandates authorising force under 
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Chapter VII remain very general in character, although they do now tend to be clear 
that Chapter VII is the basis of the mandate.  
 
In Larger Freedom built on the Brahimi Report in that it provided the most coherent 
strategy to date for peacekeeping by proposing the formation of a mechanism to 
integrate the different stages and responses required to rebuild a State from collapse to 
independent action.  If adopted, the Peacebuilding Office will be responsible for 
identifying from the outset how a State could be rebuilt and coordinating the elements 
involved in achieving this goal.  The planning and implementation will for the first 
time run from troop insertion through rebuilding bureaucracy to handover of a 
functioning independent domestic State.  This process would overcome the concerns 
seen in early reports for stagnation in peacekeeping. 
 
The reports set out in this chapter demonstrate that peacekeeping from a UN 
perspective has changed significantly over the years. Although the first of the reports 
considered in this chapter was presented fairly late in the development of 
peacekeeping, there has clearly been a shift over the past 13 years in the UN approach 
to the use of peacekeeping as a tool.  Peacekeeping has moved from a discreet activity 
used to monitor ceasefires or elections and on occasion to act as a force capable of 
intervening between parties in order to prevent armed conflict to an element of an 
integrated plan to recover a failed State, where necessary by temporarily undertaking 
activities such as the administration of justice normally associated with sovereignty.   
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As demonstrated by this and the previous chapter, peacekeeping has grown over time 
to become a key tool of the UN.  Its development has been watched, documented and 
debated within the UN and in the wider community.  The next two chapters of this 
work move from a theoretical review of peacekeeping and examine the practicalities 
of peacekeeping and the legal frameworks that have been applied in Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII UN peacekeeping operations.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Chapter VI Peacekeeping Operations 
Introduction 
  
The previous chapters of this work looked at the concept of peacekeeping, what it is 
and how it has developed from a theoretical perspective.  From this examination it has 
been established that the UN has engaged in peacekeeping from two Chapters of the 
UN Charter.  The original Chapter VI peacekeeping described in chapter one of this 
work has over time been superseded by the advent of more complex operations with 
their legal authority derived from Chapter VII.  However, peacekeeping based on a 
Chapter VI mandate remains part of the peacekeeping responses available to the UN 
and as such is relevant to the inquiry into whether international human rights law or 
international humanitarian law is the law applicable in peacekeeping operations in 
collapsed States.  This chapter will examine the Chapter VI UN operations from 1946 
to 2003.   
 
While the majority of Chapter VI operations will be dealt with briefly to identify 
certain legal principles and establish that they do not assist in determining the legal 
framework to be applied in collapsed State peacekeeping, the 1962 operation in West 
Irian, the 1989 operation in Namibia and the 1992 operation in Cambodia will be 
examined in more detail as they raise interesting issues concerning the use of the 
Trusteeship provisions as a model in collapsed State peacekeeping operations. 
 
In order to set out the contribution made by Chapter VI operations this chapter is 
divided into two parts.  The first part will examine Chapter VI operations that did not 
use the Trusteeship as a model and draw conclusions from the reliance on host State 
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consent and the resultant agreements that are set in place to regulate the interaction of 
peacekeepers and the local population.  The second part examines in more detail the 
legal framework applied in West Irian, Namibia and Cambodia.   
 
Peacekeeping under Chapter VI 
 
In chapter one of this work it was established that over time peacekeeping has become 
more complex and moved from the traditional, or first generation, peacekeeping 
through a continuum to complex or second generation peacekeeping.  Although 
second generation peacekeeping is more commonly associated with Chapter VII 
operations it will become evident that Chapter VI operations have also become more 
complex over time and become increasingly integrated into Chapter VII operations.  
Despite this increased complexity Chapter VI operations have still maintained the 
core requirements of impartiality as between the parties, use of force only in self 
defence and consent from the domestic State or States.   
 
By considering how these principles have been applied in Chapter VI peacekeeping it 
will be demonstrated that the UN is not in a position to impose a legal framework on 
this style of operation.  However, an extant legal framework can be adapted through 
use of agreements between the UN and the host State.  The Chapter VI operations in 
this part will be considered chronologically so that the emerging trend towards 
complex operations can be clearly seen. 
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Greece 1946 UNSCOB 
 
The first peacekeeping mission undertaken under the United Nations was in Greece in 
1946. The mission was not initially military in character but comprised a Commission 
of Inquiry into the Greek allegation that neighbouring States were compromising its 
northern borders and were also assisting guerrillas within Greece.1  Although the 
Commission made a number of recommendations to the Security Council these could 
not be implemented due to the consistent use of the veto by the USSR, whose satellite 
States, Yugoslavia and Albania, were alleged to be involved.  With no way around 
this impediment in the Security Council the matter was brought to the General 
Assembly and in October 1949 the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans 
(UNSCOB) was founded.  The Committee was empowered to investigate the issues, 
report on the situation and provide the parties with mediation assistance.2   
 
By 1952 the situation had settled to the extent that a subcommission of the Peace 
Observation Commission3 replaced UNSCOB.  This was in turn terminated in August 
1954 with the UN withdrawal from Greece.4   
 
UNSCOB made recommendations and reports to the General Assembly.5  Analysis of 
the recommendations leads to the conclusion that the committee was acting on the 
                                                 
1Fabian, L. Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping. (1971) at 261.  
2 Ibid. 
3 A body established by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. 
4 Above n 1. 
5The report of the Australian delegations recording the recommendations of the committee to the 
General Assembly is recorded in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Historical Publications. 
Cablegram 87, LONDON[1] , (14 September 1948): 
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vVolume/CB0713C44AA7820CCA256CD90
0161913 (10 Mar 2005). 
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basis of Article 35 of the Charter6 and under the powers of the General Assembly 
found in Article 11.  This conclusion is supported by the rejection by the Security 
Council at its 188th meeting on 19 August 1947 to specifically bring the problem 
under Chapter VII.7 
 
Although the make up and function of UNSCOB would not today be immediately 
recognised as a peacekeeping operation, it is included here because it was the step that 
paved the way for subsequent military operations.  Peacekeeping had been born and 
over the remainder of the twentieth century it would mature into a useful tool and 
arguably the most universally recognised face of the UN. 
 
Palestine 1949 UNTSO 
 
The British mandate in Palestine expired in May 1948.  Prior to this the UN attempted 
to facilitate a Jewish-Arab settlement on the future of Palestine; however, these efforts 
were unsuccessful and when on 15 May 1948 the provisional Israeli government 
declared independence the neighbouring Arab States invaded Palestine.8  After 
considerable diplomatic efforts by the UN, an armistice was concluded and 
agreements were entered into for the positioning by the Security Council of the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was to observe and 
report on the ceasefire and armistice agreement.9 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/  (10 Mar 2005). 
7 United Nations Report http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art40/english/rep_orig_vol2-art40_e.pdf 
(10 Mar 2005). 
8 Above n 1 at 261. 
9 Id at 262. 
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UNTSO was the first clearly identifiable peacekeeping operation10 and was 
established 11 June 1948.  It is one of the UN’s longest serving missions, it continues 
to the present day.  The tasks performed by UNTSO have varied over the years with 
its present concerns being to assist with other missions in the Israeli – Syria sector, the 
Golan Heights and in the Israeli – Lebanon sector.  UNTSO also has a level of 
presence in the Egypt – Israeli sector in the Sinai and offices in Beirut and 
Damascus.11   
 
The UNTSO operation was established as a traditional peacekeeping operation.  
However, it was made clear in the Security Council’s call for the cessation of 
hostilities: 
 
that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been 
accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be 
reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.12 
 
 
The Israelis indicated that they were prepared to abide by a prolonged truce in 
Palestine but the Arab League rejected the Security Council’s approaches.  The 
Security Council did consider whether Chapter VII action was necessary.  In Security 
Council Resolution 5413 the Security Council expressly found that there was a “threat 
to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations”.  
The Security Council at this stage was content to order the cessation of military action 
                                                 
10 Golding, M. Peacemonger. (2002) at 13. 
11 United Nations The Blue Helmets (3rd ed 1996) at 691. 
12 SC Res. S/801 29 May 1948; See also Higgins, R. United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: 
Documents and Commentary. (1970)  at 15. 
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under Article 40 and threaten further action under Chapter VII rather than to issue a 
broad mandate to UNTSO.  The crisis seems to have been averted by the strong words 
rather than by strong action from the Security Council.  The tone of Security Council 
Resolution 7314 is quite different from its predecessors with high hopes for the 
success of the armistice and directions to the Secretary-General to continue the work 
of UNTSO in maintaining the ceasefire.  
 
UNTSO is an example of an express rejection by the Security Council of a Chapter 
VII mandate.15  The operation was set up as traditional peacekeeping with unarmed 
observers monitoring the situation.  UNTSO continues to have no means of 
intervening in any conflict between the parties and depends upon consent to continue.   
 
Kashmir 1949 UNMOGIP 
 
Following the partition of India and Pakistan as part of the post World War Two 
policy of decolonisation, the disposal of Kashmir became a source of considerable 
tension between the two States due to its incorporation into India despite its having a 
predominantly Moslem population.16  Allegations were made of raids and incursions 
and the UN responded by sending in the United Nations Commission for India and 
Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate, report and mediate between the parties. Once the 
Karachi agreement had been reached on a ceasefire a traditional peacekeeping 
operation was commenced by way of an observer group, the United Nations Military 
                                                                                                                                            
13 (1948) of 15 July 1948. 
14 (1949) of 11 August 1949. 
15 Above n 7. 
16 Above n 1 at 262. 
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Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).17  UNMOGIP was positioned in 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir to supervise the ceasefire that had been agreed 
between India and Pakistan in the Karachi Agreement. In 1972 an agreement was 
reached between India and Pakistan to establish a ‘Line of Control’ in Kashmir that 
“closely followed the ceasefire line established under the Karachi Agreement.”18   
 
A further disagreement arose between India and Pakistan at this point as the Indian 
government was of the view that UNMOGIP had effectively been terminated. 
Pakistan took a contrary view.  The Secretary-General made it clear that as far as he 
was concerned only the Security Council could terminate UNMOGIP and until the 
Security Council adopted a resolution to that effect, UNMOGIP was to continue.19  
Pakistan has continued to interact with UNMOGIP in the usual manner but India has 
not and although transport and facilities have been supplied, India does not send 
reports to UNMOGIP.   Despite India’s approach UNMOGIP has not to date been 
terminated by the Security Council and so continues to function. 
 
Security Council Resolution 47,20 which enlarged UNCIP, arguably21 made an Article 
39 finding by stating “that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger 
international peace and security”.  Despite what appears to be an activation of Chapter 
VII the Security Council has opted only to place an observer group on the ground.   
 
It appears that from the earliest days of peacekeeping the difficulty was not in the 
Security Council making an Article 39 finding, as has been suggested by the 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 UN. http:www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missons/unmogip/unmogipB.htp (15 Jul 2002) 
19 Above n 11 at 703. 
20 (1948) of 21 April 1948. 
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commentators referred to in chapter one of this work, but in following that finding 
through with a robust peacekeeping operation.    
 
UNMOGIP could have been an anomaly in the traditional peacekeeping model22 due 
to the withdrawal of consent by India in 1972.  However, India did not make any 
moves to remove UNMOGIP, continuing to provide logistic support23 and as a result 
can be construed as accepting that UNMOGIP is legitimately acting under Chapter VI 
despite withdrawal of consent.    
 
Egypt 1956 UNEF I 
 
A dispute resulting in the use of force developed between Israel, France, Britain and 
Egypt due to the perceived Egyptian threat to the Suez Cannel.  The Security Council 
was unable to act due to the use of the veto by Britain and France so the provisions of 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution24 were invoked and the matter transferred to the 
General Assembly.25  
 
As a result of General Assembly resolutions and recommendations, agreement was 
reached for the insertion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I).26  This 
operation consisted of a relatively large military force of some 6,000 observers at its 
                                                                                                                                            
21 It is arguable because of the use of the word “likely” rather than a clear finding of a threat. 
22 Consent is a key element in the traditional peacekeeping model as per chapter one of this work. 
23 http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unmogip.html (10 Mar 2005). 
24 The Uniting for Peace Resolution was passed by the General Assembly as a method of ensuring that 
where the Security Council was rendered ineffective through use of the veto then the General 
Assembly could take action to ensure that the responsibilities of the world community towards peace 
and security were met. 
25 Above n 1 at 262. 
26 General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I), 5 November 1956. 
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height.27  The function of the operation was to ensure the cessation of hostilities and 
the withdrawal of forces by France, Israel and the UK from Egypt’s territory. After 
withdrawal the force was to act as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces.28 The 
observers operated between Israel and Egypt until Egypt requested their withdrawal in 
May 196729 and the operation was formally terminated in June of that year.30       
 
UNEF I was an immensely important operation due to its establishment being an act 
of the General Assembly and not the Security Council.  The right of the General 
Assembly to establish a peacekeeping operation was challenged in the Certain 
Expenses Case.31  However, the ICJ upheld the right of the General Assembly to 
establish peacekeeping operations as an implied power found under the UN Charter. 
Operations established by the General Assembly are limited in character by the 
Charter. The General Assembly does not have the powers set out in Chapter VII, these 
being exclusively the province of the Security Council. As a result it was impossible 
for UNEF I to have powers of coercion.   
 
Lebanon 1958 UNOGIL 
 
In May 1958 Lebanon made accusations against the United Arab Republic (Egypt and 
Syria) regarding its interference in internal Lebanese affairs.  Alternative diplomatic 
efforts were unsuccessful so following Security Council Resolution 128 of 11 June 
                                                 
27 Above n 11 at 693. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Above n 1 at 263. 
30 Above n 27. 
31 Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep 1962 151.  This challenge 
will be discussed in chapter seven of this work. 
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195832 the Security Council sent in the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon 
(UNOGIL).33  There was no Article 39 finding so that the operation was authorised 
under Chapter VI.  The operation was formed to confirm that weapons, personnel or 
other military support was not being infiltrated across the Lebanese borders.34  
Following considerable diplomatic and military activity in the region matters were 
sufficiently resolved by mid-December for UNOGIL to be terminated.  The operation 
was formally concluded on 9 December 1958.35 
 
Yemen 1963 UNYOM 
 
During 1962 civil war raged in Yemen with royalists ranged against republicans.  
Foreign States supported both sides with Saudi Arabia backing the royalists and the 
United Arab Emirates behind the republicans.  However by early 1963 a concerted 
diplomatic effort by the UN and the USA resulted in a disengagement of forces.36  
 
Under the agreement reached between the parties demilitarised zones were formed 
and these were to be policed by the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission 
(UNYOM), which was formed by Security Council resolution 179 of 11 June 1963.37   
 
                                                 
32 http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/128%20(1958)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION (10 Mar 
2005). 
33 Above n 1 at 263. 
34 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unogilmandate.html (10 Mar 2005). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Above n 1 at 264. 
37 Above n 11 at 702. 
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Unfortunately compliance with the agreement was poor and without the ability to 
enforce compliance UNYOM was helpless.  As a result the mission was terminated in 
September 1964.38 
 
Despite the tensions that eventually led to the termination of UNYOM, the Security 
Council established the operation as a Chapter VI observer operation.  There was no 
Article 39 finding in the establishing Resolution.  
 
Dominican Republic 1965 DOMREP 
 
The operation in the Dominican Republic represents one of the smallest, most 
successful and relatively short lived of the UN peacekeeping operations.  The 
operation’s formal title was Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in 
the Dominican Republic (DOMREP).  It was established by Security Council 
Resolution 203 of 14 May 1965 with the purpose of observing a ceasefire that had 
been reached between two de facto authorities in the Dominican Republic.  The 
military element consisted of a Major-General Military adviser and two military 
observers.  The operation was concluded on 22 October 1966 following agreement on 
a new government in the Dominican Republic.39   
 
Not surprisingly, given the purpose of DOMREP and its staffing, DOMREP was a 
classic traditional peacekeeping operation.  It was designed and conducted merely to 
establish a UN presence, which in the circumstances was sufficient to achieve the 
purpose of a peaceful reconstitution of government. 
                                                 
38 Above n 1 at 264. 
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India and Pakistan 1965 UNIPOM 
 
In August 1965 armed conflict broke out between India and Pakistan.  With the 
support of the Superpowers, the Security Council demanded in the strongest language 
that the parties effect a ceasefire immediately.  Three days later the parties put the 
ceasefire into effect.40 
 
UN observers were already operating in Kashmir as UNMOGIP and these forces were 
supplemented and strengthened in order to patrol the borders of India and Pakistan in 
areas other than Jammu and Kashmir where UNMOGIP continued its operations. The 
operation that supplemented UNMOGIP was called the United Nations India-Pakistan 
Observation Mission (UNIPOM).  UNIPOM was created by Security Council 
Resolution 211, which was adopted on 20 September 1965.41  It remained in place 
until after the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to those areas held prior to 5 
August 1965.  Once the withdrawal was complete UNIPOM was terminated.42  The 
operation lasted from 23 September 1965 to 22 March 1966.43 
 
UNIPOM was a traditional peacekeeping operation conducted under Chapter VI of 
the Charter.  The use of a large force to oversee the withdrawal was effective despite 
the restrictions on the use of force inherent in a Chapter VI operation.  Unfortunately 
the withdrawal of UNIPOM did not permanently solve the underlying issues in 
Kashmir and further conflict erupted.  
                                                                                                                                            
39 Above n 11 at 771. 
40 Above n 1 at 265 
41 Above n 11 at 705. 
42 Ibid. 
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Egypt 1973 UNEF II 
 
The ceasefire between Israel and her Arab neighbours did not resolve into a lasting 
peace.  Tensions continued to mount and on 6 October 1973 in an unexpected move 
Egypt advanced into Israel across the Suez Canal while Syria simultaneously 
advanced from the Golan Heights.  Although the USSR and US were able to agree 
regarding a call for a ceasefire no agreement could be reached in the Security Council 
on the deployment of peacekeepers.  The USSR was willing to respond to a call by 
Egypt for Soviet and US peacekeepers but the US was not.  Finally, following a tense 
period of posturing between the superpowers, agreement was reached on a new UN 
peacekeeping force, which was to be known as the second United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF II).  With the deployment of UNEF II on 25 October 1973 and the 
establishment of a fresh ceasefire the crisis between the superpowers was resolved 
without resorting to armed conflict.44 
 
The mission of UNEF II was to supervise the fresh ceasefire that had been negotiated 
between Egypt and Israel.  Following agreements reached between the parties on 18 
January 1974 and 4 September 1975 UNEF II was to supervise the redeployment of 
troops and to work in the buffer zones that had been agreed by Egypt and Israel. 
UNEF II was formally terminated on 24 July 1979 when its mandate lapsed following 
the implementation of the peace treaty concluded between Egypt and Israel.45 As with 
UNEF I, UNEF II was established as a traditional peacekeeping operation.   
                                                                                                                                            
43 Ibid. 
44 Above n 11 at 59. 
45 Id at 70. 
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Syria 1974 UNDOF 
 
While UNEF II was conducting operations on the borders between Egypt and Israel 
no new force had been deployed to the Syrian sector.  Although some peacekeeping 
observer posts were established tension remained high and an escalating pattern of 
ceasefire violations emerged.  Eventually the US Secretary of State conducted a 
diplomatic mission to the area, which resulted in an Agreement of Disengagement 
between Israel and Syria on 31 May 1974.  The United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force (UNDOF) was established on 3 June 1974 under the agreement and 
began operating in the Syrian Golan Heights maintaining the ceasefire between Israel 
and Syria.  As part of its duties UNDOF was required to supervise areas of separation 
that had been created by the Agreement on Disengagement.46     
 
UNDOF continues to function in its role of supervision.  A new priority for the 
operation, reflecting the emergence of different world interests, is to ensure that the 
force itself does not contribute to environmental degradation of the area.47  
Consideration of environmental factors is an additional legal consideration for all 
military operations.  Although in certain circumstances international law may operate 
to diminish environmental obligations48 tighter domestic and international 
environmental regimes mean that compliance with environmental law will be a 
                                                 
46 Id at 73. 
47 UN http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/undof/undofB.htm (10 Jul 2002). 
48 For an example of the effect of international armed conflict on environmental law see  Boelaert-
Suominen, S. “International environmental law: the effect of marine safety and pollution conventions 
during international armed conflict” (December 2000)  Newport Papers No. 15.   Chapter VI 
operations will usually be performed where there is consent.  Where the host State has treaty 
obligations it will be the host State’s responsibility to ensure that it enters into an agreement with the 
UN to ensure that the force does not breach those obligations. 
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significant consideration in the planning and implementation phases of future 
operations. 
 
UNDOF was set up as a Chapter VI operation by Security Council Resolution 350 
(1974) of 31 May 1974 and has continued as such through its life span.  UNDOF was 
intended merely as an observer mission with no references made to the restoration of 
international peace and security.  The Security Council left the detailed arrangements 
to the Secretary-General, not feeling it necessary to incorporate the details of the 
mandate into the resolution.   
 
Lebanon 1978 UNIFIL 
 
The borders of Israel were very volatile in the 1970s.   UN peacekeeping operations 
were being planned and undertaken in Syria and Egypt with tensions mounting along 
the border with Lebanon.  The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) were 
operating across this border and in 1978 claimed responsibility for an attack which 
killed a number of Israeli civilians.  The Israeli response was swift and within a few 
days of the attack Israel had occupied a large part of southern Lebanon.   
 
The Lebanese government protested to the UN on the grounds that it had nothing to 
do with the PLO attack.  In response to the Lebanese protest the Security Council 
adopted resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Israel and the establishment of the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).  UNIFIL deployed its first troops 
into the area on 23 March 1978.49  
                                                 
49 UN http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/unifilB.htm. (10 Jul 2003). 
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By June 1982 tensions had increased to a level where Israel felt justified in invading 
Lebanon.  This time the Israelis were not satisfied with limited incursions and pushed 
through to the Lebanese capital Beirut.  UNIFIL personnel remained at their posts and 
were left behind the Israeli lines to provide what humanitarian assistance and 
protection they could to the local population.  Although Israel carried out a partial 
withdrawal in 1985, elements of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) remained in control 
of an area of southern Lebanon.  Although the Security Council issued resolutions 
demanding an Israeli withdrawal it was not until 25 May 2000 that confirmation was 
received that Israel had finally complied with the Security Council resolutions.50 
 
UNIFIL did not remain static after the Israeli withdrawal.  Violations of the ceasefire 
had been numerous and clearance of ordnance and mines was required for the safety 
of the local inhabitants as well as for UNFIL itself.  As rear areas were cleared they 
were handed over to the Lebanese government and UNIFIL reorganised the 
deployment in the south.  UNIFIL remains in place due to the on going, although low 
level, violations.  Tensions remain between Israel and Lebanon, particularly over the 
activities of Hezbollah so that UNIFIL is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.51  
 
Security Council Resolution 42552 requested the Secretary-General to establish the 
operation that became UNIFIL.  It is interesting that the Security Council called for 
the foundation of UNIFIL for the purpose of “restoring international peace and 
security”, but did not go on to make a finding under Article 39 enabling the use of 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 (1978) of 19 March 1978  
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Chapter VII measures.  This appeared again in Security Council Resolution 51653 
where condemning the Israeli attacks upon Beirut, it only authorised the Secretary-
General to deploy an observer group to monitor the situation around Beirut. Security 
Council Resolution 51754 again demanded an Israeli withdrawal noting the violation 
of the ceasefire but failed again to make a finding under Article 39 of the Charter.  
Instead authorisation was given for an increase in the number of observers in Beirut.    
This became the set pattern for the resolutions relating to UNIFIL.  Apart from 
extending the mandate to include the provision of humanitarian and administrative 
assistance, the Security Council declined to give UNIFIL the power under Chapter 
VII to intervene in order to force Resolution compliance by Israel.   
 
As a result of the increasingly complex legal and political environment faced by the 
operation, UNIFIL is a good example of the more complex Chapter VI operations that 
the UN began to get involved in as the practice of peacekeeping developed. 
 
Afghanistan 1988 UNGOMAP 
 
Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 on the basis of a claim 
that the Afghan government had requested their intervention.  Almost immediately 
armed conflict erupted between Soviet forces and the Afghan mujahideen.  The UN 
Security Council commenced discussions over the issue and in January 1980 called 
for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.    A year later in February 
1981 the Secretary-General appointed an official to coordinate peace talks aimed at 
achieving compliance with the Security Council’s demand for withdrawal.  Talks 
                                                 
53 (1982) of 1 August 1982 
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continued for a number of years, with a break through only finally occurring due to 
the Soviet government’s need to withdraw its forces back into the Soviet Union.  In 
April 1988 accords were signed between USSR, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan.55  
 
A traditional peace observer operation was requested as an integral part of the peace 
accords.  The Security Council agreed to the operation and on 31 October 1988 
adopted Resolution 622 (1988) establishing the United Nations Good Offices Mission 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).  The UNGOMAP operation was to 
monitor the separation of the parties, the withdrawal of Soviet forces and assist in the 
repatriation of refugees.  Although UNGOMAP was originally expected to operate for 
only 20 months from the signing of the accords, it was not terminated until 15 March 
1990.56  UNGOMAP was a traditional peacekeeping operation. 
 
Iran / Iraq 1988 UNIIMOG 
 
Armed conflict developed between Iran and Iraq in 1980.  Despite calls from the 
Security Council for a cessation of the violence and a negotiated settlement, the 
conflict continued with mounting civilian casualties.  Through the activities of the 
Secretary-General an agreement was reached that civilians would no longer be 
targeted and in June 1984 elements of UNTSO were detached to Baghdad and Tehran 
to support this agreement.   Matters continued to escalate however, with attacks on 
merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf causing a number of States to provide armed 
protection to ensure safe passage for their vessels.  UN attempts at reaching a 
settlement were increased and on 20 July 1987 the Security Council issued Resolution 
                                                                                                                                            
54 (1982) of 4 August 1982 
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598 (1987).  This Resolution made an Article 39 finding that the conflict represented 
a threat to international peace and security.  As well as demanding a cessation of the 
conflict it also called upon the Secretary-General to deploy UN observers.57  
 
Talks continued, as did the conflict and it was not until August 1988 that the parties 
were in a position to receive a peacekeeping operation.  Finally on 9 August 1988 the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 619 (1988) establishing the United Nations Iran-
Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG).  UNIIMOG was to monitor the ceasefire 
and withdrawal of the parties to their pre-conflict boundaries.  With the assistance of 
the prepositioned elements of UNTSO, UNIIMOG was able to deploy on 20 August 
1988.  While progress was initially good the security situation deteriorated 
dramatically when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990.  However, although ceasefire 
violations were not uncommon, the Iran-Iraq border was relatively peaceful. The 
work of UNIIMOG was not complete at the advent of the first Gulf War, which meant 
that the observers could only work in Iran.  However, by February 1991 UNIIMOG 
reported that it had been informed that both sides had withdrawn in compliance with 
Resolution 598 (1987).  As the UNIIMOG mandate was complete it was terminated 
on 28 February 1991.58 
 
UNIIMOG is an example of the increasingly frequent move by the Security Council 
to conduct traditional peacekeeping operations in an environment where Chapter VII 
measures are also being taken.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
55 Above n 11 at 661-662. 
56 Id at 662-666. 
57 Id at 669-670. 
58 Id at 670-678. 
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Angola 1988 UNAVEM I / Angola 1991 UNAVEM II / Angola 1995 UNAVEM III 
 
The UN peacekeeping operations in Angola have proved to be successful.  Angola 
was a former Portuguese colony fighting for independence. In 1974 Portugal changed 
governments and its attitude towards colonialism. In Angola this translated into a 
move to support independence by reaching an agreement for government between the 
three Angolan liberation movements: the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola (MPLA), the Frente National de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and the Uniao 
Nacional para a Independencia Totalde Angola (UNITA).59 
 
Although agreement was initially achieved this was short lived and armed conflict 
erupted with the different factions receiving support from States such as Cuba, South 
Africa, USA and USSR.  By November 1975 MPLA found itself strong enough to 
declare the Peoples Republic of Angola.  MPLA received continued support from the 
USSR and Cuba while UNITA, the only other viable military group remaining, 
received backing from the USA and South Africa.  As the Cold War began to fizzle 
out Soviet and Cuban commitment to Angola waned.  Following delicate international 
negotiations, agreement was reached for the withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Angola.  On 20 December 1988 the Security Council adopted Resolution 626 (1988) 
establishing the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) to 
monitor the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.60 
 
UNAVEM I was clearly a Chapter VI operation.  It was traditional in character, in 
that it was a monitoring task.  
                                                 
59 Id at 233. 
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Progress towards peace in Angola continued.  A ceasefire was effected in May 1991 
and the government of Angola requested that the UN verify the implementation of the 
peace agreements.  On 30 May 1991 the Security Council responded by passing 
Resolution 696 (1991) establishing UNAVEM II.  UNAVEM II was to verify and 
report on the implementation of the Angolan peace agreements.61  
 
Although established under a separate Resolution with an amended mandate, 
UNAVEM II was established under the same Chapter VI framework as its 
predecessor.   Where UNAVEM I was tasked with observing troop withdrawal 
UNAVEM II was concerned primarily with monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire 
and disarmament.  By Security Council Resolution 747 (1992)62 the mandate was 
enlarged to include monitoring Angolan elections. 
 
The elections were conducted peacefully but UNITA was not prepared to accept the 
result and launched a State wide campaign against local government administrative 
structures. By the end of October 1992 the UN received reports of widespread 
resumption of hostilities.  With UN negotiation a further ceasefire was agreed, which 
came into effect on 2 November 1992 and was monitored by UNAVEM II.  At the 
end of the month the ceasefire broke down and the return to hostilities became 
widespread.  A humanitarian disaster threatened as large segments of the civilian 
populations were dislocated by the conflict.  Although it was suffering from attacks 
by UNITA rebels, UNAVEM II was repeatedly extended on its Chapter VI mandate.  
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It was not given authority to establish any form of administration to support the rule 
of law. 
 
On 15 September 1993 the Security Council decided that tougher measures were 
required against UNITA and adopted Resolution 864 (1993).63  Resolution 864 (1993) 
changed the environment for UNAVEM II.  The Security Council made an Article 39 
finding “that, as a result of UNITA’s military actions, the situation in Angola 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”   The use of the Chapter VII 
powers was an attempt to block the sale and supply of arms and materiel to UNITA.  
The UNAVEM II position was not expressly addressed, leaving a small, dispersed 
military force in an operation designed under Chapter VI operating in a situation 
where Chapter VII measures where also being taken. 
 
The UN continued talks in an attempt to bring about a final settlement in Angola. As 
peace negotiations appeared to bear fruit, the UNAVEM II mandate was again 
extended and in October 1994 the size of the military monitoring force was raised to 
350 personnel.  On 20 November 1994 a peace agreement was signed in Lusaka.  
Although the military situation remained tense it was decided to spread UNAVEM II 
activities and assess the future requirements for peacekeeping.  In December 1994 the 
UNAVEM II mandate was again extended to monitor the UNITA ceasefire 
agreement.64   
 
In order to further facilitate the peace process an enhanced role for UNAVEM was 
planned.  On 8 February 1995 the Security Council adopted Resolution 976 (1995) 
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establishing UNAVEM III.  The fresh mandate was aimed at assisting compliance 
with the peace agreements and national reconciliation.65   UNAVEM III was a much 
larger force with some 7,000 military personnel deployed.  It was protected by a 
Chapter VII requirement that all Member States assist by containing UNITA and 
protecting the security of the operation and its logistics.66  As compliance with the 
agreements was successful UNAVEM III completed its mission and was terminated 
in December 1996.  It was replaced by a fresh monitoring operation, the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).67 
 
Although the size of UNAVEM III was a significant increase on its predecessor the 
framework remained the same.  UNAVEM III operated along side Chapter VII 
measures but was not mandated to conduct an enforcement operation.   
 
The UNAVEM operations are an example of the increasing tendency of the Security 
Council to favour complex operations in which Chapter VII measures are mixed with 
Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. 
 
Central America 1989 ONUCA 
 
The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established 
by Security Council Resolution 644 (1989) on 7 November 198968 as a Chapter VI 
operation to verify compliance by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.   
                                                                                                                                            
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Security Council Resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997. 
67 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unavem_p.htm. (14 Jul 2002) 
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These States were to comply with their undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces 
and insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used 
for attacks on other States. In addition, ONUCA played a part in the voluntary 
demobilisation of the Nicaraguan Resistance and monitored a ceasefire and the 
separation of forces agreed by the Nicaraguan parties as part of the demobilisation 
process.69   
 
ONUCA was a short-term traditional observer operation. 
 
Western Sahara 1991 MINURSO 
 
One of the potential new States that emerged from the period of de-colonisation in the 
1970’s was the Western Sahara.  Western Sahara has three neighbouring States, 
Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria.  Until 1976 Spain administered Western Sahara but 
on Spain’s withdrawal Morocco and Mauritania both laid claim to it.70  These claims 
were opposed by the indigenous Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia ei-
Hamra y de Rio de Ore (Frente POLISARIO).  When Morocco moved to incorporate 
Western Sahara fighting broke out between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO, which 
was supported by Algeria.  The UN attempted to negotiate a settlement with the 
support of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which became involved in 1979 
following the withdrawal of the Mauritanian claim.71 
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Eventually in 1988 Morocco and Frente POLISARIO accepted peace proposals put 
forward by the UN and OAU.  Acceptance of the peace proposals was followed in 
1990 by the Secretary-General’s report, which inter alia recommended a 
peacekeeping operation to facilitate self-determination by the people of the Western 
Sahara.  The Security Council accepted the Secretary-General’s recommendations and 
issued Resolution 690 (1991)72 that established the United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).  The plan was for MINURSO to assist 
in the registration of people eligible to vote in the Western Saharan referendum and to 
monitor the ceasefire agreement between Frente POLISARIO and Morocco.  While 
the ceasefire has held to a greater or lesser degree there has been significant delay in 
agreeing the process for identification and its implementation.  Currently the process 
of identification of people eligible to vote is complete but disputes continue regarding 
the appeal process and the repatriation of refugees.   MINURSO continues to monitor 
the ceasefire and give support to the settlement process.73 
 
MINURSO is an integrated military and civilian organisation.  It is clear from an 
examination of the operation that the military component conducted a traditional 
observer operation under Chapter VI of the Charter.  Consent to the operation was 
based on the agreement of the parties to the UN and OAU settlement proposals 
accepted by Morocco and Frente POLISARIO in 1988.   
 
 
 
                                                 
72 (1991) of 29 April 1991. 
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El Salvador 1991 ONUSAL 
 
Civil war supported by neighbouring States had raged in El Salvador between the 
government and the Frente Farabundo Mart para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) for 
many years before the UN was able to bring the parties to the negotiation table in 
September 1989.   After a complex process, an agreement was reached that aimed to 
bring democracy and unity to El Salvador.  A preliminary agreement was reached on 
26 July 1990 that included provision for a UN mission to monitor human rights.  After 
discussion with El Salvador and consideration of the situation the Secretary-General 
recommended the establishment of a peacekeeping operation to the Security Council.  
The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 693 (1991),74which 
established the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).  The 
peacekeeping operation was to be an integrated military and civilian operation.  The 
initial task of ONUSAL was to monitor the human rights agreements reached by the 
parties. 
 
Although ONUSAL had deployed, negotiations were still being conducted to achieve 
a final peace settlement. On 31 December 1991 the parties finally signed a 
comprehensive settlement and agreed to sign a final peace agreement on 16 January 
1992. The signing of the peace agreements required an extension of the ONUSAL 
mandate to include monitoring of the ceasefire and separation of the armed forces as 
well as law and order duties for the civilian police element while the national El 
Salvadorian service was being created.  The Security Council responded by passing 
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Resolution 729 (1992),75 which expanded ONUSAL to enable it to perform the 
additional tasks related to the final peace agreement.  The Security Council was to 
expand the mandate again for ONUSAL in order to assist in elections and stabilisation 
of the government.  ONUSAL was not terminated until April 1995.  During this time El 
Salvador had survived threats to the peace agreement caused by the discovery of arms 
caches in violation of the agreement and an election, monitored by ONUSAL, that 
was declared to be free and fair.   
 
ONUSAL is a good example of the type of Chapter VI operation being developed by 
the UN.  The military and civilian components were integrated, with the military 
predominantly performing a traditional peace observer operation while the civilian 
elements engaged in peace building.  The overall effect was to stabilise the 
government while remaining impartial and thereby reducing the likelihood of a return 
to armed conflict.  The deployment was consensual as it arose from the peace 
agreements signed by the parties.   
ONUSAL was more dynamic than the traditional model of peacekeeping with a fully 
incorporation civilian component.  It was also mandated to strengthen respect for 
human rights and assist the domestic authorities to embed human rights into the 
administration of the law.76 
 
Cambodia 1991 UNAMIC 
 
The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established as a 
traditional peacekeeping operation in order to assist in maintaining the ceasefire 
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achieved in Cambodia following the horrific regime of Pol Pot and the subsequent 
civil war.  One of its major roles was to train the local population in mine awareness 
and subsequently to establish a self help training program in mine detection and mine 
clearance, particularly along repatriation routes, reception areas and resettlement 
areas.77    
 
UNAMIC was essentially a specifically directed humanitarian operation set up under 
Chapter VI.  It was not in a position, either in terms of numbers or equipment, to 
operate under Chapter VII.  
 
Mozambique 1992 ONUMOZ 
 
Mozambique became independent of Portugal in 1975 as a result of a change in the 
Portuguese attitude to colonial possessions.  Peaceful independence did not last long 
before the government found itself involved in civil armed conflict with the South 
African backed Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO).  Finally in 1990 the 
parties were brought to the negotiating table and after two years of discussion a 
general peace agreement was signed.  Placement of a UN observer operation formed 
part of the agreement.  The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 797 
(1992),78 which established a traditional peacekeeping operation, the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).  It was established as a peace observer 
operation to monitor the ceasefire, assist in demobilisation, recovery of weapons, 
oversee elections, assist UNHCR in their humanitarian mission and assist in the 
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integration of former combatants into the new national army.  ONUMOZ was 
terminated on 9 December 1994 on the successful completion of its mission.  A 
civilian UN peace building mission continued in Mozambique after the departure of 
ONUMOZ.79 
 
Rwanda / Uganda 1993 UNOMUR 
  
The Rwandan Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) were engaged in 
armed conflict that erupted in October 1990.  Fighting was mainly focused in the 
north where the RPF fought from the Ugandan border.  Ceasefire agreements were 
numerous but ineffective despite the active involvement of the OAU in attempting to 
achieve a permanent settlement.  In February 1993 the Rwandan government 
approached the Security Council for assistance.  A goodwill mission was sent to 
Rwanda to investigate the potential for a UN operation.  Meanwhile the OAU 
continued talks with the parties and managed to conclude an agreement on March 
1993.80  
 
Following the report of the Secretary-General into the feasibility of deployment to 
Rwanda, the Security Council passed Resolution 846 (1993) establishing the United 
Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR).  The operation was based in 
Uganda and was to monitor the transport or transit of weapons and materials of 
military use across the border.  UNOMUR also provided liaison with the OAU 
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Chapter VIII operation, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), so that the 
peacekeeping effect could be coordinated.81 
 
In August 1993 the parties reached a final settlement and the Security Council moved 
to establish a further mission of assistance to rebuild Rwanda.  UNOMUR was to 
continue to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda.  Although plans for the 
continuation of the operation were laid the operation came to an abrupt halt when its 
mandate was ended on 21 September 1994.82 
 
The end of UNOMUR and the subsequent reluctance of the Security Council 
Members to support robust83 peacekeeping for some time84 was caused by events in 
Somalia where a failed operation by US forces that formed part of the Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF).  UNITAF was a Chapter VII mandated US led operation set in 
place to protect humanitarian aid distribution.  The US forces decided to capture a 
Somali warlord but the mission failed, two Blackhawk helicopters were shot down 
and a number of servicemen were killed.  The graphic television pictures of the dead 
bodies of US aircrew being dragged through the streets caused a negative response 
from the US public.    
 
UNOMUR was a small traditional model observer operation consisting of 81 military 
observers supported by a small civilian staff.   
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Rwanda 1993 UNAMIR 
 
In response to a request from the parties contained in the Rwandan peace accords of 
August 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 872 (1993) establishing the 
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).   
 
While the Security Council was stunned by the Somali failure, genocide went 
unchecked in Rwanda where some 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
murdered by Hutu extremists. Some 250,000 Tutsi women were raped, many of them 
subsequently dying from the brutality of the ordeal or AIDS contracted from their 
rapists.85 
UNAMIR was set up as a Chapter VI operation and when the genocide began was 
under resourced, under manned and without the mandate to act.  In a terrible 
indictment of the operation the force commander General Dallaire stated that he 
believed that the poor handling of the operation, including the lack of proper military 
response, had abetted the genocide.86   
 
In 1999 Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a report into the failure in 
Rwanda.  The report found the: 
 
Overriding failure… was the lack of resources and political will to stop the genocide.  
UNAMIR was not planned, deployed or instructed in a way which would have 
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enabled the mission to stop the genocide. UNAMIR was also the victim of political 
will in the Security Council and on the part of Member States.87 
 
The UN force, conducting a traditional peacekeeping operation under a Chapter VI 
mandate was neither armed nor mandated to take action.  Peacekeeping had reached a 
low point and the UN reputation for peacekeeping was tarnished.88  Had the Security 
Council seen fit to authorise a Chapter VII operation the force would at least have had 
the legal ability to attempt to prevent the disaster.   Soldiers forming part of the 
Australian contingent found it difficult to stand by and do nothing.  Some of them 
attempted to trigger the rules of engagement by creating a situation where they would 
be entitled to return fire in self defence.  Fortunately for the outnumbered force they 
were unsuccessful.89 
 
Chad / Libya 1994 UNASOG 
 
The Republic of Chad and the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) 
commenced a dispute over an area between Chad and Libya known as the Aouzou 
Strip in 1973.  Though initially violent, the parties were able to reach diplomatic 
agreements but not a total settlement, so in 1990 the parties referred the matter to the 
ICJ.  The ICJ gave its determination in February 1994 and on 4 April 1994 the parties 
signed a final agreement which was formally notified to the UN.  As part of the 
agreement UN observers were to monitor the withdrawal of forces and 
implementation of the agreement.  The Security Council agreed to deploy 
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peacekeepers and on 4 May 1994 adopted Security Council Resolution 915 (1994) 
establishing the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG).  On 30 
May 1994 Chad and Libya jointly declared that the withdrawal was complete and the 
agreements complied with as witnessed by UNASOG.  UNASOG was duly 
terminated in June 1994.90 
 
UNASOG is yet another example of an observer operation being conducted under 
Chapter VI in a Chapter VII environment.  The Security Council had used the Article 
41 embargo powers to limit the arms flow into the area thereby forcing the parties to a 
diplomatic solution.  This approach appears to have been successful and the Security 
Council did not recall the Chapter VII Resolution when dealing with the 
establishment of UNASOG.  As a result UNASOG would not have had the option of 
upgrading its resources to act under Chapter VII without a fresh Resolution.   
 
Tajikistan 1994 UNMOT 
 
Tajikistan became an independent State in September 1991 following the break up of 
the USSR.  Tajikistan did not have a stable government and in May 1992 opposition 
elements tried to seize power.  Civil war erupted with the government forces finally 
gaining the upper hand effectively ending the civil war in early 1993.  Although the 
government had been successful the rebels were not eliminated and continued to 
strike against the government across the Tajik-Afghan border.  Tajikistan sought aid 
from the Russian Federation, which provided troops to protect the border.  Although a 
measure of stability had been restored, the population of Tajikistan had experienced 
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major disruption with a significant number of civilians killed or displaced internally 
and into neighbouring States as refugees.91 
 
Regional States moved to assist in stabilising Tajikistan and to support humanitarian 
aid programs. The UN was also involved in diplomatic efforts to coordinate political 
and material support.  By September 1994 the UN had brought about an agreement 
for a temporary ceasefire across the Afghan-Tajik border.  A request for the 
deployment of a UN observer operation formed part of the agreement.  Preliminary 
work to establish an operation was commenced while further talks between the parties 
further defined the role the operation was required to undertake.   On 16 December 
1994 the UN adopted Resolution 968 (1994) establishing the United Nations Mission 
of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT).  Although the operation was an integrated 
military and civilian deployment it consisted primarily of military observers.92 
 
Despite talks fighting flared and by July 1996 the ceasefire had collapsed. Diplomatic 
efforts intensified resulting in a further peace agreement being established in June 
1997.  UNMOT was strengthened in November 1997 to assist in the demobilisation 
and repatriation efforts set out in the agreement.  Elections, monitored by the UN 
were held in February and March 2000.   Although the UN monitors criticised the 
elections and sporadic violence continued the Secretary-General was confident that 
stability was attainable and he was keen to establish a peace building operation to 
continue the stabilisation process.  By May 2000 the Security Council was satisfied 
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that UNMOT had successfully completed its mission in Tajikistan and the operation 
was terminated on 15 May 2000.93 
 
UNMOT was a traditional military observer operation with a small civilian element.   
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 UNMIBH 
 
On 15 December 1995 the Security Council welcomed the deployment into Bosnia 
Herzegovina of the International Force (IFOR), a NATO led operation, following the 
termination of armed conflict.  IFOR was in turn replaced by another NATO based 
multinational stabilisation force (SFOR), authorised by the Security Council in 1996 
under a Chapter VII mandate.   While the NATO led SFOR provided the military 
presence, the UN decided to deploy a non military peacekeeping operation, the United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).  UNMIBH was established 
by Security Council Resolution 103594 and consists of the United Nations 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office.95 
 
While it has not been uncommon for the UN to run an observer mission alongside a 
contracted out peacekeeping operation or to have integrated civilian and military 
operations, this operation is the first UN peacekeeping operation that consisted 
entirely of civilians.  This operation exemplified a developing practice of the UN to 
mandate Member States or regional organisations such as NATO, to conduct 
peacekeeping operations and in conjunction establish a UN peacekeeping operation, 
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normally consisting of UN military observers conducting a traditional observer 
operation.    
 
Although IFOR was expressly established under Chapter VII, UNMIBH appears in a 
clearly separate section of the Resolution with no express Chapter VII authority.   
Also, although in recalling Resolution 103596 the Article 39 finding that the situation 
creates a threat to international peace and security is imported, the Security Council 
appears to have avoided expressly identifying UNMIBH as a Chapter VII operation.  
This is a form the Security Council appears to have adopted over recent years to 
distinguish between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations that are running 
simultaneously. 
 
The task of UNMIBH was entirely one of peace building with the implementation of a 
civil justice system. It should be noted that the human rights mandate was a key 
component of this.  UNMIBH is another example of the complex second generation 
combinations of Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations.  
 
Haiti 1996 UNSMIH 
 
The UN had deployed a civilian mission to Haiti in 1993 to monitor human rights and 
uphold the human rights defined in the Haitian Constitution97  The re-establishment of 
the rule of law was not complete however.  In particular the Haitian police were not 
yet fully trained and able to ensure a stable environment.  The presence of a UN force 
was felt to be necessary in order to maintain stability until the Haitian authorities were 
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able to take on this role for themselves.  As a result on 28 June 1996 the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1063 (1996) establishing the United Nations Support 
Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) to train the police force and maintain a stable 
environment in Haiti for peace building.  UMSMIH finished when its mandate 
expired on 31 July 1997.98    
 
The UNSMIH mission and the structure under which it was set up are a little 
troubling.  Although previous resolutions were referred to in a general way in 
Resolution 1063 (1996), no specific previous resolution was adopted into it.  There 
was no Article 39 finding and no express adoption of Chapter VII from previous 
resolutions.  As a result, although UNSMIH had as part of its mission to provide a 
secure environment in Haiti, it could not use force other than in self-defence because 
of its status as a Chapter VI operation.  UNSMIH also had some difficulties in 
meeting the normal requirements for a Chapter VI operation.  Although it was present 
by consent and could use force only in self-defence, it was not impartial, having been 
set in place to provide security to Haiti from the rebel forces threatening to undermine 
Haitian stability.  UNSMIH therefore represents a modification of the standard model 
for a Chapter VI operation.  Impartiality had always been one of the key principles of 
Chapter VI peacekeeping, even in internal disputes.  UNSMIH was not impartial with 
regard to the rebels and therefore provides an exception to the norms that had been 
established with regard to impartiality in Chapter VI peacekeeping operations.    
 
Guatemala 1997 MINUGUA 
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One of the longest running conflicts in South America was between the government 
of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).  In 
1994 the General Assembly contributed to the efforts to resolve the situation by 
establishing a human rights verification and institution-building mission.   Peace 
negotiations made significant progress and in December 1996 the parties signed the 
last of a series of agreements aimed at achieving a lasting peace.  The Security 
Council moved to support the peace process by passing Resolution 1094 (1997),99 
which inter alia attached 155 military observers to the civilian verification mission as 
the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).  The traditional 
observer operation commenced on 3 March 1997.  The observer element of 
MINUGUA was to monitor the ceasefire agreement between the parties.  On 14 May 
1997 a list of destroyed and deactivated munitions was provided to the Guatemalan 
government, verified by the Chief UN Military Observer, marking the completion of 
the observer operation.  The operation was terminated on 27 May 1997.100 
 
Angola 1997 MONUA 
 
The UN had been actively involved in Angola for some time in attempting to settle 
the civil war between the government and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola (UNITA).  A series of Chapter VII operations were established, 
which are discussed in the following chapter of this work. 
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On 30 June 1997 Security Council Resolution 1119 (1997) established the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).  MONUA was to take over the 
previous Chapter VII operation UNAVEM III and:  
 
assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, 
enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term 
stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.101 
 
The plan for MONUA was that it would takeover and then downsize the UN military 
force.  Civil police and other civilian staff were to have been the primary component 
with a small military traditional observer group remaining.  This plan was never 
completed as the situation in Angola seriously deteriorated.  The UN tried to revive 
the stalled peace process, postponing the withdrawal of MONUA troops.  Eventually, 
after the loss of UN lives and two aircraft, the UN acknowledged that the peace 
process had collapsed and MONUA was withdrawn in February 1999.102  
 
MONUA differed from many of the operations running at the time because it was 
formed separately as a Chapter VI operation instead of being part of the Chapter VII 
operation.  
 
Haiti 1997 UNTMIH 
 
The Security Council determined that following the termination of UNSMIH in July 
1997 Haiti was still in need of support but that this support would only be for a period 
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of four months from the end of UNSMIH until 30 November 1997.  The new 
operation was predominantly civilian in order to complete the training of the Haitian 
police force. This operation was established by Security Council Resolution 1123 
(1997)103 and was known as the United Nations Transitional Mission in Haiti 
(UNTMIH).104 
 
Given that the UNTMIH operation was predominantly designed to finalise the 
restructure of the Haitian civil police it is not surprising that the resolution providing 
the mandate for UNTMIH set it up as a Chapter VI operation.  The thrust of the 
operation was peace building with the military element performing a quasi-policing 
role as the security operation run by the military was limited to providing for itself 
and the UN personnel involved in the operation.  UNTMIH demonstrates the trend 
that was developing towards combined peacekeeping and peace building operations.  
 
Haiti 1997 MIPONUH 
 
Although the UN military operations in Haiti finished with the termination of 
UNTMIH in November 1997, the UN remained in Haiti in the form of a peace 
building operation to establish a modern and capable police force.  In order to achieve 
this the Security Council adopted Resolution 1141 (1997),105 which established the 
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).  As well as finishing 
the work of previous operations in providing Haiti with a highly capable police force, 
the operation laid the groundwork for a subsequent UN and the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) mission aimed at developing the civil justice system, which 
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after years of neglect was in much need of assistance and promoting human rights 
within Haiti.  MIPONUH was terminated in March 2000. 
 
As MIPONUH was a civilian police operation at the invitation of the Haitian 
government it inevitably had the characteristics as well as the mandate of a Chapter 
VI operation.  In some respects it does not belong in an analysis of military 
peacekeeping operations because it was staffed by civilian police.  However, the 
operation does provide an example of an operation that is conducted as part of the 
transition from a military peacekeeping operation to a civilian staffed peace building 
mission, where the aim is not to stand between or monitor parties potentially in 
conflict but to assist in the re-establishment of the necessary structures of a State.     
 
Croatia 1998 UNPSG 
 
The United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG) was established on 19 
December 1997 by Security Council Resolution 1145 (1997) at the termination of the 
Chapter VII United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sirmium (UNTAES).  The UNPSG operation represents a continuation of the 
movement towards the civilianisation of the peacekeeping process, as there was no 
military component to the operation at all.  Like its predecessor MIPONUH, it was 
established solely as a civilian police mission to monitor the Croatian police and to 
take over the policing tasks performed by the military staffed UNTAES.106  Although 
it followed directly from UNTAES, it was established under Chapter VI, underlining 
                                                                                                                                            
104 http:www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm. (20 Jul 2002). 
105 of 28 November 1997. 
106 http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missons/cropol.htm. (22 Jul 2002). 
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the reservation of Chapter VII to military operations or operations with a significant 
military component that may be called upon to use force.   
 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000 UNMEE 
 
There has been a long history of conflict and resultant humanitarian crisis in and 
around Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Mindful of this history of crisis following the outbreak 
of fresh fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 the Secretary-General 
moved to assist in the mediation that was being conducted between the protagonists 
by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).    Some success was achieved and 
proposals for redeployment of forces, demobilisation and demilitarisation were put 
forward.  Despite efforts by the UN and regional organisations fighting again erupted 
in May 2000.  The Security Council reacted by condemning the resort to arms and 
implemented an embargo to prevent the parties from accessing the means to continue 
the conflict.  As anticipated, a significant humanitarian crisis was also developing as a 
result of the conflict and the UN moved to support the provision of humanitarian aid 
to the region.107   
 
Finally in June 2000 an agreement was reached between the parties.  As had become 
increasingly common in such circumstances, the agreement called upon the UN to 
provide peacekeepers to implement the agreement.  The Security Council responded 
by passing Resolution 1312 (2000),108 which established the United Nations Mission 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).  This operation was further expanded by 
                                                 
107 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/unmeeB.htm. (22 Jul 2002). 
108 of 31 June 2000 
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Resolution 1320 (2000),109 under which up to 4,300 troops could be deployed.110   On 
12 December 2000 a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the parties 
and the process of compliance with the agreement commenced.   
 
UNMEE was essentially a traditional peacekeeping operation but the size of the force 
was larger than usually associated with the traditional model and was somewhat more 
sophisticated with a detailed mandate set out in the body of the Resolution rather than 
provided by the Secretary-General as was usually the case in the early traditional 
operations.   
 
Afghanistan 2002 UNAMA 
 
The terrorist attack by Al ‘Quaida on the US in September 2001 resulted in a major 
shift in US policy and ultimately led to the invasion of Afghanistan and expulsion of 
the Taliban rulers by armed force.  Afghanistan is a State that has been subject to 
conflict since its creation as a buffer between empires over 130 years ago.  In the 19th 
Century the British fought several wars in the region.111  The USSR invaded 
Afghanistan and fought to control it from 1979 to 1992.  Internal armed conflict raged 
intermittently throughout its history as a State and even the Taliban, victors of internal 
armed conflict following the withdrawal of the USSR, failed in their bid to rule the 
whole of Afghanistan.112 
 
                                                 
109 of 15 September 2000 
110 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/unmeeB.htm (23 Jan 2003). 
111 See for example Allen, C. Soldier Sahibs ( 2000) for accounts of activities during the First and 
Second Afghan Wars and the Sikh Wars in the mid 19th Century. 
112 Brogan, P. World Conflicts. (1998) at 123-136. 
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The UN involvement in Afghanistan dates back to early 1980 with efforts to provide 
aid to the conflict ridden State.  Following the US invasion of Afghanistan and defeat 
of the Taliban the Security Council, under Resolution 1386 (2001) established under 
Chapter VII the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  The US led force 
was a contracted out operation tasked with providing stability and creating the 
conditions necessary to initiate peaceful government in Afghanistan and the 
implementation of the Bonn Agreement.113   
 
On 28 March 2002 the Security Council established a UN operation in Afghanistan 
under Resolution 1401 (2002).   The operation was to be known as the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Its tasks were to coordinate the 
provision of assistance from the UN, there being some 16 UN agencies deployed to 
Afghanistan in addition to a number of NGOs, and to assist in police and security 
functions.  The Resolution did not specify that UNAMA was to be a Chapter VII 
operation although the resolution did recall the previous Resolutions made under 
Chapter VII.114    
 
UNAMA is another example of the emerging trend for the Security Council providing 
for multiple levels of peacekeeping in terms of the legal basis underpinning the 
operation.  As with the former Yugoslavia, a contracted out operation was provided 
with a robust Chapter VII mandate while the UN operation was maintained on a 
Chapter VI basis under the protection of the Chapter VII operation.  UNAMA is 
therefore a good example of the complex form of Chapter VI operation being 
developed by the UN. 
                                                 
113 Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) 20 December 2001. 
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Ivory Coast 2003 MINUCI 
 
Between independence in 1960 and the death of its founding president in 1993 the 
Ivory Coast was politically stable and relatively prosperous.   The death of the 
founding president plunged the Ivory Coast into a political power struggle, which was 
not resolved until a military coup d’etat in December 1999.  Elections held in October 
2000 produced more disputes, this time resulting in violent clashes between political 
supporters that resulted in the death of at least 50 people.  The Supreme Court was 
required to determine the election result and found against the military candidate.  The 
new president attempted a policy of open elections and reconciliation.  This policy 
resulted in general agreement between the political adversaries and the founding of a 
new government of national unity on 5 August 2000.115  
 
The promise of a return to the post independence stability and prosperity was not to 
come to fruition.  On 19 September 2002 soldiers mounted attacks on a number of key 
cities, including the capital, Abidjan.  A number of political leaders were killed in the 
subsequent fighting and although the capital was recaptured the rebels held a number 
of towns and cities in the north and west of the country.   In an attempt to resolve the 
impasse the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) stepped in to 
support a resolution to the crisis.  With assistance from ECOWAS and the UN Special 
Representative, a ceasefire agreement was reached on 17 October 2002 and a 
monitoring force from ECOWAS and France was put in place while peace talks 
continued.   Although a peace agreement was reached on 26 January 2003 there were 
                                                                                                                                            
114 http://www.unama-afg.org/about/index.html. (2 Mar 2003). 
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demonstrations against aspects of the settlement and the defence forces rejected 
provisions for power sharing with the rebels.   Further negotiations and manoeuvring 
took place that finally resulted in a settlement on 8 March 2003.116 
 
On 13 May 2003 by Resolution 1479 (2003)117 the Security Council established the 
United Nations Mission in the Ivory Coast (MINUCI).  An Article 39 finding was 
made that the situation in the Ivory Coast constituted a threat to international peace 
and security but the Security Council did not go on to specifically establish MINUCI 
under Chapter VII.  As it had by this time become the custom of the Security Council 
to specify Chapter VII activities MINUCI must be considered as a Chapter VI 
peacekeeping operation.  This position is distinguishable from the approach taken 
regarding the operation in Cyprus because at the time that the Cyprus Resolution was 
taken the Security Council had not developed the practice of specifically nominating 
the elements of a Resolution that belonged to Chapter VII. 
 
The very small military component, initially 26 members with approval to increase 
that number only by 50, supports the view that MINUCI was intended to be a Chapter 
VI operation.  The military component was established only to provide and establish 
liaison with key actors such as the French and ECOWAS forces, the Ivory Coast 
forces and to monitor disarmament and demobilisation.  Although performing a 
quintessentially traditional role the combination of Chapter VI and Chapter VII 
operating environments gives the operation a different flavour to its predecessors. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
115 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html. (24 Mar 2005). 
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Principles of Chapter VI Peacekeeping 
 
Chapter VI is the legal basis for the traditional form of peacekeeping.  The traditional 
model of peacekeeping was based on the implied power within Chapter VI.118   The 
first traditional peacekeeping operation was implemented in 1949.  Although a 
mandate under Chapter VI gives life to the operation it is not a process of violation or 
negation of a State’s rights and all States have sovereign equality under Article 2(1) of 
the Charter so can, at least in theory, reject suggestions by stronger States or the UN 
for a Chapter VI operation to be conducted on their territory.119   
 
The requirements for equality between the States also means that the UN must treat 
inter State situations in accordance with this Charter provision. This has led to the 
establishment in peacekeeping of the principle of impartiality between the parties, 
including for the most part, during intra State disputes. 
 
As Chapter VI of the Charter does not contain any provision for an imposed solution 
on a State or inter State issue, any Chapter VI operation must have consent of the 
parties at its foundation.  States are also at liberty to enter into agreements with other 
States or regional organisations to obtain intervention.  The Security Council has 
expressly recognised this right of States to request and consent to intervention by 
another State.120  However, there is a risk of abuse of this process, particularly where 
there is dispute as to the lawful government.  Collective action for the benefit of the 
                                                                                                                                            
116 Ibid.  
117 S/RES/1479 (2003) 
118 As determined by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Case. 
119 Israel has repeatedly rejected moves to establish a peacekeeping operation as a solution to its 
difficulties with the Palestinians.  
120 Jenkins, R and Watts, A (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed 1996) Vol 1 at 435. 
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international community is not considered to present such a risk so that a UN 
operation may have more latitude than an invited State or regional organisation.121  
 
From these observations on the centrality of consent and continued sovereignty of the 
host State or States, it is clear that some form of agreement must be entered into with 
the host States in order to provide for such things as entry and exit of forces, entry and 
exit of personal belongings, labour, claims and contractors, and susceptibility to 
income and sales taxes as well as the operation and jurisdiction of host State law, 
carriage of arms and so on.122  Such agreements are known as Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFA) and can be traced back to the 19 June 1951 agreement between 
the NATO States for the interaction of their armed forces.    The UN developed a 
model SOFA of 9 October 1990 and in 1997 the Secretary-General recommended that 
the model SOFA123 provisionally apply to all peacekeeping operations unless a 
specific SOFA had been entered into for that operation.  The General Assembly 
adopted this approach in Resolution 52/12,B of 19 December 1997. 
 
The UN had recognised the importance of agreements with the host State in the 
earliest days of peacekeeping. In 1957 the UN entered into an Exchange of Letters 
with Egypt to specify the status of UNEF in Egypt. This agreement on the status of 
UNEF was the first document of its kind to be used by the UN. Similarly, in 1989, the 
UN entered into an agreement with South Africa to detail the status of UNTAG.124  
The SOFA has been used extensively by the UN and it has been argued that the model 
                                                 
121 The General Assembly has for example spoken out against intervention by outside States in 
suppressing groups seeking self determination. Id at 439-449. 
122 Topic covered under such agreements are discussed for example at Global Security Status of Forces 
Agreement http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm. (31 Mar 2005) 
123 (A/45/594) 
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SOFA developed in 1990 by the UN for use in peacekeeping operations has passed 
into customary international law.125 The SOFA is not imposed on the State by the UN 
but entered into as an act of sovereignty by the State. If the SOFA has indeed passed 
into customary international law then acceptance of the provisions represents an act of 
compliance with the State’s international obligations. 
 
While under Chapter VII the mandate may be the only legal authority for the 
peacekeeping operation, under Chapter VI operations the consent of the parties 
supported by individual agreements, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and/or a 
SOFA provides the legal authority for the activities of the peacekeepers.  In situations 
where a SOFA has not been established it may be that in modern Chapter VI 
operations the UN Model SOFA provides support on a customary international law 
basis.   
 
While reliance on the Model SOFA is a relatively recent development, Chapter VI 
operations have since their inception had available the provisions of the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.126   The Privileges and 
Immunities Convention provides for varying levels of privileges and immunities for 
the representatives of members, officials of the United Nations, the Secretary-General 
and Assistant Secretaries-General, and experts on mission.  Under the Model SOFA 
the position of UN peacekeepers was clarified as “experts on mission” under the 
                                                                                                                                            
124 Sharpe, W. “Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and Security” 7 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 93 (1996). 
125 Wellens, K. “The Practice of the (UN) Security Council With Regard To Treaties and Other 
Agreements Governed By Internation Law” 
http://www.javeriana.edu.co/Facultades/C_Juridicas/Facultad/revistainternacional/LAW%201.pdf. (1 
Jul 2005) at 22. 
126 13 February 1946.  
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Convention provisions.127  The model SOFA goes further than the Convention as it 
gives exclusive criminal jurisdiction to the sending State over its military personnel.   
 
Peacekeepers operating as part of a contracted out, regional or coalition operation, 
such as the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, must rely upon an 
agreed SOFA with the host State as the Convention and Model SOFA do not apply to 
non-UN operations.   
 
In addition to the provisions set in place by the UN, Greenwood argues that 
peacekeepers are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions, specifically 
GC IV, and the 1977 Protocols.128  He argues that peacekeepers engaged in Chapter 
VI operations are essentially in the same position as civilians and that as a result the 
protections must apply.  Clearly these protections are only relevant where 
peacekeepers are operating in a situation of armed conflict.129   As a Chapter VI 
operation is by definition unable to engage in armed conflict, not only because of its 
mandate but also because it is practically unable through lack of arms, this is a logical 
position.  A Chapter VI operation may therefore find itself in a relatively complex 
situation legally, having to comply with convention130 provisions, MOU and SOFA 
requirements and in dire situations, humanitarian law provisions to ensure 
preservation of their protected status.  This does not however mean that they are 
parties to any conflict, merely that where the laws of armed conflict have been 
engaged they are subject to such provisions as are relevant, for example, provisions 
                                                 
127 Above n 123. 
128 Greenwood, C “Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime” 7 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 185, 190 (1996). 
129 See  McCoubrey, H and White, N  The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations (1996) at 169 for agreement with this position. 
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regarding naturals, civilians and so on.  As demonstrated in Cambodia, even in a post 
conflict environment, where the Chapter VI operation has been responsible for 
establishing a legal framework it has relied on human rights law to provide that 
framework not humanitarian law. 
 
Despite the protections afforded, UN peacekeepers have not been immune from 
attack.  In response to a number of violations of UN neutrality the Secretary-General 
presented the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel Report to the General 
Assembly  in 2001.131  The report does not alter the legal position of UN peacekeepers 
but urges an increased level of compliance with the extant protection for UN 
personnel and puts in place resources and plans for evacuation of UN personnel, 
including peacekeepers, in the event that the host State lacks the will or ability to 
protect them. In return for the services of a peacekeeping operation a State will be 
required to comply with its agreements and provide a level of protection to the 
peacekeeping operation if required. 
 
As well as the principles of impartiality and consent in Chapter VI peacekeeping, 
there is one other principle that can be identified.  The use of force limited to self 
defence has been strictly adhered to in Chapter VI peacekeeping.  In any event until 
the most recent operations the size of the force was very often a significant limiting 
factor in the ability of the operation to use force other than in self defence.  The 
situation that emerged in Rwanda is perhaps the most graphic example of this 
limitation.  The restriction on the use of force is consistent with the absence of 
                                                                                                                                            
130 As well as the Convention on immunities there is the Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel. 9 December 1994: 34 ILM (1995) 482-493. 
131 UN General Assembly A/55/494. Fifty-fifth Session. (2001). 
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provisions in Chapter VI that are found in Chapter VII, Article 42 authorising the use 
of armed forces to achieve peace.   
 
In addition to the principles of consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self 
defence another consistent theme that appears in the Chapter VI operations set out 
above is that the legal framework under which peacekeepers operate is that of the host 
domestic State as modified by agreements and conventions.  These operations 
therefore contribute by ruling out humanitarian law or indeed human rights law as the 
legal framework in the majority of Chapter VI operations.  There are however 
exceptions to the general rule that the legal framework will be provided by the host 
State and these exceptions are discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
“Trusteeship” style model 
 
The majority of Chapter VI operations have been conducted in circumstances where 
the host domestic State legal framework has been functioning to a greater or lesser 
degree.  There have however been three notable exceptions to this situation.  These 
are West Irian, Namibia and Cambodia.  These are examined in detail as in these 
operations the UN has provided the legal framework.  This framework, which it will 
be argued is a legal framework, has been applied in circumstances where there has 
been an absence or collapse of the domestic State framework. 
 
 
 
 
 195 
West Irian 1962 UNSF 
 
After World War Two the Dutch were in a weakened position and unable to maintain 
effective control of its former colonies.  This situation led to the formation of 
Indonesia.  The former Dutch colony of West New Guinea or West Irian did not 
however immediately become part of Indonesia.  It continued to be administered by 
the Dutch against Indonesian protest that often spilled into isolated low level armed 
conflict.  Eventually agreement was reached regarding the future sovereignty of the 
territory and the UN set up an interim administration to transfer authority to Indonesia 
pending a plebiscite 132 as required under Article 76.  
 
In September 1962 the General Assembly moved the formation of the United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA).133  The United Nations Security Force 
(UNSF) was established by the Security Council under Resolution 1752 (XVII) of 21 
September 1962. The administration and military force was mandated to administer 
the territory including the maintenance of local security.134  UNSF also monitored the 
ceasefire that had been established with Indonesia.135  UNTEA administered West 
New Guinea until Indonesia took over in May 1963136 and UNSF was formally 
terminated on 30 April 1963. 
 
UNSF was a Chapter VI operation in the traditional form but it was part of a new 
breed of peacekeeping that would later become more common.  Although the military 
aspect, UNSF, fitted into the traditional model the legal basis of UNSF and UNTEA 
                                                 
132 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsf.htm  (10 Mar 2005); Above n1 at 264. 
133 Resolution 1752 (XVII) of 20 September 1962. 
134 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsfmandate.html (10 Mar 2005). 
135 Above n 11 at 770. 
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was quite different.  UNTEA and UNSF were not set up under Chapter VII, as would 
later be the case for combined administration and peacekeeping operations such as 
Kosovo and East Timor, but was based on an agreement between Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, part VIII of which provided for UNSF.  The operation was dispatched by 
the UN on the basis of a General Assembly Resolution137 that did no more than 
endorse the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.138  
 
The legal basis for this action was not set out in the Resolution but it appears that 
although not articulated it was very closely modelled on Chapter XII of the Charter, 
the International Trusteeship System.139  The process of agreements was certainly 
consistent with the procedure laid down for the Trusteeship system. Chapter XI of the 
Charter provides for the administration of territories prior to self-government but it is 
restricted to administration by Members of the UN not the UN itself as occurred in 
West Irian.  There is on the other hand clear authority for the process that was 
undertaken in UNTEA as Chapter XII provides expressly for the General Assembly to 
authorise the UN to act as the administration.  Article 81 relevantly provides:   
 
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust 
territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the 
administration of the trust territory.  Such authority, hereinafter called the 
administering authority, may be one or more States or the Organisation itself. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
136 Above n 1 at 264. 
137 Above n 133. 
138 http://www.hampapua.org/skp/hukum/unga1752-1962e.pdf (10 Mar 2005). 
139 The NGO “West Papu Action” claim that the territory was in fact brought under the Trusteeship but 
this is not substantiated by the mandate or the fact that Trusteeship Council was not involved as 
required under the Trusteeship provisions:  http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/ft-hrw.htm (10 Mar 2005). 
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West Irian was still under colonial rule prior to the UN administration and had 
therefore not become a Member of the UN140 so the process did not fall foul of the 
prohibition against the trusteeship applying to Members set out in Article 78, which 
provides: 
 
The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of 
the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the 
principle of sovereign equality. 
 
On the face of it the West Irian operation was a case of a UN combined administration 
and peacekeeping operation under a system closely resembling the Trusteeship.141   
The administration was empowered to make laws for West Irian and to do all things 
necessary for the government of the territory as if it were the government.  The 
framework for such government is outlined in Article 76: 
 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the 
United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:  
a. to further international peace and security;  
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the 
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of 
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;  
                                                 
140 Even where a State administered a Trusteeship territory the State did not gain sovereignty over the 
Trust territory as residual sovereignty remained with the UN or the people; Jennings, R and Watts, A 
Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, 1996) at 316. 
141 http:www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsfbackgr.html (21 August 2006) 
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c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the 
interdependence of the peoples of the world; and  
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all 
Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the 
latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the 
foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.  
 
If the Trusteeship can be used as a basis for peacekeeping operations then the legal 
framework to be applied must be human rights law because of the effect specifically 
articulated in Article 76(c) and the general provisions of the article, which are 
consistent with the major human rights conventions. 
 
Setting aside the political opposition to use of the Trusteeship in modern operations 
based on a fear of a return to colonialism, particularly from the non-aligned States; the 
question is whether the Trusteeship basis for the West Irian operation could provide a 
model for modern collapsed State operations such as Somalia, Kosovo and East 
Timor? 
 
Accepting that there would be considerable political barriers to use of the model, the 
Charter itself places limitations on the use of the Trusteeship provisions that apply to 
territories. These provisions would prevent its use in situations, such as Somalia, 
where a State or territory of a State was involved.   
 
Article 77 provides: 
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1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as 
may be placed there under by means of trusteeship agreements:  
a. territories now held under mandate;  
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second 
World War; and  
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their 
administration.  
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing 
categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.  
 
There are no territories that remain held under mandate or that have been detached 
from enemy States as a result of the Second World War.  Note that the provision here 
is very specifically linked to the Second World War.  There is no room for a wider 
interpretation that the sub clause may have had in the event that it had referred only to 
“war”.  The only category that would be available in modern peacekeeping operations 
would be those territories falling into sub clause c, as did West Irian.   
 
Another limitation to the use of Chapter XII in collapsed States is the provision in 
Article 78 which limits application of the trusteeship system by providing that: 
 
The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of 
the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the 
principle of sovereign equality. 
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The majority of the world’s States are now Members of the UN.  Somalia was in 1992 
so that a Trusteeship model could not have been used to support the UN operation and 
could not be used in any other Member State. 
 
With regard to territories that have broken away from States, the wording of the 
article does not relate to Sates that have become Members but to territories.  It could 
be argued therefore that where territories of Members States break away, such as 
Kosovo from the Member State Yugoslavia and East Timor from the Member State 
Indonesia (or Portugal noting that the UN did not recognise Indonesia’s claim), that 
they cannot be dealt with under the Trusteeship.  Whether the doctrine of succession 
could be applied in such situations to confer UN Membership on a territory is 
“uncertain and controversial.” 142  but given the political opposition in the UN to the 
Trusteeship it is unlikely that the UN would act as if Article 78 applied to territories 
formally belonging to Member States and as a result refuse to use the Trusteeship for 
such operations. 
 
While at first blush the West Irian operation looks like the first of the modern Chapter 
VII operations where an administration and peacekeeping operation is set up143 it is in 
fact almost the last of the Trusteeships and represents a legal basis for peacekeeping 
that would no longer be viable or acceptable.144  What it did provide however was a 
model upon which future collapsed State peacekeeping could be built.  The 
                                                 
142 Jennings, R and Watts, A Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, 1996) Vol 1 at 209. 
143 As would be the case in East Timor and Kosovo. 
144 Partly because of Article 78 but also due to the unpopularity of the Trusteeship, particularly among 
the non aligned States; see Marks, E. “Transitional Governance A Return to the Trusteeship System?” 
(1999) IV American Journal of Diplomacy 1; Inman, H & Sharp, W. “Revisiting the UN Trusteeship 
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Trusteeship provisions relating to human rights would be persuasive in the argument 
towards human rights as opposed to humanitarian law legal framework for future 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Namibia 1989 UNTAG 
 
Post World War Two and the collapse of the League of Nations Namibia, or South 
West Africa as it was then known, became the subject of dispute between the 
emergent UN and South Africa.  South Africa refused to accept a Trusteeship 
agreement to replace the League of Nations Mandate granted in 1921.  In 1966 the 
UN gave up trying to pressure South Africa and assumed direct responsibility itself.  
In 1968 the UN declared that the territory would be henceforth known as Namibia.   
South Africa meanwhile continued its opposition and refusal to cooperate with the 
UN administration in Namibia instead running its own administration, enforcing its 
laws and converting the natural resources to its own ends.145 
 
Throughout the 1970’s the UN continued to oppose South Africa’s activities in 
Namibia instead providing support and recognition to the South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO).  In 1978 Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the UK and USA proposed a solution leading to independent elections in Namibia 
under UN auspices and supported by a UN peacekeeping operation.  The Security 
Council adopted Resolution 435 (1978)146 establishing the United Nations 
Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG).  However, due to disagreements over troop 
                                                                                                                                            
System – Will it Work? (1999) VI American Journal of Diplomacy 
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withdrawals and South African demands for equivalent action in Angola, UNTAG 
was not implemented until 1 April 1989.  Despite the delay in implementation once in 
place the agreement proceeded swiftly with UNTAG monitoring the withdrawal of 
South African forces and ensuring free and fair elections.  Within a year Namibia had 
elected a parliament, a president and had become the 160th Member of the United 
Nations.147 
 
UNTAG was a typical traditional integrated civilian/ military operation acting as an 
observer mission and monitor for the elections in Namibia.  The operation was 
conducted under Chapter VI with no Article 39 finding evident in Resolution 435 
(1978).  The requirements of consent, impartiality and force only in self-defence were 
present. What it did provide however was a model for the administration of a State 
and it was out of the UNTAG concept that the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia would be born.148   
 
From a legal framework perspective the operation was effectively under the 
Trusteeship system. As had occurred with West Irian the process was not articulated 
as such but was conducted as if there had been a voluntary handover to the UN by 
South Africa under Article 77 (a) of the Charter rather than a forced transfer of the 
territory.  As Namibia did not became a member of the UN until 1990 the process did 
not fall foul of the prohibition against Member State Trusteeship.  From a practical 
perspective the legal framework remained the domestic system operating under South 
African rule so that a fresh framework was not required although all discriminatory 
                                                                                                                                            
146 of 29 September 1978. 
147 Above n 143. 
148 Above n 10 at 247. 
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laws were repealed149 thus complying with the human rights requirements of Article 
78.  UNTAG reinforces the argument that operations set up under the Trusteeship 
model will use human rights law, in accordance with the Article 78 requirement as the 
legal framework or to supplement the extant domestic legal framework. 
 
Cambodia 1992 UNTAC 
 
Following the successful deployment of UNAMIC the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 745 (1992)150 establishing the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC).  UNTAC was to ensure the implementation of the peace 
agreements reached in Paris in October 1991.    This agreement included agreement 
by all parties that the UN conduct a peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, thereby 
fulfilling the Chapter VI requirement for consent.  The Resolution made no Article 39 
finding or any mention of Chapter VII.  However, at paragraph 6 of the Resolution the 
Security Council called “upon all parties” to comply with agreements, cooperate with 
UNTAC “and to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of all 
United Nations personnel”.  This is a very unusual mandate to find in what is in all 
other respects a Chapter VI operation.  In later mandates the Security Council tended 
only to use such terminology when anticipating the use of force.   When anticipating 
the use of force the Security Council has become accustomed to passing the 
Resolution under Chapter VII or authorise another party to “take all necessary 
measures” under Chapter VII, as with NATO forces in support of the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.  The UNTAC forces would 
have been put in a very difficult position if they had relied upon previous mandates 
                                                 
149 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untagM.htm. (6 Jun 2005). 
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that permitted the “use of all necessary measures” to use force.  Had such force 
exceeded mere self-defence they would have been acting outside their mandate, a 
view clearly held by the UNTAC force commander General Sanderson.151  This 
example underlines the need for planners and peacekeepers to be fully aware of the 
legal framework establishing each individual operation rather than relying on the 
interpretation of terminology from previous operations.  As a Chapter VI operation 
use of force could only be in self defence.   
 
Henkin claims that the legal framework for Cambodia was provided by a “de facto 
trusteeship authority.”152  However, the legal basis could not be Chapter XII because 
Cambodia had been a Member of the UN since 1955 and therefore could not be dealt 
with under the Trusteeship system as a result of the prohibition in Article 78.   
 
The issue of the use of force was not then the only difficulty raised by the Security 
Council dealing with Cambodia under Chapter VI.  Had an Article 39 finding been 
made then the Security Council would have been able to rely on the wide powers of 
Chapter VII to impose a solution such as a de facto Trusteeship.  Article 42 provides: 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
150 Of 28 February 1992. 
151 Above n 86 at 43. 
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This Article could have provided the Security Council with the legal authority to 
provide a military force to set up a peacekeeping operation to administer Cambodia.  
The power to do this would be a continuation of the implied power under which 
peacekeeping itself was found to be available.153 
 
The peace agreements reached in Paris however could be relied upon as authority for 
the assumption of the administration of the State.  Article 33 of the Charter could 
provide the legal basis as it provides: 
 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice.  
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to 
settle their dispute by such means.  
The administration of Cambodia on a Trusteeship model was effectively an 
“arrangement” arising from the October 1991 Paris agreement and the delegation of 
powers to the UN by the Supreme National Council of Cambodia.154 
 
The legal framework that was adopted by UNTAC was human rights based.  The 
Human Rights component of UNTAC was involved in the development of legislation 
                                                                                                                                            
152 Henkin, A in above n 76 at 7. 
153 As determined by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Case, above n 31. 
154 Above n 76 at 57-61 
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and procedures for arrest and detention.155  There is no evidence of consideration of 
humanitarian law as providing the framework while respect for human rights and their 
promotion was specifically incorporated into the peace settlement and therefore the 
mandate for UNTAC.   
 
Key deduction 
 
From an examination of UN practice it can be deduced that where the legal 
framework applied is not expressly articulated it is only by looking at what was done 
that the law applicable can be deduced.  On this basis West Irian, Namibia and 
Cambodia all provide evidence that supports the hypothesis of this work that human 
rights law and not humanitarian law is the legal framework to be applied in 
peacekeeping operations in collapsed States, to the extent that it demonstrates that 
human rights law was the framework used in situations where the domestic legal 
system had collapsed or did not exist, requiring the UN operation to act in its place 
pending construction or reconstruction.  To this extent the opinio juris, or State 
practice, in such circumstances is that international human rights law is the legal 
framework to be applied. 
  
 
 
                                                 
155 Thayer, C.A. “The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The Restoration of 
Sovereignty” in Woodhouse, T., Bruce, R. and Dando, M. (eds) Peacekeeping and 
Peacemaking.(1998) at 154; Findlay, T The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC. SIPRI Reseach Report No. 
9. (1995) noted as part of his lessons learned from Cambodia that “Human rights should be a 
paramount concern in cases where government authority has collapsed or when a neutral political 
environment is required for electoral purposes. The UN should develop 'justice packages' comprising 
all the elements of a model legal system which can be employed when the UN is required to take over 
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Conclusion 
 
Three principles emerge from the practice of Chapter VI peacekeeping.  These are 
consent of the host State or States, impartiality between the parties and the use of 
force only in self defence.156  In addition it may be observed that generally the legal 
framework for the operation will be provided by the host State as modified by 
agreement or convention. 
 
Given the level of consent required and the limitations placed on Chapter VI 
peacekeeping it is clearly not a belligerent occupation of the State within the specific 
meaning of occupation provided under the Geneva Conventions.157 As a result there is 
no transplanting of the domestic law of the State and peacekeepers and the operation 
itself, where relevant, are bound by the laws of the host State as modified by 
international treaties and specific agreements.  The extant State bureaucratic apparatus 
continues in place, where such apparatus exists.   Where it has not existed there have 
been two approaches by the UN.  The first approach was to implement an operation 
that appears to have been closely based on the provisions of Chapter XII and 
subsequent operations developed this model. 
 
There are many advantages to the Trusteeship style model as the power to administer 
the territory under the Trusteeship was clearly articulated in Chapter XII.  It is also 
                                                                                                                                            
the administration of 'failed states' or those otherwise needing temporary international tutelage.” See 
also UN. http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/peace/untac.html (10 Jun 2005). 
156 Above n 129 at 78. 
157 That occupation under the Geneva Conventions has a specific definition in international law will be 
the subject of analysis later in this work.  It has been argued by Kelly, M in his book Restoring and 
Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework that occupation 
within the meaning of GCIV can be used to provide a legal framework.  That position is rejected in 
chapter six of this work. 
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helpful to the argument put forward in this work that human rights is the legal 
framework that applies to collapsed State peacekeeping as human rights is specifically 
incorporated into Chapter XII.     
 
Once Chapter XII had fallen into disuse, the UN had to improvise and develop and it 
did so on the theme of Chapter XII. 
 
As explored in chapter one of this work, there has been an expansion of peacekeeping 
within Chapter VI operations.  While traditional operations and even some of the 
more complex combined Chapter158 operations have operated under the legal 
framework provided by the domestic State structures the operation in Cambodia was a 
major step away from the traditional form of Chapter VI peacekeeping. 
 
In Cambodia a Chapter VI operation was set up to temporarily administer the territory 
as if it were under a Trusteeship.  However, the process adopted was very similar to a 
Trusteeship, though its legal basis was Chapter VI.  There was no suggestion that 
humanitarian law be used as the legal framework to legitimise passing laws and 
implementing them, rather there was an automatic assumption that human rights 
would form the basis for the laws enacted by the administration.   
 
One reason for this automatic use of human rights law may be that as a result of the 
character of the operations and the requirements for consent, impartiality and the use 
of force only in self defence, it would be difficult to engage international 
humanitarian law as a tool, other than in a passive sense as a protective measure for 
 209 
peacekeepers caught in the middle of an armed conflict.  If caught in armed conflict 
peacekeepers benefit from the protections provided but as they are not a party to the 
conflict they cannot use the authority of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols to 
supplant or prop up domestic structures, nor do they take on the responsibilities of a 
party to the conflict.159   
 
These are practical considerations but it is also the case that in Cambodia, as with all 
UN Chapter VI operations, authority was consensually passed to the UN and was not 
an imposed solution.  The humanitarian law provisions in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention that would form a humanitarian law framework for a UN administration 
are based on an occupation in the belligerent sense.160  This is incompatible with a 
situation of consent or an express request for the operation.   
 
As identified above, the UN will not always state explicitly what provisions of law it 
is relying upon to conduct operations, it must be inferred from conduct.  In the case of 
the operations discussed in this chapter the only logical conclusion that can be 
reached from the evidence of Chapter VI operations in collapsed State situations is 
that the UN is acting as if the de jure law applicable in the absence of a domestic State 
framework is human rights law.  To this extent then the conduct of Chapter VI 
operations by the UN support the hypothesis of this work that human rights law and 
not humanitarian law is the legal framework to be applied in UN peacekeeping 
operations in collapsed States.    
                                                                                                                                            
158 “Combined Chapters” are operations that have mandates operating under both Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII. 
159 Above n 129 at 153-173. 
160 This point will be argued in a later chapter of this work. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Chapter VII Peacekeeping Operations 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of chapter three and chapter four of this work is to establish what the UN 
has done in practice with regard to the legal framework applied to peacekeeping.  
Chapter three of this work examined Chapter VI operations.  Although the majority of 
Chapter VI operations were reliant on the domestic State law as modified by 
agreements and international conventions there were exceptions where the UN 
established peacekeeping operations using the Trusteeship model in collapsed States 
such as West Irian and Cambodia.  It was argued that in the Trusteeship model 
operations the UN has in practice relied upon a human rights based framework to re-
establish the rule of law.     
 
This chapter examines the Chapter VII operations established by the UN between 
1960 and 2003 in order to establish the legal framework that has been used in such 
operations and in particular whether the Trusteeship model has been used in Chapter 
VII operations in collapsed States and whether international human rights provided 
the basis for the legal framework.  The Chapter VII operations will be divided into 
categories rather than examined individually except for the UN operations in Kosovo 
and East Timor, which will be analysed as case studies to establish the legal 
framework used in these collapsed States by the UN.  The operation in the Congo 
1960-3 will be outlined as it represents an exception to the practice of UN 
peacekeeping not to become directly engaged in internal armed conflict.  The facts of 
the operation in Somalia will also be set out in order to contextualise the argument 
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made out by Michael Kelly1 that humanitarian law provides the legal framework for 
peacekeeping in collapsed States.  Kelly’s argument will be analysed in chapter six of 
this work. 
 
By looking at what peacekeeping operations have done in practice, the chapters of this 
work on Chapter VI and Chapter VII peacekeeping operations provide the basis for 
the analysis of the application of international humanitarian law or international 
human rights law as the framework for collapsed State peacekeeping operations in the 
subsequent chapters of this work. 
 
Chapter VII Operations 
 
Between 1949 and 2003 there were 22 UN operations conducted under Chapter VII.  
Some of these were conducted as a series of operations in the same State.  For 
example, in the former Yugoslavia the UN operation commenced as the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) covering the whole of the former 
Yugoslavia.  It was subsequently broken down into a number of separate operations as 
Yugoslavia was divided into multiple separate States.  Other operations such as those 
in Angola, Somalia and East Timor followed a linear pattern with different operations 
being formed to take account of the changing situation.  In East Timor for example, a 
Chapter VI traditional election monitoring operation was replaced by a UN 
administration under Chapter VII when the situation deteriorated and the territory 
collapsed.  This was in turn replaced by a less robust operation as democracy and self 
                                                 
1 Kelly M. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations. (1999).  
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government was restored and finally a Chapter VI assistance mission supporting the 
elected government of the new State of East Timor brought the process full circle. 
 
Three distinct types of Chapter VII operations can be discerned between 1949 and 
2003.  The first type are the operations that were established under Chapter VII but 
had the Chapter VI characteristics of consent, impartiality and the use of force only in 
self defence.  The 1993 UN Observer Mission in Georgia is an example of this type of 
Chapter VII operation. The operation closely resembled a traditional peace 
monitoring operation but was established under Chapter VII.  The second type of UN 
operations were those that operated in a complementary role to UN mandated 
operations conducted by Member States.  The operations in the former Yugoslavia 
with NATO and the operation in Sierra Leone in 1998 with the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) are examples of this type of operation.  The final 
type of operation is the where the UN peacekeeping operation permits the use of force 
beyond self-defence and may also include the absence of consent and impartiality.  
The operation in East Timor2 in 2000 is an example of this type of operation, although 
there was officially consent from the Indonesian and Portuguese governments. 
 
An operation that stands out from the Chapter VII peacekeeping operations between 
1949 and 2003 is the operation in the 1960-4 operation in the Congo.  The reason that 
this operation is significantly different is that the UN became involved in armed 
conflict.  The pattern and policy3 that has emerged in UN peacekeeping operations 
involving the potential for enforcement through armed conflict is for the UN to 
contract out such operation to a Member State.   Only in the Congo, 1960-64, Somalia 
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in 1993 and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1994–1995 has the UN been directly 
involved in the significant use of force beyond self defence.4 
 
Of the 22 operations conducted under Chapter VII between 1949 and 2003 the 
majority have not been conducted in such a way as to leave the UN as the effective 
administration of the State.  Indeed, as noted above, many have been conducted in a 
way that but for the mandate would make them difficult to distinguish from Chapter 
VI operations.  These have been characterised by consent of the parties, impartiality 
and the use of force only in self defence.  The legal framework has been that of the 
domestic State.   
 
Peacekeeping and armed conflict:  
 
Congo 1960 ONUC 
 
The Congo attained independence at the end of June 1960 and within weeks the army 
had mutinied followed by a general collapse of the State. When the province of 
Katanga seceded, the central government turned to the UN for help.5  The UN 
responded by forming The United Nations Congo Operation (ONUC), which was a 
composite of up to 20,000 civilian and military units authorised to use force in order 
to restore basic structure to the Congo.  The operation was initially commenced in 
order to assist the government in maintaining law and order, to provide some level of 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Although the mandate permitted it, force was not used beyond self defence as defined in the UN 
Rules of Engagement. 
3 Goulding, M. Peacemonger (2002) at 12 and 337. 
4 Chersterman, S. The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations. External Study. New York University 
School of Law. (2004). 
5 Fabian, L. Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping. (1971) at 263. 
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technical assistance and facilitate the withdrawal of Belgian troops.  As matters 
deteriorated the purpose of ONUC was extended to cover the maintenance of 
territorial integrity and political independence as well as preventing civil war with this 
aim supported by the removal of foreign military, paramilitary and other non UN 
advisory personnel including mercenaries.6  The operation was terminated, mainly 
due to financial constraints7  although not before the operation had achieved its 
primary objective of stability for the Congo.8  
 
The Congo operation represents one of the most interesting operations undertaken by 
the UN because of where it occurs in terms of the peacekeeping continuum.  In the 
1960’s peacekeeping was still in its traditional paradigm.  The key features of the 
operations surrounding it were consent, impartiality and the use of force strictly 
limited to self-defence.   In the Congo operation however there was a loss of 
impartiality as the UN forces were a party to the armed conflict fighting against the 
rebels.   
 
Security Council Resolution 1439 authorised the Secretary-General to provide military 
assistance to the government of the Congo but there was no finding under Article 39 
of a threat to international peace and security to trigger the use of Chapter VII 
measures.  Security Council Resolution 14510 did consider “that the complete 
restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute 
to the maintenance of international peace and security” but this is not the 
                                                 
6 United Nations The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, (Third ed. 1996) at 
709. 
7 Above n 5 at 263-264. 
8 Dorn, A.W. and Bell, D.J. “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64” 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1995) at 12. 
9 (1960) of 14 July 1960 
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determination required by Article 39.  Security Council resolution 14611 relied upon 
Article 49 of the Charter, a Chapter VII article, in calling for support from all 
members of the United Nations in carrying out the resolutions.  Further confusion as 
to the legal status of the operation was added where the Security Council noted in the 
resolution that the UN force: 
 
will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome 
of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.   
 
This statement seems to contradict the earlier resolution providing military support to 
the government of the Congo. 
 
The running of the operation was further complicated when the Security Council, 
finding itself blocked by the use of the veto by the Cold War powers, passed the 
operation to the General Assembly under the provisions of the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution in September 1960.  Despite initial progress the General Assembly split 
into factions making the passing of substantial resolutions impossible and the matter 
was handed back to the Security Council.12   
 
As the Congo dissolved into civil war, complicated by the death of the Prime 
Minister, the Security Council was reunited and finally moved to establish an 
                                                                                                                                            
10 (1960) of 22 July 1960. 
11 (1960) of 9 August 1960. 
12 McCoubrey, H. and White, N. The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations. (1996) at 49. 
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unambiguous Chapter VII operation.  Resolution 16113 stated that the Security 
Council was: 
 
Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of 
widespread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace 
and security. 
 
The use of force, not limited to self defence, was authorised.  With this resolution the 
Security Council had made the necessary Article 39 finding that permitted the use of 
Chapter VII powers and the exercise of those powers was brought to bear by the 
ability to use force. 
 
Security Council Resolution 16914 was more specific regarding the authorisation of 
the use of force.  This resolution authorised the use of such force as was necessary for 
the:  
 
“immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all 
foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the 
United Nations Command, and mercenaries.”  
 
Although the Congo operation was commenced as a Chapter VI operation it was from 
its inception far more robust than its predecessors.  With the original mandate setting 
it up in support of the government it is difficult to see how it could have been 
described, even in the beginning, as an impartial operation.  The ambiguities in the 
                                                 
13 (1961) of 21 February 1961. 
14 (1960) of 24 November 1960. 
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operation were removed by the Security Council fulfilling the Article 39 requirements 
and from that point a Chapter VII operation was commenced.   
 
The legal framework on the ground was mixed in nature due to the differences in 
circumstances across the territory.  Where the civilian government remained in 
control the normal domestic framework of the State continued to function to a greater 
or lesser extent, with support from the peacekeeping force.  However, where the UN 
force was engaged in armed conflict the provisions of international humanitarian law 
applied and the Geneva Conventions were specifically directed by the force 
commander to apply.15  The UN force did not set up an administration in the territory 
as the government, despite barely functioning, remained in existence.  The UN force 
was required to provide security and law and order, although what law was to be used 
was unclear as the newly independent State had not had time to adapt the colonial 
Belgium law.16  Regardless of the practicalities of the situation the fact remained that 
the legal framework was the domestic law of the State with humanitarian law used 
only to regulate the fighting and treatment of prisoners of war.  As a result the over 
arching legal framework used in the Congo was the domestic law of the State with 
humanitarian law use to complement this framework in areas where the threshold had 
been crossed into armed conflict.  The UN force did not act as if it were in occupation 
of territory, rather it deferred to the civilian government and acted in a manner 
consistent with a force present by consent.17 
 
                                                 
15 Above n 8 at 11-33. 
16 Above n 4 at 2.1. 
17 Jennings, R. and Watts, A. (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law (ninth ed 1996) Vol 1 at 1156-
1165. 
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While the operation in the Congo caused a financial crisis for the UN, a fact that put 
the UN off such operations until the 1990s, it was generally considered to be 
successful and was the model for UN action in the former Yugoslavia.18 
 
Humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement 
 
Somalia 1992 UNOSOM / Somalia 1993 UNOSOM II 
 
While many academic books and articles have been written about peacekeeping and 
specific peacekeeping operations, there had not been much interest in the popular 
‘paperback’ market.  Other than as an incidental aside, Hollywood had not the 
slightest interest in such a mundane activity.  After all, the whole aim of peacekeeping 
is to avoid the type of action that Hollywood finds stimulating.  Somalia was to 
change that,19 although the focus of attention was not the UN peacekeeping operation 
but the US led, UN approved, Unified Task Force (UNITAF).    
 
By the end of 1991 Somalia had degenerated into civil war.  Government 
infrastructure was destroyed and the State was torn between clan based factions.  Two 
of the major protagonists in the capital Mogadishu were General Mohamed Farah 
Aidid and Mr Ali Mohamed Mahdi.  In other parts of the State local leaders were 
attempting to secede from Somalia. Starvation and displacement were wide spread.  
The UN estimated that by 1992 300,000 people had died and some 2 million had been 
displaced.20 
 
                                                 
18 Above n 12 at 12, 34. 
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In January 1992 the Security Council sought to limit the capacity of the factions to 
continue conflict by placing an arms embargo on Somalia.  Humanitarian aid was of 
primary concern with a number of regional organisations and NGO represented on the 
ground.  UN personnel were also involved in the provision and coordination of aid 
with UN security personnel deployed to provide protection to the aid workers.  The 
UN also worked to facilitate a ceasefire agreement, which was signed on 27 and 28 
March 1992.21 
 
In order to monitor the ceasefire the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 
(1992)22 establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).  Initially 
UNOSOM consisted of unarmed observers but by July the operation was strengthened 
to provide operational zones in Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo. In 
October 1992 General Aidid withdrew his support for UNOSOM in the Mogadishu 
zone, attacking UN peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers.  Pakistani 
peacekeepers returned fire in self-defence.  With the situation in Somalia becoming 
increasingly unstable the Security Council responded by authorising the US led 
UNITAF to act under Chapter VII to create a secure environment for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid.23 UNOSOM remained under its Chapter VI mandate. 
 
On 3 March 1993 the Secretary-General recommended the transition from UNITAF 
to UNOSOM II.  Although UNITAF had improved the security situation and the 
provision of humanitarian aid, Somalia was still without a government and civil 
infrastructure.   Security in many regions of the State still remained unsettled.  
                                                                                                                                            
19 See Bowden M. Black Hawk Down. (1999). 
20 UN. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm, (15 Aug 2003) 
21 Ibid 
22 Of 24 April 1992. 
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UNOSOM II was to continue to create a secure environment for the provision of 
humanitarian aid and was also to commence peace-building operations.  On 26 March 
1993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 814(1993) establishing UNOSOM II.24 
 
Although agreements had been put in place with the major actors within Somalia, 
attacks on UNOSOM II persisted.  The Security Council condemned the attacks and 
the resultant loss of life and in Resolution 837(1993)25 reiterated UNOSOM II 
authorisation under Resolution 814: 
 
to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks …. 
Including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, including to 
secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, 
trial and punishment.26 
 
In order to implement the resolution UNOSOM II targeted and destroyed militia 
weapons, equipment, storage facilities and military facilities as well as wresting 
control of the radio station in Mogadishu from General Aidid.  Attempts were also 
made to arrest General Aidid in relation to the militia attacks.   US forces still 
remained in Mogadishu, although these were not under UN command or control.  The 
US forces decided to assist in the arrest and detention process by capturing General 
Aidid and his key supporters.  During the course of this attempt two US Black Hawk 
helicopters were shot down, US soldiers were killed and mutilated while the events 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Above n 20. 
24 Ibid 
25 Of 6 June 1993. 
26 Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993, para 5. 
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were transmitted around the world in news broadcasts.  The US reacted by 
withdrawing its forces from Somalia.27 
 
Although the situation in Somalia became calmer with a ceasefire being declared by 
the major factions, Somalia still remained devoid of a functioning government and 
infrastructure.  The UN commenced major initiatives to achieve a permanent 
settlement; in particular initiatives were aimed at resolving Hawiye intra clan 
rivalries, which were identified as the major obstacle to peace in Somalia.  Although 
advances were made with regard to the provision of humanitarian aid and some 
progress was made in rebuilding the police and court system, peace remained elusive.  
In March 1993 UNOSOM II was terminated as it was assessed that no further 
progress could be made.28   
 
UNOSOM I was a Chapter VI operation conducted in a Chapter VII environment.  
The Chapter VII action was in the form of an arms embargo but there was no 
reference to Chapter VII in the establishment of UNOSOM I.  While UNOSOM I was 
permitted to use force only in self-defence and was to be impartial as between the 
parties, the issue of consent raises some difficulties.  Without a sovereign authority in 
Somalia consent was sought from the major warring factions.  It is argued that this 
approach was incorrect as a matter of law.   The parties were not capable of claiming 
that they inherited the rights of the State.  The UN expressly accepted the absence of 
legitimate government when investigating the attacks on UNOSOM II29.  Although 
factions had usurped the rights of government the factions had no legitimate authority.  
There was therefore no entity in Somalia capable of granting consent for a Chapter VI 
                                                 
27 UN. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm,  
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operation.  The model that the UN wanted to use appears to have been based on the 
Chapter VI and a form of the trusteeship model approach taken in UNTAC.30    
 
As the situation worsened in Somalia and UNOSOM II was established, the Security 
Council finally moved to a Chapter VII operation.   In Resolutions 814(1993) and 
837(1993) the Security Council made Article 39 findings that the situation in Somalia 
threatened peace and security in the region.  This permitted deployment without 
consent and the ability to take on arrest and detention activities normally reserved to 
the sovereign State.  While arrest and detention were authorised under Resolution 837 
(1993) for the purposes of prosecution, trial and punishment, there was no guidance as 
to the authority to conduct such proceedings.  It is argued that the Security Council 
missed an opportunity in Somalia to establish a human rights framework to 
compliment the 837(1993) mandate.  They also failed to adequately set up an 
administration of the type that had proved successful in Cambodia. 
 
UNOSOM II attacked and destroyed militia weapons, equipment, storage facilities 
and military facilities.  The authorisation for this action was Resolution 837(1993). It 
is argued that this was done in the form of a policing action rather than as an armed 
attack on the militia.  The militia themselves were not directly the subject of the attack 
but on the militia’s means of conducting attacks on humanitarian relief and UNOSOM 
II were targeted.  At no time did the militia become an “identified enemy,” in other 
words, combatants, so as to cross the threshold into international humanitarian law.  
The legal framework remained the domestic law of what was left of the State, which 
                                                                                                                                            
28 Ibid. 
29 Above n 1 at 87. 
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was bound to apply international human rights law, not the Geneva Conventions,31 
until UNOSOM II was withdrawn in March 1995.   
 
A major problem for UNOSOM II was that the Security Council lacked the will to 
establish a Trusteeship model operation in Somalia.  As a result the legal position was 
left in a state of confusion and the peacekeepers with a feeling of helplessness that 
eventually contributed to the torture and death of a Somali youth by the Canadian 
Airborne Regiment.32 
 
UN administrations 
 
The situation in Somalia contrasted significantly with the operations in East Timor 
and Kosovo where successful administrations were set up and as a result the legal 
environment was articulated. 
 
Former Yugoslavia 1992 UNPROFOR 
 
To provide a background to the UN administration in Kosovo it is necessary to briefly 
summarise the involvement of the UN mission in the Balkans that led to its 
establishment.   
                                                                                                                                            
30 Henkin, A. (ed) Honouring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace; Lessons from El Salvador, 
Cambodia and Haiti. (1995) at 7: Or “governance-in-trust”; Chopra J. “UN Civil Governance-in-Trust” 
in Weiss T.G (ed) The United Nations and Civil Wars. (1995) at 69-88. 
31 It was only Australia that argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied. The argument for its 
application is set out in Kelly’s work, above and will be discussed in detail in latter chapters of this 
work.  The nature of the operation was in any event intended as a policing action: See Sapir D.G. 
Deconinck H. “The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention in Somalia” in 
Weiss T.G (ed) The United Nations and Civil Wars. (1995) at 166: also Lewis W. Marks E. Police 
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The UN peacekeeping activities in the former Yugoslavia represent arguably the most 
complex and challenging peacekeeping situation that the UN had ever faced.33  Post 
Cold War Yugoslavia became prey to ethnic tensions following the death of Tito and 
the adventurism of Milosevic.  By June 1991 armed conflict had erupted in Croatia 
because Croatia and its northern neighbour Slovenia had declared independence from 
Yugoslavia, a move opposed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and ethnic Serbs.  
All efforts at peace brokered by regional agencies and the UN failed to resolve the 
conflict or even obtain a ceasefire.  Eventually after much diplomatic effort in Europe 
and the UN, the Security Council adopted Resolution 743 (1992)34 establishing the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The area of responsibility for 
UNPROFOR covered Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, with a liaison presence in Slovenia.35  It was the largest ever peacekeeping 
operation.36 
 
Croatia UNPROFOR was to ensure the demilitarisation of United Nations Protected 
Areas (UNPA), monitor the local police and protect human rights.  Outside the UNPA 
it was to support humanitarian agencies and verify the withdrawal of the JNA.  
Although UNPROFOR was expanded both in size and mandate, hostilities again 
broke out in January 1993 at the instigation of the Croatian army, a move responded 
to by the Serbs.  On 25 January 1993 the Security Council demanded in Resolution 
802 (1993) inter alia a ceasefire.  Eventually after several rounds of talks an 
                                                                                                                                            
32 Canadian Government.  Report of the Somali Commission of Inquiry. 
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm (5 Oct 2005). 
33 Above n 2 at 298-299. 
34 Of 21 February 1992. 
35 UN. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm. (15 Jul 2003). 
36 Above n 3 at 310. 
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agreement was reached implementing the Resolution.  Tensions flared however again 
in July 1993 over the rebuilding of the Maslenica bridge.  Agreement could not be 
reached and conflict escalated.  A ceasefire agreement was finally reached on 15 
September 1993 and UNPROFOR moved into the disputed area.  On 17 December 
1993 the Serb and Croat representatives in Croatia entered into a ceasefire agreement 
that held until the termination of UNPROFOR.37 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina presented a more challenging situation.  The conflict was 
between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats on one side and the Bosnian Serbs 
on the other. Fighting in and around Sarajevo became so intense that much of 
UNPROFOR was withdrawn.  Fighting continued despite an enlargement of the 
UNPROFOR elements and their return to open the airport at Sarajevo for 
humanitarian lifts.  Humanitarian aid became a key concern and UNPROFOR was 
again expanded in order to provide protection for aid agencies, as well as to observe 
airfields following the establishment of a military no fly zone over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Further expansion of the force was proposed by the Secretary-General 
in December 1992 in order to enforce the sanctions at the international borders.  
Throughout the UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia Herzegovina the local government 
was critical of its activities and tended to sheet blame for real or perceived failures on 
to it.38 
 
In March 1993 Member States and UNPROFOR were authorised by the Security 
Council to use “all necessary measures” to enforce the no fly zone.  Meanwhile 
Bosnian Serb attacks on the “safe areas” intensified.  UNPROFOR’s mandate was 
                                                 
37 Above n 35. 
 226 
again strengthened and further “safe areas” established following ceasefire 
agreements reached between the parties.  However in May 1993 fighting broke out in 
central Bosnia between Bosnian Muslims and Croats.  UNPROFOR had to move to 
provide humanitarian relief and protect supply lines.  Ceasefire agreements within the 
State continued to be broken and NATO began in early 1994 to plan for pre-emptive 
air strikes.  By the end of February 1994 a further ceasefire agreement had been 
negotiated.  However, this ceasefire was broken in March 1994 precipitating NATO 
air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions.  By the end of April 1994 a further 
ceasefire had come into effect.    In July 1994 only western Bosnia remained actively 
in conflict.  The situation changed in August and September 1994 with renewed 
fighting in several regions with the Bosnian Serbs renewing attacks on the “safe 
areas” and implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing.  Further negotiations resulted in 
a ceasefire agreement between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs taking 
effect on 1 January 1995.39    
 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia formed part of the UNPROFOR mandate 
at the request of the Macedonian government, which was concerned that tensions 
might spill over from the other former States.  This deployment “represented the first 
preventative deployment operation in the history of UN peacekeeping.”40  Although 
tensions were high, mainly due to economic pressures and disputes between 
Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, UNPROFOR was successful in maintaining peace 
and security.41 
 
                                                                                                                                            
38 Ibid 
39 UN. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm (20 Jul 2003) 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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UNPROFOR was terminated in March 1995 when peacekeeping operations were 
restructured by the formation of three separate but interconnected operations42.  
Throughout its existence it was operating alongside regional peacekeeping operations 
established by NATO.  It was also able to draw on protection from these forces such 
as the close air support provided by NATO jets. 
 
UNPROFOR had a complex and fluid legal basis.  It was established on 21 
February 1992 by Security Council Resolution 743 (1992).    In this Resolution the 
Security Council confirmed the Article 39 finding by stating concern: 
 
that the situation in Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace 
and security as determined in resolution 713 (1991).   
 
The NATO elements in the area of operations were called upon under the Resolution 
to “take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of..” UNPROFOR.  The 
UNPROFOR position was not expressly stated to be under Chapter VII but the effect 
of the Article 39 finding and the mandate to NATO meant that at the very least 
UNPROFOR was conducting its operation in a Chapter VII environment.  As consent 
of the parties was unlikely to be universally available at all times during the operation 
a Chapter VII operation was effectively necessary.   
 
On 30 May 1992 the UN Security Council was unambiguous in relying upon the 
Chapter VII embargo provisions in Resolution 757 (1992).  It was also unambiguous 
on 13 August 1992 with Resolution 770 (1992) in expressly acting under Chapter VII 
in calling on States to take “all measures necessary” to assist in the humanitarian 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
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effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The Resolution also demanded that “all parties and 
others” take “all necessary measures to ensure the safety of UN and other personnel” 
involved in the humanitarian effort. The humanitarian elements of the UNPROFOR 
mission were thereby expressly protected, although not expressly conducted, under 
Chapter VII. 
 
Again, when dealing expressly with UNPROFOR, on 14 September 1992, Resolution 
776 (1992) was silent as to the Chapter under which it was operating.43  This reticence 
was not apparent on 31 March 1993 when Resolution 816 (1993) expressly operating 
under Chapter VII required UNPROFOR action in regard to monitoring compliance 
with the no fly zone.  Although the role is a passive monitoring role it is none the less 
expressly a Chapter VII activity.  Member States were given wider powers to enforce 
the no fly zone in the same Resolution. 
 
By 4 June 1993 the ambiguity in the legal basis was beginning to clear. Resolution 
836 (1993) expressly placed the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia Herzegovina under 
Chapter VII.  This followed on 4 October 1993 with Resolution 871 (1993) which 
expressly acting under Chapter VII authorised UNPROFOR in Croatia while: 
 
acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to 
ensure its security and its freedom of movement.   
 
Although this clarified the mandate position of UNPROFOR in Croatia it was silent 
with regard to the remainder of the operation in other areas.   
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Although further embargo provisions were enacted under Chapter VII no further 
clarification was given to UNPROFOR up to its termination.  It is therefore arguable 
that the Macedonian element of UNPROFOR should be viewed as a Chapter VI 
operation.  It was after all present not just with the consent but at the express request 
of the Macedonian government.  It was an impartial force and used force limited to 
self defence without extensions such as that found under Resolution 871 (1993).  The 
purpose of the operation in Macedonia was also fundamentally different from the 
remainder of UNPROFOR.  Such disjointed operations are not efficient and the 
division of UNPROFOR into separate operations was a much more efficient method 
of dealing with the situation. 
 
In Macedonia the legal framework relied upon was the domestic State law as 
modified by the SOFA.  In other areas UNPROFOR relied on the NATO operations 
to provide security while attempting to maintain impartiality and neutrality.44  At 
times UNPROFOR appears to have been engaged in armed conflict and it has been 
argued that it should have applied the laws of armed conflict.  However, it has not 
been suggested that UNPROFOR was in occupation and persons captured when 
UNPROFOR acted in self defence were handed over to the State authorities not dealt 
with under powers that would have been available had UNPROFOR been acting as 
though it was relying on humanitarian law as the legal base of its actions.45  To this 
extent the UN practice militates against humanitarian law as the legal framework even 
in a situation which appears to make it a temporary party to an armed conflict.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
43 Ibid. 
44 Although it failed to maintain these objectives and therefore created many of the problems which 
beset the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia; see Weller, M “The Relativity of Humanitarian 
Neutrality and Impartiality.” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (2002) 
http://www.jha.ac/articles/a029.htm (15 Apr 2005).   
45 Rogers, A.P.V, Law on the Battlefield (2nd ed 2004) at 245-247. 
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question for UNPROFOR was what legal framework did apply? This was a question 
that they were unable to answer.46 
 
Kosovo 1999 UNMIK 
 
Although NATO and UNPROFOR had been operating in the former Yugoslavia since 
1992 the fighting between the ethnic groups continued.  In 1998 fighting between the 
Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army caused 200,000 people, or a tenth of 
the population of Kosovo, to flee.  A Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing caused 
NATO to launch air strikes against Serbian targets in March 1999.  Retaliation for 
these strikes caused some 700,000 Albanian Kosovars to cross the borders into 
Albania and Macedonia as refugees.47   On 10 June 1999 the Security Council 
established a UN in Kosovo by Resolution 1244 (1999).  The United Nations Mission 
In Kosovo (UNMIK) was primarily a civilian organisation with a civilian head.   
 
UNMIK was established under Chapter VII but this was concerned with the placing 
into a territory of an administration capable of operating as a State rather than to 
permit the use of armed force by the UN force.   The security role was primarily a 
function of the civilian police arm of the operation with the military performing a 
secondary role as observers.  The military were not to be the main tool of the 
operation,48 although NATO in the form of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) remained in 
place to act in a security role if required.  As with UNTAC, the operation functioned 
as on the basis of the trusteeship model with the establishment of law and order, 
                                                 
46 Id at 247. 
47 Strohmeyer, H. “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in 
Kosovo and East Timor.” The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 95 No.1 (January 2001) at 
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legislation and the justice system based on the authority of a resolution drafted in very 
broad terms.    The UN structure in Kosovo has four departments: 
 
Law and Order (NATO forces in the form of KFOR and UN civilian Police). 
Civilian administration, 
 
Institution building (led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)),  
 
Reconstruction, and 
 
Regeneration (both led by the European Union).49  
 
In this way the UN utilised the services of the international community to perform 
administrative tasks, although as noted by Matthias, the legal basis for this type of 
cooperation is rather weak as the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII are 
binding on States rather than international organisations.50 
 
There was no suggestion from any participant State or the UN that UNMIK was 
operating under the Geneva Conventions, rather the administration in Kosovo was 
seen as operating on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1244. 51    
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Matheson has argued that as the scope of powers under Chapter VII is very wide the 
administration was founded on the basis of adequate legal authority provided under 
Chapter VII.  In examining this issue Matheson, referring to Article 41, concluded 
that:  
 
“There is no reason in principle why the Council cannot authorise other measures of 
governance that it believes necessary to restore and maintain the peace, including the 
creation of administrative and judicial structures, the promulgation of laws and 
regulations, and the imposition of taxes and other financial measures.” 52 
 
Support for this conclusion may be based on the authority of the Security Council 
found in the implied powers doctrine.53  This doctrine flows from the finding of the 
International Court of Justice that the United Nations: 
 
“…must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the 
Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the 
performance of its duties” 54 
 
UNMIK was therefore able to administer the territory of Kosovo under the mandate 
as part of the UN’s responsibility to maintain international peace and security through 
the powers set out in Chapter VII.  Although UNMIK administers the territory Serbia 
retains de jure sovereignty as evidenced by the actions of the Human Rights 
Committee in inviting Serbia to report on the human rights situation in Kosovo.  
                                                 
52 Above n 49 Matheson at 84. 
53 Above n 51 at 620. 
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Although Serbia declined as it did not have de facto control over Kosovo the Human 
Rights Committee agreed on 19 October 2005 to allow Serbia to attend the 
presentation of a report by UNMIK. 
 
Although the power to administer Kosovo flows from the UN Charter, UNMIK used 
the laws of the previous administration as the legal framework as modified by55 and 
within the framework of international human rights law.56   The legal framework that 
applied as a matter of fact in Kosovo was therefore a blend of local domestic law57 
and international human rights law.  International humanitarian law was not relied on. 
 
UNMIK was to provide a useful role model for the operation in East Timor.  While 
the UN had set up an administration for a brief period in Cambodia, UNMIK was the 
first example of the UN providing a full governmental system, acting as the custodian 
of government until the people of Kosovo could assert their UN Charter right to self-
determination or an agreement can be reached with Serbia as to the future status of 
Kosovo. 
 
East Timor 1999 UNAMET / UNTAET / UNMISET 
 
As with many States in Asia and Africa the territorial boundaries of Indonesia are the 
result of colonial settlement rather than ethnic groupings.  On the island of Timor two 
                                                                                                                                            
54 ICJ Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case. ICJ Rep. 1949, 174 at 
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colonial powers, Portugal and the Netherlands, had sat side by side dividing the island 
roughly in half.   Post World War Two the colonies, which had previously formed the 
Dutch East Indies, revolted.  In a weakened post war condition the Dutch were not in 
a position to resist and Indonesia was able to emerge as a predominantly Islamic 
archipelagic State.  While the former Dutch colony in West Timor became part of 
Indonesia the predominantly catholic population of East Timor remained under 
Portuguese rule.  By 1974 the Portuguese were seriously questioning the political 
acceptability of colonial possessions.  As a result Portugal sought to set East Timor on 
the path to autonomy and eventual independence.  Some factions were advocating 
integration with Indonesia while others wanted to see an independent State of East 
Timor.58   
 
Almost inevitably, civil war erupted giving Indonesia the excuse in 1975 to move in 
and later forcibly annex East Timor as its 27th province.  The UN did not recognise 
Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor, although many States including Australia 
did.59  The Timorese independence movement remained active, both politically and 
with armed force, in East Timor and continued to lobby internationally for 
independence.  From 1982 the UN facilitated discussions between Portugal and 
Indonesia in an attempt to reach a political solution in East Timor.  In June 1998 a 
limited autonomy proposal was agreed to by Indonesia and on 5 May 1999 Portugal 
                                                                                                                                            
UNMIK decided that the law would be the law applicable in Kosovo on 22 March 1989, which was the 
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58 UN http://www.un.org/peace/timor/unmisetB.htm. (15 Apr 2005) 
59 For a detailed analysis of the recognition of Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor see Shearer I. 
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(2001) at 429-440.  
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and Indonesia signed an agreement that included provision for “popular consultation” 
on the question of special autonomy or independence for East Timor.60 
 
By Resolution 124661 the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in 
East Timor (UNAMET) to assist in administering and observing the vote.  On 30 
August 1999 approximately 90% of East Timor’s voters rejected integration with 
Indonesia and elected for independence for East Timor.  The response from the pro-
integrationists was swift and violent.  Militia, with assistance from some regular 
military forces, effectively razed the majority of East Timor’s infrastructure to the 
ground, killing and deporting thousands of East Timorese in the process.  The UN 
responded with diplomatic efforts to halt the devastation and procured Indonesian 
consent to the insertion of a Member State led peacekeeping force, the International 
Force for East Timor (INTERFET).62 
 
Indonesia finally recognised the result of the consultation on 19 October 1999.  On 25 
October 1999 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1272,63 establishing the United 
Nations Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET).   UNTAET was to be a 
complex operation with civilian administration, humanitarian and peacekeeping 
elements providing a basic structure for government until the East Timorese were in a 
position to replace UNTAET with self-government.  By February 2000 UNTAET was 
in a position to take over from INTERFET, which was terminated and duly replaced 
by UNTAET64.  UNTAET successfully concluded its mission and was terminated on 
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62 Above n 58. 
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64 Above n 58. 
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20 May 2002 when the elected government of East Timor held its first parliamentary 
session and declared the independent State of East Timor.65 
 
Although East Timor is an independent State the UN recognised that it is still in need 
of significant assistance before it can stand completely independent of outside 
assistance.  On 17 May 2000 the Security Council adopted Resolution 141066 bringing 
into existence on 20 May 2002 the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET).  UNMISET is to continue to assist in the civil administration of East 
Timor such as guiding and training Timorese public officials and supporting the 
fledgling judiciary.  This assistance also includes training of East Timorese civilian 
police (ETPS) as well as contributing to internal and external security through the 
deployment of armed military units, most notably along the East / West Timor border. 
 
Both UNTAET and UNMISET were established expressly under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.  UNMISET relies upon the previous Article 39 finding being imported by 
recalling previous resolutions containing the finding.  It seems that the Security 
Council does not have to make the finding in order to make Chapter VII applicable to 
each operation but only to the geopolitical situation or State.  Both operations consist 
of a combination of armed military force operating on the basis of the ability to use 
force for the purposes of the operation and unarmed observers carrying out a 
traditional peacekeeping operation.  This has become something of a hallmark of UN 
peacekeeping operations.  The main operation is put onto a footing which is capable 
of performing an enforcement mission if required, while running parallel to that 
operation is an observer mission using unarmed military staff under a separate chain 
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of command, although both groups are ultimately under the commander of the 
peacekeeping force (PKF).   
 
This approach gives the UN a significant degree of flexibility as the structures are in 
place to react to an aggressive escalation as well as a withdrawal of the enforcement 
operation leaving the observers in place rather than being required to initiate a fresh 
operation.  The use of the observer operation again highlights the point that simply 
because an operation is conducted under Chapter VII it does not necessarily follow 
that an enforcement operation will be conducted.  What it does mean is that there is 
no legal impediment to the use of force or of the conduct of the operation without the 
consent of the relevant State or that impartiality is totally sacrificed.67 
 
As with UNMIK, the legal authority for the UN administration was Chapter VII of the 
Charter.  Also as with UNMIK, the UN administration passed laws to establish a legal 
framework.  The law that formed the framework was the law applicable prior to 
collapse, the Indonesian penal code, as modified by international human rights law.68  
There was no recourse to international humanitarian law either by INTERFET or 
UNTAET and indeed it was the position of Australia, the lead nation in the operation, 
that international humanitarian law did not apply as there was no armed conflict.69  
The legal framework for UNTAET was therefore the domestic law blended with 
international human rights law. 
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Conclusion 
 
In 1969 when considering the lessons learned from the UNEF operation, Rosalyn 
Higgins wrote that it was inconceivable that a UN force, even one constituted under 
Chapter VII should be placed in a State without the consent of that host State.70  The 
UN has gained a significant and varied amount of experience since that time and some 
trends can be drawn from the UN experience of Chapter VII operations. 
 
Despite the powers available under Chapter VII the UN still demonstrates a marked 
preference for the consent of a State into which it is to deploy peacekeepers almost 
regardless of whether a Chapter VI or Chapter VII operation is contemplated.    
Although there has been less reluctance, or perhaps more ability, to operate under 
Chapter VII in the post Cold War years, the structures of the operations have closely 
followed the Chapter VI model.  In East Timor for example, UNTAET, a Chapter VII 
operation, was not commenced until consent had been received from the Indonesian 
and Portugeese governments.71    
 
The end of the Cold War saw a rise in the number and complexity of Chapter VII 
operations.  From operations with a simple strategy of deterrence Chapter VII 
operations became the vehicle by which the UN took custody of sovereignty for the 
people of collapsed States and Territories until the people could exercise their UN 
Charter right of self determination.  This approach was particularly clear in the 
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Chapter VII operations in Kosovo and East Timor, although it had begun in the 
Chapter VI operations in West Irian, Cambodia and so on.  It is important to recognise 
that in these roles the UN does not act as a super State but as a simple administration 
on appointment from the Security Council. 
 
The fact that an operation is being conducted under Chapter VII does not mean that it 
can be distinguishable on the ground from a Chapter VI operation.  The majority of 
Chapter VII operations have used force only in self defence, been impartial between 
the parties and to some extent enjoyed the consent of the parties, where there have 
been parties capable of giving it.  What the modern use of Chapter VII permits is the 
escalation of an operation when that is required without the need to approach the 
Security Council for a new mandate.  
 
Modern peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII also tend to be integrated with a 
traditional observer mission.  These missions are not run as separate operations but 
parallel to it with a separate chain of command up to the main in-country 
peacekeeping headquarters.     
 
While the legal authority for peacekeepers to be in a State is Chapter VII,72 the legal 
framework to be applied is not articulated.  In many of the Chapter VII operations the 
applicable legal framework was clear. Some early operations were conducted in a 
situation of armed conflict, such as the Congo operation, and therefore international 
humanitarian law applied; while in others the domestic State was fully operational so 
that the domestic State law applied, subject to any variations agreed in a SOFA.  In 
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these situations the peacekeepers would be able to deal with law breakers and 
detainees by handing them over to the civilian Sate authorities.  
 
In States where the domestic framework had collapsed, such as Kosovo and East 
Timor, the UN set up an administration, preserving sovereignty until the people were 
able to exercise their Charter right of self determination.  In these situations 
peacekeepers are able to apply the law as set up and administered by the UN 
administration as if it were a functioning domestic State.   
 
To date, except for the operation in the Congo which amounted to armed conflcit, 
international humanitarian law has not been applied on the basis that the UN has not 
been a party to an armed conflict.    In collapsed States where the UN has conducted 
successful operations, the UN has applied the law applicable before collapse and 
blended this law with international human rights law.  In Somalia the UN was not 
successful and the lack of certainty as to the law that applied may well have 
contributed to the failure.   
 
In order to understand why international humanitarian law was not applied to 
peacekeeping in collapsed States the next chapter of this work will examine what 
international humanitarian law is, where it begins and more significantly for 
peacekeeping, where it ends. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
What is International Humanitarian Law? 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters of this work the theory and practice of peacekeeping was 
examined. That examination has demonstrated that over time peacekeeping has 
evolved from a simple deployment of troops with the consent of the parties, operating 
impartially as between the parties and able to use force only in self defence, to a 
complex operation capable of providing the basic infrastructure upon which a State 
can be reconstructed. Force in such circumstances may not be limited to self defence 
and peacekeepers may be taking an active role in defending one party against another. 
   
It has also been demonstrated that the legal framework applied to peacekeeping will 
vary.  In simple traditional peacekeeping operations the law of the domestic State will 
apply, as amended by agreement and conventions.  Where a UN peacekeeping 
operation has been established to administer a collapsed State, human rights law has 
been used as the foundation for the legal framework.  The operations have then 
facilitated the process of transition to a domestic government, established through the 
people exercising their right to self determination.    
 
The position of this work is that international human rights law is the de jure law to 
be applied in peacekeeping operations where the domestic State has collapsed.  The 
alternate view, put forward by Michael Kelly1, is that international humanitarian law 
is the de jure law in such circumstances and in particular that the Fourth Geneva 
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Convention should be used to provide the legal framework for peacekeeping 
operations in a collapsed State on the basis that the UN is in occupation.   
 
In order to analyse the argument that international humanitarian law is the de jure law 
to be applied in collapsed State peacekeeping, it is necessary to establish what 
international humanitarian law is.  This chapter examines the genesis and growth of 
international humanitarian law, highlighting the global nature of its development, in 
order to provide an understanding of its purpose and limits.  The sources of 
international humanitarian law, the basic principles underpinning it and the specific 
conventions that form its substance are analysed for suitability in peacekeeping. 
 
Sources of international humanitarian law 
 
As with all international law, humanitarian law has developed from treaties, custom, 
general principles of law, judicial decisions, writings of publicists and the resolutions 
or decisions of international organisations.2  Many of the international humanitarian 
law conventions and treaties have become customary international law, they are 
considered to be binding on all States not just the signatories.  The status of these 
rules as customary international law restricts the ability of States to opt out of the 
rules and adds to their morally binding character due to their being seen to be 
embedded and deeply rooted in community values.3  An excellent example of this 
                                                          
2 Dixon, M. Textbook on International Law. (4th edition 2000) at 24-47. 
3 Meron, T. in Gutman, R and Reiff, D (eds) Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know. (1999) at 
113. 
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process is the De Martens clause which was drafted by Feodor Martens in the 
preamble to the Hague Convention of 1907.4   
 
More particularly, international humanitarian law is derived from part of the law 
applicable to the use of force between States (referred to hereafter as the laws of 
armed conflict).  There is a separation of the law pertaining to the use of force into jus 
ad bellum, the legal status of the resort to the use of armed force and jus in bello, the 
legality of the force used during conflict. Humanitarian law pertains to the jus in bello 
and is similar to human rights law in that it routinely regulates the actions of 
individuals as well as States, and renders individuals liable to prosecution both 
nationally and internationally for contravention of its provisions. 5 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines international 
humanitarian law as: 
 
The body of rules which, in wartime, protects people who are no longer participating 
in the hostilities.  Its central purpose is to limit and prevent human suffering in times 
of armed conflict.  The rules are to be observed not only by governments and their 
armed forces, but also by armed opposition groups and any other parties to a conflict.  
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 are 
the principal instruments of humanitarian law.6     
 
                                                          
4 Howard, M. “Constraints on Warfare” in Howard, J, Andreopoulos, G and Shulman, M. (eds) The 
Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. (1994) at 10. 
5 A number of offences are created in, for example, the Geneva Conventions, inter alia  the grave 
breach provisions which States are obliged to prosecute.  The International Criminal Court (ICC) also 
provides a forum for international prosecution as have the various ad hoc tribunals. The ICC statue has 
effectively been incorporated into Australian law through the Criminal Code Act 1995. 
6 ICRC http://www.icrc.org/eng/ihl. (2 May 2005). 
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The ICRC definition clearly places humanitarian law as a law applicable in armed 
conflict and relevant to the conflict participants.  As demonstrated in chapters three 
and four of this work, it is very rare for UN peacekeepers to become directly engaged 
in armed conflict.  Certainly peacekeepers operate in areas where there has been 
armed conflict and on occasions where armed conflict is still occurring but in such 
circumstances they would be entitled to the protection of humanitarian law as neutrals 
or civilians.    
 
Customary international humanitarian law 
 
Despite the ICRC reference to codified humanitarian law in the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, international humanitarian law has a very long customary 
history.  Armed conflict is after all as old as man.  Ober, for example, points out that 
in the classical Greek age, about the late fifth century B.C., there were at least 12 
clearly identifiable customary rules regulating interstate conflict. 7  Bev, on the other 
hand, attributes the first humanitarian law to King Hammurabi who in ancient 
Babylon issued a decree prohibiting the strong from oppressing the weak.8  Many of 
the ancient Greek rules are specifically echoed in modern humanitarian law, such as 
the protection of sacred sites, observance of truces, returning enemy dead, prohibition 
on executions or mutilations of prisoners of war and the prohibition on attacks against 
non combatants. While these rules were often ignored or deemed not to apply to the 
members of certain social groups, they were at least acknowledged.  The primary 
                                                          
7 Ober, J. “Classical Greek Times” in Howard, J, Andreopoulos, G and Shulman, M. (eds) The Laws of 
War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. (1994) at 13. 
8 Bev, J.S. Human Rights Laws vs Humanitarian Law (Part II of II) (2000) 
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/human_rights/31140.(2 May 2005). 
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Judaeo-Christian references to early elements of humanitarian law are to be found in 
the Old Testament.  
 
References to the treatment of prisoners of war are to be found in 2 Kings 6:22.  The 
prophet Elisha advised the king of Israel regarding prisoners of war.  The king would 
have killed the prisoners’ but the prophet advised differently: 
 
And he answered, Thou shalt not smite them: wouldest thou smite those whom thou 
hast taken captive with thy sword and with thy bow? Set bread and water before 
them, that they may eat and drink, and go to their master.9  
 
The Qur-an also contains imprecations against the misuse of enemies.  At 123410 It 
prohibits the taking of prisoners for ransom.  At 1238 the Qur-an advises that: 
 
If the kindness shown to them is abused by the prisoners of war when they are 
released, it is not a matter for discouragement to those who show kindness… The 
Believers have done their duty in showing such clemency as they could in the 
circumstances of war. 
 
These examples from two of the world’s major religions demonstrate a concern with 
humanitarian issues and the generation of express rules for the treatment of prisoners 
of war that are consistent with the principles of modern humanitarian law.  They are 
also rules that pertain only to the participants in the conflict. 
 
                                                          
9 The Bible http://www.bartleby.com/108/12/6.html#S9 (2 May 2005). 
10 Holy Qur-an (2000) at 1410H. 
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Despite a long history of influence from the roots of western civilisation, the rules of 
Chivalry have often been pointed to as the foundation for the development of modern 
humanitarian law in the west.  These rules were considered to have had their genesis 
in the wars of the late republic11 and imperial Rome.  Certainly the Romans observed 
prohibitions on the slaughter of non-combatants, even if the prohibitions only applied 
to Roman citizens.   In the age of Chivalry (the European Middle Ages) this 
interpretation of Roman practice manifested itself in the application of nascent 
humanitarian principles, such as the proper treatment of prisoners of war and a level 
of respect for non-combatants.  Respect for the dead, at least the noble dead, was also 
a part of the customs of war as evidenced by the punishment meted out to one of 
William the Conqueror’s knights who struck the dead body of King Harold. However, 
these principles, following the Roman tradition, applied only to Christian forces, 
while pagans could be dealt with as the victor saw fit.12   A stark demonstration of this 
differentiation between the treatment of Christian and non-Christian enemies was the 
slaughter of Moslem women, children and prisoners of war during the Christian 
crusades of the 11th and 12th centuries.13    
 
Other examples of customary humanitarian rules practised during the Middle Ages 
are found in Shakespeare’s plays written in about the 1590s.  In Henry V Act IV 
Scene VII, Fluellen, coming upon the slaughter of the baggage handlers and other 
non-combatants cries: 
 
                                                          
11 Such as the civil war between Pompeius Maximus,  Gaius Crassus and  Gaius Julius Caesar, as well 
as  Gaius Julius Caesar’s German, Gallic and British wars. 
12 Stacey, R.C. “The Age of Chivalry” in Howard, J, Andreopoulos, G and Shulman, M. (eds) The 
Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. (1994) at 28. 
13 Foss, M. People of the First Crusade. (1997) at 159-181.  
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Kill the boys and the luggage! ‘tis expressly against the laws of arms:14 
 
Respect for prisoners of war did not appear to be quite so well entrenched as King 
Henry ordered all the prisoners throats slit in retaliation for breaches of the rules as 
Gower tells the audience in response to Fluellen: 
 
‘Tis certain there’s not a boy left alive; and the cowardly rascals that ran from the 
battle ha’ done this slaughter: besides, they have burned and carried away all that was 
in the kings tent; wherefore the king, most worthily, hath caused every soldier to cut 
his prisoner’s throat. O, ‘tis a gallant king! 
 
But then reprisals also form part of the modern law of armed conflict and arguably the 
issue of reprisals is intertwined with the concept of reciprocity, a concept central to 
the development of the laws of armed conflict.  The concept of reciprocity centred 
traditionally on the reciprocal protection of a small number of specifically identified 
people, mainly persons ‘belonging to the enemy’.15 
 
Protection of non-combatants was seen as a key principle in the law of arms (as it was 
known) but this did not prevent the pillaging of defeated territory.  The argument 
raised to defend this apparent violation of the principle of distinction was that the 
peasants and merchants were the support base without whom an army could not 
operate, thus exposing them as legitimate targets.16  This is an argument that is 
recognisable under the modern law of armed conflict and was (in conjunction with 
                                                          
14 Shakespeare, W. Volume 2 Histories and Poems (1995) at 126.  
15 Meron, T. Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection. (1987) at 11: Meron, T 
Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws: Perspectives on War in the Later Middle Ages. (1993). 
16 Above n 12 at 35. 
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economic warfare) the rationale for the bombing of industrialised areas by both sides 
during the Second World War.17  
 
Western medieval foundations of modern international humanitarian law 
 
Inherent in certain modern linguistic terms are shadows of criticism for offences 
against the law of arms that have been handed down from the early Middle Ages. The 
most obvious examples relate to the Vandals and Huns.  Both these terms have come 
into the modern vocabulary from the activities of tribally based armies of the early 
Middle Ages. In The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary18 vandal is defined as: 
 
1 a person who wilfully or maliciously destroys or damages property. 2 (Vandal) a 
member of a Germanic people that ravaged Gaul, Spain, N. Africa, and Rome in the 
4th-5th c., destroying many books and works of art. 
 
The same publication defines Hun as: 
 
1 a member of a warlike Asiatic nomadic people who invaded and ravaged Europe in 
the 4th-5th century. 2 offens.a German (especially military context) 3 an uncivilised 
devastator; a vandal.  
 
It seems that the critique of the activities of these tribal groups in the 4th and 5th 
century implicit in modern usage of their names is closely related to their breaching of 
accepted rules of warfare at the time.  In modern terms their activities would be 
considered grave breaches of international humanitarian law and the collective 
                                                          
17 Best, G. War and Law Since 1945. (1994) at 50. 
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disapproval of such behaviour ran deep enough to leave a lasting impression in 
linguistic censure.   
 
For the west the Middle Ages marks the rise of the modern concepts in international 
humanitarian law.  Parker19 identifies five foundations of humanitarian law in the 
Middle Ages.  These are; natural and divine law, ecclesiastical precept, military law, 
common custom and self-interest.  Natural and divine laws were derived from a series 
of texts: The bible, Roman law, canon law, the writings of Augustine and the Summa 
Theologica of Thomas Aquinas.  The ecclesiastical precept, distilled from the Peace 
of God movement founded in 11th century France, was based on the principle that the 
weak who could do no harm should not in turn be harmed.  At much the same time, 
armies were beginning to formally self regulate and military law was emerging to 
control the activities of troops on the basis of duty to God, obedience to superiors, 
vigilance, loyalty and (qualified) humanity towards civilians. Common custom was 
formed from the conduct of war and used as the basis to justify or condemn activities 
in conflict.  Finally, self-interest was born from a dawning realisation that mutual 
restraint, such as honouring surrenders, respecting flags of truce, sparing the wounded 
and so on, was mutually beneficial.  Although all these principles were developing 
during the Middle Ages it was not until the period 1550 to 1700 that a consistent 
western practice was seen to emerge.20  From that period on however, the majority of 
the modern international humanitarian law, or at least the “self-evident and 
unalterable” parts of it, were in existence.21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 (Third ed). Oxford University Press. (1997). 
19 Parker, G. “Early Modern Europe” in Howard, J, Andreopoulos, G and Shulman, M. (eds) The Laws 
of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. (1994) at 40-58. 
20 Id at 41-42. 
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A feature of the development of international humanitarian law is that it was a distinct 
area of law active only in the event of armed conflict.  This may seem an obvious 
point but it is an important one when searching for the boundary of the laws of armed 
conflict and to whom they may apply.  The law also applied only to participants in 
conflict.  It bound individuals engaging in armed conflict to certain rules pertaining to 
the use of force.   These individuals would in the modern context be understood to be 
combatants.  The use of force outside armed conflict was controlled by domestic 
criminal law.  Peacekeepers are not normally combatants.  In robust peace 
enforcement operations it has been the practice of the UN to contract out operations 
that may amount to armed conflict.22  Certainly in the examples highlighted in the 
previous chapters of this work where the UN has administered collapsed States, UN 
peacekeepers have not been involved in armed conflict and have not been combatants. 
 
Non Western foundations 
 
China 
 
It would be an ethnocentric assertion to claim that international humanitarian law 
stems only from the customs and practices of the west.  China has one of the oldest 
civilisations in the world.   Over two thousand years ago, at some point during the 
fifth to third century B.C., the Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu wrote the Art of 
War.  The essential proposition in the Art of War is the most fundamental 
humanitarian principle of all, war should be avoided where at all possible.23  
                                                                                                                                                                      
21 Id at 58. 
22 For example the first Gulf War, former Yugoslavia, the initial phase of East Timor. In the Korean 
War the fighting was contracted out to the US. 
23 Sun Tzu Translated by Cleary, T. The Art of War (1998) at 1. 
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Therefore those who win every battle are not really skilful – those who render others’ 
armies helpless without fighting are the best of all.24 
 
 The Art of War is based on spiritual Taoist principles. To some extent, then, the rules 
for warfare set out in it have a parallel with Christian and Moslem traditions in that 
there is a spiritual underpinning to their development.  
 
Specific parallels in the development of western humanitarian law are evident in the 
approach to the treatment of prisoners of war. Sun Tzu advises commanders to treat 
them well and take care of them.25  Respect for the property of civilians is also 
alluded to in Sun Tzu’s advice to divide up troops that have to live off the land so as 
not to over burden the local population.26  And nowhere in the text does Sun Tzu refer 
to attacking anything other than enemy armies, except where a siege on a fortified 
defence is required.  
 
Pre-Conquistador South America 
 
The rules for combat amongst the Aztecs also displayed attributes consistent with 
modern humanitarian principles.  The aim of battle was to capture an enemy rather 
than kill him.  Admittedly he was then sacrificed to the gods but this was an honour 
and not something to be granted to non-combatants.  As with modern humanitarian 
law, spies were not considered to be legitimate combatants and were dealt with 
summarily.  Defeat was inflicted on an enemy not by the slaughter of troops, non-
                                                          
24 Id at 67. 
25 Id at 63. 
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combatants and the ransacking of the town but by capturing and burning the local 
temple, thus defeating the local gods who were the real focus of the conflict.  Where 
these rules were broken, for example by Atzcapotzalco and his son who tried to 
destroy the dynasty of Texcoco, they became a disgrace and are the outcasts of 
Mexican historical writings.27 In modern terms they were castigated because they had 
violated the principle of distinction. 
 
The Inca were not as interested as the Aztec in preserving prisoners of war and were 
reported to have taken few prisoners except those considered sufficiently important to 
sacrifice or ritually humiliate then kill.  The Inca did however respect the difference 
between combatants and civilian populations that were conquered and wide spread 
destruction of territory was not acceptable.  The logic of this prohibition related not to 
a desire to implement humanitarian principles but to the preservation of populations 
and territories that would be added to the empire.28 
 
India 
 
Many of the principles by which civilisations live are laid out in the ancient texts.  
One of the central Sanskrit stories, the Mahabharata, is such a text and with the 
Ramayana captures the essence of Indian cultural heritage.29  The vehicle for 
transmitting this heritage is the story of a feud between two branches of a ruling 
Indian family.  The feud culminates in a battle of cataclysmic proportions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 Id at 118. 
27 Soustelle, J. The Daily Life of the Aztecs (1961) at 212-216. 
28 Mason, J.A. The Ancient Civilizations of Peru. (1965). 
29 Van Nooten, B.A. in Buck, W. (translator) Mahabharata  (1973) at xiii. 
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One of the central characters in the Mahabharata, Bishma, sets out the rules to be 
complied with during battle when he tells Duryodhana: 
 
But I will never slay the innocent, or those without weapons, or chariot drivers, or 
women, or those who run away or surrender or are fighting with others.30 
 
And at the end of the great battle the king orders that silk be found to wrap the dead 
and pyres made from the broken chariots.  
 
The principles set out in the Mahabharata, are wholly consistent with the modern 
humanitarian concern with the protection of non-combatants, prisoners of war and 
respect for the dead.   
 
International nature of humanitarian law 
 
It is very easy to take only a western perspective in examining the origins of 
customary international humanitarian law.  This very brief selection from some of the 
major continents of the world demonstrates that the development of the core 
principles of humanitarian law was not the preserve of the west, although it is not 
suggested that in the face of expedience these rules would, as a matter of practice, be 
complied with, at least they existed in principle in most of the major civilisations of 
the world.  The code of conduct in armed conflict that developed from the fifteenth 
century in Western Europe, while unconscious of parallel developments outside of 
Europe and the Mediterranean, was not alone in the world and while Grotius might 
have been the western father of international law he was not articulating a unique 
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system of international relations.  That international humanitarian law passed with 
relative ease into universal service as public international law is to a great degree due 
to the familiarity with the principles that had for some time before the spread of 
European influence been practiced or regarded as a principles of warfare in other 
regions of the world.31   
 
There is also a pragmatic side to the adoption of humanitarian law based on one of the 
foundations of international relations and international law; reciprocity.  Some aspects 
of this can be found in common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Convention and Article 
96(2) of Protocol I which govern belligerent relations among High Contracting 
Parties.  An example of the practical application of reciprocity in international 
humanitarian law can be seen in the Second World War where Germany complied 
with the 1929 Convention in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war from treaty 
parties such as France and the UK but would not do the same for prisoners from the 
USSR on the basis that it was treating German prisoners poorly, although in any event 
the USSR was not a party to the 1929 Convention.32 
 
As can be seen from the examples set out above, there has been a global emergence of 
recognisable rules for those engaging in armed conflict.  Participants apply the rules, 
non participants benefit from them.  Effectively the only rule for non participants is 
that they stay out of the conflict.  The rules do not otherwise regulate non participants, 
they remain subject to domestic laws or the laws imposed by a belligerent occupier 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention.  If public international law was to be stripped 
                                                                                                                                                                      
30 Id at 268. 
31 Best, G. War and Law Since 1945. (1994) at 16. 
32 Provost, R.  International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002) at 153. 
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back to the roots outlined above it would be clear that as non combatants and non 
participants in the conflict the rules would not apply to peacekeepers.   
 
From the rich international heritage of customs and traditions there have emerged 
basic principles that underpin the development of specific provisions of the law of 
armed conflict.  These principles are primarily concerned with limiting suffering 
within armed conflict. 
 
Principles of humanitarian law 
 
A number of references have already been made in this chapter to the development of 
the modern principles of international humanitarian law.  There are four basic 
international humanitarian law principles and the prohibitions and restrictions in 
treaties and customary international law can be related to one or a combination of 
these principles.  The four principles of international humanitarian law are; prevention 
of unnecessary suffering, military necessity, proportionality and distinction. 
 
Prevention of unnecessary suffering 
 
The principle of the prevention of unnecessary suffering, also known as the principle 
of humanity, is shared with international human rights law as one of the fundamental 
principles.33   It provides a general prohibition against inhumane activities that are not 
specifically prohibited by treaty law.34 Much of the body of treaty law that has built 
up restricting the means and methods of warfare that is known as the “law of the 
                                                          
33 Above n 15 (1987) at 10. 
34 Rogers, A. Law on the Battlefield (2004) at 7. 
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Hague”35 is aimed at limiting unnecessary suffering.  The prevention of unnecessary 
suffering was the motivation behind the establishment of the organisation that became 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  A Swiss businessman Henri 
Dunant, who witnessed the aftermath of the battle of Solferino in 1859, founded the 
Red Cross in 1863-4.  He was so appalled by the suffering of the wounded soldiers 
that he was determined to take action to improve conditions for them.  The inaugural 
conference of October 1863 set out the principles of the movement and led to the 
adoption in August 1864 of the first of the Geneva Conventions.36 
 
Arguably one of the best known expressions of the principle of humanity that 
underlies all humanitarian law comes from The Law of the Hague.  Originating in 
1874 it was passed on through the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to Protocol 1 
of 1977 and states that in any armed conflict the means and methods of warfare are 
not unlimited.37 
 
On 13 April 2003 the Supreme Court of Israel delivered a judgement that directly 
considered the principle of unnecessary suffering.  In Physicians for Human Rights 
and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights v Major-General Doron Almoj, 
Southern Commander and the State of Israel-Minister of Security,38 the petitioners 
claimed that the use of ‘flechette’39 tank rounds by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in 
the Gaza-Strip breached the principle of unnecessary suffering.  Specifically it was 
                                                          
35 See for example International Committee of the Red Cross,  International Law Concerning the 
Conduct of Hostilities: Collection of Hague Conventions and Some Other International Instruments. 
(1996). 
36 Best, G. Humanity in Warfare. (1980) at 150. 
37 Article 35(1) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977. 
38 Supreme Court of Israel http://www.ihlresearch.org/portal/ihli/summary.php?a=5748.(16 Aug 2003) 
39 A flechette is a thin metal dart.  Multiple flechettes are delivered in a round and lodge in the body 
like large splinters so that the victim suffers a slow painful death by a thousand cuts.   
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claimed that the use of these rounds breached the principle found in the Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious Or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (the 
‘Convention on Conventional Weapons).  The Court found against the petitioners on 
the grounds that the use of the flechette shells was not inconsistent with the guidelines 
found in the Convention. And that in any event, normal tank rounds would, in the 
circumstances of the case, have caused the injuries that had been suffered by the 
civilians.  As a result, the injuries complained of could not necessarily be imputed to 
the flechettes.  Finally, the Court held that flechettes had not been specifically banned 
by the Convention on Conventional Weapons and that as a result their use was not 
contrary to the laws of armed conflict. 
 
This case illustrates the difficulties that codification of the principles of armed conflict 
can create.  Debate continues with regard to the use of flechettes because they are 
difficult to remove from the body and cause multiple injuries.  If they do not strike a 
vital organ or sever a major blood vessel the victim can take a considerable period of 
time to die.  However, agreement on their use was not reached in the debate over the 
Conventional Weapons Convention and it remains open for courts to make decisions 
such as that made by the Israeli Supreme Court.  The decision is relevant to the laws 
of armed conflict as Israel is in occupation of the Palestinian territories.40 
 
The Australian Defence Force’s doctrinal definition of the principle of unnecessary 
suffering provides a concise definition of the principle:   
 
                                                          
40 Wallace, R.M.M. International Law (1997) at 98: Darcy, S. In the Name of Security:IDF Measures 
and the Law of Occupation. (2003). 
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The principle of unnecessary suffering forbids the use of means or methods of 
warfare which are calculated to cause suffering which is excessive in the 
circumstances. It has also been expressed as the infliction of suffering, injury or 
destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military 
objectives.41 
 
This definition clearly shows that the principle applies to armed conflict. It refers to 
“warfare” and “military objectives.”   In situations where the peacekeepers are not 
participants in armed conflict,42 this principle as it is defined above, could not apply. 
 
Military Necessity 
 
The doctrine of military necessity recognises that conflict is entered into for the 
purpose of winning and that as a result things may be done in order to achieve the 
mission that would otherwise be impermissible.  For example, an attack on a military 
objective will cause damage if not destruction of the target and may cause the death of 
combatants and non-combatants.   Death, damage and destruction for their own sake 
are not permitted, only military objectives can be legitimately attacked.  Military 
objectives are defined in Article 52(2), Additional Protocol I of 1977 as: 
 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution 
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.  
 
                                                          
41 Australian Defence Force Publication 37. The Laws of Armed Conflict 
42 The extent to which peacekeepers can become involved in armed conflict is discussed in the next 
chapter of this work. 
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The principle of military necessity developed partly from the very liberal 
interpretations of the nineteenth century European powers and the more restrictive 
provisions set out in the Lieber Code.  That the European rules were developed in 
relation to international armed conflict while the Lieber Code’s contribution emerged 
from an internal armed conflict, the American Civil War.  This may well have been 
the reason for the more restrictive approach of the Lieber code as it is easier to be 
harsh with members of another State than ones own citizens.   
 
The European rules were of particular interest to the German statesmen of the time 
and was refined to become the doctrine of Kriegsraison.  This doctrine allowed 
violation of the laws of war and the majority of international law in general in order to 
avoid defeat.  The Lieber Code in contrast was a far more restrictive interpretation of 
military necessity allowing only the means and methods indispensable for victory and 
not in violation of the laws of war.43  The modern interpretation of the principle is 
closer to the Lieber Code than to Kriegsraison. 
 
Military necessity can be raised as a defence as well as a permission to act in a 
manner that would otherwise be prohibited.  The best example of the development of 
the principle of military necessity in the form of a defence is to be found in the post 
Second World War Nuremberg trials.  The principles of law under which the tribunal 
was to operate were ratified under a Resolution of the General Assembly44 headed: 
“Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognised by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.” The principles laid out the basis upon which a person could be 
                                                          
43 Stephens, D. “Human Rights and Armed Conflict – The Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case” Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal Vol 4, 
(2001) at 17-18.  
44 General Assembly Resolution 95 of 11 November 1946. 
 260
prosecuted by the tribunal45 and these principles form the basis of the modern 
International Criminal Court.  The defences were not comprehensively set out and 
defendants could rely upon such defences as were available at law.   
 
The German defendants claimed protection under the wider Kriegsraison based 
interpretation. For example, U-Boat commander Eck was tried by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal for the murder of shipwrecked survivors from the merchant ship Peleus.  Eck 
argued that he was following the orders of the Grand Admiral Doenitz, then 
commander of the German navy and that the destruction of survivors was on the basis 
of military necessity; namely preservation of the U-Boat fleet.  While the tribunal was 
critical of the order it accepted that the terms of the order were based on the principle 
of military necessity in circumstances where the existence of wreckage may well give 
away the position of the U-Boats.  However, the tribunal did not accept that the order 
was intended to include the murder of protected persons and Eck was found guilty and 
executed.46  In Eck’s case military necessity was accepted for the attack on civilian 
shipping and its destruction but the murder of specifically protected non-combatants, 
namely persons who were shipwrecked, was a violation of international humanitarian 
law that could not be condoned under the principle of military necessity. 
 
In a rejection of the Kriegsraison doctrine the Nuremberg Tribunal set out the 
parameters of the defence of military necessity as: 
 
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any 
amount and kind of force to compel submission of the enemy with the least possible 
                                                          
45 Best, G. Law and War Since 1945 (1994) at 180. 
46 Nizkor. http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/nca/nca-oz/nca-02-06-01.html. (16 Aug 2003) 
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expenditure of time, life and money … It permits the destruction of life of armed 
enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the 
armed conflicts of the war…47 
  
Following on from the Nuremberg position Hampson identifies three rules of the 
modern international law that limit the action that may be taken under the provisions 
of military necessity.  First, an attack must be aimed at contributing to the defeat of 
the enemy; if an attack does not achieve this then it cannot be justified under military 
necessity because it would have no military purpose.  Second, any attack that 
complies with the first criterion must not cause damage or harm to non-combatants or 
protected objects that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.  Finally, military necessity cannot justify violation of the other 
rules of international humanitarian law.48  
 
Despite Hampson’s assertion that military necessity cannot justify the violation of 
other rules of international law, there are a number of examples of situations where 
military necessity has been pointed to as an argument excusing such violations.  For 
example, the sack of Drogheda to keep up troop morale.  The killing of Irish prisoners 
by the English on the basis that the English position would be untenable while they 
lived. The elimination of American Indians through fear of what they might do.  The 
German U-boat campaign against neutral shipping seen as the only way to win the 
war in 1917 and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaski to win 
                                                          
47 Stephens D. “Human Rights and Armed Conflict – The Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case” Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal. Vol 4. 
(2001) at 1-23.  
48 Hampson, F. “Military Necessity” in Gutman, R and Reiff, D (eds) Crimes of War: What the Public 
Should Know. (1999) at 251-2. 
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the Second World War.49  These examples demonstrate the subjectivity of the test that 
was applied by a commander or government in determining that certain courses of 
action were acceptable within the principle of military necessity.  Despite the turn 
towards an interpretation of military necessity more closely aligned to the Lieber 
Code, the more serious the situation the broader the permission to act becomes, even 
to the point of using nuclear weapons where the survival of the State is at stake.50 
 
The Australian Defence Force’s doctrinal definition of the principle of military 
necessity is:   
 
The principle of military necessity states that a combatant is justified in using those 
measures, not forbidden by international law, which are indispensable for securing 
complete submission of an enemy at the soonest moment. Military necessity requires 
combat forces to engage in only those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
military objective. It permits the killing of enemy combatants and other persons 
whose death is unavoidable. It permits the destruction of property if that destruction 
is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction of property as an end 
in itself is a violation of international law. There must be a reasonable connection 
between the destruction of property and the overcoming of enemy forces.  The 
principle cannot be used to justify actions prohibited by law, as the means to achieve 
victory are not unlimited. This also reflects the principle of war of economy of 
effort.51 
 
As with the principle of humanity, the definition of the principle of military necessity 
places it as a principle of international law applicable only to participants in armed 
                                                          
49 Kennedy, P and Andreopoulos, G “The Laws of War: Some Concluding Remarks”  in Howard, J, 
Andreopoulos, G and Shulman, M. (eds) (1994) at 218. 
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conflict. As a result it is not applicable to UN peacekeepers that are not party to an 
armed conflict. 
 
Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality is very closely aligned to military necessity.  
Proportionality strikes a balance between military necessity and the principle of 
unnecessary suffering or humanity.52  The key to this balance is whether the damage 
to otherwise protected people or property is excessive in relation to the anticipated 
concrete and direct military advantage.53  In other words, is the death or destruction 
worth the step it gives toward victory.  The issue of proportionality and the balance 
with military necessity has raised a number of long standing debates.  The bombing of 
Dresden and the Dam Busters raids are but two famous World War Two examples 
that continue to be debated.  As the law currently stands it is probable that the 
bombing of Dresden and much of the carpet-bombing perpetrated by both sides 
offends the principle of proportionality.54  However, these conclusions are with the 
benefit of hindsight and advancements in the attention paid to international 
humanitarian law principles in the environment after World War Two.  It should also 
be noted that the principle is applied against the knowledge or understanding of the 
situation and circumstances at the time. For example, the Dam Busters raid was 
anticipated by the allies to have caused a considerable level of disruption to German 
electricity supplies and had a significant effect on their war effort.  The loss of life 
and damage was considered proportional when balanced against the military necessity 
                                                                                                                                                                      
50 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) I.C.J. 226 at 105E. 
51 Above n 41. 
52 Waibel, M. International Humanitarian Law – An Overview. 
http://afa.at/globalview/042002/international3.html (5 May 2005). 
53 Article 51(5)(b) Additional Protocol I  of 1977. 
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of the planned disruption to the German war effort.  In fact the electricity supplies 
came back on line very quickly and had little or no effect at the cost of some 8000 
lives, many of whom were Russian forced labourers held in a detention camp in the 
path of the river and unable to escape. 
 
A more recent example of the interactions of the principles of proportionality and 
military necessity was the bombing by the US of the Amiriyah bunker in Baghdad 
during the 1991 Gulf War.  Many civilians were sheltering in the bunker, which was 
considered by the US to be a military target of such importance that the death of 
civilians was sufficiently within the principle of proportionality to permit the attack.  
The US claimed that the bunker was still operating as a command node although 
intelligence reports allegedly identified the civilian presence.   Whether the 
assessment on the basis of military necessity was correct remains the subject of debate 
and again highlights the subjective nature of many of the decisions made under the 
laws of armed conflict and its principles.55  
 
Proportionality does not mean that the same weapons or level of force must be used.  
This would effectively create a stalemate and in any event would be over ridden by 
military necessity instead of creating a balance.  An illustration of the implementation 
of proportionality would be a sniper in the bell tower of a heritage-listed church.  The 
opposing force must clear the sniper quickly and without loss of any of their troops in 
order to achieve their mission.  There are a number of ways to safely clear the sniper 
                                                                                                                                                                      
54 Above n 45 at 200-202, 277-278. 
55 McCoubrey, H. and White, N. The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations at 164: See also Fischer, H. “Proportionality, Principle of.” in Gutman, R and Reiff, D (eds) 
Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know. (1999) at  294; It should be noted that the US argued 
that this was not an issue of proportionality but of mistake of fact, reliance having been placed on 
faulty intelligence reports:  
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without risking the lives of the troops.  They could call down artillery fire, obliterating 
the church and probably most of the village, or they could use heavy calibre or tank 
rounds that would damage and possibly destroy the belltower but leave the main 
structure and other buildings in the vicinity untouched.   In this example the use of 
heavy calibre or tank rounds would not offend against the principle of proportionality 
despite being a use of greater force than would be available to a lone sniper.  The use 
of an artillery barrage most certainly would offend against the principle of 
proportionality. This is particularly the case if it wiped out a village in the process 
given that artillery fire does not achieve pinpoint accuracy. The amount of damage 
that would be caused would far exceed the military advantage in a situation where 
other methods that do not offend the principle are available. 
 
From these examples and illustrations it can be seen that the principle of 
proportionality is subject to a number of factors.  There is knowledge and belief in the 
effects of the action weighed at the time that the action is taken against the progress to 
victory or aversion of defeat.  The availability of means and methods to achieve the 
desired or required ends are set in the context of the laws and principles of armed 
conflict.  Implementation of the principle of proportionality is above all the subjective 
analysis of all these factors by the commander.  Although the situation can be judged 
against the circumstances that the commander believed prevailed at the time it is still 
the commander’s judgement that is applied as to the effect that an attack, for example, 
will have and some commanders are more confident in the outcomes than others.  
 
The Australian Defence Force’s doctrinal definition of the principle of proportionality 
is:   
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The principle of proportionality provides a link between the concepts of military 
necessity 
and unnecessary suffering. In simple terms, the principle generally relates to the 
reduction of 
incidental injuries caused by military operations and requires that the losses and 
damage resulting from military action should be proportionate (i.e. not be excessive) 
in relation to the anticipated military advantage. It is self evident that the 
proportionality principle, together with the unnecessary suffering principle, dictates 
that civilians should not be made the object of attack, and that while civilian 
casualties may be an inevitable consequence of an attack, every effort must be made 
to spare them, and other parties who are noncombatants, from becoming adversely 
affected. The principle of proportionality not only requires that an attacker must 
assess what feasible precautions must be taken to minimise incidental loss, but must 
also make a comparison between different methods or axis of attack so as to be able 
to choose the least excessively destructive method or axis compatible with military 
success. When making that assessment the attacker should naturally take into account 
likely friendly casualties. 
 
Again, this principle is applicable only to situations of armed conflict and would not 
apply to peacekeepers performing a policing role in State reconstruction. 
 
Distinction 
 
The principle of distinction has always been inherent in the concepts and articulation 
of international humanitarian law.   In simple terms it is the differentiation or 
distinction between legitimate objects of attack; persons, places and things, and 
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unlawful objects of attack, such as prisoners of war, hospitals, civilians and so on.  As 
detailed above, military objectives are defined in Article 52(2) Additional Protocol I 
of 1977 as: 
 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution 
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.  
 
Objects that cannot legitimately be attacked must be avoided or protected, subject as 
always to the principle of military necessity and proportionality in terms of collateral 
damage. 
 
The principle of distinction is usually expressed in terms of protections from attack 
rather than a formal direction to distinguish. The prisoners of war, civilians and so on 
that are to be distinguished from combatants are all specifically protected people or 
things under the laws of armed conflict.  This approach can be seen in the ICRC 
definition of distinction which states:56 
 
The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants in order to spare the civilian population and civilian property. Neither 
the civilian population as a whole nor individual civilians may be attacked. Attacks 
may be made solely against military objectives. People who do not or can no longer 
take part in the hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and for their physical 
and mental integrity. Such people must in all circumstances be protected and treated 
                                                          
56 ICRC “What are the essential rules of international humanitarian law?” International Law: Answers 
to your Questions. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/sitrrng0.nsf/iwpList133/C2195351DEAF06EC1256C 
(1 Sep 2003). 
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with humanity, without any unfavourable distinction whatever. It is forbidden to kill 
or wound an adversary who surrenders or who can no longer take part in the fighting. 
 
Many of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions are effectively concerned 
with the principle of distinction although the word “distinction” is not expressly used.  
Geneva Convention I, for example, distinguishes the wounded, sick and all facilities 
and personnel concerned with their care from lawful combatants.  Geneva Convention 
II requires a similar distinction to be applied to sea based operations while Geneva 
Conventions III and IV provide for the distinction between prisoners of war and 
civilians from lawful combatants respectively. 
 
The principle of distinction is expressly articulated with regard to civilians in Article 
48 of Protocol I; 
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 
 
The provisions in the Geneva Conventions requiring distinctions to be made with 
regard to objects of attack are underlined by Article 51(2) of Protocol I which 
specifically prohibits attacks against the civilian population, Article 51(6) prohibiting 
reprisals against civilians, Article 52(1) prohibits reprisals against civilian objects, 
Article 53(c) protecting cultural objects and places of worship, Article 54(4) 
protecting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, Article 
55(2) protecting the natural environment and Article 56(4) prohibiting attacks against 
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works and installations containing dangerous forces.  As well as codifying the 
distinction between the military and civilians Protocol I also prohibits reprisals 
against non-combatants such as the wounded, sick, shipwrecked and so on.   
 
The Australian Defence Force is an example of the approach that the principle of 
distinction is not a basic principle. Its doctrinal definition of the principle of 
distinction is:   
 
 
Although not a basic principle, distinction is said to be a related principle and seeks to 
ensure that only legitimate military objects are attacked. Distinction has two 
components. The first, relating to personnel, seeks to maintain the distinction between 
combatants and noncombatants or civilian and military personnel. The second 
component distinguishes between legitimate military targets and civilian objects. 
Military operations must only be conducted against enemy armed forces and military 
objects. Noncombatants and civilian objects are protected from attack, that is, they 
are not legitimate objects of attack. LOAC57 therefore requires that belligerents 
maintain the clear distinction between armed forces and civilians taking no direct part 
in hostilities; that is, between combatants and noncombatants, and between objects 
that might legitimately be attacked and those 
protected from attack.58 
 
From the text it seems that the Australian doctrinal position is that distinction is not a 
basic principle, this differs from the position of the UK, NZ, US59 and Canada60, all of 
which view distinction as a basic principle.61 
                                                          
57 Laws of Armed Conflict. 
58 Australian Defence Force Publication 37.The Laws of Armed Conflict. 
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From the definitions and descriptions of the principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict 
it can be seen that unless a peacekeeping force is engaged in armed conflict they do 
not apply.   
 
Codification of the Principles 
 
Although the principles outlined above deal with protection of non-combatants they 
are acted on by the parties to a conflict.  The principles are rules for combatants so 
that where peacekeepers are not combatants their involvement with the principles 
would appear to be passive, that is as recipients of the protections and not as persons 
or forces required to implement them.  An argument that peacekeepers can use the 
laws of armed conflict as a framework could not therefore be maintained on the 
firmest or best basis, that it comes from the basic principles.  If such an argument that 
the laws of armed conflict can be used as a framework for collapsed State 
peacekeeping is to be maintained it must be founded on something more than the 
basic principles.  This means that there must be something to draw on from the 
codification of the laws of armed conflict.   
 
The principles of humanitarian law and the customary rules that had developed over 
the centuries crystallised into their modern form and began to be codified in the 19th 
century into formal national rules and international treaties.   It is helpful for the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
59 US Field Manual 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-
10/toc.htm. (1 Oct 2003). 
60 Canadian Defence Force. National Defence Joint Doctrine Manual B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 
http://www.dnd.ca/dcds/jointDoc/docs/LOAC_e.pdf (1 Oct 2003) at.32. 
61 While Australia’s view that distinction is not a basic principle is perhaps esoteric the difference in 
approach is noted here for completeness.   
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purpose of contextualising the laws of armed conflict to examine the formation of the 
major contributors to show how significant conflicts and events have shaped that 
development as well as to search for evidence of the basis for an extension of the laws 
of armed conflict into peacekeeping.   
 
Lieber code  
 
The Lieber Code is generally acknowledged as the earliest codification of the modern 
laws of armed conflict.  It came into existence during the American Civil War as the 
“Instruction for the Government Armies of the United States in the Field”, US Army 
General Order No. 100 on 24 April 1863. 62   It was named after its primary drafter 
Francis Lieber, a German born American who was a professor of history, political 
science and law.  He researched world military history in creating the rules of warfare 
at the direction President Abraham Lincoln for use during the American Civil War.63   
 
The Lieber Code created a distinction between the conduct that was permitted toward 
combatants and non-combatants.  Non-combatants were clearly articulated as being 
protected from the ravages of the conflict.  The Lieber Code also established the 
conditions that were to be followed for the treatment of prisoners of war by the 
capturing force.  Underpinning the Lieber Code was the principle that all soldiers 
were to be treated equally regardless of their social, ethnic or economic origins.  The 
                                                          
62 Above n 45 at 200. 
63 Parks, H. in Gilmore, G.J. “Modern Law of Warfare Instituted During the Civil War” American 
Forces Information Service News Articles. (16 May 2003) 
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particular concern behind this principle was for the treatment that the black soldiers of 
the Union force might receive if captured by the Confederacy.64 
 
The Lieber Code was divided into ten divisions relating to areas of conduct within the 
conflict: 
 
Section I. Martial Law - Military jurisdiction - Military necessity - Retaliation.                            
 
Section II. Public and private property of the enemy - Protection of persons, and 
especially of women, of religion, the arts and sciences - Punishment of crimes against 
the inhabitants of hostile countries 
 
Section III. Deserters - Prisoners of war - Hostages – Booty on the battlefield.                                          
 
Section IV. Partisans - Armed enemies not belonging to the hostile army - Scouts- 
Armed prowlers - War-rebels.           
 
Section V. Safe-conduct - Spies - War-traitors – Captured messengers - Abuse of the 
flag of truce.                      
 
Section VI. Exchange of prisoners - Flags of truce - Flags of protection                                          
 
Section VII. The Parole                                            
 
Section VIII. Armistice - Capitulation                             
 
                                                          
64 Mahle, A.H. Traditional Laws of War. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/berga/crimes/laws.html (5 May 
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Section IX. Assassination                                          
 
Section X. Insurrection - Civil War - Rebellion                    
 
The majority of the issues covered under the Lieber Code would be well known to 
modern international humanitarian lawyers and military operations lawyers.  It 
represents a codification of much of the international customary law of the time and 
would be heavily drawn upon as a basis for subsequent Hague and Geneva law.  
 
Some of the Code has been expressly withdrawn as a legitimate method of warfare, 
for example: 
 
Art. 17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the 
hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier 
subjection of the enemy. 
 
Art. 18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in 
order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it 
is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten 
on the surrender. 
  
These Articles are found under the provisions for military necessity.   
 
While the Lieber Code represents the first modern codification of international 
humanitarian law it is also very much a prototype when compared to the twentieth 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2005) 
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century iterations of the law. The modern law of armed conflict would not accept 
starvation as a legitimate method of warfare and would certainly not permit the return 
of civilians to a place where they would be purposely starved, even on the ground of 
military necessity.  It has indeed been suggested that far from a genuine attempt to 
ameliorate the sufferings of armed conflict the code was little more than a piece of 
propaganda.  Professor Thomas DiLorenzo expresses this position most forcefully: 
 
The Lieber Code paid lip service to the notion that civilians should not be targeted in 
war, but it contained a giant loophole: Federal commanders were permitted to 
completely ignore the Code if, "in their discretion," the events of the war would 
warrant that they do so. In other words, the Lieber Code was purely propaganda. 
The fact is, the Lincoln government intentionally targeted civilians from the very 
beginning of the war. The administration’s battle plan was known as the "Anaconda 
Plan" because it sought to blockade all Southern ports and inland waterways and 
starving the Southern civilian economy. Even drugs and medicines were on the 
government’s list of items that were to be kept out of the hands of Southerners, as far 
as possible.  
As early as the first major battle of the war, the Battle of First Manassas in July of 
1861, federal soldiers were plundering and burning private homes in the Northern 
Virginia countryside. Such behavior quickly became so pervasive that on June 20, 
1862 – one year into the war – General George McClellan, the commanding general 
of the Army of the Potomac, wrote Lincoln a letter imploring him to see to it that the 
war was conducted according to "the highest principles known to Christian 
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civilization" and to avoid targeting the civilian population to the extent that that was 
possible. Lincoln replaced McClellan a few months later and ignored his letter.65  
 
Regardless of the true motives behind the Lieber Code the fact remains that it 
provided a basis for the codification and development of international humanitarian 
law.  With the exception of Henri Dunant, the start point for many of the treaties that 
have become customary international law or that underpin international humanitarian 
law have been commenced or participated in on the basis of a State’s own best 
interests. Such is the nature of international relations.   
 
Geneva Conventions 
 
The Geneva Conventions were the result of the activities of a Swiss businessman, 
Henri Dunant. In 1859 Dunant was pursuing a business venture requiring the approval 
of the French Emperor Napoleon III.  He travelled to the Emperor’s headquarters near 
the Italian town of Solferino in time to witness one of the bloodiest battles of the age.  
The battle had a deep effect on Dunant and he determined to improve conditions for 
the fighting men.  He set out his plan to alleviate the suffering of the combatants in his 
book A Memory of Solferino.    Using the influence he had gained as a businessman he 
set about implementing his plan to set up national organisations which would educate 
and train volunteers to relieve suffering on the battlefield.  These organisations 
became the national Red Cross Societies and eventually the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC).  Expending vast amounts of time, effort and personal 
financial resources, Dunant travelled Europe obtaining backing for his plan and 
                                                          
65 DiLorenzo, T. Targeting Civilians. http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo8.html (8 May 
2005). 
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agreement from governments to send representatives to the Conference of October 
1863.  On 22 August 1864 twelve States signed a treaty known as the Geneva 
Convention.66  The Convention guaranteed neutrality to sanitary personnel, expedite 
                                                          
66 Convention signed at Geneva August 22, 1864;  
22 Stat. 940; Treaty Series 377 
[TRANSLATION] 
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED IN ARMIES 
IN THE FIELD 
ARTICLE 1 
Ambulances and military hospitals shall be acknowledged to be neuter, and, as such, shall be 
protected and respected by belligerents so long as any sick or wounded may be therein.  
Such neutrality shall cease if the ambulances or hospitals should be held by a military force.  
ARTICLE 2 
Persons employed in hospitals and ambulances, comprising the staff for superintendence, medical 
service, administration, transport of wounded, as well as chaplains, shall participate in the benefit of 
neutrality, whilst so employed, and so long as there remain any wounded to bring in or to succor.  
ARTICLE 3 
The persons designated in the preceding article may, even after occupation by the enemy, continue 
to fulfil their duties in the hospital or ambulance which they serve, or may withdraw in order to rejoin 
the corps to which they belong.  
Under such circumstances, when these persons shall cease from their functions, they shall be 
delivered by the occupying army to the outposts of the enemy.  
ARTICLE 4 
As the equipment of military hospitals remains subject to the laws of war, persons attached to such 
hospitals cannot, in withdrawing, carry away any articles but such as are their private property.  
Under the same circumstances an ambulance shall, on the contrary, retain its equipment.  
ARTICLE 5 
Inhabitants of the country who may bring help to the wounded shall be respected, and shall remain 
free. The generals of the belligerent Powers shall make it their care to inform the inhabitants of the 
appeal addressed to their humanity, and of the neutrality which will be the consequence of it.  
Any wounded man entertained and taken care of in a house shall be considered as a protection 
thereto. Any inhabitant who shall have entertained wounded men in his house shall be exempted from 
the quartering of troops, as well as from a part of the contributions of war which may be imposed.  
ARTICLE 6 
Wounded or sick soldiers shall be entertained and taken care of, to whatever nation they may 
belong.  
Commanders-in-chief shall have the power to deliver immediately to the outposts of the enemy 
soldiers who have been wounded in an engagement, when circumstances permit this to be done, and 
with the consent of both parties.  
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supplies for their use and adopt an emblem.   The emblem that was adopted was the 
Red Cross, an inversion of the Swiss national flag.67 
 
The Convention of 1864 was not to be the last word on the subject, indeed it would 
prove to be merely the beginning of an important series of agreements codifying and 
upgrading international humanitarian law.  In 1928, as a result of the horrific effect on 
combatants of mustard gas used in the trenches of WWI, a new Geneva treaty came 
into effect, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating 
Gas, and for Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.  This protocol prohibited the use in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Those who are recognized, after their wounds are healed, as incapable of serving, shall be sent back 
to their country.  
The others may also be sent back, on condition of not again bearing arms during the continuance of 
the war.  
Evacuations, together with the persons under whose directions they take place, shall be protected by 
an absolute neutrality.  
ARTICLE 7 
A distinctive and uniform flag shall be adopted for hospitals, ambulances and evacuations. It must, 
on every occasion, be accompanied by the national flag. An arm-badge (brassard) shall also be allowed 
for individuals neutralized, but the delivery thereof shall be left to military authority.  
The flag and the arm-badge shall bear a red cross on a white ground.  
ARTICLE 8 
The details of execution of the present convention shall be regulated by the commanders-in-chief of 
belligerent armies, according to the instructions of their respective governments, and in conformity 
with the general principles laid down in this convention.  
ARTICLE 9 
The high contracting Powers have agreed to communicate the present convention to those 
Governments which have not found it convenient to send plenipotentiaries to the International 
Conference at Geneva, with an invitation to accede thereto; the protocol is for that purpose left open.  
ARTICLE 10 
The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Berne, in four 
months, or sooner, if possible.  
In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it and have affixed their seals thereto.  
Done at Geneva, the twenty-second day of the month of August of the year one thousand eight hundred 
and Sixty-four.  
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva04.htm 
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warfare of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices’ as well as ‘bacteriological’ methods of warfare.68 
 
The next convention in the Geneva series came in 1929 with the convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  This convention was to be the longest so far in 
the series, amounting to 97 articles. The Convention dealt comprehensively with the 
way in which prisoners of war and those civilians entitled to prisoner of war status 
should be treated.  Annexed to the convention was a model agreement for the 
repatriation or removal to a neutral State of prisoners with serious health concerns.69 
 
Following WWII it was decided that a more comprehensive convention structure was 
required and an update of the conventions already in existence.  To this end, on 12 
August 1949 the four Geneva Conventions currently extant came into being.  The four 
conventions are for the protection of the members of the armed forces who are sick 
and wounded on land (First Geneva Convention), protection of members of the armed 
forces who are sick, wounded or shipwrecked at sea (Second Geneva Convention), 
conditions and treatment of prisoners of war (Third Geneva Conventions) and 
protection of civilians in time of war (Fourth Geneva Convention).  These 
conventions are almost universally subscribed to.  There are less than a hand full of 
States that are not signatories to the Geneva Conventions and as a result they are 
generally considered to represent a statement of the customary international law.70 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
67 Art 38 GCI. 
68 Full text of the convention is set out at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva01.htm 
(8 May 2005). 
69 Full text of the convention is set out at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva02.htm 
(8 May 2005). 
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In recognition that further clarifications and expansions were required to the Geneva 
Conventions, Protocols additional to them were agreed at the diplomatic conferences 
of 1974-1977.  The Protocols were finally adopted on 8 June 1977 and came into 
force on 7 December 1978.71 They are generally referred to as the Protocols of 1977.  
The Protocols are divided into the rules relating to international armed conflict 
(Protocol I) and the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict 
(Protocol II).  Protocol II is concerned with expanding the provisions of common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions for the benefit of those involved in internal 
armed conflict. The Protocols do not enjoy the same universal recognition as that 
enjoyed by the Geneva Conventions; particularly as the US has not ratified them and 
the UK only recently became party to both.  However, they still enjoy widespread 
recognition and application in principle by the US despite not being formally ratified.   
 
The rules that are set out in the body of treaties known as Geneva law and contained 
primarily in the four Geneva Conventions and Protocols are not the only treaties that 
aim to provide protection from the chaos of armed conflict.  A second strand of 
treaties commenced at about the same time as the first of the Geneva Conventions and 
is known collectively as Hague law.  While Geneva law is concerned with 
safeguarding military personnel who are no longer taking part in hostilities and those 
not involved in the conflict, such as civilians, Hague law is concerned with the rights 
and obligations of those engaged in armed conflict and limiting the means and 
methods of armed conflict.72  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
70 Paust, J.J. “Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial” 
Harvard International Law Journal Vol.44, No.2 (Spring 2003) at G1-G30. 
71 ICRC. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. (1996). 
72 ICRC. http://www.redcross.org.sg/IntSvc_IHL.htm. (8 May 2005). 
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Hague Law 
 
The body of customary international law that was codified73 following the Hague 
Conference of 1899 into the Hague Conventions of 1907 were the result of the 
concerns felt by the Russian Tsar Nicholas II over the willingness of the European 
powers to use force in international relations.74  The Tsar’s concerns were not entirely 
altruistic.  Russia at the time was suffering economically from the burdens placed 
upon it by attempts to keep pace militarily with the other European industrialised 
powers.  Defence spending was running at about 4.4 per cent of net national product, 
the highest spending at that time in Europe, and still the Russian General Staff could 
not find the funds for the necessary replacement of the Russian artillery stock.  
Contemporary commentators were also warning of the vast financial burden of 
modern warfare and the Tsar was particularly influenced by the writing of Jan Bloch, 
prominent banker and author of the pessimistic and to the Tsar and like minded 
European readers disturbing book The Future of War.75  The Tsar was not alone in 
wishing to limit the financial burden of the bourgeoning arms race, Lord Salisbury, 
the British prime minister, was also expressing concern and calling for the limitation 
of arms and the concomitant expenditure.  While the Hague Conventions are now 
seen as significant contributors to international humanitarian law they did not achieve 
the purposes for which they were ratified, namely the limiting of the use of force in 
international relations or the reduction of arms manufacture in Europe.76 
 
                                                          
73 Jennings, R, Watts, A. Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, 1996) at 99. 
74 O’Brien, J. International Law. (2001) at 22. 
75 Roberts, A. “Land Warfare” in Howard, J, Andreopoulos, G and Shulman, M. (eds) The Laws of 
War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. (1994) at 120. 
76 D.F. Vagts “Symposium: The Hague Peace Conferences The Hague Conventions and Arms 
Control.”   94 American. Journal of. International Law (31 January 2000) at 31. 
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Twenty-six States attended the first conference. The conventions were signed on 29 
July 1899 and came into force on 4 September 1900.  The conventions that were 
signed were: 
 
Hague I -- Pacific Settlement of International Disputes  
Hague II -- Laws and Customs of War on Land  
Hague III -- Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of Principles of Geneva Convention 
of 1864  
Hague IV -- Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons  
Declaration I - on the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons  
Declaration II - on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of 
Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases  
Declaration III - on the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the 
Human Body  
Final Act of the International Peace Conference; July 29, 1899 77 
 
Although the Geneva Conventions were by this time in force a second series of Hague 
Conventions were called by Theodore Roosevelt.  The Second Peace Convention was 
attended by 44 States.  Thirteen conventions were signed on 18 October 1907 
following the Second Hague Conference.  The conventions were to come into force 
on 26 January 1910.  The conventions signed at the Conference and subsequently 
ratified were: 
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Hague Convention I -- The Pacific Settlement of International Disputes  
Hague Convention II -- The Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of 
Contract Debts  
Hague Convention III -- The Opening of Hostilities  
Hague Convention IV -- The Laws and Customs of War on Land  
Hague Convention V-- The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case 
of War on Land  
Hague Convention VI -- The Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of 
Hostilities  
Hague Convention VII -- The Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships  
Hague Convention VIII -- The Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines  
Hague Convention IX -- Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War  
Hague Convention X -- Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva 
Convention  
Hague Convention XI -- Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right 
of Capture in Naval War  
Hague Convention XIII -- The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War 
One other convention in the 1907 series was signed but was never ratified; Hague 
Convention XII -- The Creation of an International Prize Court.78 
The Geneva Protocol to Hague Convention, titled Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
                                                                                                                                                                      
77 Full text of the convention is set out at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/hague.html (8 May 2005). 
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Methods of Warfare, which was signed on 17 June 1925 and came into force on 8 
February 1928; and finally the conventions for the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, which was signed on 
14 May 1954 and came into force on 7 August 1956.79 
 
The early Hague conventions were considered by the parties to be a new statement of 
law based on the treaty obligations of the parties.  They contained the si omnes clause 
that provided that if one party to the conflict was not party to the convention then the 
convention obligations would not apply to any of the parties to the conflict. This was 
generally considered to be the position until the Nuremberg trials following the 
Second World War where in the trial of German Major War Criminals the defence 
raised the si omnes clause as several of the belligerents were not parties to the Hague 
Convention No IV of 1907.  The International Military Tribunal acknowledged the 
facts raised by the defence but stated in regard to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 
that:      
 
by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilized 
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war.80 
 
This approach was followed by the Tribunal in subsequent cases during the 
Nuremberg trials.  The substance of Hague Convention IV of 1907, along with much 
                                                                                                                                                                      
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. And the Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict 1999. 
80 Trial of German Major War Criminals, (1946) Cmd. 6964, Misc. No. 12, at 65.  
 284
of the Hague series of conventions, is now considered to form part of customary 
international law and the si omnes clause is regarded as having fallen into desuetude.81  
 
Although the Hague Conventions form the majority of Hague law there are other 
treaties which are considered to fall under Hague law.  These have been compiled by 
the ICRC82 and consist of the following treaties and other instruments: 
 
Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic 
Monuments (Roerich Pact), Washington, 15 April 1935 
 
Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War.  London, 26 February 1909 (not 
ratified by any signatory) 
 
Procès-verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London of 22 April 1930. London, 6 November 1936 
 
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea: 
Prepared by a group of international lawyers and naval experts convened by the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law. June 1994. 
 
Convention of Maritime Neutrality. Havana, 20 February 1928 
 
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight. St. Petersburg, 29 November – 11 December 1868 
 
                                                          
81 Meron, T. “The Humanization of Humanitarian Law” 94 American. Journal of  International  Law  
(April 2000) at 247-248. 
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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (UN General Assembly Resolution 31/72). 10 December 
1976 
 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects.  Geneva, 10 October 1980 and Protocols thereto 
 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Paris, 13 January 1993. 
 
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production   and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Ottawa 1997 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome 1998 
 
Hague law can be seen to make a significant contribution to the limiting of the 
methods and means of armed conflict available to the parties.  The achievement of 
customary law status83 means that not only are States bound to comply with the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
82 ICRC. International Law Concerning the Conduct of Hostilities: Collection of Hague Conventions 
and Some Other International Instruments. (1996). 
83 McCoubrey, H and White, N. The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military 
Operations (1996) at 158-159; Note also that Art 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
includes as a definition of war crimes a violation in terms that are recognisable as restatement of Hague 
Law:  
Art 8 (xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of 
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently 
indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such 
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive 
prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with 
the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;  
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limitations placed on them by its rules but that in internal armed conflict the 
limitations also apply despite the inability of parties other than the State, to formally 
undertake to be bound by it.84 
 
It is in the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that the argument for use of the laws 
of armed conflict and in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention by peacekeepers 
arises.  As can be seen above, the Fourth Geneva Convention is a relatively late 
development in international humanitarian law.  The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
represented a significant codification of the principles and rules that were already 
widely understood, if not always applied.  The Geneva Conventions could be argued 
to be the product of a mature understanding of international humanitarian law at a 
time when peacekeeping was unthought of.   However, peacekeeping would develop 
and become more complex.  It was certainly in existence and well known by the time 
that the Additional Protocols of 1977 were adopted.  However, the argument that the 
Geneva Conventions applies to peacekeeping is not founded on the later 
amplifications but must revert to arguments based on articles drafted before 
peacekeeping was invented by the UN.  One inference that may be drawn from the 
absence of reference to peacekeeping in the Additional Protocols is that they were 
never intended to apply to it.  This would be consistent with the state of development 
of peacekeeping as by 1977 the vast majority of operations were traditional operations 
with limited use of force.   
 
 
 
                                                          
84 If this argument were incorrect it would mean that the means and methods of warfare were not 
limited in the way envisaged by Hague law in internal armed conflict.  This is inconsistent with the 
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Enforcement of international humanitarian law 
 
As States are the subject of international law it is usually States that have enforcement 
action taken against them, subject to treaty arrangements such as the statue of the 
International Court of Justice.   International humanitarian law is an exception to this 
rule and individuals can be liable to prosecution for breaches.   
 
Domestic courts 
 
Even breaches of the nascent principles of international humanitarian law would have 
been dealt with under domestic legal arrangements.  For example, in the 12th Century 
king Edward III gave the English Courts of Chivalry85 the exclusive right to deal with 
breaches of the law of arms.  The Court of Chivalry is a civil court and has been 
presided over by the Earl Marshal, head of the college of arms, as sole judge since 
1521.  Although technically still in existence it now deals exclusively with matters of 
heraldry.86  
 
Ratification of treaties through the enactment of domestic legislation has also 
contributed to the ability of States to prosecute breaches of international humanitarian 
law as domestic criminal law.  In Australia the Geneva Convention Act 1957 
incorporates the four Geneva Conventions and Protocols but does not expressly create 
offences except in relation to the misuse of the Red Cross and identity cards.  Acts 
                                                                                                                                                                      
intent of Art 1(2) of Protocol I (international law derived from established custom).   
85 The Court of Chivalry is an ancient English civil court under the jurisdiction of the Earl Marshall of 
England, the Duke of Norfolk that judges cases regarding heraldry.  The court was last convened in 
1954, in a case in which a theatre (the Manchester Palace of Varieties) was using the arms of the City 
of Manchester both inside the theatre and on its seal; the city had requested that the theatre cease the 
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that amount to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions such as murder, torture, 
wanton destruction of property and so on have been incorporated into domestic 
criminal law.  For a soldier serving overseas the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 
would apply which incorporates through s61 of the act the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 
and all laws of the Commonwealth in force in the Jervis Bay Territory. 
 
 
The ICC 
 
Until the end of the Second World War offences were dealt with under the domestic 
law of States.  The Nuremberg Tribunals and the associated tribunals such as the 
Tokyo Tribunal marked a departure from this practice and the beginning of a move 
toward an internationalisation of the jurisdiction over breaches of international 
humanitarian law by individuals.  Initially this jurisdiction was entrusted to ad hoc 
tribunals formed for the purpose of dealing with specific conflicts, such as the 
tribunals for Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and so on.  Since the coming into force 
of the Rome Statute there is, for some States at least, the prospect of trial by a 
permanent international court in the form of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
The ICC is not intended to take away from States the ability to deal with matters.  
Indeed the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to situation where the State voluntarily 
passes jurisdiction to the court, fails to exercise jurisdiction or holds a sham trial or if 
the matter is passed to the court by the Security Council under Chapter VII.87  The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
usage, and had met with refusal.  The court ruled in favour of the City of Manchester: 
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Court-of-Chivalry (8 May 2005). 
86 College of Arms: http://www.college-of-arms.gov.uk/about%5C12.htm (5 Nov 2003). 
87 Articles 13-15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 289
court is also limited to jurisdiction over only the most serious crimes identified in the 
statute as: 
 
(a)     The crime of genocide;  
(b)     Crimes against humanity;  
(c)     War crimes;  
(d)     The crime of aggression.88 
 
These crimes are further defined within the statute.  Although generally understood as 
representing an international tribunal for the prosecution of violations of international 
humanitarian law, the Rome statute is not limited to activities committed during 
armed conflict.  For example, the crime of apartheid89 listed under crimes against 
humanity does not require a state of armed conflict or occupation to be in effect.  The 
ICC therefore represents a point of conversion between international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law. 
 
In Australia the Rome Statute has been ratified and incorporated into domestic law as 
the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (ICC).  Unlike the Geneva Conventions 
Act 1957 the ICC Act creates offences that parallel those that can be prosecuted under 
the Rome Statute and makes them offences under domestic law. 
 
 
 
                                                          
88 Article 5(1) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; The crime of  aggression has not yet 
been defined and is subject to future agreement. 
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Conclusion 
 
International humanitarian law has its roots in the more positive side of human nature.  
Some of the basic principles of humanitarian law are associated with the earliest 
recorded cultures and are seen in the Judeo-Christian and Moslem religious text.   In 
its development in Europe during the Middle Ages it was associated with the noble 
knights and the rules of chivalry.  Although distinguished as much in their breach as 
in their application, recognisable tenets of international humanitarian law were 
evident across diverse populations of the world.  This wide spread recognition in 
terms both of geography and history has arguably assisted in the universal acceptance 
of international humanitarian law in the modern context. 
 
Basic principles of international humanitarian law began to emerge and crystallised as 
the principles of military necessity, humanity or the prevention of unnecessary 
suffering, proportionality and finally distinction.  In the mid to late 19th century these 
rules, primarily for reasons of political expediency on the part of States, were codified 
into a series of treaties. While there is some level of interaction between them these 
treaties are seen as representing two strands.  Geneva law relates to the protection of 
non combatants and those hors de combat while the law of the Hague limits the 
means and methods of armed conflict.   
 
A shift has also been seen in the method of dealing with breaches by individuals of 
international humanitarian law.  Until the Second World War breaches of 
humanitarian law would primarily be dealt with under extant State domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
89 Article 7(1)(j) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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legislation.  The Nuremberg, Tokyo and related tribunals marked an 
internationalisation of the prosecution of breaches of international humanitarian law.  
Ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda followed in the foot steps of 
Nuremberg.    
 
In the latest stage of development the most serious breaches by individuals of 
international humanitarian law may be dealt with by an international tribunal in the 
form of the ICC rather than domestic courts, although the requirement for brining a 
case before the ICC that the domestic court is unable, unwilling or engage in a sham 
trial probably means that in effect the domestic courts remain the dominant forum. 
 
The ICC Statute also marks a convergence with international human rights law as 
unlike Nuremberg and the ad hoc tribunals, which had jurisdiction only over armed 
conflict, the ICC, with the exception of the crime of war crimes, does not require an 
armed conflict to occur before assuming jurisdiction. 
 
International humanitarian law is the law that governs armed conflict.  From the 
beginning of its development it was restricted in application and applied only to and 
during an armed conflict.  As discussed in the previous chapters of this work, the UN 
has demonstrated a reluctance to deploy UN forces where it is anticipated that the 
force will become engaged in armed conflict.  The use of force by UN peacekeepers 
has been restricted in practice to policing and deterrent activates.  Since Korea and the 
Congo UN peacekeepers have not been directly involved in armed conflict, there has 
not been an identified enemy, there have not been any combatants and people 
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apprehended have been dealt with as detainees, where necessary prosecuted in 
criminal courts, not as prisoners of war.    
 
In Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo the UN peacekeepers were not participants in 
armed conflict.  How then could international humanitarian law have been the de jure 
legal framework?  The next chapter of this work aims to discover the threshold that 
must be crossed to trigger the application of international humanitarian law.  It will 
also analyse in detail the specific argument put forward by Michael Kelly. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Boundary Between International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law. 
 
Although human rights have precedence over the rights of States they do not 
possess the same legal quality because international law implicitly regards the 
State as the guarantor for human rights within the nation1 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter of this work it was established that the purpose and application 
of international humanitarian law is very specifically concerned with the regulation of 
armed conflict.  For parties engaged in armed conflict international humanitarian law 
is the lex specialis that regulates activities between the parties and places obligations 
on them for the protection of identified persons, places and things.  Unless UN 
peacekeepers are involved in armed conflict, which as demonstrated in chapters three 
and four of this work is highly unusual,2 this work argues that UN peacekeepers will 
not be in a position to use international humanitarian law as a framework for 
operations.  
 
However, this view is not universally held and there are influential advocates for the 
application of international humanitarian law to a broader spectrum of peacekeeping 
operations.3 It is important for peacekeepers and planners to be able to identify the 
legal environment in which an operation is to take place and to plan for the effect that 
this environment will have on core issues such as the rules of engagement and 
                                                          
1Zwanenburg, M. “The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law: Some Preliminary Observations”. International Peacekeeping. July – 
(October 1999) at 128  
2 Whether UN forces can as a matter of law become engaged in armed conflict will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
3 Kelly, M. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: The Search for Legal 
Certainty. (1999): On Kelly’s advice the Australian contingent in Somalia applied the law of 
occupation to their sector of the United Nations Operation in Somalia in 1993. 
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treatment of individuals in the area of operations as well as custody and detention 
policies.  There are differences in the rights of an individual under international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law.  There is therefore a difference 
in the rights that peacekeepers would be required to protect depending on the 
framework applied so that establishing the correct framework is more than merely an 
esoteric exercise.  Some differences in the approach to the issue of individual rights 
will be examined in the first part of this chapter to demonstrate the importance to the 
domestic civilian population of determining the correct legal framework for an 
operation. 
 
Having established that there are significant practical implications for a domestic 
civilian population in applying the correct framework to an operation the next section 
of the chapter seeks to determine at what point an operation crosses the threshold to 
trigger the application of international humanitarian law and as a result cause the legal 
framework to be international humanitarian law  In order to assist in clearly 
identifying this threshold, existing definitions of armed conflict are examined and 
shown to be inadequate in assisting peacekeepers and planners to accurately 
determine which framework applies.  As a result, new definitions that more accurately 
describe the point at which international humanitarian law applies are proposed.  In 
the penultimate section of this chapter the question is raised as to whether UN 
peacekeepers can as a matter of law become parties to an armed conflict.  If they 
cannot then international humanitarian law could not be used even when peacekeepers 
engage as a matter of fact in armed conflict.  Finally, the argument against the 
application of international humanitarian law as the legal framework for peacekeeping 
in collapsed States is made out. 
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Individual rights in international humanitarian law  
 
A significant feature of the difference between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law is the different way that the rights of an individual are 
treated.  There is no doubt that international humanitarian law seeks to protect certain 
human interests.  However, the way in which it does this differs from human rights 
law in that, while obligations and offences for breach are created, it does not bestow 
on an individual “rights” the way that human rights law does.  Even though there are 
references in the Geneva Conventions to the ‘rights’ of protected persons, Provost4 
argues that the Conventions do not confer rights on individuals but a minimum 
standard of treatment that cannot be derogated from by a State.  In support of this 
proposition he points to the situation during the Second World War when the Vichy 
French government agreed to ‘transform’ a number of prisoners of war held by the 
Germans into civilians thus removing the protections afforded them as prisoners of 
war.5  The provisions of the extant Conventions of 1949 are drafted in absolute non 
derogable terms utilising the terminology of ‘right’ to prevent this type of abuse.  
Provost’s view on the granting or otherwise of rights to the individual, is not held 
universally.  It should be noted that Meron6  relies on exactly the same provisions and 
example to argue that individuals have rights under international humanitarian law 
and that there is a convergence of international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law in the recognition of individual rights. 
 
                                                          
4 Provost, R. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. ( 2002). 
5 Ibid at 28-29. 
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However, Provost finds further support for his proposition in the rigidity of the 
standards that are applied to the treatment of individuals, a standard that cannot be 
waived by the individual because it is not a right of the individual.  The example 
given to illustrate this point is that of a person forced to fight for one particular party.  
If that person is captured he or she is not at liberty to fight for the other party but must 
remain a prisoner of war.  The ‘right’ is not one that adheres to the individual as is the 
case with international human rights law, but represents a minimum standard of 
treatment that must be applied to all regardless of the wishes of the individual.7 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supports this view of the 
differing status of the individual under international humanitarian and human rights 
law in its definitions.  International humanitarian law is described as: 
 
A set of international rules, established by treaty or custom, which are specifically 
intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or non-
international armed conflicts.  It protects persons and property that are, or may be, 
affected by an armed conflict and limits the rights of the parties to a conflict to use 
methods and means of warfare of their choice. 
 
In contrast the ICRC defines international human rights law as: 
 
A set of international rules, established by treaty or custom, on the basis of which 
individuals and groups can expect and/or claim certain behaviour or benefits from 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 Meron, T. Human Rights in International Strife: Their Interpretation Protection. (1987): Meron, T. 
“The Humanisation of  Humanitarian Law” American Journal of International Law. (July 2000) at 
239-340. 
7 Above n 4 at 30. 
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governments.  Human rights are inherent entitlements which belong to every person 
as a consequence of being human.8 
 
The ICRC position accords with the proposition that one of the fundamental 
differences between international humanitarian and human rights law is the position 
of the individual.  The rights are inherent to the individual in international human 
rights law, while international humanitarian law arguably does not give inherent rights 
to individuals but imposes obligations on States and individuals to comply with its 
provisions and is underpinned more strongly by the principle of reciprocity than is 
international human rights law.  Perhaps the greatest difference between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law is with regard to the issue of killing.  
International human rights law specifically prohibits the taking of human life other 
than as a sentence following criminal proceedings according to law, while 
international humanitarian law permits the taking of life, even innocent civilian life 
within the limits of unavoidable collateral damage associated with proportionality and 
military necessity.9     
 
The obligations and requirements placed on peacekeepers with regard to the treatment 
of individuals in an operation governed by international humanitarian law would be 
quite different from the obligations placed on them in a situation where international 
human rights law applied.   The issue of whether international human rights law or 
international humanitarian provides the legal framework for collapsed State 
                                                          
8 ICRC “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Similarities and 
Differences.” Advisory Service on international Humanitarian Law. (01/2003). 
9 Meron, T. “The Humanisation of  Humanitarian Law” American Journal of International Law. (July 
2000) at 239-340: Hodgson also compares the responsibilities placed on individuals in international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, demonstrating the broader spectrum of rights and duties under 
international human rights law. Hodgson, D Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse. (2003) 
at 61-137. 
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peacekeeping therefore has significant implications for the treatment of the domestic 
civilian population.  If international human rights law applies individuals have non-
derogable rights, where if international humanitarian law applies the obligations to an 
individual can be subordinated to situations where, for example, there is reason to 
apply the principle of military necessity to achieve a peacekeeping mission. 
 
Where international humanitarian law applies 
 
Meron10 observed in 1987 that international humanitarian law and human rights law 
were converging.  Despite this he questioned whether there was a lacuna in the area 
where humanitarian law and human rights law meshed, which for him was the key 
area of internal strife.  Areas of internal strife have increasing seen the insertion of 
peacekeeping operations, particularly operations under the robust mandates issued 
under Chapter VII.   However, if a lacuna indeed existed in 1987 it is argued that it 
has been closed and that international human rights law has filled the gap.  There is 
overwhelming support for the proposition that international human rights law applies 
at all times, even during armed conflict and that during armed conflict international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law act in a complementary not 
mutually exclusive way.11   
 
                                                          
10 Meron, T. Human Rights in International Strife: Their Interpretation Protection. (1987). 
11 Human Rights Committee General Comment No.31 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, (26 May 2004) 
: See also Abella v. Argentina, Case No. 11.137, Report No. 5/97, Annual Report of the IACHR 1997 
at para 158. The application of human rights in armed conflict was first considered by the UN at the 
International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968, which adopted Resolution XXIII, 
"Human rights in armed conflicts". The Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 reaffirmed the 
linkage between human rights and international humanitarian law in armed conflicts (the Vienna 
Declaration at part II, E, para 96).  International human rights law was also expressly considered to 
exist during armed conflict by the ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion at 25: See also 
Henckaerts, J-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. Customary International Humanitarian Law. Vol 1. Rules 
(2005) at 299-300. 
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This position was supported by the ruling of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission, which issued a ruling in March 2002 on the status of detainees in the US 
detention centre at Guantanamo Bay.12  The Commission recognised that human 
rights law applied at all times while international humanitarian law does not apply in 
the absence of an armed conflict, in other words the threshold must be crossed into 
armed conflict for international humanitarian law to apply.  Although both may apply 
during armed conflict, the Commission found that where there is a state of armed 
conflict the lex specialis rules of international humanitarian law take precedence.13  
The position that international human rights law continues during armed conflict is 
supported by State practice. During the Second Gulf War the UK adhered to the 
European Convention on Human Rights concurrently with the international 
humanitarian laws of occupation.14 
 
Acknowledgement that international humanitarian law overrides international human 
rights law in armed conflict was expressly made by the UN Secretary-General in 
relation to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when 
he reported:  
 
to the extent that in present international law 'lawful acts of war' are recognized, such 
lawful acts are deemed not to be prohibited by Article 6.15 
 
                                                          
12 Organisation of American States. Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (12 March 2002). Decision 
on Request for Pecuniary Measures. 
13 Murphy, S.D. “Inter-American Human Rights Commission Decision on Cuba Detainees” American 
Journal of International Law. (July 2002) at 730. 
14 Kelly, M “Legal Factors in Military Planning for Coalition Warfare and Military Interoperability” 
Australian Army Journal. Vol 11. No.2, (Autumn 2005) at 166. 
15 Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/8052, 
at 104 (1970). 
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As unlike international human rights law international humanitarian law does not 
have a continuous existence it is necessary to establish when the threshold has been 
crossed into international humanitarian law. Definitions that provide only general 
guidance are of little use.   
 
Another complication for peacekeeping operations is that the legal framework under 
which the peacekeepers are operating may be different from that applicable to other 
actors in the environment in which they are working.  When inserted into an armed 
conflict as an interposition force peacekeepers do not become a party to the conflict.  
If a peacekeeping force is fired upon they will have rules of engagement which permit 
them to return fire on the basis of self defence, but they cannot, for example, set 
ambushes with the intent to kill combatants as they themselves are not combatants.   
 
However, peacekeepers still need to be able to distinguish when their mission has 
caused them to become a party to the conflict and therefore apply customary 
international humanitarian law. As the UN is not a State or a party envisaged in 
Protocol II it cannot be party to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.  The San 
Remo Manual position in such situations is to apply the De Martens clause: “In cases 
not covered by this document or by international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international 
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the 
dictates of the public conscience.”16   
 
                                                          
16 Part 1 Section 1(2). 
 301
In enforcement operations with the character of the Korean War or the first Gulf War 
it will not be difficult. In a situation such as the US forces found themselves to be in 
Mogadishu when attempting to arrest General Aideed, the situation is not as clear.  
Fighting was not protracted but it was intense.  It was more focused than a riot but it 
only lasted for a matter of hours.  The Somalis involved in the incident were firing at 
will at the US forces, using rocket propelled grenades and heavy weapons.  The troops 
reacted in accordance with their training and returned fire.17  The problem the US 
forces faced was that there was no identifiable enemy, indeed there was no enemy at 
all because they were not engaged in an armed conflict but attempting to bring 
humanitarian aid and create a secure climate for peace building.  And yet on the 
ground it may have been difficult for many of the soldiers to accept that they were not 
involved in an armed conflict.   
 
In order to put the Somali type of peacekeeping experiences into perspective they can 
be compared with situations that police authorities have faced in domestic 
jurisdictions.  A comparable situation would be the so called “Waco massacre” in 
Texas, US.  The Branch Davidians were a cult movement that had settled in Waco.  
They came to the attention of the US authorities through complaints of former 
members.  There were allegations of abusive practices and possession of illegal arms.  
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Food, Tobacco and 
Firearms (BFTFF) decided to move in on the community and effectively laid siege to 
it on 28 February 1993.  The siege lasted for 51 days, during which time the US Army 
became involved.  Although not on the physical scale of the Somali situation, where 
fighting covered the centre of the city, the siege was prolonged and there are parallels 
                                                          
17 Bowden, M. Black Hawk Down (1999). 
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in the way that the authorities engaged in a prolonged exchange of fire with the 
members of the Branch Davidian movement.  Indeed heavier weapons were used at 
Waco than in Somalia as tanks were deployed to the scene by the US army.  
Eventually incendiary devices were deployed which destroyed the compound with the 
loss of 74 men, women and children.18   
 
Despite the use of arms, including tanks and incendiary devices, and the protracted 
nature of the siege, there is no suggestion that the Waco incident amounted to an 
armed conflict. Yet it may have had a greater claim to qualify as such under extant 
definitions of armed conflict than the events of 1993 in Somalia.    This is not to 
suggest that the Waco siege was an armed conflict, rather it highlights the point that 
the definition of armed conflict is very wide.   At Waco there was a resort to armed 
force between government authorities and the group, the Branch Davidians. There 
was protracted armed violence, 51 days of it.  Understanding why the Waco siege was 
not armed conflict may be the key to developing a meaningful test for the threshold 
into armed conflict that can be applied by peacekeepers.  Once the threshold is clearly 
discernable the line between the primacy of human rights law and the requirement to 
implement international humanitarian law can be identified. 
 
Definitions of armed conflict 
 
From the Middle Ages until the mid twentieth century international law recognized a 
clear distinction between peace and war.  If States were at war they declared it and 
applied the appropriate rules.  States that were not a party to the conflict were dealt 
                                                          
18 Serendipity The Waco Massacre http://www.serendipity.li/waco.html (22 Aug 2005). 
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with under the rules of neutrality and at all other times the international law applicable 
in peace time was applied.   Following the Second World War there ceased to be a 
clear cut distinction between peace and armed conflict.  Formal declarations of war 
were no longer made.  States behaved differently in terms of their interactions so that 
even where there was an armed conflict between them diplomatic, economic, political 
and peaceful international legal relationships, including treaties, were often 
maintained.  As a result it may be difficult to identify when an armed conflict between 
States exists.  Add to this the complexity of internal armed conflict with the 
involvement of non State actors and the threshold for the implementation of 
international humanitarian law becomes very difficult to discern.19 
 
A number of definitions have been developed in an attempt to identify when the 
international humanitarian law threshold has been crossed.  The starting points for 
modern definitions are those set out in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.  
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions identifies international armed conflict 
as occurring where there is a declared war or: 
 
…any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them. 
 
This provides very little assistance in identifying an armed conflict, although the 
definition does confirm that an international armed conflict can exist where one of the 
parties denies its existence.   There is no assistance given in the Geneva Conventions 
to identifying an internal conflict as common Article 3 appears to assume that such an 
                                                          
19 Greenwood, C. in Fleck, D. (ed.), Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, (1995) at 
201-202. 
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event needs no interpretation.  The ICRC commentaries on the Conventions are even 
more expansive in the interpretation of armed conflict describing it as: 
 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed 
forces … even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.  It makes no 
difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.20 
 
Writing shortly after the Conventions of 1949, Lauterpacht21 defined armed conflict 
as: 
 
“War is a contention between two or more States through their armed forces, for the 
purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the 
victor pleases.” 
 
As observed by Dinstein,22 this definition does not take understanding of when an 
armed conflict has commenced (and therefore how a peacekeeper might recognise 
that it is occurring), further than to effectively eliminate intra State conflict.  Dinstein 
objects to the narrowness of the definition because it does not account for situations 
where a state of armed conflict exists between States and yet no shot is fired.  He 
further criticises this definition because it relates only to comprehensive conflict and 
overlooks the possibility of armed conflict conducted to achieve more limited ends 
than total subjugation of the enemy.  Finally, Dinstein takes issue with the implied 
                                                          
20 Pictet, J. (ed) Commentary on the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. (1952) at 32-33. The commentary does not provide a 
definition of internal armed conflict although some criteria for application of the customary principles 
are suggested at 49-50. 
21 Lauterpact, H. (ed) Oppenheim’s International Law, II. (1952) at 202.  
22 Dinstein, Y War, Agression and Self Defence. (3rd ed, 2001) at 4-14.  Dinstein’s own definition 
suffers from the circular argument problem. He effectively states that armed conflict occurs when it is 
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symmetry of the positions of the parties to the conflict, noting that the parties may 
well have quite different aims, for example, one party may have a very limited goal 
while the other desires total victory.   Lauterpacht, it would seem, does not assist in 
providing a definition for armed conflict.  
 
Although it relates to internal armed conflict Article 1(2) of Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions gives a little more assistance regarding the identification of an armed 
conflict generally by stating that: 
 
This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such 
as riots, isolated acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts.23 
 
While this definition seems to shed a little more light on the subject it only really 
serves to eliminate activities at the very lowest point on the possible scale of violence.  
The fact that the definitions comes from the Protocol that relates to internal armed 
conflict means that it is strictly a definition relating only to internal armed conflict but 
it is used here to shed some light on how any armed conflict may be defined in 
circumstances where a formal declaration has not been made between States.  The 
distinction between internal and international armed conflict is vital when considering 
which provisions of international humanitarian law apply but it is not so vital when 
simply trying to determine how to recognise an armed conflict.       
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
happening, adding that it must be comprehensive for one party.  This definition does not progress the 
search for a definition that can be used by peacekeepers to identify armed conflict.  
23 Article 1(2) Protocols Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
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It seems inconceivable that even without the Protocol II definition, a rational observer 
would have concluded that, for example, the Brixton or Toxteth riots of the 1980s in 
the UK amounted to armed conflict, despite their intensity and the associated loss of 
life.  Northern Ireland presented different issues and will be discussed below.  Internal 
armed conflict will always prove a difficult area because of the competing issues of a 
desire to provide a humanitarian influence on violence through international 
regulation and the principles of State sovereignty, particularly in light of Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter.  A cynical approach may be that the attempt to balance these 
interests is more likely to be at the root of the Protocol II definition than genuine 
assistance in defining armed conflict. However, for the purposes of this work the 
Protocol II definition will be taken as having general application in attempting to 
define armed conflict.  That is, to qualify as an armed conflict, internal or 
international, there must be more than the types of disturbances and tensions 
identified by Article 1(2) Protocol II, regardless of the involvement of individuals or 
groups operating under the direction and control of a foreign State. 
 
The ICRC Commentary on Protocol I takes understanding no further than an 
emphasis on the irrelevance of duration and intensity: 
 
Humanitarian law … covers any dispute between two States involving the use of their 
armed forces.  Neither the duration of the conflict, nor its intensity, play a role …24 
 
The ICRC Commentary on Protocol II merely describes armed conflict for the 
purposes of the Protocol to be: 
                                                          
24 Sandoz, Y, Swinarski, C and Zimmerman, B. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949  (1987) at para. 62. 
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the existence of open hostilities between armed forces which are organised to a 
greater or lesser degree.25 
 
Greenwood26 drew heavily upon the Geneva Conventions in proposing a definition of 
international armed conflict: 
 
An international armed conflict exists if one party uses force of arms against another 
party.  This shall also apply to all cases of total or partial military occupation, even if 
this occupation meets with no armed resistance (Art. 2, para 2 common to the Geneva 
Conventions).  The use of military force by individual persons or groups of persons 
will not suffice.  It is irrelevant whether the parties to the conflict consider themselves 
to be at war with each other and how they describe this conflict. 
 
The only difference of substance between this definition and the Geneva Conventions 
is the recognition that an international armed conflict may take place between parties 
who are not High Contracting Parties. Interestingly Greenwood dismisses the ability 
of a group to be involved in armed conflict while using the term party instead of State 
to describe the entities between which force is being used.  But one of the questions to 
arise from this definition is when does a group become a party?  Is it a matter of size 
or intent?  These issues are not addressed in the definition and as a consequence it 
takes understanding little further than the Convention definition.  The Convention, 
Commentaries, Protocol and definitions by respected scholars such as Greenwood all 
seem to be out of step with modern practices in the use of armed force and 
acknowledgement of the existence of armed conflict.  It is generally accepted that 
                                                          
25 Ibid at para. 4341. 
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isolated incidents such as border clashes, military surveillance operations and small 
scale raids do not amount to armed conflict.27 
 
In the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 
12 June 199428 (San Remo Manual) the threshold for international humanitarian law 
to be applied is described in Part 1 Section 1 as: 
 
1. The parties to an armed conflict at sea are bound by the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law from the moment armed force is used.29 
 
Although the San Remo Manual is aimed at providing a contemporary restatement of 
international humanitarian law provisions that relate to armed conflict at sea, as well 
as some progressive developments,30 there are necessarily findings as to the extant 
state of the law of armed conflict generally.   San Remo Manual article 1 above, is 
based on a rejection of intensity as a relevant consideration in determining whether an 
armed conflict exists.  This position is drawn from the ICRC Commentary on Article 
2 of the Geneva Conventions.31  The ICRC commentary defines armed conflict as: 
 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members 
of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 Above n 19 at 202. 
27 Schmitt, M. “Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and jus in bello”. IRRC (June 2002). Vol. 
84. No.846, at.372: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v 
USA) ICJ Rep 1984, 392. 
28 Doswald-Beck, L. (ed) San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at 
Sea  (1995) 
29 Id at 7. 
30 Ibid at ix. 
31 Ibid at 73. 
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of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.  It makes no difference how long 
the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.32 
 
The San Remo Manual goes slightly further than the ICRC commentary as in the 
Manual formulation of Article 1 it is make clear that the intervention involves the use 
of armed force.   Two warships or two bodies of troops facing each other would not 
be sufficient to amount to an armed conflict until at least one shot is fired. 
 
These statements of the law appear to be based on the assumption that armed 
conflicts, at least international ones, would occur between the legitimate armed forces 
of a State. While non State actors are acknowledged as becoming involved in non-
international armed conflict in Protocol II,33 it is probably correct, despite the 
statements of prominent politicians such as the US President Bush regarding “the war 
on terror”, that international armed conflict can only be conducted legitimately 
through armed forces.  Lawful combatants are indirectly defined in Article 13 of the 
First Geneva Convention: 34 
 
The present Convention shall apply to the wounded and sick belonging to the 
following categories: 
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
                                                          
32 Pictet, J. S. (ed) ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea. (1960).  
33 Protocol II of 8 June 1977 “Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts” Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
34 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field of August 12 1949.  
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2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those 
of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating 
in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such 
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the 
following conditions: 
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) That of carrying arms openly; 
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an 
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 4. Persons who accompany the 
armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civil members of 
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour 
units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they 
have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany. 
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices of the merchant 
marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit 
by more favourable treatment under any other provisions in international law. 6. 
Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who on the approach of the enemy 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to 
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war. 
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Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention uses the same definition for describing 
persons who are to be treated as prisoners of war. 
 
The definition is further refined by Article 43 of Protocol I35 
 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct 
of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority 
not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict.  
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel 
and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is 
to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.  
As the Party to a conflict referred to is a High Contracting Party international armed 
conflict can only occur between States.  This may have put the UN in an ambiguous 
position had the Article 4336 agreements been signed.  In the circumstances, each 
State Party contributing troops to a UN force will be a Party to the conflict.37 In the 
event that an internationally recognised actor such as the UN or a future East India 
Trading Company38 engages in armed conflict the international customary law rules 
                                                          
35 “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977”.   
36 Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. 
37 Although troops are contributed to a UN force there remains a National Command Element that 
approves the directions given by the UN so that each national force remains effectively under national 
command regardless of UN operational control. See for example: Stephens, D, “The Lawful Use of 
Forces: The Tactical Imperative.” International Peacekeeping, Vol.12 No.2 (Summer 2005) at 160. 
http://www.vanguardcanada.com/ftp_folder/pdf/01-3_nether.pdf (17 Jul 2005). 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/raaf14_17july2003/raaf_report/chapter3.pdf (17 Jul 
2005):  
38 In the mid 18th century the East India Trading Company developed its own private army.  By the end 
of the 18th century the company army numbered 150,000 troops, which was a larger number than the 
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will apply, many of which, and certainly those relating to armed conflict at sea, are 
contained in the San Remo Manual. 
Returning to the definition of armed conflict, the San Remo Manual does advance the 
understanding of armed conflict by establishing that international armed conflict is 
concerned with the use of force between combatants.  If an individual is not a lawful 
combatant he or she cannot be involved in armed conflict. 
 
The difficulty with the majority of the definitions canvassed so far is that they convey 
more about what armed conflict is not than how an armed conflict can be recognised, 
except that international armed conflict at least, is engaged in by combatants.  Neither 
do the definitions articulate the degree of force that must be used to constitute an 
armed conflict, an issue clearly relevant to a modern understanding of armed conflict 
despite rejection of this position by the ICRC.   Is intensity or purpose of the conflict 
relevant?  The acid test is whether a definition of armed conflict can be used to 
understand the legal status of events such as the deployment of troops to East Timor 
under the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and actions against Aideed in 
down-town Mogadishu by the United Task Force (UNITAF) in 1993.  These are the 
types of situation that UN peacekeepers may increasingly be required to analyse, 
although both these examples were faced by multinational rather than blue helmet 
operations. 
 
The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
provided a definition when it was required to determine what constituted an armed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
British army of the time: Addington, L. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. (Second 
ed.1994) at 7. 
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conflict in the course of the trial of Dusco Tadic.39  In its Decision on the 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (October 2, 1995), the Appeals Chamber defined 
an armed conflict as existing: 
 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.  International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of 
such conflict and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general 
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved.  Until that moment, international [humanitarian] law continues 
to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party whether or not actual combat 
takes place there.40 
 
This test attempts to clarify when international humanitarian law applies and also 
when armed conflict begins and ends.  As pointed out above, peacekeepers in such a 
situation would not be a party to the conflict and therefore would still be required to 
apply international human rights law themselves while receiving the benefits of 
protected status under international humanitarian law.  
 
Despite an apparent shift towards a qualitative assessment of the force required to 
amount to armed conflict, Jinks argues that the identification of a requirement for 
protracted armed violence in Tadic is no more than an affirmative restatement of the 
Protocol II requirement that the violence be more than merely sporadic or limited to 
                                                          
39 The Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 
Appeals Chamber, (2 October 1995). 
40 See also Zwanenburg, M. “UN Deployments in the Crossfire”. International Peacekeeping. (July – 
October 1999). at 128. This dictum goes against the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. 
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rioting.41  In other words the insertion into the definition of a requirement for the 
violence to be protracted does not take understanding of the threshold of armed 
conflict further than Protocol II. 
 
The test laid out in the Tadic case appears to have influenced the drafting of the Statue 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as at Article 8(2)(f) the statute identifies 
internal armed conflict as follows: 
 
…armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted 
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or 
between such groups.42 
 
The advantage of the ICC definition is that it caters for situations where armed 
conflict is occurring between a State or organised armed groups operating across State 
borders. 
 
These definitions lead to an understanding that armed conflict exists, and therefore 
that humanitarian law must be applied, when there are two or more parties using 
armed force against one another.    The nature of the arms is not specified but must 
presumably be capable of doing violence to a human being.   The violence or force 
must be more than isolated acts of violence, however intense, and when not of an 
international character, must be protracted violence against the government of the 
State or between parties.   Protracted violence means that the violence must be more 
than something in the nature of riots or sporadic unrest.  It appears that the purpose of 
                                                          
41 Jinks, D. The Temporal Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law to Contemporary 
Conflicts http://www.ihlresearch.org/portal/ihli/Session3.pdf (3 Mar 2003). 
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the violence or conflict is not relevant except with regard to defining whether the 
conflict is an internal or external conflict, an issue which will be addressed separately 
in this chapter.   
 
The definitions of armed conflict that appear in the conventions and cases have made 
little progress in clearly defining what armed conflict is.  Even where situations 
appear to fit into the definitions the reality of State practice means that situations 
which may be argued to fit at the penumbra of the definitions of armed conflict, such 
as “Waco,” are not considered by either the State or the international community to be 
armed conflict. 
 
This state of affairs is not helpful to peacekeepers who must deal with practical 
situations on the ground.   An alternative definition must be found to properly 
describe the threshold of armed conflict.   
 
Schmitt argues that the underlying purpose of humanitarian law is to protect certain 
people, places and things from injury, suffering, death, damage or destruction.   These 
effects must be intended or foreseeable and more than merely sporadic and isolated 
incidents.43   This approach seems to give a much more practical starting point to 
develop a working definition that peacekeepers can use to identify their status in the 
field.   
 
In 1998 The Armed Conflict Report of Project Ploughshares defined armed conflict in 
a different way from that seen in the Conventions, ICTY and ICC.  It defined it as: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
42 Statue of the International Criminal Court.  
43 Above n 27 at 373-374. 
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a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one 
State (or one or more factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the State), and 
in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by fighting during the course of the 
conflict.44 
 
The project makes it clear that the armed conflict is considered to have commenced 
when the first person dies but cannot be identified until the 1,000 person’s death is 
attributed to the conflict.  This definition recognises the purpose of the combat, 
political control of a State or territory and the intensity of the conflict measured in 
deaths.  This approach is certainly more helpful in eliminating minor border 
incursions and so on that are not as a matter of practice seen as armed conflicts but 
would otherwise fit into the formal definitions.  However, the selection of a number of 
deaths seems arbitrary and unhelpful. 
 
A similar approach to the problem of finding a workable definition of armed conflict 
has been taken by Wallensteen and Sollenberg in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project.45  
They developed a more complex test to identify armed conflict based on a number of 
elements: 
 
An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a State, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. 
 
                                                          
44 Regehr, E. The Armed Conflict Report. Project Ploughshares. 
http://ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/ACR98.html (1 May 2003). 
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This definition, though rather complex and requiring its own interpretation, comes far 
closer than its predecessors in providing practical guidance.  Again it suffers from the 
inclusion in the definition of an arbitrary number of deaths with no evidence of a 
rational explanation for the choice of figure.   The most striking difference between 
both the Ploughshares Project and the Uppsala Data Project and the previous 
definitions of armed conflict is the inclusion of motive and intensity.  It should be 
noted that the use of intensity as a guide to defining armed conflict was expressly 
rejected as an element by the ICRC.46   
 
One of the difficulties with using the number of deaths as a guide to intensity is that it 
creates difficulty at the commencement of an operation.  While situations may 
certainly change and develop, it is best for planners to know what situation they are 
going to be working in.  If an operation begins on the basis that it is not a party to an 
armed conflict and then the death count rises to a level that means that it has been in 
an armed conflict from commencement, this creates confusion and practical 
difficulties if people have been for example, arrested, tried and so on.  Therefore, 
while intensity may have a valid place in helping to determine the legal status of 
armed conflict, to relate intensity to a body count is unlikely to prove a practical 
approach.  Intensity may be a useful guide to identifying an armed conflict by a better 
approach may be to define levels of intensity by relating it to the weapons or 
munitions and their frequency of use in the conflict. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
45 Wallensteen, P and Sollenberg, M. “Armed Conflict 1989-2000”, Journal of Peace Research 38(5): 
629-644 (2001). 
46 Sandoz, Y, Swinarski, C and Zimmerman, B. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. (1987) at 62. 
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Another option that may be available for use in identifying whether an armed conflict 
exists is to examine the motive behind the violence.  The advantage of the inclusion of 
a motive to seize territory or political dominance in the definition is that it can 
distinguish between the Waco type of situation and situations that are genuinely 
deserving of recognition as armed conflicts.  The combination of armed force and 
motive seem to create powerful claims to inclusion in any definition but there are 
other elements that need to be included to provide a workable definition for use by 
peacekeepers. 
 
Acknowledgement or otherwise of the status of a situation as an armed conflict by one 
or all of the parties was expressly deemed irrelevant by the Conventions, ICRC and 
Greenwood definitions.  This approach should remain as an integral part of the 
definition as highlighted by the decades of conflict in Northern Ireland.   The 
approach taken over many years by the UK government to the troubles in Northern 
Ireland was that it was involved in the suppression of criminal organisations.  Despite 
protest to the contrary and some sympathy (not to mention funding) from the Irish 
Diaspora, particularly from the USA, the international community refused to 
recognise an armed conflict.47     
 
Under the definitions of armed conflict addressed above the euphemistically named 
‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland can be argued to qualify as an armed conflict.  
Specifcally there could be an argument made out that the troubles were an 
international armed conflict against colonial domination by operation of Protocol I, 
article 1(4).  However, until recently there was no international recognition that an 
                                                          
47 See for example, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/ira.html 
(22 Aug 2005): US Navy http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/ira.htm (22 Aug 2005). 
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armed conflict had been taking place, presumably in order to avoid embarrassment to 
or confrontation with the UK government.48  Even in determining issues of law in 
relation to the treatment of detainees the court that was appealed to was the European 
Court of Human Rights that dealt with the case on the basis of international human 
rights law not humanitarian law.49  This political dimension to the identification of 
armed conflict is one that peacekeepers must be prepared for but should not influence 
the legal definition of the situation into which they have been inserted.   Further 
development of a workable definition of armed conflict must remain a purely and 
expressly objective approach. 
 
Cartledge’s50 contribution to the debate of a definition of armed conflict adopted a 
motive based approach of a political character.  This definition states that: 
 
International armed conflict exists when there are official military or paramilitary 
forces performing acts of war in apparent furtherance of their government’s policy, 
and that government or the government of any country against which the acts are 
being perpetrated acknowledges that armed conflict is taking place. 
   
There are a number of problems with this definition.  First there is the mixing of the 
terms war and armed conflict.  In this definition the term armed conflict effectively 
rests on performance of acts of war.  War is not defined but one definition offered by 
The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary is ‘a specific conflict’.  This part of the 
definition is therefore circuitous.  The second issue of considerable concern is the 
                                                          
48 UN Press Release. “Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to Visit Northern 
Ireland. (14 December 2000): see also Karhilo, J. “Armed Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook (1999) at chapter 2. 
49 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Series A, No.3. 
50 Cartledge, G. The Soldiers Dilemma: When to Use Force in Australia. (1992) at 165 n 1. 
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requirement for the State party against which hostilities are perpetrated to 
acknowledge that armed conflict is taking place.  This requirement is a reflection of 
common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions but is one which the ICRC 
Commentary was at pains to interpret as not requiring either party to acknowledge.  
 
The danger of an interpretation requiring a party to acknowledge there is a state of 
armed conflict is that it could allow States wishing to avoid the implementation of 
international humanitarian law to do so by the simple expedient of refusing to 
acknowledge its existence.  Subsequent definitions of armed conflict in the Protocols, 
ICC Statute, Tadic and Nicaragua have avoided imposing this requirement thereby 
leaving the threshold of international humanitarian law as an objective determination 
on the facts rather than at the mercy of political expedience.  
 
Cartledge does rely on motive as an element determinative of when the threshold has 
been crossed.  Motive as an element is represented by the cause or reason for the 
armed conflict, in this definition “the furtherance of government policy.”   This 
motive based definition distinguishes between internal conflict and the accidental shot 
across the border.  The method by which a State’s policy is furthered is through an 
official military or paramilitary organisation rather than a legitimate police force or 
crime fighting agency.  Therefore in this definition armed conflict is distinguished 
from policing actions. 
 
Although these definitions of armed conflict provide guidance they do not provide an 
adequate method for peacekeepers to identify a situation into which they are being 
inserted or recognising situations when they themselves have stepped over the 
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threshold into armed conflict.  A definition of armed conflict has to be developed that 
can allow peacekeepers to make a judgement on the law to be applied with a 
reasonable level of confidence that the decision is one that can be justified both on the 
international stage and if necessary in the domestic court room. 
 
There are a number of elements that can be taken from the definitions set out above 
that can be combined to provide a practical guide to the legal environment.  First, 
there appears to be agreement that armed conflict must involve the use of force or 
violence through the application of weaponry capable of taking human life.  The 
weaponry does not have to be conventional.  For example, computer network attack 
that directly results in injury, death, damage or destruction can be categorised as an 
armed attack.51  Save for the situations envisaged by Protocol I, article 1(4), in 
international armed conflict the application of force must be by the representatives or 
citizens of one State against those of another.   There needs to be some way of 
distinguishing activities such as criminal activities, which are not intended and do not 
as a matter of State practice fall under international humanitarian law, and those 
activities which should properly be defined as armed conflict.    
 
Although Protocol II sets out to make this distinction in internal armed conflict by 
excluding criminal activities such as riots and isolated and sporadic violence, the 
analysis of the Waco incident demonstrates the inadequacy of the Protocol II 
approach because it fails to distinguish between domestic law enforcement that is 
protracted and properly dealt with under the domestic laws of the State and an internal 
armed conflict to which international humanitarian law should apply.  There is a 
                                                          
51 Above n 27. 
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danger that without a more certain definition the potency and efficacy of international 
humanitarian law will be diluted by so broad or indistinct a definition that it becomes 
easy for a State to ignore it. 
 
An element that could be inserted into a definition of armed conflict is that it is 
conducted by a group that has as an end political dominance over a State or territory 
within a State or States and attempts to gain it through force.  This element would 
seem to meet the requirement and would certainly distinguish between a Waco type 
situation and universally recognised armed conflicts such as those in the former 
Yugoslavia identified by the ICTY in Tadic.  Politically motivated groups committing 
random acts of violence to instil fear in the population to achieve certain political 
goals would not fit into this definition because their motive is not political dominance 
over a State but to change the policy of the existing order.    
 
However, there may be violence on such a scale that it does reach the threshold in 
circumstances where international humanitarian law should properly apply.  The 
Ploughshares and Uppsala projects recognised this problem and determined that a 
more explicit reference to intensity was required in a definition of armed conflict, 
although their representation of this element in terms of a body count seems a rather 
crude approach.    
 
Protocol II identifies intensity in terms of the spacing of violent acts.  Sporadic 
violence such as riots and disturbances are not armed conflict.  This point was taken 
in Tadic to mean that violence had to be prolonged.  The requirement for the violence 
to be prolonged is not applied in international armed conflict as demonstrated by the 
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Six Day War between Egypt and Israel in 1967.   Protocol II and the Tadic decisions 
relate only to definitions of internal armed conflict and illustrated the difficulties in 
determining when an armed conflict is occurring.      
 
If defining intensity in terms of the number of deaths directly related to the conflict is 
arbitrary and unhelpful, what other means are there of determining the intensity of the 
conflict?  One approach might be an examination of the weapon systems used.  Where 
light arms and skirmishes are involved there might be the prelude to armed conflict 
but more often as a matter of practice such encounters are ignored.  Even where field 
artillery is used the situation may not amount to armed conflict as is the case in 
Kashmir and Jammu where despite skirmishes between the armed forces and the 
exchange of artillery fire between Pakistan and Indian, they are not considered to be 
engaged in an armed conflict but in a state of cease-fire monitored by the United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.52  Similarly the attacks by US 
fighter jets on Libya in 1986 did not put the US and Libya into a state of armed 
conflict despite the devastating effect of the use of hi-tech weapons platforms.53  In 
such circumstances, as with the Lockerbie plane bombing, for which Libya has 
accepted State responsibility, other international law provisions apply.54 
 
Another possibility is to look at the preparedness of a party to the conflict to target 
and in general treat as combatants or military objectives people, places and things 
associated with the other party.  This would result in an element of the definition 
                                                          
52 Centre for Policy Analysis http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unmogip.html 
(22 Aug 2005). 
53 Schafer, B. “The U.S. Air Raid on Libya in April 1986 – A Confidential Soviet Account from the 
Stasi Archives” www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_5/texts/intro_schaefer.pdf. (22 Aug 2005).   
54 Gomes, J.G. Public International Law 
http://www.geocities.com/kjgomes.geo/Personal_International_Law.doc (22 Aug 2005). 
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being the interaction of the parties as combatants.  The problem with this approach is 
that it is somewhat circuitous as it is the state of armed conflict that permits the 
existence of combatants in the first place.  The approach could be improved by an 
objective assessment that the parties are behaving as combatants and adopting the 
Protocol II55 approach of the parties’ organisation, command structure and 
compliance with the laws of armed conflict as indicative of their combatant status.  
The definition would then partly be that ‘at least one party which is organised in such 
a way as to engage in combat in accordance with the laws of armed conflict and has 
commenced targeting military objectives.’ 
 
Difficulties are also encountered with this approach; very often armed conflict and in 
particular internal armed conflict, is characterised by a failure to observe the laws of 
armed conflict.56  Even where protagonists in the conflict are recognised State 
military forces, the observance of the laws of armed conflict may not provide a 
meaningful basis for defining the conflict, as was graphically illustrated by the 
massacres associated with the policies of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.   
The problem remains, how does an impartial observer identify from the behaviour of 
parties that the intensity of the conflict is such as to cross the Rubicon into armed 
conflict?   
 
Since 1945 there have been numerous internationally recognised armed conflicts 
ranging across a broad spectrum of conflict based activities.  At one end of the scale, 
where the fact of armed conflict is unambiguous, there are the conflicts such as the 
Korean War, the Six Day War, the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, the First and 
                                                          
55 Article 1 Protocol II. 
56 The murder of civilian Muslim men at Srebrenica for example during the Balkans War. 
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Second Gulf Wars.  At the other end there are the predominately internal conflicts 
such as that in Northern Ireland, the pre-independence conflict between the 
independence movement and the Indonesian government in East Timor and the 
sporadic violence against the Philippine authorities.  The intensity of the six 
international armed conflicts identified did not appear to be relevant to the fact that a 
state of armed conflict existed.  The Falklands War for example, began with minimal 
resistance from the Royal Marine detachment at that time serving on the islands.  It 
seems then that in the search for a meaningful definition of armed conflict there is no 
place for intensity, despite the apparent attractiveness of such a course, because there 
are numerous examples of armed conflicts that have commenced with little or no 
bloodshed.57   
 
The search for a meaningful definition of armed conflict has led this work to identify 
the need for the elements of application of force and motive to be present in any 
useful definition.  Although the element of intensity of conflict seemed appealing it 
has been rejected as not warranting development beyond that already set out in 
Protocol II due to a review of factual situations that have been recognised 
internationally as armed conflict but that have not involved a level of intensity 
sufficient to pass the identified bench mark of Article 1(2) Protocol II.  It seems that it 
is not the level of intensity that is of concern in international armed conflict but the 
violation of sovereignty through force of arms.  Similarly in internal armed conflict 
the level of intensity must be such as to go beyond that which is consistent with the 
ability of the sovereign State to deal with under its national legal framework.  An 
                                                          
57  Ziegler, D. W. War, Peace, and International Politics. (7th ed. 1997). 
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approach to defining armed conflict which recognises the capacity of the State to deal 
with the situation therefore seems logical.   
 
It is suggested that a divergence in the definitions of internal and international armed 
conflict requires the insertion of an element of State capacity into each definition.  For 
international armed conflict the element should be to the effect that there has been a 
violation of sovereignty through force of arms that exceeds isolated or sporadic 
attacks accepted by the parties and the international community as not amounting to 
armed conflict.  The key here is State control of the situation.  If any party or the 
international community consider attacks to amount to armed conflict then under the 
extant principles underlying international law58 it must be so.   This does not leave a 
void; individuals and their property remain protected by international human rights 
law as well as other provisions of international law as demonstrated by the Lockerbie 
compensation determination.  International humanitarian law should be utilised when 
it is needed, not squandered in debate over its application that only muddy the waters 
and dissipate its effectiveness. 
 
Internal armed conflict needs more than merely the use of arms, the example of the 
Waco massacre highlights this point.  In addition to the Protocol II exemptions a more 
positive approach is warranted that sees internal armed conflict as occurring when the 
State is no longer able to contain armed revolt or armed attacks through the primary 
use of its non military assets such as police.  Waco style situations are distinguished in 
this element as although military assets were deployed they remained under the 
primary control of the civil authorities.  In an Australian context this type of situation 
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may have been dealt with under the provisions of the Defence Act 1903 which 
provides for the use of the military in Defence Force Aid to the Civilian Authorities 
(DFACA).59  DFACA is a totally separate situation from a response by the military to 
an internal armed conflict. The use of force by the military in DFACA is controlled by 
legislation and the operation of Australian criminal law if required60 and there is no 
suggestion of the application of the provisions applicable to internal armed conflict.   
 
New definitions of armed conflict 
 
As a result of this analysis two definitions of armed conflict can be suggested.  Firstly 
a definition of international armed conflict: 
 
An international armed conflict exists where a State or States use armed force, or 
attack capability, for political or territorial purposes against the people or interests of 
another State or States and such armed force or attack is more than merely sporadic or 
isolated.   
 
Armed force is sporadic and isolated when it amounts only to the occasional 
exchange of fire or isolated raid and is accepted to fall short of the threshold of armed 
conflict by all parties and the international community.  The international community 
is deemed to include the UN and ICRC.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
58 Based on the premise that international law requires the consent of the State to be bound by it and 
therefore a degree of pragmatism on issues of when States are subject to international law must be 
recognised. See for example Dixon, M. Textbook on International Law. (2000) at 14-19. 
59 Section 51 Defence Act 1903. 
60 For example, a member of the Defence Force using force in accordance with s51T is subject to the 
criminal law if the use of force is excessive or unlawful in the circumstances. 
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This definition recognises the role that sovereignty and political reality play in 
situations where occasional armed force is used.  Isolated and sporadic use of armed 
force remains a breach of the UN Charter and, if damage or injury is caused, also of 
international human rights law so that a system of protection is maintained.  Protocol 
I, article 1(4) applies to extend this definition to include situations covered in the 
article. 
 
Secondly, the definition of internal armed conflict: 
 
Internal armed conflict exists when there is systematic, organised armed violence 
within a State aimed at obtaining political change or territorial independence of, or 
political control over, all or part of the State, and the State is no longer able to contain 
armed revolt or armed attacks through the primary use of its civil assets such as 
civilian police. 
 
Again in this definition the State is recognised as having the primary responsibility to 
deal with cases of domestic violence.  Under this definition the Toxteth riots and 
Waco do not amount to internal armed conflict while the conflict in the Philippines 
and the independence movement in   Aceh61 can be identified as armed conflicts that 
require the application of international humanitarian law. The situation in Northern 
Ireland may still be open to debate.  There was certainly considerable involvement of 
the armed forces in Northern Ireland for many years62 but the prime responsibility 
remained with the Irish police and the Ulster Constabulary.  In all other respects the 
conflict meets the definition of internal armed conflict.  The situation in Northern 
                                                          
61  Aceh would be armed conflict as the Army have prime control not the civilian authorities. 
62 Weale, A. Secret Warfare: Special Operations Forces from the Great Game to the SAS. (1997). 
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Ireland cannot amount to an international armed conflict despite terrorist cells 
allegedly operating from across the border as they do not meet the criteria set out in 
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. 
 
Distinguishing internal from international  
 
Having developed a test that is capable of identifying the threshold for the application 
of international humanitarian law in both international and internal armed conflict, it 
is necessary to determine when a conflict is internal and when it is international.   
 
While it is vitally important for peacekeepers to be able to identify when they have 
passed the threshold into armed conflict, (that is when they have become involved in 
the armed conflict rather than an impartial force) they must also be able to identify 
whether they have been inserted into an internal armed conflict or an international 
armed conflict.  This is important not just for the activities that can be undertaken as 
parties to the conflict but also what may be done for example, with persons taken into 
custody.  In an international armed conflict combatants may be held as prisoners of 
war and must be returned at the conclusion of hostilities.63  In an internal armed 
conflict there is no such provision and combatants may well find themselves dealt 
with under the State’s extant legislation64 if they are not granted an amnesty, a matter 
                                                          
63 Geneva Convention III of 12 August 1949, supplemented by Protocol I of 1977 regulates the 
treatment of prisoners of war. 
64 Article 6 Protocol II of 1977: See also the Criminal Code Act (Cwlth) 1995 which provides for the 
crimes committed in both international and non international armed conflict to be dealt with by 
domestic courts in the federal jurisdiction.  This act also creates certain offences against peacekeepers 
and peacekeeping operations. 
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which is wholly at the discretion of the authorities in power, regardless of an 
obligation to ‘endeavour’ to grant amnesty.65 
 
In UN peacekeeping the issue of whether there is an international or internal armed 
conflict is even more complicated than it might on the face of it appear.  Certainly in 
circumstances where the force is as a matter of fact and law engaged in an armed 
conflict there will be combatants from several States involved thus giving the 
appearance of an international armed conflict.  However, if the State has collapsed 
and the exceptional, although not uncommon situation that the UN holds 
sovereignty66 on behalf of the people until they can exercise their Charter right of self 
determination, then the conflict may be open to classification as an internal conflict.67  
This would apply equally to a situation where the UN was acting on the request of the 
lawful government of the State.68   
 
The issue of when a conflict is internal or external has been raised with the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case69 and in a number of cases 
before the ICTY70.   In the Nicaragua Case the ICJ ruled that the test for international 
armed conflict through agency was one of dependence and control.  This test was 
developed in the Nicaragua Case to assess the USA’s level of responsibility for 
                                                          
65 Article 6(5) Protocol II of 1977. 
66 As has been the case in Namibia, Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo. 
67 In the Congo the UN force acted as if it were involved in an international armed conflict and applied 
the Geneva Conventions, treating detainees as Prisoners of War under GCIII: Dorn, A.W. and Bell, 
D.J. “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64” International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1995) at 12. 
68 States are at liberty to request support from other States; Jennings, R and Watts, A (eds) 
Oppenheim’s International Law (ninth ed, 1996) at 1154-1155.   
69 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), Nicaragua 
v United States, ICJ Reports (1986) at 14-546. 
70 For example see Prosecutor v Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo (Celebici), Trial Chamber 
Judgement, 16 November 1998, Case No. IT-96-21-T: The Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeal Chamber 
Judgement, 15 July 1999, Case No. IT-94-1 and The Prosecutor v Rajic, Review of the Indictment 
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violations of humanitarian law committed by the Contra rebels who were found as a 
matter of fact to have been supplied by the USA but not controlled by it sufficiently 
for State responsibility to attach to the USA for their activities. 
 
The ICTY determined that the agency test developed by the ICJ was not an 
appropriate test to be used in the cases of individuals, who were liable to prosecution 
for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions if the conflict was characterised as an 
international armed conflict.71  The ICTY applied a more liberal test in Rajic72 finding 
that the agency test should amount only to ‘general political and military control’ by a 
foreign State.73   
 
In the Tadic case the ICTY returned to the Nicaragua position finding that it laid 
down the test that there must be ‘dependence on the one side and control on the 
other’.74  This test was seen as having a high threshold for determining the required 
degree of control that the foreign State must have, in other words the foreign State 
would seem to be required to be giving specific orders to bear State responsibility and 
therefore cause the conflict to be characterised as international.75 
 
A year after the decision in Tadic the ICTY rejected the Nicaragua test altogether in 
the Celebici Case on the basis that it was inappropriate to apply a test to individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Pursuant to Rule 61, 13 September 1996, Case No. IT-95-12-R61.  The facts of all these cases 
concerned the commission war crimes by members of the Serbian forces. 
71 Byron, C. “Armed Conflicts: International or Non-International?” Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law. Vol. 6No.1, 63-90, (2001) at 68. 
72 The Prosecutor v Rajic, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 13 September 1996, Case No. 
IT-95-12-R61. 
73 Ibid at para 25. 
74 The Prosecutor v Tadic, Trial Chamber Judgement, 7 May 1997, Case No. IT-94-1-T, at para.585. 
75 Above n 71 at 69. 
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that was intended to establish State responsibility.76  In the Celebici case the ICTY 
found that once Bosnia-Herzegovina was internationally recognised that all activities 
associated with the conflict became international in character and particular incidents 
could not be separate hostilities.77  
 
The ICTY turned again to the Nicaragua test in 1999 finding that there must be 
specific instructions from a foreign State to an individual, organisation, coordination 
or military planning for a group and an:  
 
Assimilation of individuals to State organs on account of their actual behaviour 
within the structure of a State (and regardless of any possible requirement of State 
instructions. 78 
 
Based on the rulings of the ICTY Byron79 identifies five situations that will be 
classified as international armed conflict. These are first, conflicts between two or 
more internationally recognised States. Second, a conflict in one State in which 
another State intervenes. Third, an internal armed conflict may be internationalised by 
participants acting on behalf of another State. Fourth, where an internal armed conflict 
becomes an international armed conflict by the operation of Additional Protocol I it 
being: 
 
                                                          
76 Prosecutor v Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo (Celebici), Trial Chamber Judgement, 16 November 
1998, Case No. IT-96-21-T, para 230. 
77 Ibid at paras 214-5. 
78 The Prosecutor v Tadic, Appeal Chamber Judgement, (15 July 1999), Case No. IT-94-1 at paras130-
141. 
79 Above n 71 at 80-83. 
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Where peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination.80 
 
Finally, it has been argued by Byron that where a State requests the assistance of 
another State in quelling rebel forces the conflict may become an international armed 
conflict if the request is not genuine or made by individuals or parties not legally 
capable of making the request.  In civil war Byron points out that it may be argued 
that no authority is competent to request foreign intervention and therefore an 
international armed conflict results if foreign States intervene.81   
 
Planners of UN operations must be clear before orders can be written regarding the 
actions to be taken with arrested persons as to whether they are involved in an internal 
or international armed conflict.  Issues of jurisdiction between international and 
national courts could arise in international armed conflict.  Detainees have a right to 
be advised on what basis they are being detained and the basis will be quite different, 
as will the rights and obligations, between a criminal detention and prisoners of war. 
 
Muddying the waters 
 
This work argues that there is a clear threshold that must be crossed for international 
humanitarian law to apply and until and unless that threshold, armed conflict, has 
been crossed it does not apply.  Any ambiguity lies in determining where the 
threshold lies not in which law should apply once it has been crossed. In this work 
some fresh definitions have been suggested in an attempt to assist in clarifying when 
                                                          
80 Article 1(4) Protocol I of 1977. 
81 Above n 71.  
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the threshold into armed conflict has been crossed.   Where UN peacekeeping is 
concerned the waters have been muddied by two quite separate publications.  The first 
of these is the Secretary-General’s Bulletin82 and the second is the argument by 
Michael Kelly regarding the use in peacekeeping of the Fourth Geneva Convention.   
The Bulletin 
Secretary General Kofi Annan attempted to deliver some clarity regarding the legal 
framework within which peacekeeping was to be conducted where armed force was to 
be used as part of the peacekeeping process. 
 
To date it has been generally, although not universally, accepted that the UN is not 
capable of being a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.83 However, in 
appropriate circumstances a military contingent would be bound by the Conventions 
to the extent that the contributing State is bound.84  In operations not amounting to 
armed conflict, or where the UN force is not a party to the conflict, the provisions of 
the Conventions or customary international humanitarian law, which apply to parties 
to an armed conflict, do not apply to a UN force monitoring the situation or providing 
humanitarian assistance.85   
 
Application of the laws of armed conflict. The issue of whether the UN can be bound 
by the laws of armed conflict is an important one and central to determining which 
                                                          
82 Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian 
Law. ST/SGB/1999/13 (6 August 1999).  Entered into force 12 August 1999. 
83 Palwankar, U. “Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping 
Forces” International Review of the Red Cross. No 294, 227-240, (30 June 1993) at 228. 
84 Stephens, D. “The Lawful Use of Force by Peacekeeping Forces: The tactical Imperative” 
International Peacekeeping Vol.12, No.2 (Summer 2005) at 161: Roberts, A and Guelff, R. Documents 
on the Laws of War. (Third ed,, 2001) at 723: Greenwood, C. “International Humanitarian Law and 
United Nations Military Operations” Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law. Vol.1 (1998) at 17-
19. 
85 Above n 84 Greenwood at 28. 
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legal framework applies to collapsed State peacekeeping operations.  As noted above, 
the UN cannot be a party to the Conventions and treaties that make up the laws of 
armed conflict.  The issuing of the Bulletin was cited by Roberts and Guelff86 as a 
means of clarifying to what extent UN peacekeeping forces are bound by the 
customary laws of armed conflict.  UN forces have been required to observe the 
“principles and spirit” as a result of directions to UN forces by the Secretary-General, 
regulations pertaining to specific operations and, since 1993, through the status-of-
forces agreements concluded with contingents.87  The matter appeared to be settled 
with the 1994 UN Convention on the Safety of the UN and Associated Personnel, 
Article 2(2) of which states that the law of international armed conflict applies to 
enforcement actions under Chapter VII in international armed conflicts in which any 
of the UN personnel are engaged as combatants. 
 
There has been considerable debate regarding the extent of the obligation on UN 
forces to comply with international humanitarian law although many commentators 
agree that the customary international law aspects of the laws of armed bind the UN.88 
 
Greenwood argued that despite the requirement for at least one party to an 
international armed conflict to be a State other parties possessing at least de facto 
international status may be subject to customary international law.89  He noted that 
augments have been raised over the ability of the UN to become involved in armed 
                                                          
86 Roberts, A and Guelff, R., above n 83.  
87 Ibid at 722-723. 
88 See for example, Zwanenburg, M. “The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United 
Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law: Some Preliminary Observations”. International 
Peacekeeping. (July 1999 – October 1999) at 134: McCoubrey, H. and White, N. The Blue Helmets: 
Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations. (1996) at 157-158.  
89 Above n 83 at 7: In the Advisory Opinions on Reparations, ICJ Rep. (1949), 174 at 179 the ICJ 
determined that the UN is “a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights 
and duties.” 
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conflict as its role is that of law-enforcer rather than belligerent.  However, 
Greenwood concluded that armed conflict is a matter of fact and if, as a matter of fact, 
the UN becomes a party to an armed conflict then the nature of its motive is 
irrelevant.   Once there is a state of armed conflict then international humanitarian law 
applies regardless of the nature of the parties.  It would also be illogical if one side 
could benefit from and be bound by the laws of armed conflict while the other side 
was not.90  Greenwood therefore concluded that UN forces are bound by customary 
international humanitarian law if as a matter of fact such forces become involved in 
armed conflict. 
 
Bowett also argued that regardless of the jus ad bellum and the legal status of the 
opponent, once UN forces are engaged in armed conflict then the full force of 
customary international humanitarian law applies to them.91  McCoubrey and White, 
while agreeing that customary international humanitarian law will apply to UN forces 
engaged in armed conflict, make the point that beyond the core principles there may 
not necessarily be universal agreement of what constitutes customary international 
humanitarian law.92 
 
Whether universally accepted as being subject to customary international law or not, 
the events surrounding the UN operation in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 raised 
questions over the clarity and understanding of the rules to be applied by UN 
peacekeepers.93   The Bulletin was preceded by a number of ad hoc statements on the 
state of the law in relation to particular operations and considerable lobbying by the 
                                                          
90 Ibid at 14. 
91 Bowett, D.W. United Nations Forces. (1964) at 496. 
92 Above n 88,, McCoubrey and White at 159. 
93 Above n 86 at 724. 
 337
ICRC.94  The ICRC called for UN peacekeeping forces to be more explicitly bound by 
humanitarian provisions.95  The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping requested 
the Secretary-General to; 
 
“complete the elaboration of a code of conduct for United Nations peacekeeping 
personnel, consistent with applicable international humanitarian law, so as to ensure 
the highest standards of performance and conduct”.96 
 
There seems to be implicit in this request an understanding that international 
humanitarian law did apply to UN peacekeeping operations but that it needed to be 
specifically articulated in the form of a code.   
 
A draft of the ‘code’ was presented by the ICRC to the Secretary-General and 
following negotiations and consultation with members of the Security Council the 
Bulletin was issued in 1999.97  The Bulletin was intended: 
 
to set out the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations 
command and control.98   
 
It is only applicable to UN commanded forces99 and therefore did not apply to forces 
under national command such as the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) 
or the NATO led forces in the former Yugoslavia. 
                                                          
94 Above n 83. Palwankar provides an analysis of the statements and the position of the ICRC prior to 
the Bulletin of 1999. 
95 Above n 88 Zwanenberg  at 133. 
96 UN document A/50/230 of June 1995, at para 73. 
97 Secretary-General Bulletin ST/SGB/1999/13 6 August 1999. 
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The Bulletin is uncontentious with regard to the statements of the humanitarian law 
that it covers, although it expressly states that it does not cover the field with regard to 
the principles and rules binding military forces.100  The issues that are expressly 
covered, based upon the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, are the 
protection of the civilian population, means and methods of combat, treatment of 
civilians in the context of non-combatants, treatment of detained persons101 and 
protection of the wounded, the sick, medical and relief personnel.  It does not attempt 
to deal with the contentious terminology of the Additional Protocols, to have done so 
would have been to lose the support of the USA at the very least.  While the issues 
themselves are not contentious, Zwanenberg complains that many of the rules do 
cause a conflict with the UN Safety Convention because the convention does not 
contemplate a situation in which members of the UN are armed and may be required 
to use armed force.102  This complaint is however itself inconsistent with the UN 
Charter which clearly contemplated the use of force by the UN in Chapter VII and 
Article 2(2) of the Convention itself which expressly refers to UN combatants.   
 
While the international humanitarian law areas that are covered are uncontentious the 
“field of application” is troubling.  In section 1.1 the Bulletin states that the principles 
set out: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
98 Above n 97 preamble. 
99 Above n 95 at 136. 
100 Above n 97 at section 3. 
101 In dealing with detained persons the Bulletin avoids granting prisoner of war status under this 
category but does rely upon the Geneva Convention thus creating a contradiction where the UN is not a 
combatant. Above n  95 at 137. 
102 Above n 95 at 136-139. 
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are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are 
actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their 
engagement.  They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping 
operations when the use of force is permitted in self defence.  
 
The first part of this statement is not in issue.  It is perfectly reasonable that UN forces 
should be subject to humanitarian law, and specifically the Geneva Conventions when 
acting as combatants in an armed conflict.  What is of significant concern is the 
implication that when acting in self-defence members of a UN force could be acting 
as combatants.   If members of the military contingent come under attack then they 
are entitled to use such force as is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances to 
defend themselves.  The force used in self defence must be proportionate to the threat 
faced.103  The form of the rules of engagement controlling the use of force in self 
defence for UN peacekeepers has been substantially similar to the force that may be 
used in most common law States by an ordinary person responding to an attack in the 
street.  On a literal reading of the application of the Bulletin, where an individual 
soldier is attacked, for the period that force is being used to repel the attack, the 
peacekeeper is engaged in armed conflict.  This is inconsistent with even the most 
liberal definitions of armed conflict. 
 
If one or two individuals attack an individual peacekeeper or even a small group of 
peacekeepers, armed conflict simply cannot be made out.  If on the other hand an 
                                                          
103 This is a standard formulation of self defence used by contingents as part of the rules of 
engagement.  For example the Orders for Opening Fire under the UNTAET PKF Individual Guidance 
on the Use of Force stated: 
 
... You have the right to use the MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY up to and  
including deadly force FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME NECESSARY in defence of  
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organised group of belligerents’ conduct repeated and sustained armed attacks against 
a peacekeeping unit then the Tadic requirement for protracted armed violence 
between organised groups, even though one is acting in self defence, may be made 
out.   
 
By failing to further define what was intended in terms of the level of self-defence 
required to trigger its provisions and by introducing conflict with the Safety 
Convention, the Bulletin is effectively introducing a further blurring of the situation 
from a legal perspective.  Rather than a clarification of when to apply humanitarian 
law, peacekeepers are left in considerable doubt in the very situations when guidance 
is most required.  The fact that the Bulletin does not apply to non-UN commanded 
peacekeeping operations only goes to further muddy the waters.  As national 
contingents are responsible for implementing any disciplinary actions arising from the 
breaches of the rules,104 it is suggested that prosecutions are far more likely to occur 
on the basis of individual national codes than on the basis of a UN rule.  From a 
practical perspective given the lack of clarity surrounding its application contingents 
are unlikely to have the Bulletin embedded into their national disciplinary codes and 
in any event, the substance of it should already be present due to ratification of the 
Conventions and customary international law. 
 
The Fourth Geneva Convention.  
 
The second area where the waters have been muddied with regard to the applicable 
legal framework in peacekeeping operations is in relation to the application of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
yourself, your unit, other UN personnel and those it is your duty to  
protect. 
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Fourth Geneva Convention.  By tracing the history of the law of occupation and the 
current thinking on the topic Michael Kelly105 weaves an interesting argument for the 
application de jure of the laws of occupation, found primarily in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, to peacekeeping in collapsed States.  This assertion springs from 
an interpretation of the word ‘occupation’ in article 2, an article common to all four of 
the Geneva Conventions.  The relevant section of the article reads: 
 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance.106 
 
The difficulty with this definition of occupation is that on the face of it a situation of 
occupation may occur without the threshold into armed conflict, and therefore 
international humanitarian law, having been crossed due to an absence of armed 
resistance.  However, as Kelly himself points out107, the drafters of the 1949 
conventions had in mind the advance through Europe of the German army which on 
occasions met with little or no resistance.  Yet to consider that the annexation of 
States such as Poland amounted to something other than a situation to which 
international humanitarian law should apply fails common sense.  The occupation of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Denmark was by force of arms even though little or no 
meaningful resistance was put up.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
104 Above n 84 Stephens at 160. 
105 Above n 3. 
106 ICRC The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. (1997) at 23,51,75,153.  The Wall Advisory 
Opinion [2004] ICJ (9 July 2004) at para 95 confirmed the application of the Conventions to situations 
where territory has been occupied without armed conflict.  However, it is clear that the Court was 
referring to belligerent occupation rather than foreign troops on the ground simplicita.  
107 Above n 3 at 121-129. 
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Even where there is no resistance, invasion by the armed forces of a foreign State 
meets the criteria suggested in this work for an international armed conflict.  In the 
Second World War armed force was used to control and annex States to Germany.  
The Fourth Geneva Convention deals with occupation as a specialised part of the law 
of armed conflict that is not necessarily synonymous with fighting, though generally it 
is characterised by bloodshed.  With an invasion force present in occupation of the 
State resistance forces may legitimately target the troops on the ground in accordance 
with the laws of armed conflict.108  In such circumstances it is entirely logical for the 
laws of armed conflict to apply.  However, this is wholly different from a situation 
where peacekeepers are present in a State assisting in the reconstruction of that State 
with the express or implied consent of the State. 
 
Kelly argues that the Fourth Convention; 
 
was designed to regulate the relationship between foreign military forces and a civilian 
population where the force exercises the sole authority or is the only agency with the 
capacity to exercise authority in a distinct territory.109 
 
In support of this position Kelly relies on Roberts110 who argued that in every 
situation where military forces of a foreign State control territory that is inhabited, 
there will be application of some or all of the provisions of the laws of occupation. It 
is the position of this work that Kelly and Roberts have attempted to push the law of 
occupation beyond its de jure limits. 
                                                          
108 During the Second World War French Resistance fighters did exactly this often with the support of 
members of the British Special Operations Executive. 
109 Ibid at 149. 
110 Roberts, A. “What is a Military Occupation” 55 British Yearbook of International Law (1984) at 
250.  
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Kelly’s argument that occupation under the Geneva Conventions can include 
peacekeeping situations such as were faced in Somalia, is based on an analysis of the 
law of occupation and its division into belligerent and non-belligerent occupation.   
Kelly traces this development from the 19th century111 and concludes that by 1949 the 
customary law of occupation had divided into belligerent and non-belligerent 
occupation.  The non-belligerent form was:  
 
“a de facto condition founded on the actual presence of a force exercising authority 
over foreign territory and ceased immediately when possession ceased.”112    
 
Such a force in a collapsed State could not assume the same level of authority as a 
belligerent but could enforce temporary measures to re-establish public order and 
safety, including the establishment of temporary tribunals to administer local law. 
 
Kelly points to the experiences of the post World War I occupation in the Rhineland 
as part of the motivation for the provisions to be found in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and asks whether the customary law relating to non-belligerent 
occupations was also taken into account and whether the Conventions extinguished 
non-belligerent occupation.113 
 
Kelly answers this in the affirmative by arguing that the wording of common Article 2 
is to be understood as extending the application of the Conventions to territorial 
                                                          
111 Above n 3 at 111 - 143 
112 Ibid at 140. 
113 Ibid at 143. 
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occupation in the absence of any state of armed conflict.114 The purpose of the 
Conventions is therefore to provide protection for persons finding themselves, for 
whatever reason, in the hands of an Occupying Power.  This includes both belligerent 
occupation and non-belligerent occupation.  
 
There is no definition of occupation in the Geneva Conventions.  The Geneva 
Conventions rely upon the importation of certain definitions from the Hague 
Conventions.115  Occupation is defined in Article 42 annexed to Hague II of 1899 and 
Hague IV of 1907 and remains the extant definition of occupation. It remains extant 
through the operation of Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which 
preserves inter alia Article 42 thus setting it as the definition of occupation 
specifically applicable to the Fourth Geneva Convention.  Article 42 defines 
occupation as follows:  
 
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army.  
 
The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
established, and can be exercised.116  
 
While territory may well be placed under the authority of UN peacekeepers either 
with or without the consent of the parties, it would be inconsistent with the UN 
Charter for a UN force to enter a State as a ‘hostile’ army, other than in a UN 
approved armed conflict.  It has already been established that the guiding principles of 
                                                          
114 Ibid at 151. 
115 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899 
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peacekeeping are consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence. Even 
in Chapter VII operations not amounting to armed conflict the practice has been to 
attempt to establish consent where there is an authority capable of granting it.  These 
principles are inconsistent with the peacekeepers acting as a hostile army.  There is 
also a question as to whom the peacekeepers would be hostile, particularly if it is a 
Chapter VII operation in a collapsed State conducted on the basis of human security. 
 
Even in Somalia, where Kelly clearly asserts that the law of occupation and therefore 
the Fourth Geneva Convention applied, the UN and United States with the support of 
NGOs gained consent to UNITAF and subsequently UNOSOM I from factions in de 
facto rule.117 
 
In dealing with the issue of “hostile army” Kelly argues that the term is rendered 
irrelevant because of the extension of provisions relating to occupation to non-conflict 
situations.118   He provides no other authority for reading the Article down in this way 
and it is the position of this work that the definition having been specifically imported 
it cannot be read down and dismissed without express language in the clause. 
 
This aspect of Kelly’s argument is not accepted by the ICRC:  It accepts that in order 
for the Geneva Conventions to apply the force must be hostile: 
 
“The rules of international humanitarian law relevant to occupied territories become 
applicable whenever territory comes under the effective control of hostile foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                      
116 Regulation 42 Annexed to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) 29 July 1899 and to 
Hague IV of 18 October 1907. 
117 Above n 3 at 14: See also http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsom1backgr1.html (24 
August 2006). 
118 Above n 3 at 149. 
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armed forces, even if the occupation meets no armed resistance and there is no 
fighting.”119 
 
Kelly’s argument that the interpretation of occupation is rendered otiose is also 
inconsistent with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties120 
which requires that the ordinary meaning be given to the terms of a treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.  The definition of occupation 
imported from the Hague Convention unambiguously requires the force to be hostile 
in character while the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to regulate 
armed conflict.  As stated in the preamble of the Fourth Geneva Convention: 
 
“The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments represented at the Diplomatic 
Conference held at Geneva from 21 April to 12 August 1949, for the purpose of 
establishing a Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War…”  
 
It is submitted in this work that the issue of the force being “hostile” is key to 
understanding the limits of the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to 
peacekeeping in collapsed States.  If a UN force is deployed with consent it can 
hardly be said to be hostile.  If it deploys in the absence of any authority capable of 
providing such consent in order to provide humanitarian aid to the people, to whom is 
it hostile?   
 
Kelly asserts that peacekeeping operations deployed in the absence of consent will 
certainly attract the de jure  application of the laws of occupation and the Fourth 
                                                          
119 ICRC “Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers.” 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList594/AE4C5F11BA20DDB0C1256ED800518988 
(23 August 2006)  
 347
Geneva Convention.121  However, examples of UN peacekeeping operations being 
deployed without consent are rare as demonstrated in earlier chapters of this work.  
Even in East Timor where there were differences in opinion as to which if any State 
could give consent, INTERFET and the UN  rejected the de jure application of the 
laws of occupation, Australia using them only as a guide122 in the absence of the type 
of framework advocated in this work.  
 
Following the practice in East Timor and Kosovo it would seem that at best the law of 
occupation and the Fourth Geneva Convention would only apply in situations where 
there was no consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation.  This is a far less 
extensive application than argued by Roberts. 
 
Roberts sets out four criteria that identify a military occupation.  These are:  
 
1. a military presence in a territory not fully sanctioned by valid agreement; 
2. the military force has displaced the local public order and government; 
3. there is a difference in nationality, allegiance or interests between the 
occupier and the population; and 
4. emergency rules are needed to protect the civilian population.123 
 
The first criterion would not be met in any Chapter VI peacekeeping operation as such 
an operation would not take place without a valid agreement from the relevant State, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
120 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155 at 331. 
121 Above n 3 at 155. 
122 Kelly, M. McCormack, T. Muggleton, P. Oswald, B. “The Legal Aspects of Australia’s 
Involvement in the International Force for East Timor” 2001  International Review of the Red 
Cross No. 841 at 101-139  
123 Roberts, A. (1984) in Provost, R. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.  (2002) at 
251-252. 
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States or recognised controlling groups such as occurred in Cambodia.  In Chapter VII 
operations there are probably only two situations where an agreement would not be 
forthcoming.  The first would be in a situation such as the second Gulf War where an 
armed conflict results.  In circumstances of armed conflict a Fourth Geneva 
Convention occupation would follow.  These types of operations are not the subject of 
this work.  The second would be where no agreement could be reached because of the 
absence of a government capable of reaching an agreement.  In such situations, while 
not sovereign itself, the UN must hold sovereignty on behalf of the people until they 
are able to exercise it through the process of self-determination.  In any event, States 
that are Members of the UN are bound by the Charter and as a result are bound by 
actions of the Security Council under Chapter VII.  A duly authorised UN operation 
may therefore amount to a fully sanctioned military presence by implication from 
signing the Charter. 
 
The second criterion requires that the military has ‘displaced’ the local public order 
and government.  UN peacekeeping operations are not able to ‘displace’ local public 
order or government.  Chapter VI operations would simply be incapable of 
performing wide governmental functions and would in any event lack the authority to 
do so.  In Chapter VII operations there is often a requirement to rebuild order and 
government or to protect such local institutions from destruction.  This is 
distinguishable from a displacement of an existing, functioning institution and to 
displace existing structures would be inconsistent with the Charter obligations toward 
sovereignty.  The point about peacekeeping operations in collapsed States is that there 
is no local institution to displace, the UN has to provide one. 
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The third criterion is certainly met by UN peacekeeping operations in that the 
nationalities of the peacekeepers will invariably be different from the local 
population.  The allegiance of the peacekeepers will be to the UN and their mission, 
although inevitably, as no Article 43 agreements have been signed, they will continue 
to bear allegiance to their State.  With regard to a divergence in interests between the 
peacekeepers and the population, this is a matter of perspective.  There may be 
elements of the population with divergent interests, Somalia being one stark example. 
However, where a population’s interest is in a return to peaceful self-government, 
then the interests of the peacekeepers and the population will be aligned. 
 
Roberts’ criteria do not then support the conclusion that a UN peacekeeping operation 
amounts to an occupation.  Not only does it fail to meet the very first of the criteria 
but it is difficult to find any element of the test, save for divergence in nationality, that 
it could meet.   
 
Another impediment to the adoption of the Convention de jure is that throughout the 
Fourth Geneva Convention there are obligations that are inconsistent with the practice 
of UN peacekeeping.  An example of this is found at Article 6, which states:  
 
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one 
year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be 
bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the 
functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of 
the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. 
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If the convention applies to cases of UN peacekeeping on the basis of opinio juris it is 
hard to find any instance of the UN demonstrating a belief that troops acting under its 
auspices were bound to comply with this or any other provision.  Even in Somalia 
where Kelly argues that the Convention did apply de jure, the UN did not make any 
attempt to comply with the convention during the course of the operation let alone for 
one year afterwards. 
 
Article 12 provides another example of occupation in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
being more properly associated with parties to an armed conflict and not with UN 
peacekeeping operations.  Article 12 provides: 
 
Art. 12. In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected persons, 
particularly in cases of disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to the 
application or interpretation of the provisions of the present Convention, the 
Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the 
disagreement. 
 
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either at the invitation of one 
Party or on its own initiative, propose to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their 
representatives, and in particular of the authorities responsible for protected persons, 
possibly on neutral territory suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict shall be 
bound to give effect to the proposals made to them for this purpose. The Protecting 
Powers may, if necessary, propose for approval by the Parties to the conflict a person 
belonging to a neutral Power, or delegated by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, who shall be invited to take part in such a meeting. 
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Article 12 clearly envisages that the parties involved in occupation to be belligerents 
or potential belligerents, a circumstance wholly consistent with the Article 42 Hague 
IV interpretation of occupation and wholly inconsistent with the principles of 
peacekeeping.  
 
This interpretation of the boundaries of the Fourth Geneva Convention is consistent 
with the position of the ICRC on the limits of humanitarian law.  The ICRC has stated 
clearly that the humanitarian conventions, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
are applicable only in times of armed conflict. 124  Where peacekeepers are not a party 
to an armed conflict the Geneva Conventions simply cannot apply de jure. 
 
From a purely practical perspective, there may arguably have been an imperative 
before the rise to current prominence of international human rights law, for 
international humanitarian law to expand as far as possible to protect individuals and 
communities.  In the next chapter of this work it will be argued that this imperative no 
longer exists. 
 
Reliance on the Fourth Geneva Convention also brings with it political implications 
for the sovereignty of the “occupied” State.   It seems inconsistent with the respect 
paid to sovereignty in the Charter that a UN force could be used to occupy a State or 
part of State territory. Such an act is inherently inimical to the concept of sovereignty.  
Further it has been argued in this work that the UN is capable of being the custodian 
of sovereignty and indeed should be so in a collapsed State for the benefit of the 
population and until the people can exercise their right to self determination.  If the 
                                                          
124 ICRC. http://www.icrc.org/eng/ihl (22 Aug 2005). 
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UN does become the custodian of sovereignty then it can hardly be in occupation of 
the sovereign territory.  Although both these points are important, the essence of the 
argument put forward in this work is that occupation, as it is used in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, relates to acts that are hostile and closely related to armed 
conflict or the political domination of territory in a way that is adverse to the interests 
of the majority of the population.  This is not what peacekeeping is about and even in 
collapsed States the motive behind a UN peacekeeping operation must be to return the 
State to its people; otherwise it would be acting ultra vires of the UN Charter. 
 
Finally and perhaps the most practically persuasive argument against the application 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention to peacekeeping operations, is the fact that if the 
Fourth Convention does apply then all the conventions apply.  The article on which 
Kelly relies is after all common to all the Geneva Conventions of 1949.  This means 
that the UN forces on the ground could be argued to be lawful targets and combatants.  
Questions could arise as to the status of persons detained by the UN force with regard 
to the Third Geneva Convention and their possible status as prisoners of war.  It is 
suggested that the practical consequence of adopting the Fourth Geneva Convention 
as de jure applicable is a major reason for a failure by the UN to respond to the 
argument put forward by Kelly and that it is far more likely that the UN will adopt as 
de jure a human rights framework for peacekeeping operations.   In any event as 
Greenwood has observed: 
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“The law of belligerent occupation is rightly considered not to apply when a United 
Nations force is involved in administering a territory but has not been a party to an 
international armed conflict.  That was the case, for example, in Somalia”125 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the generally uncontentious argument has been put forward that 
international human rights law applies at all times and that international humanitarian 
law applies only once the threshold into armed conflict has been crossed or a 
belligerent occupation has occurred to which armed conflict is a legitimate response.  
As pointed out by Pictet126 with regard to armistices, they merely suspend hostilities, 
not end them.  In an occupation where the movement into the State has been 
unopposed the armed response has effectively been suspended not eliminated.  
 
Once the threshold has been crossed then as the lex specialis international 
humanitarian law has precedence.  The difficulty for peacekeepers is to identify when 
the threshold has been crossed.  In order to assist peacekeepers in identifying which 
framework to apply two definitions of armed conflict have been put forward.   The 
definitions relate to international and internal armed conflict and unlike other 
definitions found in the literature, these definitions link motive to action.  This has 
been done in order to assist in distinguishing the activities generally described as 
‘policing” involving the suppression of crime, from activities which properly belong 
under international humanitarian law.   The definition of international armed conflict 
                                                          
125 Above n 85 at 30. 
126 Pictet, J. Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time 
of War (1957) at 22. 
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also takes into consideration the intensity of a conflict in order to render it meaningful 
as against the practice of States. 
 
The question of whether a UN force can become involved in armed conflict and 
therefore be subject to international humanitarian law has been analysed. The 
conclusion drawn is that a UN force could become involved in armed conflict and that 
in such circumstances customary international humanitarian law applies de jure to the 
force.   
 
The difficulties created by Michael Kelly’s argument for use of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention in peacekeeping has also been explored.  The Fourth Geneva Convention 
argument is not the correct interpretation of the law and one which has the potential to 
cause more harm than good.   Peacekeepers and planners need legal certainty in order 
to conduct their activities effectively.   The death of a Somali youth at the hands of the 
Canadian Parachute Battalion127 should remain as a salutary lesson to planners who 
fail to provide a means to deal with issues of law and order in peacekeeping 
situations.  While it is argued in this work that the use of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention is not the correct legal approach, it did provide a legal basis for the 
operations of the Australian peacekeepers in Somalia so that the troops on the ground 
could see that action was being taken.  This is vitally important in a peacekeeping 
context and while use of international humanitarian law outside of armed conflict has 
been shown not to be the correct approach in law there is a viable alternative 
available. In the next chapter a legally accurate framework under international human 
rights law is set out to fulfil the requirement for certainty. 
                                                          
127 Canadian Government Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry 
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c9e.htm (22 Aug 2005). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
The Power of International Human Rights Law 
 
The establishment of an independent justice system and the prosecution of war crimes 
are indispensable prerequisites for the stabilisation of a civil society.1  
 
Introduction 
 
The first four chapters of this work have established what peacekeeping is, the UN 
vision for the development of peacekeeping through its reports, and how 
peacekeeping operations under Chapters VI and VII have been run in practice, 
focusing on the legal framework established by UN administrations.  In the last two 
chapters the development of international humanitarian law as the lex specialis of 
armed conflict and its application to peace enforcement that amounts to armed 
conflict was examined so that a foundation was established for the analysis of 
Michael Kelly’s argument that international humanitarian law, and specifically the 
law of occupation and the Fourth Geneva Convention, provides the legal framework 
in collapsed State peacekeeping.  The result of this analysis was that international 
humanitarian law does not provide the legal framework for peacekeeping in collapsed 
States in circumstance, such as the UN encountered for example in West Irian, 
Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor, where the peacekeeping force had not crossed the 
threshold into armed conflict.   
 
Having concluded that international humanitarian law does not provide the framework 
for collapsed State peacekeeping the final chapter of this work seeks to provide an 
                                                          
1 Zwanenburg, M. “The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law: Some Preliminary Observations”. International Peacekeeping.( July – 
October 1999) at 131. 
 355
alternative framework to be applied in such circumstances and to argue that the 
correct legal framework to be applied is international human rights law. 2  
 
In this final chapter, major international human rights treaties and conventions are 
analysed.   The UN Charter and the treaties forming the International Bill of Rights, in 
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as 
customary international human rights law is analysed to draw out the obligations 
found under international human rights law for peacekeeping operations. Having 
established the obligations that apply to collapsed State peacekeeping under 
international human rights law, a proposal is put forward to enable peacekeeping 
operations to fulfil the obligations relating to the administration of justice through the 
use of military justice systems that are structured in such a way as to comply with the 
requirements placed on such tribunals under international human rights law. 
 
The Charter  
 
When the UN established the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and East Timor one 
of the first actions of the administration was to pass an ordinance directing that the 
law was to be administered in accordance with human rights law and that all 
legislation was to be read accordingly. 3   Any legislation that was in violation of 
human rights law was effectively repealed.  The examples from Kosovo and East 
Timor demonstrate the emphasis placed on compliance with human rights 
requirements in peacekeeping operations and is constant with the practice of the UN 
in following a Trusteeship model when administering territory.  The emphasis on 
                                                          
2 This is the legal framework that the UN has applied to collapsed State peacekeeping as set out in 
chapters three and four of this work. 
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human rights is entirely logical given that the Charter itself contains major statements 
of international human rights standards.   
 
It has been argued that international human rights law is largely a creation of the UN4.  
In the preamble to the Charter one of the aims of the UN is identified as being:  
 
“to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in equal rights of men and women.”  
 
In order:  
 
“to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”    
 
This ideal is a cornerstone of the UN Charter.  The protection and promotion of a 
respect for human rights is expressly incorporated into the Charter obligations.    
Article 1(3) of the UN Charter states that one of the purposes of the UN is the 
promotion of and respect for human rights.  Thus there is a compelling argument that 
an obligation is placed on the UN to consider and promote human rights in all its 
activities, which includes peacekeeping.5 
 
There are other Articles in the Charter directly focused on the promotion of human 
rights.  Articles 55 and 56 are particularly relevant.  Article 55 is in mandatory terms 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Kosovo UNMIK/REG/1999/1 of 25 July 1999 and East Timor UNTAET/REG/1999 of 27 Nov 1999. 
4 Hannum, H. “Human Rights” in Schachter, O and Joyner, C.C. United Nations Legal Order Vol 1. 
(1995) at 345. 
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stating that the UN "shall" inter alia “promote a respect for and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion”6.  Article 56 reinforces this position with a pledge by all Members to take 
joint and separate action for the achievement of the purposes set out in Article 55.  
Another key human rights theme of the Charter is the right of peoples to self-
determination.  While self-determination often forms the basis for the establishment 
of a peacekeeping operation it is not considered in detail here as the focus of this work 
is on the legal framework applicable to operations rather than specific reasons for 
establishment.    
 
As a consequence of the Charter provisions, a UN peacekeeping operation is obliged 
to promote the observance of human rights while the Member States contributing to 
the operation are pledged to achieve the purpose and the promotion and observance of 
human rights.  The problem for the implementation of Articles 55 and 56 is that the 
specific human rights to be promoted are not set out in the Charter itself.  This 
situation is rectified by a number of multilateral treaties and customary international 
law.  In many ways this approach is a more flexible solution than fixing rights in the 
Charter.  The evolution of human rights demonstrates that the rights that may have 
been specifically articulated and therefore fixed in the Charter in 1945 would be 
considered inadequate today.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Jennings, R and Watts, A. (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law Vol 1. (9th ed 1996) at 998. 
6 Article 55(c). 
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The United Nations 
 
The significance of human rights in the UN Charter is under pinned by action.7  The 
UN has been at the forefront of promoting, developing and interpreting human rights 
laws and has since its inception condemned human rights violations. One of the 
earliest acts of the UN was the creation of commissions on human rights and the 
status of women. 8   Actions by the Security Council under Chapter VII have been 
taken with the intention of enforcing human rights compliance, thereby linking human 
rights to peace and security.9  From its creation as a body which merely discussed 
human rights issues, the Commission on Human Rights has developed into a body 
capable of receiving reports from special rapporteurs and adopting public resolutions 
expressing concern over human rights violations and even condemning a State for 
such violations. Despite the absence of formal enforcement measures this process has 
proved effective in persuading States to correct human rights violations.  Statements 
by the Commission have also assisted in the creation or clarification of new human 
rights norms,10 trends which have been followed in the General Assembly where an 
increasing number of Resolutions have assisted in the amplification and statement of 
the international law obligations relating to human rights. 
 
In moving to further discussion of the amplifications and statements of the 
international law relating to human rights, an examination needs to be made of the 
                                                          
7 The Secretary-General's Reform Programme of 1997, called for the integration of human rights into 
all major activities of the Organization at part 1, section b, paras 78-79. 
8 Above n 4 at 322. 
9 Id at 323. 
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primary treaties and conventions from which the law has developed.  Given the 
volume of human rights material, the outline will focus on the elements relevant to the 
practical requirement of what must be provided by a peacekeeping force where the 
structures normally responsible for their provision are not in existence. 
 
International Bill of Human Rights 
 
The International Bill of Human Rights represents the corner stone of human rights 
law.  The collection of interrelated treaties that make up the International Bill of 
Human Rights set out the fundamental human rights guarantees to be aimed for or 
achieved, depending on the status in international law of its various provisions.  The 
International Bill of Human Rights is a combination of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966).11    The ICCPR has the most direct relevance to peacekeeping and is therefore 
dealt with here in more detail than the other two, more aspirational, elements of the 
International Bill of Rights.  
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
“as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”12  It was not 
designed as a binding treaty but as a statement of the aspirations of the world 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 Id at 324-5. 
11 The Challenges for Peace Project Challenges for Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century. 
www.peacechallenges.net/pdf/concluding1.pdf (11 Sep 2003) at 77 para 8. 
12 Preamble 217 (III). International Bill of Human Rights. 
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community.  It has however formed the basis for the majority of binding human rights 
conventions since its adoption13 and provides the foundation of international human 
rights.    
 
Significant forerunners to the binding conventions found in the Universal Declaration 
include; Article 5, which provides the basis for subsequent prohibitions against cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment:  Article 7 provides for equality 
before the law free from discrimination: Article 8 identifies the right to bring 
violations of human rights to courts of competent jurisdiction.  Of particular 
significance for peacekeeping is Article 9 prohibiting arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile.  Article 11 provides for the presumption of innocence until proven guilty at a 
fair trial and a prohibition on retrospectivity of offences and punishments.  
Importantly, Article 12 grants a right against arbitrary interference with home, 
privacy, family and correspondence and from attacks on honour and reputation.  The 
Declaration also states that there is a right to the “protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.”  Article 17 inter alia protects against arbitrary deprivation of 
property.  Article 28 identifies a right to a “social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.”  The 
responsibility to support and implement these articles would of necessity fall to 
peacekeepers in a collapsed State situation. 
 
The Declaration was not legally binding when it was adopted in 194814 but there is 
support for the view that it has passed into customary international law and it has 
certainly been relied upon as international law by the International Court of Justice.15    
                                                          
13 Above n 4 at 326-7. 
14 Above n 5 at 1001-2. 
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There are human rights covenants in the International Bill of Human Rights that are 
binding on the State Parties and that have been adopted by States, such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia, most frequently involved in 
peacekeeping operations.   These covenants have their origins in the Universal 
Declaration and often repeat the key provisions of the Universal Declaration.  All of 
the provisions identified above as directly applicable to peacekeeping operations can 
be found in these binding treaties. 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted by the 
General Assembly and opened for signature in December 1966.  It finally came into 
force in 1976.  To date there are 154 parties, including major peacekeeping 
contributor States such as Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.16  Many of the provisions highlighted as having significance for 
peacekeepers in the Universal Declaration are directly repeated in the ICCPR. While 
the UN itself is not capable of being a party to the Covenant it is bound to comply 
with customary international law.  Where the majority of Member States adopt such 
Resolutions they can effectively be seen as amounting to statements of customary 
international law so that the UN itself is bound to comply with the substance of the 
Resolution as customary international law.17  States contributing to the peacekeeping 
operation by providing troops or a capability are bound by their individual 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Namibia (Legal Consequences) Case. ICJ Rep (1971) at 46. The Court referred to violations by 
South Africa of its obligations inter alia  under the Universal Declaration.   
16 As of 21 August 2002: United Nations Human Rights Website – Treaties Bodies Database. 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menue3/b/a_ccpr.htm (11 Sep 2003). 
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responsibility to comply18 as they are provided as State entities not as troops supplied 
to the UN under an agreement pursuant to Article 43 of the UN Charter.  
 
The ICCPR is the most important of the core human rights covenants in terms of the 
implications for peacekeeping operations.  Although it does not have a traditional 
enforcement mechanism the ICCPR does have a method of procuring State 
compliance that has proved to be effective.  The Covenant creates an 18 member 
Human Rights Committee that examines reports submitted to it by States under 
Article 40.  Under the Article the Committee is obliged to make an annual report to 
the General Assembly detailing it activities.  The views of the Committee are 
generally accepted as accurate interpretations of the Covenant and the state of 
international human rights law generally.  The vast majority of States wish to avoid 
reproach or being critically reported to the General Assembly and have thus far 
generally chosen compliance with the determinations of the Committee over 
condemnation.19 
 
A proper understanding of Article 2 of the ICCPR is crucial because it defines the 
circumstances in which a State becomes subject to the Covenant.  Pursuant to Article 
2 the State Party “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction” the rights and obligations under the Covenant. 
The question arises as to whether States operating outside their territory (and for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 Bowett, D.W. The Law of International Institutions. (4th ed. 1982) at 46. 
18 In the same way that in the event of armed conflict the military would be bound by their State being 
signatories to comply with the laws of armed conflict despite the UN not being a party to the Geneva 
Conventions: Stephens, D. “The Use of Force by Peacekeeping Forces: The Tactical Imperative.” 
International Peacekeeping. Vol 12, No.2 (Summer 2005) at 161. 
19 Singh, N. Enforcement of Human Rights in Peace and War and the Future of Humanity. (1986) at 
104. 
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customary international law purposes the UN, which has no territory),20 are bound by 
the Covenant.   
 
It has been argued that the State’s obligations are only triggered under the ICCPR in 
territory of the State so that the Article must be read as operating only where there is 
territory and jurisdiction.21  This interpretation would create an anomalous situation 
however, as a State bound by the Covenant in its own sovereign territory would be 
free to ignore it in situations where it had mere jurisdiction over other territory. This 
would mean that the Covenant would not apply to flag ships, to members of the armed 
forces operating abroad or to laws of extra territorial application.  Frequently in 
peacekeeping operations in collapsed States, the lead nation or UN has de facto 
jurisdiction but is not in its own territory.22  This would lead to a situation where the 
States bound by the Charter to promote human rights could ignore key provisions of 
human rights law in situations where they were the sole authority capable of 
promoting or enforcing them.  This would make nonsense of the Charter and the 
intent of the ICCPR.  In order to achieve a sensible outcome, it is argued that the 
requirement to observe the Covenant must be read disjunctively so that States Parties 
are bound in situations where they have jurisdiction as well as when they are acting 
on their sovereign territory. 
 
This is clearly the position of the Human Rights Committee as expressed in its 
General Comments to Article 2.   
                                                          
20 Arguably the UN has territory where it is the administrative authority.  However, if this status is 
analogous to the mandate or Trusteeship then it does not.  
21 Muggleton, P. Unpublished paper. Operational Law Course 1/01. Australian Defence Force Warfare 
Centre. (02 – 06 April 2001). 
22 For example INTERFET, IFOR, SFOR etc and where areas of operation are allocated to a specific 
State, for example the Australian battalion (AUSBAT) was allocated the border region in East Timor.  
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The Committee considers it necessary to draw the attention of States Parties to the 
fact that the obligation under the Covenant is not confined to the respect of human 
rights, but that States parties have also undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of these 
rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction.23    
 
The Committee has emphasised here that it is jurisdiction, rather than territory, that is 
the key trigger for implementation of the ICCPR.  The Committee has also applied 
this interpretation in cases brought before it.24 Specifically, in the case of Lopez 
Burgos V Uruguay where the Committee stated: 25 
 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to 
ensure rights “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”, but 
it does not imply that the State Party concerned cannot be held accountable for 
violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of 
another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in 
opposition to it…It would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under 
article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the 
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on 
its own territory.  
 
The Committee has felt it necessary to issue further amplification in terms of General 
Comments on Article 2.26  In this fresh amplification the Committee states: 
                                                          
23  Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 (2004). See also The Wall Advisory Opinion 
[2004] ICJ 9 July 2004) at para 111. 
24 Joseph, S, Schultz, J and Castan, M. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases 
and Commentary. (2000) at 59-62. 
25 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay Human Rights Committee Case 52/79. 
26 General Comment No.31 Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant. (26 May 2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, General Comment No.31. 
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States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the 
Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction.  This means that a State Party must respect and ensure the 
rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of 
that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.  As 
indicated in General Comment 15 adopted at the twenty-seventh session (1986), the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to the citizens of State Parties but must 
also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as 
asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find 
themselves under the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.  This 
principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a 
State Party assigned to an international peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
operation.27   
 
From the perspective of the Human Rights Committee there appears to be no doubt 
that as a matter of law State Parties to the ICCPR must apply the Covenant on 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.  Given the status of the Committee 
within the UN framework this must be the position for UN peacekeeping operations.  
 
In a climate of American hegemony it is always difficult to ignore the position of the 
US in Conventions to which it is a party.  As part of the process eventually leading to 
the belated ratification of the Covenant by the US, the US Senate Committee on 
                                                          
27 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Unedited Version: The Nature 
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant: 05/05/2003. 
CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.3. (General Comments). 78th session Human Rights Committee: At para 11 the 
General Comment also reinforced the position that Covenant applies during armed conflict and that 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law are complementary not mutually 
exclusive in such situations, a position repeated in General Comment No.31.  
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Foreign Relations defined the official US interpretation on the scope of the covenant.  
The Senate Committee stated that the role of the Covenant was to guarantee: 
 
A broad spectrum of civil and political rights, rooted in basic democratic values and 
freedoms, to all individuals within the territory or under the jurisdiction of the States 
Party without distinction of any kind, such as race, gender, ethnicity, et cetera.28    
 
The Senate Committee also noted that the:  
 
Covenant obligates each State Party to respect and ensure these rights, to adopt 
legislative or other necessary measures to give effect to these rights and to provide an 
effective remedy to those whose rights are violated.29  
 
Although he US has issued a number of reservations, understandings and declarations 
regarding the ICCPR it has not sought to formally limit the application of the 
Covenant solely to territory.30  It follows that the US position on the application of the 
ICCPR is that it applies where the US has jurisdiction. As a result of this 
interpretation US obligations under the Covenant are that where the US is, for 
example, the lead State in a multinational peacekeeping operation in a collapsed State, 
subject to the mandate, it may have jurisdiction because of the terms of the mandate31 
and as a result an obligation to comply with the ICCPR.    
                                                          
28 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23 at 1 (1992): 31 I.L.M. 645, 648: Carpenter, K.D.A. “The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A Toothless Tiger?” 26 NCJILCR 1 (Fall 2000) at 
4. 
29 Ibid Carpenter at 4. 
30 Stewart D.P. “United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The 
Significance of Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations” 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1183. (Summer 
1993). 
31 The mandate must be in such terms as to have the necessary implication, if not the express provision, 
for such jurisdiction as was the case for example in Kosovo and East Timor. 
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The US administration under President Bush has attempted to argue that US laws do 
not apply to situations where the US is not the sovereign over territory.  In the case of 
the UN Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay the administration argued that it was not 
bound where it does not have sovereignty over territory and that Cuba had ultimate 
sovereignty.  The US Supreme Court ultimately rejected this stance in the case of 
Rasul v Bush.32  The case resulted from a petition by prisoners at Guantanamo Bay 
who had been detained in Afghanistan.  The petitioners filed suits under US federal 
law challenging the legality of their detention, alleging that they had never been 
combatants against the US or engaged in terrorist acts, and that they had not been 
charged with wrongdoing, permitted to consult counsel, or provided access to courts 
or other tribunals.  The District Court rejected the petition as they were outside the US 
sovereign territory.  The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.  The petitioners 
made a further appeal to the US Supreme Court. The Supreme Court overturned the 
courts below and determined that the US had “jurisdiction and control” over 
Guantanamo Bay and that as a result the US law applied.  Consequently the ICCPR 
also applies. 
 
With regard to UN operations, although the permanent Members of the Security 
Council are parties and individually have a responsibility to comply with the ICCPR, 
the Security Council is not bound to the treaties entered into by the individual 
members, only to customary international law or principles.33   However, individual 
States engaging in peacekeeping operations are still obliged to observe their 
international commitments.  Therefore even under a UN operation a State that is a 
                                                          
32 Rasul v Bush (03-334) 321 F.3d 1134 
 368
party to the ICCPR will be required to comply with its obligations where its forces 
have jurisdiction in an area.  The extent to which the UN is bound in such 
circumstances is dependent upon the extent to which the ICCPR forms part of 
customary international law.  However, the point is effectively moot as regards UN 
peacekeeping operations because the forces on the ground will be bound by their State 
obligation.34 
 
Returning to the provisions of the ICCPR, Article 2(3) requires the provision of 
remedies at law for the victims of breach and the enforcement of such judicial 
remedies.  The setting up of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction becomes a 
planning issue for peacekeepers bound by the ICCPR.  The ICCPR does not give 
express authority to enact legislation independently of sovereignty to support this 
requirement but it is a necessary implication of the obligation.  Where administrative 
jurisdiction has expressly passed to the peacekeeping operation through the mandate, 
including a capacity, express or implied, to enact binding directions such as 
Ordinances, there can be no argument against exercise of that jurisdiction because the 
action is required to fulfil the ICCPR obligations.   
 
Where no express administrative jurisdiction is granted then the operational planners 
must balance their powers and obligations.  Where a State has collapsed and the 
mandate places the peacekeeping force in effective control, without granting express 
jurisdiction over the territory, then it would seem contrary to the clearly expressed 
human rights substance of the UN Charter for the operation to eschew its human 
                                                                                                                                                                      
33 Szasz, P. in Schachter, O. and Joyner, C.C. (eds). United Nations Legal Order. Volume 1. (1995) at 
95. 
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rights obligations.   The peacekeeping operation would therefore gain jurisdiction to 
execute its obligations from its mandate and the ICCPR including the customary 
international law embodied in it.   
 
Fair Treatment Obligations: Article 7 of the ICCPR foreshadows the provisions of 
the Convention Against Torture.  It prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment.35  Article 7 is complemented by Article 10, which relates to 
the humane treatment of persons in detention.  Of particular note for peacekeeping 
planners is the requirement in Article 10 for the separation of juvenile and adult 
offenders and the purposes of the penitentiary system, which is for a prisoner’s 
“reformation and social rehabilitation.”  This means that peacekeepers may be 
required to do more than merely hold a person in detention, there may also be a 
requirement to establish some form of reformation or rehabilitation program.  
 
Obligations Necessitating Ordinances:  Further obligations also arise necessitating 
the enactment of some form of legislation or ordinances by the peacekeepers.  Article 
6 identifies the inherent right to life and the protection of that right by the law.  Article 
9 protects against arbitrary detention and permits deprivation of liberty only “in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.”36  Article 9 goes on to 
require arrested persons to be advised promptly of the charges against them and 
brought before a court of competent jurisdiction within a reasonable time or released.  
Article 9(4) effectively provides for Habeas Corpus, an issue made the subject of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
34 Had Article 43 of the Charter been effective the situation would be different as the force would 
belong to the UN.  With the failure of Article 43 the troops remain subject to the sending State 
obligations: see Stephens above n 18. 
35 This will be covered in more detail in the section on the CAT. 
36 ICCPR Article 9(1).  
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General Assembly Resolution 34/178.37  This Resolution specifically identified 
Article 9(4) and calls upon “all Governments to guarantee to persons within their 
jurisdiction the full enjoyment of amparo, habeas corpus or other legal remedies to 
the same effect, as may be applicable in their legal systems.” 38   Peacekeepers will 
have to rely on the laws extant in the State to provide the protections demanded by the 
Covenant or enact laws or ordinances to fulfil the requirement to act to protect, 
charge, deal with according to law.  If arrest and detention are contemplated in a 
peacekeeping operation there will have to be laws and procedures to protect the rights 
and access to a court of competent jurisdiction to comply with the ICCPR, as well as 
implementation of the related General Assembly recommendations.  
 
Trial Provisions:    Article 14 of the ICCPR provides further arrest, detention and trial 
guarantees. The right to a fair trial and equality before the law are set out in Article 
14.  These are rights historically regarded as fundamental rules of law.39   
Significantly for the purposes of this work, the Human Rights Committee has not used 
this section of the Covenant to rule out the use of military courts to try civilians 
provided that such courts afford the full guarantees stipulated in Article 14.40  Article 
14(3)(c) provides the requirement for trial without undue delay.  This is consistent 
with the provisions of Article 9(3), which relates to the dealing with detainees in a 
reasonable time. Although the application of this provision will depend on the 
circumstances in each case, the Committee has found a delay of three years between 
                                                          
37 17 December 1979 
38 UN 34/178 “The Right of Amparo, Habeas Corpus or Other Legal Remedies to the Same Effect” 17 
December 1979: Rauschning, D, Wiesbrock, K and Lailach, M. Key Resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly 1946-1996. (1997) at 327. 
39 Above n 24 at 279. 
40 Id at 288-9. 
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arrest and final appeal to be excessive.41  It should be noted that there were persons 
arrested by the peacekeepers in East Timor in 1999 who in 2003 were still awaiting 
completion of their trial at first instance.  Although a form of bail provision had been 
implemented there were detainees who spent more than two years in prison waiting 
for the establishment of the East Timor justice system. 
 
The right set out in Article 15 of the ICCPR echoes the Universal Declaration 
provisions against retrospectivity of offences.  Article 17 also follows the Universal 
Declaration provisions in prohibiting arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, 
home, correspondence and unlawful attacks on honour and reputation. Article 17(2) 
specifically states that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”  These provisions provide the guidelines for the 
introduction of protective legislation that should be established and are particularly 
relevant as an accompaniment to a peacekeeping mandate that includes a domestic 
peace and security role. 
 
Derogation:  The ICCPR has significant implication for the planning of peacekeeping 
operations in States where the State infrastructure capable of guaranteeing the rights 
under the Covenant has collapsed.  It may well be argued that in serious emergency 
situations the immediate implementation of all measures is not possible.  However, 
the ICCPR does have provision for derogation.   
 
The derogation provision is set out at Article 4.  It permits derogation “[i]n times of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
                                                          
41 Hill and Hill v Spain  UNHRC 526/93. 
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officially proclaimed.”42  Concerned that the derogation may be used unnecessarily, 
the UN Committee on Human Rights made a detailed comment on this Article.43  The 
Committee emphasised that derogation was only to be used in exceptional 
circumstances and for a limited period.  The criteria of public emergency threatening 
the life of the State and the requirement for an official proclamation must be met.  The 
Committee pointed out that generally derogation would only be used in armed conflict 
and then only if the life of the State was actually threatened, for example by an armed 
aggressor invading in force in order to annex or control it.  Even where derogation 
was justified the General Comment emphasised that the derogation provision would 
not afford blanket application.  Each activity would be scrutinised and must be 
justified.  The principle of proportionality should be used to determine whether the 
actions were justified under the derogation.   
 
The Committee appeared sceptical that derogation could be invoked other than in 
armed conflict  As with Article 2, the General Comment expressly stated that the 
Covenant continued in force during armed conflict and was to operate in a 
complementary manner with international humanitarian law.  Peacekeepers in a 
collapsed State operation would arguably not find themselves in circumstances in 
which the derogation could be invoked. Past experience has shown that the life of the 
nation would at that point be in the hands of the UN in a post conflict reconstruction 
phase and as such not in the dire situation required before derogation could be 
invoked.    
 
                                                          
42 ICCPR Article 4(1). 
43 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 31 August 2001. General Comment No. 29. 
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Consideration was given to derogation in the “Siracusa Principles”. A conference of 
international jurists sponsored by the International Association of Penal Law, the 
American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan 
Institute of Human Rights and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal 
Sciences was held from 30 April to 4 May 1984 in Siracusa, Italy.  The delegates 
made a detailed examination of the limitations allowed for in the ICCPR. The 
outcome of the conference was the development of the Siracusa Principles, which it 
was agreed represent a statement of international law and severely restrict the manner 
in which limitations can be imposed.  For example, on the issue of the threat to the 
life of the State under Article E of the Siracusa Principles it states: 
 
39.  A State party may take measures derogating from its obligations under the    
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pursuant to article 4 
(hereinafter called "derogation measures") only when faced with a situation of 
exceptional and actual or imminent danger which threatens the life of the nation. 
A threat to the life of the nation is one that:  
         (a)  Affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of 
the territory of the State, and  
         (b)  Threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political 
independence or the territorial integrity of the State or the existence or basic 
functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the rights 
 recognized in the Covenant.  
 40.   Internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent 
 threat to the life of the nation cannot justify derogations under article 4.  
 41.   Economic difficulties per se cannot justify derogation measures. 44  
                                                          
44 UN Economic and Social Council, E/CN 4/1985/4 (28 September 1984). Commission on Human 
Rights Forty-first Session:  See also Gosden, R.“Shrinking the Freedom of Thought: How Involuntary 
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The Human Rights Committee45 was also keen to emphasise limitation on derogation 
both temporally and geographically, the ideal being that derogation should not apply 
to the whole State but only in the local area and for the strictly limited period 
necessitated by the situation.  The Committee noted that the principle of 
proportionality of response was not always adhered to when States tried to claim 
derogation.  The Committee further emphasised that derogation was not a blanket 
release from the provisions of the Covenant and that each Article must be separately 
and justifiably derogated.  To date there has been no derogation by either a 
peacekeeping State or States participating in a UN peacekeeping operation.  It would 
also be difficult for a peacekeeping force, particularly UN peacekeepers, to justify 
derogation, as deployment usually occurs after an armed conflict and in order to 
maintain the life of the State and prevent threats to it.  The issue of derogation appears 
to be one that has been overlooked by States in peacekeeping operations.  It is 
therefore an issue that planners should address, especially when considering the 
implementation of detention policies. 
 
The ICCPR has been expressly cited by the ICJ as continuing to have effect during 
times of armed conflict regardless of that state of armed conflict and therefore 
international humanitarian law applying.46  In the Nuclear Weapons Case the ICJ 
stated: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Psychiatric Treatment Violates Basic Human Rights” Journal of Human Rights and Technology, Vol.1, 
(February, 1997). 
45 See Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 31 (2004). 
46 Nuclear Weapons Case ICJ (1996), 226,239 (8 July). 
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“The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not 
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby 
certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.” 
 
It would seem therefore that peacekeepers are bound to apply the ICCPR and comply 
with all its requirements.  As a result a method of ensuring its compliance must be 
found and planned for prior to the insertion of the operation into the State or territory 
concerned. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was 
adopted and opened for signature by the General Assembly at the same time as the 
ICCPR.  As with the ICCPR it embodies many of the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration.  The ICESCR has been described as protecting “second generation” 47 
human rights.  ICESCR rights are those that follow on from the basic rights such as 
the right to life and are characteristic of developed States. Many of the rights to be 
provided to the population under its provisions require some form of stable economy 
and social organisation to be in existence.  The rights laid out in the ICESCR 
therefore provide a goal for peacekeeping operations where the focus is on rebuilding 
a collapsed State.  The ICESCR is also not drafted in the same mandatory language as 
the ICCPR so that although the Covenant is binding the obligations represent a goal 
toward which a State has agreed to attempt to achieve rather than an inherent right 
that a State must protect. 
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The rights set out in the ICESCR to free association in trade unions and paid leave or 
adequate social security benefit systems cannot be guaranteed or provided in the 
initial stages of an operation in a collapsed State.  Arguably even in an established 
State many of the ICESCR provisions have proved difficult to implement.  Neither 
can governmental level requirements such as a social security system be provided by 
a military operation.  However, free association and protection of the right to work are 
issues which may have to be addressed by peacekeepers as the operation develops and 
as such should be recognised in the planning process.   Where the infrastructure is 
capable of supporting these rights, peacekeepers may be required to support them, 
although generally this will fall to the civilian rather than the military arm of an 
operation. 
 
Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984. 
 
Following on from the International Bill of Rights are a number of conventions and 
UN resolutions that are relevant to the human rights obligations in peacekeeping. The 
prohibition against torture exists in the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and in 
customary international law.48  As with the ICCPR the Torture Convention was 
preceded by a General Assembly declaration49 and was considered to be a statement 
of customary law by the time it was adopted in 1984.50 The Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
47 Above n 5 at 695. 
48 Above n 5 at 715:  Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others 
Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
and Others Ex Parte Pinochet 2 WLR 827 (1999). 
49 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 3452 (Dec. 9, 1975). 
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was adopted in line with the adoption of more detailed Conventions further 
developing the rights identified in the Universal Declaration.  Under Article 2 of the 
CAT the State Parties are to take measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory 
under its jurisdiction.  There is no ambiguity here as to whether the territory belongs 
to the State or not, it is sufficient that the State has jurisdiction.  Therefore in a 
peacekeeping situation where the UN has jurisdiction by virtue of the mandate the 
Convention applies.51   As it is a statement of the customary international law the 
provisions apply equally to UN peacekeeping operations as a whole as it does to 
individual contributing States and regional or multinational peacekeeping operations.  
 
Under Article 4 of the CAT, torture, with its inchoate offences, is to be a crime and 
punishable as a grave offence.  While the Article relates to the obligation of State 
Parties to legislate, it is argued that a like requirement attaches where Ordinances are 
passed, such as occurred in East Timor, the former Yugoslavia and other Trustee 
model operations.  In a peacekeeping operation the respective military codes are 
likely to already prohibit and provide sanctions against the military contingents.  The 
civilian police may not be covered by such provisions so that an ordinance may be 
required in the event that it was not already provided for. 
 
Articles 5 to 9 lay down a framework for a wide jurisdiction and extradition in 
relation to offences of torture.  Article 10 requires that education regarding the 
prohibition against torture is included in the training of any person, specifically 
including military personnel, “that may be involved in the custody, interrogation or 
treatment of any individual subject to any form of arrest, detention or integration.”  
                                                                                                                                                                      
50 Above n 4 at 332. 
51 Article 2(1).  
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Prior to the deployment of peacekeepers, planners should incorporate proposals for re-
training and reappraisal based on these principles.  States contributing forces to the 
operation should be asked to guarantee that such training has taken place in 
compliance with their Convention obligations. Practices such as the combination of 
sleep deprivation, use of “white noise”, food rationing and the use of stress positions, 
previously viewed by western forces as standard interrogation practice have been 
found to be in violation of the European Convention, the relevant clause of which is 
drafted in the same terms as the Covenant.52   This means that it is vital for the 
contributing force practice to be audited by the peacekeeping command, if not by the 
UN headquarters. 
 
There are further articles in the CAT that are of importance to peacekeeping 
operations.  Article 11 requires review of custody and interrogation procedures to 
prevent torture, while Articles 12 to 15 deal with the proper handling of complaints, 
evidence and compensation for torture victims.  Article 16 is an undertaking by the 
States parties to prevent other acts, not amounting to torture but amounting to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.  Peacekeeping operations need to plan for 
compliance with this Convention and ensure that detention and interrogation practices 
are compliant and that appropriate processes consistent with the CAT are in place.  
While establishing a complaints process may be onerous it is no more so than the 
processes that are routinely set in place during peacekeeping operations for civil 
claims by the local population for damage and injury caused by peacekeepers. 
 
                                                          
52 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. Series A, No.3. 
 379
Resolutions  
 
The General Assembly does not have the power to create international legislation; this 
power was specifically denied to it by the San Francisco Conference.53  However, it 
can influence the development of international law, although the weight and 
significance of Resolutions vary depending on the circumstance of each Resolution 
and situation.  Organs of the UN, including the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, are often seen as identifying in Resolutions or statements the customary 
rules or general principles of international law.54  In effect therefore, Resolutions of 
the General Assembly can become evidence of international law, with the more 
support for the Resolution strengthening, and the less support correspondingly 
weakening this presumption.  The accession of a large number of Members to treaties 
such as the ICCPR for example, strengthens the argument that its adoption by the 
General Assembly represents a statement of principles of international law.55 
 
If the Secretary-General is bound by General Assembly Resolutions it is immaterial 
whether the Resolutions are customary international law.  If the Secretary-General is 
bound then peacekeeping forces controlled by the Secretary-General must also be 
directed to comply.56  The fact that the Secretary-General is bound to comply with the 
Resolutions of the UN was clearly identified by Dag Hammarskjold.  When referring 
to the obligations of the Secretary-General he stated: 
 
                                                          
53 Castaneda, J. Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions.  (1969) at 2-3. 
54 Id at 5. 
55 Above n 17 at 46. 
56 UN peacekeeping forces are “in a general sense organs of the United Nations” Above n 14 at 1164. 
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Is he entitled to refuse to carry out the decision properly reached by organs on the 
ground that the specific implementation would be opposed to positions some Member 
States might wish to take as indicated, perhaps by an earlier minority vote? … 
 
The answers seem clear enough in law; the responsibilities of the Secretary-General 
under the Charter cannot be laid aside merely because the execution of decisions by 
him is likely to be politically controversial.  The Secretary-General remains under the 
obligation to carry out the policies as adopted by the organs.57 
 
Resolutions of the Security Council establishing a peacekeeping operation pass the 
control of the operation to the Secretary-General.58  Where the Secretary-General has 
control of a peacekeeping operation he or she is therefore obliged to structure and 
conduct that operation in accordance with the Resolutions of the organs.  The General 
Assembly is an organ of the UN.  As the General Assembly has adopted the Universal 
Declaration, the ICCPR and the CAT the Secretary-General is therefore obliged to 
conduct peacekeeping operations in compliance with them.  This obligation is in 
addition to the obligation of the UN to comply with such elements of the conventions 
and treaties that have passed into customary international law.59 
 
As the General Assembly has adopted the above Resolutions the Secretary-General is 
obliged to comply with them in the conduct of peacekeeping operations.  In effect the 
obligations resulting from the decisions of the organs of the UN make UN 
                                                          
57 Hammarskold, D. in Schachter, O and Joyner, C.C. (eds) United Nations Legal Order Vol 1. (1995) 
at 250. 
58 Usually expressed as command and control, however as a civilian and a non national he or she 
cannot legally "command" only control: Above n 17 Stephens. 
59 See for example Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of 
international humanitarian law, 
6 August 1999, ST/SGB/1999. 
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peacekeeping operations subject to more extensive obligations than the contracted out 
peacekeeping operations where States are required only to comply with their treaty 
obligations.. 
 
Setting International Standards in the Field of Human Rights 1986 
 
In 1986 the General Assembly moved to further clarify the standards to be achieved in 
the field of human rights.  General Resolution 41/120 Setting International Standards 
in the Field of Human Rights, recalled the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, reaffirming the fundamental importance to the field of human rights in their 
implementation.  The Resolution called for broad ratification of the key human rights 
treaties by the Member States and importantly identified these treaties as the 
international legal framework.  The Resolution went on to invite Members and UN 
bodies to follow a series of guidelines in developing international human rights; “such 
instruments should, inter alia: 
 
(a) Be consistent with the existing body of international human rights law; 
 
(b) Be of fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and 
worth of the human person; 
 
(c) Be sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable rights and 
obligations; 
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(d) Provide, where appropriate, realistic and effective implementation 
machinery, including reporting systems; 
 
(e) Attract broad international support.”  
 
Given the obligation of the Secretary-General to abide by such decisions UN 
peacekeeping instruments must follow these guidelines. 
 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 
 
While not a treaty, the General Assembly made a statement consistent with the 
Universal Declaration known as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
(Vienna Declaration).60 It represents an important and relevant statement of intent.  
The Vienna Declaration was a restatement of the commitment of the world 
community to fulfil the obligations that had been developing since the Universal 
Declaration.  Of particular significance is the repeated assumption, carried on from 
the Universal Declaration that rights existed in customary form before being expressly 
articulated in treaty form61.  This is important for UN peacekeeping operations as 
although the UN or a non signatory State may not be bound on the basis that it is not a 
State party to a treaty, it is subject to customary international law. 
 
                                                          
60 32 ILM 1661 (1993). 
61 Dixon, M and McCorquodale, R. Cases and Materials on International Law.( 3rd ed 2000) at 192. 
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Strengthening the Rule of Law 
 
In December 1993 the General Assembly adopted without vote the Strengthening the 
Rule of Law Resolution.62  The aim of the Resolution was to reinforce the progress 
already made in human rights regulation.  The General Assembly endorsed the  
 
Recommendations of the World Conference on Human Rights that a comprehensive 
program be established within the United Nations under the coordination of the 
Centre for Human Rights of the Secretariat, with a view to helping States in the task 
of building and strengthening adequate national structures which have a direct impact 
on the overall observance of human rights and the maintenance of the rule of law.  
 
The Secretary-General was also asked to submit proposals to support this aim and 
bring it to fruition.  The Secretary-General controls UN peacekeeping forces.  It 
would therefore seem incomprehensible that with the position of the Secretary-
General, as eloquently summarised by Dag Hammarskjold, a peacekeeping force 
should be other than bound to comply with the clear wishes expressed by the General 
Assembly in these Resolutions.  As a result UN peacekeeping operations have an 
obligation to use human rights law as the legal framework.  This position is supported 
by the obligations placed on the UN and contributing States by customary 
international law. 
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 Customary international law 
 
It is uncontentious that the majority of non-binding declarations, resolutions and 
statements of principle, where followed by State practice, become binding as 
customary international law.63  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Declaration Against Torture and the Declaration preceding the ICCPR fall into this 
category, although there is as yet no general agreement that the whole of the 
Universal Declaration has entered into customary law.64   There are however, some 
basic provisions found in these major human rights conventions that have 
unequivocally the status of jus cogens, for example the prohibition on torture.65   
 
The most widely accepted view of human rights customary international law is found 
in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States.66  In 
this document six acts were identified that if practiced, encouraged or condoned by a 
State would violate international law.  These are: 
 
a. genocide; 
 
b. slavery or slave trade; 
 
c. the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; 
 
d. torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;  
                                                                                                                                                                      
62 General Assembly Resolution 48/132 Ref: 50/179, 49/194 of 20 December 1993. 
63 Above n 4 at 336. 
64 Above n 4 at 341: Above n 5 at 1002. 
65 Meron, T. Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection. (1987) at 52. 
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e. prolonged arbitrary detention;  
 
f. systematic racial discrimination; and 
 
g. a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised 
human rights.67 
 
In support of this statement of customary international law the US national courts 
have recognised that arbitrary detention is a violation of international law.68   Based 
on the US statement there is certainty for peacekeepers that arrest and indefinite 
detention without legal justification is a recognised violation of international law and 
yet there seems to have been a disregard for this provision in recent operations69  and 
with regard to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay.   
 
In planning for peacekeeping operations the customary laws regarding the torture and 
detention provisions and ensuring a legal framework to regulate the arrest and 
treatment of detainees must be considered.  Issues also arise with regard to the action 
to be taken against individuals or bodies found by peacekeepers to be engaging in 
practices prohibited by customary international law.  It is argued that under customary 
international law peacekeepers in collapsed State environments not only have the 
power under the mandate to pass ordinances but are obliged to do so to protect against 
                                                                                                                                                                      
66 Above n 4 at 341. 
67 American Law Institute, 2 Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 
709 (1987) at 161. 
68 Rodriguez-Fernanandez v Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff’d on other grounds, 654 
F. 2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).  
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human rights violations and to ensure that their own action is compliant with 
international human right law.   
 
Implied powers 
 
Ordinances have been passed under the UN Trusteeship model administrations, 
including East Timor and Kosovo, without objection. The obligations found in the UN 
Charter and human rights covenants as well as from the generally worded mandates 
must of necessity be accompanied by the implied power to create binding rules, laws, 
ordinances et cetera to enforce the law.  Jurisdiction must be a necessary implication 
of a mandate that requires the military to establish peace and security and the 
provision of a safe environment for the provision of humanitarian aid.  The argument 
that the right to pass ordinances flows from the mandate is consistent with the view of 
the ICJ and ICTY, expressed respectively in the Reparations Case,70 Certain 
Expenses Case71 and the Tadic72 case.   
 
In these cases the courts found that “Under international law, the Organisation must 
be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, 
are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance 
of its duties.”73 If the implied powers doctrine found in the Expenses Case74 is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
69 In East Timor the UN made no provision for trail of detainees with some persons arrested and 
detained under the Australian led operation remaining in prison without trial for more than two years. 
70 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case. Advisory Opinion. ICJ 
Reports (1949) at 174. 
71 Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case. Advisory Opinion. I.C.J. Reports (1962) at 151. 
72 Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) (1996) 35 I.L.M. 35; (1996) 3 I.H.R.R. 578. 
73 Above n 66. 
74 Above n 71.  This doctrine flows from the finding of the International Court of Justice that the 
United Nations: 
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followed, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter itself can be pointed to as a head of power to 
pass ordinances in collapsed State peacekeeping situations to promote human rights.  
Article 1(3) provides: 
 
“To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”    
 
As peacekeepers operate, at least in UN operations, as part of the Organisation75 they 
must also be deemed to have the powers that are attributed to the organisation.  In 
both UN and multinational peacekeeping operations the Security Council mandate has 
been deemed as authorising arrest, detention and the passing of Ordinances.76  In both 
East Timor and the former Yugoslavia the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representatives have passed regulations setting up judicial systems and have done so 
without question or objection from the international community.  The source of this 
power has not been analysed in detail by commentators but it is argued in this work 
that implied powers flow not only from the mandate but also from the human rights 
framework of treaties and Resolutions discussed above. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“…must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the 
Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance 
of its duties”  
75 Above n 5 at 1164 referring to peacekeepers stated that “in a general sense are organs of the UN.” 
76 Ordinances were used by peacekeepers in INTERFET and by NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia 
operations.  UNTAET passed regulations.  In none of these cases was there an express power granted 
under the mandate. 
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Enforcement of human rights 
 
The development of a process whereby human rights can be enforced in a collapsed 
State peacekeeping environment is vital.  Nagendra Singh pointed out that; 
 
 if the legal link of enforcement is missing the word of law would degenerate to a 
moral recommendation to be ignored at will.77  
 
The State Parties to the human rights conventions, and the UN under customary law 
and decisions of the organs, have an obligation to take action to ensure that human 
rights are not the first casualties of a collapsed State.  Without the implementation of a 
means of enforcing human rights there is every indication that they will be ignored at 
will as Singh predicts.   
 
Not only is there an implied power to set up an enforcement framework but a legal 
requirement to do so.   In the Namibia Case78  Judge Morelli stated in his separate 
opinion that: 
 
Any State which, having attributed certain rights to foreign nationals, prevents them 
from gaining access to the courts for the purpose of asserting those rights is guilty, in 
international law, of a denial of justice.79   
 
                                                          
77 Singh, N. Enforcement of Human Rights in Peace and War and in the Future of Humanity.(1986) at 
10. 
78 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West 
Africa), not-withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) I.C.J. Reports (1971) at 16. 
79 Id at 234. 
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States involved in peacekeeping in collapsed States that are Parties to the ICCPR have 
attributed rights to both nationals and non-nationals that fall under their effective 
jurisdiction.  There is an obligation therefore to provide a system for asserting those 
rights.  Judge Morelli was effectively restating extant obligations under the ICCPR 
and applying them as general principles of law. 
 
The power of the UN to establish police and judicial mechanisms has not been 
challenged.  In East Timor and the former Yugoslavia arrest and detention provisions 
were passed initially by the military authorities and were followed by the 
establishment of UN civilian police and judicial authorities.  Hans Corell, Under-
Secretary-General of the UN has publicly emphasised the urgent need for the 
immediate implementation of a justice framework in peacekeeping.  In a keynote 
address to a conference on humanitarian intervention he stated:  
 
One very clear conclusion is that, in parallel with any humanitarian assistance that 
would have to be given, there is an immediate requirement of putting in place a 
system for the administration of justice.  Civilian police, a judiciary and a correctional 
system have to be developed almost instantaneously.  Otherwise criminality will very 
quickly take hold.80   
 
UNHCR Inspector-General Dennis McNamara has echoed this position noting that: 
 
                                                          
80 Corell, H. To Intervene or Not: The Dilemma That Will Not Go Away. Keynote Address at the 
Conference “Future of Humanitarian Intervention” Duke University, (19 April 2001). 
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The Achilles’ heel of post-conflict peace operations is that of justice/rule of law and 
civilian policing.81 
 
This view of the obligation on peacekeepers to establish a rule of law is not limited to 
the UN.  Steve Darvill82 in a paper on the rule of law in peace operations noted: 
 
For peacekeepers inserted into the anarchic conditions prevalent in contemporary 
armed conflict situations, the primary objective is restoration of public order.  
 
And the purpose of this restoration; 
 
is concerned with ensuring compliance with the ‘rule of law’ by would be 
perpetrators of crimes.    
 
It seems clear that in modern peacekeeping operations peacekeepers must plan to 
provide the legal framework where none exists and that this function is pivotal to the 
success of any operation. 
 
Civilian corrections staff and police can be deployed to safe areas.  The military can 
support their activities by arresting and detaining until a hand over can be conducted, 
effectively creating an interim police service.  This approach was taken in East Timor 
where strict guidelines for arrest and periods of detention by the military were put in 
place to protect the individuals and as the area became more secure the policing role 
                                                          
81 McNamara, D. “The UN has been learning how its done” International Herald Tribune, (29 October 
2002). 
82 Darville, S. Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).  The Rule of Law on Peace 
Operations from the Perspective of an Institutional Donor. Address at the Conference “The Rule of 
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was accordingly transferred to civilian police.  This process, although not ideal, is 
viable and can be implemented relatively quickly.  What has proved to be a much 
slower process is the implementation of a justice system to deal with the people that 
have been detained.  Under the ICCPR there is a requirement for timely trials.  In a 
State where the judiciary must be trained and a legal system developed with all the 
associated rules of procedure and practice from scratch, a timely trial is simply 
impossible.   There is only one pre-existing judicial system that is instantly deployable 
and that can assist both the UN and States to comply with treaty obligations and UN 
directives. This is the military justice systems of the troop contributing States.  The 
key to this solution is the provision by contributing States of a justice system that 
complies with international human rights law in terms of its structure and function. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Law on Peace Operations: A Conference of the “Challenges of Peace Operations” Project” University 
of Melbourne (11-13 November 2002). 
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The military justice system 
 
The use of a military justice system to deal with detainees is not unheard of.  The 
Australian military justice system was adapted and used in East Timor in the Detainee 
Management Unit (DMU).  The DMU processed people arrested on allegations of 
being militia. It acted in many ways as a bail court, releasing those found not to be 
genuinely involved in the commission of crimes.  The remaining individuals were 
swiftly handed over to the UNTAET administration and held in prison awaiting the 
setting up of the East Timor justice system.  There was no complaint or outcry from 
any official or NGO source regarding the implementation of this system.  There was 
no suggestion that it was unlawful to use an adaptation of the military justice system 
in this way.   
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The only arguable failing of the process was that there was no derogation by Australia 
from the timely trial provisions of the ICCPR.  The fact that detainees were handed 
over to the UN within months at most may excuse this omission, the problem then 
being one for the UN to resolve.  The DMU was not used to try people, only as a 
filtering or “bail court.”  People that were not released had to endure up to two years 
of imprisonment without trial waiting for the UN assisted East Timorese system to 
become active.  Such a long delay represents a denial of human rights under the 
ICCPR by the administration in East Timor.  Had peacekeeping planners considered 
this issue in terms of the protection of human rights it would have been feasible to 
extend the activities of the DMU to include trial proceedings.83 
 
In the US it has been suggested that al Qa’ida terrorists should be tried under the 
military justice system precisely because it provides fair trial guarantees consistent 
with human rights.84  While there may be military justice systems that do not comply, 
a number of cases brought before human rights courts have ensured that many of the 
military justice systems used by peacekeeper contributing States are compliant.  The 
UN is in a position to accept the offer of military justice systems from compliant 
States in the same way that it accepts offers of infantry battalions or logistic support.  
The main difficulty with this approach is that not all States have military justice 
systems that comply with the standards required of such a system.  The UN would not 
be able to accept any offer from a State but would be required to limit acceptance to 
                                                          
83 For an analysis of the DMU in East Timor see Oswald, B. “The INTERFET Detainee Management 
Unit in East Timor” (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law at 347. 
84 Malinowski, T. “Court Martial Code Offers a Fair Way to Try Terrorist Suspects” International 
Herald Tribune. (December 29, 2001). 
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those States that can comply with the international human rights standard for fair trial 
provisions. 
 
The concept of using military systems of justice to fill the gap is not unheard of.  In 
2001, having observed the deployment of the DMU, Strohmeyer concluded: 
 
“In order to avoid a law enforcement vacuum in the early days of the mission, it is 
crucial to establish ad hoc judicial arrangements facilitating the detention and 
subsequent judicial trial of individuals who are apprehended on criminal charges. As 
a short-term relief effort, the quick deployment of units of military lawyers in 
situations where a complete breakdown of the judicial sector has occurred and where 
civilian arrangements cannot be deployed rapidly, could fill the vacuum until the UN 
is staffed and able to take over what is ultimately a civilian responsibility.  It would 
be understood that any such ad hoc arrangements would have to be in strict 
compliance with internationally recognised human rights and other relevant legal 
standards, and should apply, once established, a set of UN sponsored interim rules on 
criminal procedure.”85  
 
The offences that may be dealt with by such courts would also need to be limited to 
those necessary to support human rights and the peace and security in the territory 
concerned.  Jurisdiction would be limited only to those areas where the indigenous 
legal systems had in the assessment of the Secretary-General failed.  As local court 
processes are returned or rebuilt the military justice system would be removed.  
Finally, there would have to be an automatic right of appeal against conviction and 
sentence to the civilian system once that system had been reconstructed.  With these 
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safeguards and the oversight of agencies such as UNHCR the military justice system 
provides the best guarantee for human rights in collapsed States. 
 
As well as being human rights compliant and instantly available, there is another 
advantage provided by the use of military justice systems.  With the global provision 
of peacekeepers there is representation of all the major legal systems.  A military 
justice system that complies with Articles 9 to 16 of the ICCPR could be selected to 
match the type of law that pre-existed in the collapsed State or territory or if that 
system was opposed by the people, an agreed system.   Many of the European States 
have civil law and inquisitorial processes.  British and Commonwealth States use the 
common law adversarial systems.  A number of Asian States and Arab States rely 
upon religious law systems.  The appropriate human rights compliant system can be 
selected and deployed with qualified and experienced legal officers who are 
practitioners in that system.  The military system can operate until an appropriate 
civilian court can replace it.   To reiterate the point, the system must be one that 
compiles with international human rights so that not every State wishing to contribute 
would be in a position to do so. 
 
Perhaps the most compelling argument for the immediate deployment of a human 
rights compliant military justice system is that regardless of any imperfections it may 
have it can provide a functioning justice system in a situation where the alternative is 
no justice system at all and therefore no means to comply with international human 
rights obligations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
85 Strohmeyer, H. “Making Multinational Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of Transitional 
Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol.25 No.2 (Summer 
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Offences 
 
It would not be appropriate for all the offences available against military personnel to 
be made available against civilians.  For example disciplinary offences such as 
Absence Without Leave, or Failure to Comply With A Lawful Order could not be 
applied in a civilian context.  A selection of the available criminal offences would 
need to be made. The most obvious offences over which the courts may be given 
jurisdiction are murder, rape and other crimes of violence.  These offences have 
universal standing as violations of human rights.  A reasonable start point for 
identifying offences that should be included within jurisdiction is the ICCPR.   
 
Article 6 of the ICCPR requires protection for the right to life and expressly refers to 
the crime of genocide. As noted above, the right to life is a basic human right with the 
offence of murder universally legislated. In order to protect the right to life the 
relevant offence framework should be utilised.  This would include offences related to 
murder such as manslaughter. Genocide, like piracy is a crime of universal 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Article 7 prohibition on torture, cruel or inhuman treatment can create a number 
of offences.  Torture itself can form the basis of an offence as it does under Australian 
law through s61 of the Defence Force Discipline Act86 into the Crimes (Torture) Act.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
2001) at 122. 
86 Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 s61 provides access to the ACT Crimes Act 1900 and all laws of 
the Commonwealth including the Crimes (Torture) Act 1988.  Note that as currently drafted the Crimes 
(Torture) Act only applies to Australian citizens or persons in Australia. However, the jurisdiction 
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Cruel and inhuman treatment might reasonably be expected to involve some form of 
assault or variations of offence against the person.  It would also cover indecency 
offences including rape.  Indeed any crime that affects the right of an individual to the 
quiet enjoyment of his or her life could arguably be considered necessary under this 
provision. 
Article 8 provisions against slavery and servitude can again be found in general 
legislation through the military codes.  
Article 9, 11 and 12 relate primarily to maintaining liberty and freedom of movement.   
Offences such as false imprisonment, kidnap et cetera deal with this right.  The US 
Uniform Code of Military Justice for example, makes specific provision against 
unlawful detention.  At Article 97 the Code states:  
Any person subject to this chapter who, except as provided by law, arrests, or 
confines any person shall be punished as a court- martial may direct.87  
 
ICCPR Article 17 rights prohibiting the arbitrary interference with a person’s privacy, 
family, home or correspondence and attacks on honour and reputation can be upheld 
through assault, criminal damage, theft and in the extreme cases, criminal defamation 
provisions.  All of these can be protected by offences and from a US and Australian 
                                                                                                                                                                      
would in any event have been extended under the mandate as military courts would require an 
extension of jurisdiction to deal with civilians.  Such an extension can be made by Ordinances, as 
occurred in East Timor with the DMU. 
87 Uniform Code of Military Justice 897. Art 97. Unlawful Detention. 
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perspective can be found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice88 and through s61 of 
the Defence Force Discipline Act in Commonwealth legislation.   
                                                          
88 The Uniform Code of Military Justice has some of the most detailed provisions covering offences 
against human rights for example:  
909. ART. 109. PROPERTY OTHER THAN MILITARY PROPERTY OF UNITED STATES - 
WASTE, SPOILAGE, OR DESTRUCTION  
Any person subject to this chapter who wilfully or recklessly wastes, spoils, or otherwise wilfully and 
wrongfully destroys or damages any property other than military property of the United States shall be 
punished as a court-martial may direct.  
916. ART. 116. RIOT OR BREACH OF PEACE  
Any person subject to this chapter who causes or participates in any riot or breach of the peace shall be 
punished as a court- martial may direct.  
917. ART. 117. PROVOKING SPEECHES OR GESTURES  
Any person subject to this chapter who uses provoking or reproachful words or gestures towards any 
other person subject to this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  
928. ART. 128. ASSAULT  
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to do 
bodily harm to another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault 
and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who--  
(1) commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or 
grievous bodily harm; or  
(2) commits an assault and intentionally inflicts grievous bodily harm with or without a weapon;  
is guilty of aggravated assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  
929. ART. 129. BURGLARY  
Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to commit an offence punishable under section 918-
929 of this title (article 118-128), breaks and enters, in the night time, the dwelling house of another, is 
guilty of burglary and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.  
930. ART. 130. HOUSEBREAKING  
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with 
intent to commit a criminal offence therein is guilty of housebreaking and shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.  
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It is not a technically complex process to identify appropriate offences over which 
military courts should exercise jurisdiction by comparing the rights to be protected 
against the available military offences.   By this simple expedient the overall 
requirement of peace and security can be met without further exacerbation of the 
situation by the failure to implement a timely justice system.   
 
Compliance with international human rights requirements 
 
Australian example 
 
The argument for a military justice system to provide a justice system in a collapsed 
State is dependent upon that justice system being itself compliant with human rights 
requirements for a fair trial.  It would be hypocritical to step in to fulfil human rights 
obligations while breaching them through the process established to effect protection.  
Ensuring compliance would should be a simple step but recent cases have suggested 
that procedures previously considered to be compliant with Article 14 of the ICCPR 
are in fact in breach of it.  An analysis of the Australian military justice system 
provides an example of the difficulties in ensuring a fully compliant system. 
 
In order for a matter to enter the Australian military justice system under the Defence 
Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA) it must first be brought before an officer who is a 
Commanding Officer89 for the purposes of discipline.90    The Commanding Officer 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
89 In certain specified cases a subordinate summary authority, DFDA s108. 
90 DFDA s107. 
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has a number of options available for dealing with the matter depending on the nature 
of the offence.  Where the offence is outside the jurisdiction of the Commanding 
Officer, as the proposed peacekeeping offences would be, the Commanding Officer 
can direct that it not be proceeded with, refer it to a Superior Summary Authority, to 
another Commanding Officer or to a Convening Authority.91  A Convening Authority 
is an officer of senior rank appointed by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to 
perform that role.92  In the proposed peacekeeping context, where there was sufficient 
evidence for the matter to proceed it would be referred to a Convening Authority as a 
Superior Summary Authority would not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter.  A 
Commanding Officer’s discretion in dealing with a matter cannot be fettered.93 
 
Where a matter outside the jurisdiction of a Summary Authority94 is referred to the 
Convening Authority that officer has a number of options.  The matter may be 
directed not to be proceeded with, referred to a Defence Force Magistrate, a 
Restricted Court Martial convened or a General Court Martial convened.95   A 
General Court Martial consists of a President and four members.  All are officers of 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) without legal training and substitute for the jury 
in a civilian criminal trial.  A Judge Advocate, who is an officer of the ADF who is 
also a legal practitioner, assists them in matters of law.  The roles performed by the 
President and Members are identical to an English Magistrates Court with the Judge 
Advocate having the same standing as clerk of the court.  A Restricted Court Martial 
                                                          
91 DFDA s110. 
92 DFDA s102. 
93 Re Smith (1999) per Colonel Morcombe (DFM) Defence Force Magistrate Trial  (Unreported 1999).  
The decision in this trial led to a public apology being made by the then Chief of Army, Lieutenant 
General Cosgrove, for an order given to the Commanding Officer that the member subject of the trial 
was to be referred for trial by DFM and not dealt with by the Commanding Officer, thus fettering the 
Commanding Officers’ discretion to deal with the matter. 
94 Subordinate Summary Authority, Commanding Officer and Superior Summary Authority. 
95 DFDA s103. 
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is set up in the same way but with a president and only two members.  The Judge 
Advocate, president and members of the Court Martial, including the prosecuting and 
defending officers are appointed by the Convening Authority.96   In Defence Force 
Magistrate trials the Defence Force Magistrate sits alone to hear matters as a 
stipendiary magistrate.  The Defence Force Magistrate has the same powers as a 
Restricted Court Martial with the most significant power being the ability to impose a 
maximum punishment of six months imprisonment.97  
 
While the Judge Advocate and Defence Force Magistrates are appointed to a 
particular trial by the Convening Authority the Convening Authority can only appoint 
an officer to that position who is a member of the Judge Advocates’ panel.98  The 
Judge Advocate General, who is appointed by the Governor-General,99 makes the 
appointments to the Judge Advocates’ panel.   Although appointed to the panel by the 
Judge Advocate General, it is the Judge Advocate Administrator that allocates Judge 
Advocates and Magistrates to trials.  The Judge Advocate Administrator is an officer 
appointed to the position by the CDF.  The officers appointed as Judge Advocates and 
Magistrates are all members of the Defence Force and as such are ultimately subject 
to the command of the CDF.  The Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force have the 
authority to promote members of the Defence Force.  They are directly commanded 
by the CDF.100   Therefore, except for the Judge Advocate General, there is no 
independence as all other actors are commanded and rely for their promotion on the 
CDF. 
                                                          
96 DFDA ss114 – 117. 
97 DFDA s129. 
98 DFDA ss117 and 127. 
99 DFDA s179.  The Judge Advocate General and Deputy Judge Advocates General must be or have 
been a Justice or Judge of a Federal Court or a Supreme Court of a State or Territory – DFDA s180.   
100 Defence Act 1903 s9. 
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Following trial there is an automatic review process whereby a legal officer appointed 
by the CDF, on the recommendation of the Judge Advocate, ensures that any 
conviction and punishment is according to law101 and advises the Reviewing 
Authority appropriately.  The Reviewing Authority could technically be the same 
officer as the Convening Authority although the Judge Advocate Administrator has 
issued a direction that in practice a different officer holds these appointments in any 
given case.  A further petition of review can be requested to the CDF or Service 
Chief.102  Alternatively an appeal can be lodged with the Defence Force Discipline 
Appeal Tribunal.103  The members of the Appeal Tribunal are appointed by the 
Governor General and must be or have been a judge or justice in a federal, State or 
Territory jurisdiction.104 
 
The Australian military justice process outlined above is based on the British system 
and until 2000 the two remained very similar.  The changes to the British system have 
been effected as a result of challenges brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).  These challenges have significant implications for the ability of 
the Australian military justice system to be considered compliant with the ICCPR.  
The challenges to the British process have been founded on Article 6 of the ECHR, 
which is identical in terms to the Article 14 ICCPR requirement for an independent 
                                                          
101 DFDA s154. 
102 DFDA s155. 
103 Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955. 
104 Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 s8. 
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and impartial tribunal.  The most significant case of relevance to this issue is that of 
Findlay v the United Kingdom.105   
 
Alexander Findlay was charged with a number of offences arising out of his misuse of 
a firearm following a heavy drinking session.  A Convening officer followed a 
procedure identical to that found under the DFDA to appoint all the participants in the 
Court Martial.  The majority of participants were to some extent under that Convening 
Authority’s direct or indirect command, not an uncommon situation given the senior 
rank required to perform the role of Convening Authority.  The trial commenced on 
11 November 1991 following which Findlay was convicted and sentenced to two 
years imprisonment, reduction to the rank of guardsman and dismissal from the army.  
The same officer that had acted as the Convening Authority performed a review of the 
sentence on petition.  Findlay made further petitions for review through the military 
system, which were also rejected.     
 
Findlay then proceeded with civil action in an attempt to have his sentence 
overturned.  In May 1993 he complained to the European Human Rights Commission 
which found in its report of September 1995 that the court martial process violated the 
requirements for an independent and impartial tribunal.  In its judgement of 21 
January 1997 the European Court of Human Rights determined that “in order to 
establish whether a tribunal can be considered as “independent”, regard must be had, 
inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the 
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body 
presents an appearance of independence.”    It went on to note that “impartiality” 
                                                          
105  (1997) 24 EHRR 221. 
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required both the objective and subjective appearance of impartiality.  The court was 
particularly critical of the role of the Convening Authority, a position too closely 
associated with the prosecution of the offences to satisfy the required degree of 
impartiality to appoint the court.  Criticism was also made of the review process. 
 
The decision that the British court martial process prior to amendment did not provide 
an independent and impartial hearing was repeatedly upheld in the cases of Hood v 
United Kingdom106, Cable and others v United Kingdom107 and most recently in the 
Case of Morris v The United Kingdom.108  In Morris the European Court of Human 
Rights also cited with approval criticism of the role performed by the judge advocate 
made during the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Genereux.109  This criticism 
related to the lack of tenure for judge advocates.  Because the judge advocate was 
appointed on a case by case basis, as with the Australian system, the court found that 
there was a reasonable apprehension that the performance of the judge advocate might 
be affected by concerns over future selections.  
 
The findings against the British and Canadian military justice systems are directly 
applicable to the Australian system where the Convening Authority appoints the 
participants and instructs the prosecutor.  There is also an absence of tenure for Judge 
Advocates and Defence Force Magistrates, a point that has been argued before the 
Australian courts, though as at mid 2005 without success.110  The ICCPR cannot be 
                                                          
106 18 February 1999 no. 27267/95 ECHR 1999-I. 
107 18 February 1999. http://www.onecrownofficerow.com/hru/items/item229.htm.(12 Sep 2005) 
108 Application no. 38784/97 European Court of Human Rights (26 February 2002). 
109 [1992] 1 SCR 259. 
110 In Re Tyler and Ors; ex parte (1989) 166 CLR 518 the Genereux point was argued with regard to 
the independence of the Defence Force Magistrate.   
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directly enforced by the Australian courts.111 However, in the event that an Australian 
military justice system were to be utilised as proposed in a peacekeeping operation a 
review of the procedures would be required to ensure compliance with international 
law.  Although the cases before the European Court are not binding they are 
persuasive.  Despite Australia’s domestic courts rejecting the arguments regarding the 
impartiality of the Australian military justice system it would seem that at an 
international level it might well be found that it is not compliant with Article 14 of the 
ICCPR.  The role of the Convening Authority would require modification and the 
magistrate would need to have tenure.  In the context of a deployment the magistrate 
would effectively have tenure for the period of the deployment so that this issue at 
least would be resolved.  As a matter of practicality the Defence Force Magistrate 
would be utilised for deployment rather than a court martial format as the trial of the 
matter by peer that is the principle underlining the court martial process would not 
apply to a civilian.  
 
The Australian example highlights the requirement for a careful analysis of the 
systems proposed for use in a peacekeeping context.  The suspect areas in the 
Australian system can easily be rectified by modification of the process but this would 
require an act of parliament and could not be done by the UN.  Planners have to be 
prepared to consider human rights law well in advance to ensure that the system that 
is put in place is itself compliant with the international human rights law it is designed 
to protect.  The UN would not be able in this situation to simply accept the first offer 
that was made by a State but would be required to be selective.  At this point in time 
an Australian military justice system would not be in a position to be selected. 
                                                          
111 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353. 
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UN as sovereign? 
 
In this work it has been argued that international human rights law is the legal 
framework to be applied in collapsed State peacekeeping.  For completeness the issue 
of whether the UN assumes the role of sovereign needs to be addressed as if the UN 
does assume sovereignty then its powers would derive from its position as sovereign 
rather than from the Charter and international human rights law. 
 
The UN is not a State or a territory.  It is not populated nor does it have any citizens.  
It is simply a politico-bureaucratic organisation created by a number of States and 
showered with the gifts deemed necessary to conduct the business that the most 
powerful States in the post WWII world determined it should do.  It is in some 
respects a club with hereditary seats in the inner sanctum for the States that were 
victorious in WWII.  The inner core of power, the Security Council, is fixed in a time 
warp.  The fluctuating fortunes of States are not reflected in terms of membership of 
the Security Council.  Although the General Assembly works on broadly democratic 
grounds the Security Council is not truly democratic as between States due to the 
veto.  The distribution of power between the Security Council and General Assembly 
is unequal.  Despite all these apparent injustices and contradictions of the ‘one 
member one vote’ ideal it is arguably indispensable to the global intercourse of States.  
It has become a unique entity that has in many regards the character of a State with 
none of its attributes.  The UN Secretary-General for example, receives a significant 
amount of attention from the world media and is treated in much the same way as a 
head of State.    How is it then that States which so jealously guard their rights, 
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privileges and territories from one another raise not the slightest concern when the 
UN appears to act like a sovereign State?  It is suggested that the answer to this, as 
with many things, lies in the history of the UN. 
 
The League of Nations 
 
The ill fated forerunner of the UN was the League of Nations.  It was set up in 
response to the horrors and carnage of WWI while a commitment never to repeat such 
diabolical folly was fresh and sincere.  With the continental shifts caused by 
crumbling empires the drafters of the League had to deal in some way with the 
political vacuums left behind and provide some form of interim government for the 
former subjects of the empires.   
 
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not expressly refer to the self-
determination of peoples, nor was it a central issue as it is to the UN Charter.  
However, the League’s concern for the territories left ungoverned post World War I 
by the fall of Germany and Turkey was expressed in terms that can be seen as the 
forerunner of the principles of self-determination.  The Covenant of the League stated 
that peoples of some of the former imperial territories were not yet able to stand by 
themselves. Therefore Mandated Territories should be set up to tutor such peoples 
until they would be ready to govern themselves112.  Different categories of Mandate 
were established dependant on the needs of the territory113.  
 
                                                          
112 Article 22 Covenant of the League of Nations:  Fry, C.B Key-book of the League of Nations. (1923) 
at 165-7. 
113 Harris, in Harris, D.J. Cases and Materials on International Law. (5th ed. 1998) at 131. 
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The Mandatory State was to provide administration to the territory on behalf of the 
League and render an annual report on its activities to a permanent Commission, 
which was in turn to report to the Council of the League. Pursuant to the founding 
Article 22, the Mandatory State was to be selected in accordance with the wishes of 
the communities that were at a state close to self-sufficiency.  Other Mandatories were 
to be provided on the basis of geographical propinquity and the voluntary assumption 
of the role by the Mandatory. 
 
In terms of administration of the territories, Article 22 directed the Mandatory to 
create conditions guaranteeing “freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to 
the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the 
slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the 
establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of 
the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also 
secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the 
League.”  Circumstances were also identified where the Mandatory could extend its 
own laws and treat the territory as if it were part of the Mandatary’s territory, subject 
to provisions relating to just treatment.  Although all the trappings may have been 
present, the Mandatory was not granted sovereignty over the territory114. 
 
The United Nations 
 
Following the end of the World War II and the founding of the UN, the League’s 
Mandates system was replaced by the UN trusteeship system.   The provisions of the 
                                                          
114 See for example the Status of South West Africa Case ICJ Rep (1950) at 132 where the ICJ held that 
the conferment of a mandate did not involve cessation or transfer of territory. 
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trustee system were broadly similar to the League with the promotion of self-
government and the interests of the inhabitants within the system of international 
peace and security being fully articulated.    The territories, which still required 
trusteeship, were transferred to the UN system with the Mandatory becoming the 
trustee.  There are now no trustee territories remaining with all such territories having 
achieved Statehood.   
 
Under the UN Charter, States are very broadly analogous to the individual in domestic 
law.  The State is the unit that interacts with the UN and other State actors engaging in 
debate and agree or otherwise to be bound by treaties.  States are created equal under 
the Charter regardless of political power realities115.  The territorial integrity and 
political independence of the State is guaranteed under the Charter by the principles 
of non-intervention and prohibition on the use of force.   The sacrosanct sovereignty 
of the State, regardless of political and power realities, is at the very core of the UN 
system, and despite the fictional foundation of equality upon which the UN is built 
both the UN and the theory of sovereign equality has remained intact.   Unlike a 
natural person it is recognised that the State is made up of parts, the people of the 
State.  There is no specific recognition of the individual as such in the Charter but 
there is express recognition of the right of the people as a collective to choose 
government and in this way the people constitute the State116. The UN stance on 
sovereignty as creating an absolute right and the questionable efficiency of the 
                                                          
115 Walker, R.B.J. “Peace in the Wake of Sovereign Subjectivities”  in Hindess, B and Jolly, M (eds) 
Thinking Peace Making Peace. Occasional Paper Serries (1/2001) at 28.  
116 Id at 27. 
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Security Council have been cited as causes for the increasing incidence of 
peacekeeping and peace building operations coming under fire.117   
 
The UN has from time to time taken on the administration of States and territories.  
This is a different situation and quite separate as a matter of law from the trusteeship 
arrangements, as discussed in chapter four of this work.  Apart from the Kosovo and 
East Timor case studies in chapter four other examples of UN administrations can be 
found in the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG, 
1989-90), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992-4), the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-3), and the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES, 1996-8).    
 
The ICJ has examined the powers that flow to the UN from the Charter with regard to 
administration. In the Namibia Case the ICJ stated that: 
 
Article 24 of the Charter vests in the Security Council the necessary authority to take 
such action as that taken in the present case. The reference in paragraph 2 of this 
Article to specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the 
Charter does not exclude the existence of general powers to discharge the 
responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1.  Reference may be made in this respect to 
the Secretary-General’s Statement, presented to the Security Council on 10 January 
1947, to the effect that ‘the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted 
to the specific grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII… [T]he 
Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council powers 
commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.  The 
                                                          
117 Fleshman, M. “Sierra Leone: Peacekeeping Under Fire” Africa Recovery, Vol.14 No.2 (July 2000), 
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only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes found in Chapter I of the 
Charter.118 
 
 
It appears then that the UN is able, at the very least as a matter of practice, to 
administer a State or territory with the requirement for sovereign power.  If the 
Security Council has the power flowing from the Charter to create an administration 
then it can surely create a mandate that is strong enough to provide the lawful basis 
for basic legislation or ordinances for the enforcement of law and order in a 
peacekeeping operation.  After all it is only in States where the peacekeeping 
operation is being conducted at the extreme of the peacekeeping continuum, where 
local infrastructure is in a state of collapse, that peacekeepers would need the UN to 
exercise legislative power.  The power to legislate was expressly granted to 
Mandatories under the League and to trustees under the UN scheme.  The implied 
extension of power to peacekeeping operations relying on a Trusteeship model where 
the UN administers the State or territory on behalf of the people in whom sovereignty 
is vested119  is entirely logical. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the situations into which peacekeepers are placed become more complex the 
strategies for effecting successful outcomes must be correspondingly inventive.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
at 8 
118 Namibia Case 276 ICJ Rep. (1971) at 52. 
119 In Porter v United States (1974) ILR, 61 at 102 it was stated that  “sovereignty resided in the people 
of the territory and was held in trust for them by the administering authority:  Aradanas v Hogan ILR, 
24 (1957) at 57 concerned trust territory and described it as being under UN sovereignty and 
jurisdiction. 
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rule of law has been identified as a key ingredient for success in peacekeeping 
operations.  Without the firm foundation of the rule of law peacekeeping operations 
are likely to fail or have only a transitory effect.  The more complex the situation is 
found to be, the more vital that the justice system is firmly established and that it has 
credibility and integrity.  In situations where the justice system has collapsed 
peacekeepers must quickly fill the void.  The UN has exercised the power to legislate 
and set up judicial systems in past operations without international protest.  The most 
successful operations have used a legal framework that has been a blend of the pre-
collapse domestic legislation and human rights law. The UN has the legal authority to 
subject the occupants of a collapsed State to the rule of law under the doctrine of 
implied powers and where to do so is consistent with the objects of the Charter.  
 
Recent experiences in East Timor and the former Yugoslavia have underlined the 
difficulties in providing instant credible justice solutions from local resources.    
Justice systems developed from nothing require time.  Operations cannot be 
postponed for the justice system to develop: justice must be available instantly to 
underpin the operation.  The only instantly available and deployable justice system is 
the military justice system.  The mandate combined with extant international human 
rights conventions and customary laws provide the framework for jurisdiction, rights 
and obligations.  Donor States can make systems that are human rights compliant 
available in the same way that they currently provide equipment and personnel.  
Military justice systems can be selected that match the type of legal system previously 
operating in the area and may well improve on it.  By deploying a military justice 
system, legally qualified prosecutors, defenders and magistrates are made instantly 
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available.  The justice system is well understood by those that operate it so that no 
time is lost in retraining or familiarisation.   
 
Deployment of a military justice system does not interfere with the development of a 
permanent local solution; indeed it supports local development by relieving the 
pressure for that system to qualify judges and legal professionals instantly.  The time 
that is necessary to produce a credible local system is available while the military 
justice system is in operation.  The military system can also be used as a model for the 
local system allowing local court officials to train by witnessing practices and 
procedures first hand.   
 
Planners for peacekeeping operations need to be aware of the international human 
rights law requirements and ensure that only systems that meet the international 
human rights law requirements are deployed.  The implementation of this solution 
would significantly enhance the effectiveness of operations.  It would also ensure that 
the human rights imperatives that flow directly from the UN Charter are complied 
with on peacekeeping operations. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The hypothesis of this work is that international human rights law and not 
international humanitarian law provides the legal framework for UN peacekeeping in 
collapsed States.   This hypothesis has been confirmed through an analysis of the 
purpose and function of these two areas of international law.  It has been shown that 
international human rights law has evolved from aspirational statements of the 
international community into a body of law with the practical power to improve and 
bring certainty to the conduct of UN peacekeeping by providing a framework around 
which to reconstruct law and order, the foundation of civil society. 
 
The way that international human rights law can be used to practical effect has been 
set out in chapter seven of this work.  Use of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights as the foundation for ordinances has been put forward as a workable 
solution to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of domestic State infrastructure.   
Use of military justice systems has also been recommended as a rapid response 
measure to support peace building and the reconstruction of a viable State. 
 
The conclusion reached is that there is a seamless continuum of law between 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.  International human rights law 
applies at all times.  Even where the threshold has been crossed into international 
humanitarian law as a result of an armed conflict or belligerent occupation, as 
determined by the UN Human Rights Committee and the International Court of 
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Justice,1 international human rights law continues and works in a mutually supportive 
way with international humanitarian law. 
 
As set out in chapter one, there are many forms and definitions of peacekeeping.  
These range from the traditional form, where peacekeepers typically observe border 
regions and troop demobilisations or elections, to peace enforcement where 
peacekeepers may be actively engaged in armed conflict.  There is no dispute in this 
work that the laws of armed conflict apply to situations in which peacekeepers are 
engaged in armed conflict as occurred in Korea in the 1950s and the Congo in the 
1960s There is also no dispute raised in this work that where peace enforcement 
action puts the force into a situation of belligerent occupation that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the law of occupation apply.  Although the second Gulf War in 2003 
was not sanctioned by the UN, it was adopted as a UN authorised peacekeeping 
operation on 22 May 2003 by UN Security Council Resolution 1483.  It was 
recognised as an occupation and the laws were applied accordingly. The acceptance 
by the UN that the force was in occupation can be seen in Resolution 1546,2 which 
endorsed the end of the occupation and transition to a new phase of the operation on 8 
June 2004.     
 
In chapter two of this work the approach of the UN was examined through reports of 
Secretaries-General and other reports prepared for or on behalf of the UN.   The 
conclusion reached as a result of this analysis was that, from a UN perspective, 
peacekeeping is a tool to maintain the peace and security for the world community 
and to be used to rebuild peace and ensure human security.  Actions taken by the UN 
                                                 
1 Human Rights Committee General Comment No.31 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, (26 May 2004). The 
Wall Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ (9 July 2004). 
2 United Nations S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004). 
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to ensure human security are consistent with sovereignty that is vested in the people 
and therefore unless State forces engage peacekeepers in armed conflict the UN force 
cannot be seen as an occupying force violating that sovereignty.  In any event it may 
be argued that a Member State may be presumed to have consented to the actions of 
the UN by its participation in the Charter and therefore the position of a UN force is 
the same as a peace time visiting force; a very different legal condition to belligerent 
occupation.3  
 
This position is consistent with the practice of peacekeeping as demonstrated in 
chapters three and four of this work.  Other than the Australians in Somalia, UN 
forces have not considered themselves in occupation of a State.  The troop 
contributing nations have not acted in a manner consistent with occupation.  There has 
been application of international humanitarian law only in circumstances where a 
state of armed conflict has arisen.  As a result it is argued that State practice points 
clearly to the legal position being that where UN forces are not in belligerent 
occupation4 or involved in armed conflict, that international humanitarian law and in 
particular the laws of occupation do not apply. 
 
The conclusion drawn with regard to the lack of application of international 
humanitarian law to UN operations in collapsed States is wholly consistent with the 
purposes of international humanitarian law.  Analysis of this body of law and its 
application to peacekeeping in chapter five makes it clear that the purpose of 
international humanitarian law is to regulate the conduct of hostilities that amount to 
armed conflict or have the potential for the lawful application of force against an 
                                                 
3 Jennings, R and Watts, A (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law (ninth ed, 1996) at 1155 n. 4. 
4 It is not disputed that the UN is capable of being in belligerent occupation; merely that it is not so 
simply because it has jurisdiction over territory as a result of operations in a collapsed State. 
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occupying force.5  Where a force has occupied territory in violation of sovereignty 
and there has been no resistance there is still the potential for the invaded State to 
respond and use armed force to eject the invader from its territory.  As a result there is 
application of all the laws of armed conflict in belligerent occupation situations.6   
 
Belligerent occupation is wholly distinguishable from the situation that UN forces 
found themselves in deployments such as those to East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia and 
so on.  In these deployments a system of law was required that would support the 
reconstruction of the State.  This is not the function of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
which tends to preserve the status quo of the occupied State’s domestic law while 
making allowances for the preservation of the occupying force’s security.7 
 
While it is accepted that a UN authorised force can be in occupation in certain 
circumstances, it is not accepted that where a peacekeeping operation is conducted in 
a collapsed State and the UN takes effective control, that it is as a result in occupation 
and that the international humanitarian law of occupation applies, as contended by 
Michael Kelly.8 
 
The basis for contending that Kelly is incorrect is found in an analysis of his argument 
and a demonstration that it is founded on an incorrect interpretation of occupation as it 
appears in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions, the approach taken by the 
UN to its peacekeeping activities, the conduct of peacekeeping operations, and the 
purpose of international humanitarian law.   
                                                 
5 Actions of the French resistance against the German occupation for example. 
6 Article 2 is common to all the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and therefore brings them all into play in 
a belligerent occupation.   
7 See for example Article 64-77 Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.  
8 Kelly M. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations. (1999).  
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In chapter six of this work it was concluded that not only were the laws of armed 
conflict not applicable to peacekeeping operations in collapsed States simply by virtue 
of the peacekeepers administering the State but also that an attempt to extend the laws 
of armed conflict to cover such situations may effectively defeat the operation.  
 
In chapter seven an alternative solution to that found by Michael Kelly was put 
forward as the law applicable to collapsed State peacekeeping.  International human 
rights law, it is argued, is the law applicable to such situations. The chapter 
demonstrates how international human rights law instruments such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be used as the framework for 
a system of law that is capable of providing the basis for reconstruction of a State.  A 
constitution founded on international human rights law has an excellent chance of 
providing the necessary structure around which a peaceful civil society can be 
recreated.  The authority for the UN force to do this is based on the mandate and the 
obligations of the States contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force to comply 
with their international human rights obligations. 
 
Chapter seven also argued for the need for a rapid reaction to State collapse by the 
reestablishment of the rule of law and order.  Without the rapid return of law and 
order there can be no reconstruction and the longer the State is in turmoil the harder it 
is for the operation to succeed.9   The solution put forward is for the UN to select the 
military justice systems from Member States that best suit the domestic State’s legal 
                                                 
9 Strohmeyer, H. “Making Multinational Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of Transitional 
Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol.25 No.2 (Summer 
2001) at 107. 
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regime10 and that complies with the international human rights requirements for trials. 
Jurisdiction over certain crimes could be given to the military tribunal of the 
mandated States.  With this in place the domestic justice system could be grown 
without the pressure to act instantly while poorly trained and prepared.  The result 
would be the immediate establishment of law and order, so vital to peace building and 
the construction of a robust domestic justice system capable of taking its place as a 
corner stone of civil reconstruction.  
 
Whereas international humanitarian traditions reach back into the early times, 
followed by its development into international law in the 19th Century, international 
human rights law is a much younger branch of international law that has grown and 
developed only in the last fifty or so years.  Although international human rights law 
does not have the historical traditions of international humanitarian law it has become 
increasing powerful and has proved a robust ally to peacekeeping operations designed 
to reconstruct civil societies.  It is flexible enough to form a framework that can be 
used where there is little other social structure as well as providing for the protection 
of a broad spectrum of rights in complex western democracies.  Indeed the UN has 
been effectively using it as a framework without articulating it as demonstrated in 
chapters three and four of this work.  
 
By providing peacekeepers with a clear and practical understanding of the laws that 
apply to peacekeeping in collapsed States and by the rapid establishment of a credible 
and legitimate justice system founded on the robust legal framework that international 
human rights law provides the tragedy that accompanied the failed operation in 
                                                 
10 Common law, civil law, religious law with adversarial or inquisitorial process etc. 
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Somalia11 can be avoided and a significant step made in the evolution of 
peacekeeping. 
 
  
                                                 
11 Canadian Government.  Report of the Somali Commission of Inquiry.(2 July 1997) at 
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm. (5 Oct 2005). 
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